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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a study of the different trajectories of Kurdish nationalism in 
the Middle East. In the late 2010s – years of momentous advance for Kurdish 
forces in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria – Kurdish politics was deeply divided into 
competing movements pursuing irreconcilable projects for the future of the 
Kurdish nation. By investigating nationalism as embedded in social conflicts, 
this thesis identifies in the class basis of Kurdish movements and parties the 
main reason for their political differentiation and the development of 
competing national projects. After the defeat of the early Kurdish revolts in 
the 1920s and 1930s, Kurdish nationalism in Iraq and Turkey diverged along 
ideological lines due to the different social actors that led the respective 
national movements. In Iraq, the Kurdish national movement that emerged 
in the early 1960s was largely dominated by the tribal and landowning elite 
and primarily interested in preserving existing social hierarchies, while 
middle-class progressive nationalists were systematically sidelined. 
Conversely, in Turkey, as the Kurdish traditional elite had been co-opted 
into the Kemalist state in the 1950s, the nationalist struggle was resumed in 
the late 1970s by a generation of Kurdish students of peasant extraction 
that framed their project as an anti-colonial struggle and that violently 
opposed both Turkish security forces and Kurdish landlords. The thesis 
argues that these opposing trajectories of Kurdish nationalism were 
influenced by the evolving class structure of the newly established states 
of Turkey and Iraq, and by their location in the international state system 
and within global capitalism. The analysis of the social origins of competing 
‘nationalisms’ provides a novel approach to the study of nationalism based 
on Historical Sociology and Political Economy and offers a materialist 
reading of the history of Kurdish politics. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction  
 
 
 
The Purpose and Questions of this Thesis 
This thesis was conceived and written in years of momentous change for 
the Middle East and the Kurds. After the defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL) in Kobanî in January 2015, a large Kurdish-controlled 
region emerged in north-eastern Syria, alongside the one that had existed 
in northern Iraq since 1991. In the meantime, almost one hundred 
municipalities in south-eastern Turkey were ruled by a pro-Kurdish party. 
Even if the Kurds were still a people without a state, in the mid-2010s, they 
reached a degree of self-rule without precedent in modern times. Yet, 
Kurdish politics was fragmented and divided. The border between the 
Kurdish-controlled regions of Iraq and Syria was closed, preventing much-
needed supplies from reaching the ISIL frontline. In Syrian Kurdistan, the 
Kurdish opposition linked to the Iraqi Kurds was silenced and repressed 
while forces sympathising with the Kurdish struggles in Syria and Turkey 
were banned in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) of 
Iraq suspended the regional parliament in summer 2015 and Kurds took to 
the streets on a daily basis protesting their own Kurdish rulers. The Kurdish 
movement in Iraq, on the one hand, and those in Turkey and Syria, on the 
other, are divided by profound ideological differences and opposite political 
projects for the future of the Kurds. The ruling Kurdish parties in Iraq are 
pursuing, through semi-authoritarian means, a classic nation-building 
project aimed at secession from Iraq and the integration of Iraqi Kurdistan 
into the global economy. The dominant Kurdish forces in Turkey and Syria 
have developed a project of community-based stateless democracy that 
rejects nationalism and yet there are significant doubts on its compatibility 
with a basic level of political pluralism. Rooted in divergent historical paths 
of development dating back to the partition of the Kurdish land after the 
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dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, this divide seems far stronger than the 
feeling of pan-Kurdish solidarity. Pursuing opposite nation-building projects, 
the dominant Kurdish forces are locked in a political and military competition 
that places them on the opposite fronts of the zero-sum geopolitics of the 
Middle East. 
These internecine conflicts fit well into the Orientalist picture of a Middle 
East dominated by primordial allegiances and tribal, ethnic, or sectarian 
identities – an idea that still holds ground in the academy and dominates the 
policy circles informing great-power strategy on the region. In the Orientalist 
narrative produced in the West and developed in parallel to colonial 
expansion, nomadic and tribal people were depicted as noble warriors 
whose tradition of freedom allowed them to resist Oriental despotisms and 
yet condemned them to a primitive and violent existence. Lawrence of 
Arabia crystallised this view in his famous tirade against the Bedouins: “So 
long as the Arabs fight tribe against tribe, so long they will be a little people, 
a silly people, greedy, barbarous, and cruel.”1 These ideas were deployed to 
justify colonial tutelage and yet were not alien to the pre-colonial Middle 
East. The nomadic inhabitants of imperial and state borderlands – like the 
Kurds but also the Bedouins or the Berbers – were often portrayed by the 
neighbouring settled peoples who dominated them as unruly tribal warriors 
incapable of developing advanced forms of politics and society. In the 
1950s, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said claimed that, to quell the revolt of a 
Kurdish tribe, he simply had to “send a bag of gold to a neighbouring chief.”2 
These stereotypical readings of Middle Eastern politics feed culturalist 
understandings of the region as the seat of ancestral conflicts that resist 
modern and rational modes of politics and prevent the spread of democracy 
and the free market. By locating the sources of contemporary conflicts in 
the unchangeable character of the Kurds and their region, these readings 
erase politics.   
 
1 David Lean (dir.), Lawrence of Arabia (Columbia Pictures, 1962). 
2 Cited in David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2004), 10. 
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To counter this depoliticising narrative, this thesis seeks an alternative 
explanation to the present divide within Kurdish nationalism capable of 
reconnecting contemporary Kurdish politics with the history and political 
economy of the Middle East region. As this study will show, all Kurdish 
nationalist groups aim at the self-determination of the Kurdish people and 
hold a similar understanding of the Kurdish nation – who the Kurds are and 
where Kurdistan is. Despite these apparently fundamental commonalities, 
the relationship among these groups is conflictual to the point that 
competition overshadows forms of cooperation. This contradiction begs 
questions on the origins and resilience of the present conflicts within 
Kurdish nationalism: What determines the political divides within a national 
movement? This question can be further unpacked to explain the current 
state of Kurdish politics as well as to engender broader theoretical 
considerations: What is the origin of conflicts among Kurdish nationalists 
and why are they so resilient? What is the origin of the alternative and 
competing nation-building projects they pursue? What is nationalism if it can 
be associated with the most diverse set of ideological propositions? What 
determines the political content of nationalist movements?  
By adopting an approach based on Historical Sociology, this study dissects 
the competing Kurdish nationalist projects that developed in the twentieth 
century and finds their roots in class politics. In a century of deep change 
that altered Kurdish society beyond recognition, social classes were 
transformed by the long-term spread of capitalist social relations, the 
encroachment of colonialism, the Cold War, as well as the geopolitical 
partition of the Kurdish lands and their incorporation into the four nation-
states of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Changing relations of power within 
Kurdish society triggered the development and diversification of alternative 
nationalist projects whose influence depended on their capacity to give 
political expression to existing class interests. Class struggle is by no means 
the only driver of politics but the history of Kurdish nationalism shows that 
the power of political movements goes hand in hand with their capacity to 
give voice to and draw their strength from material grievances and 
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demands. Drawing these considerations from the history of the Kurdish 
national movement and scholarly debates on nationalism, I suggest that we 
cannot understand the competing forms of Kurdish politics in the Middle 
East without understanding their class origins and basis. 
This introductory chapter explains the purpose of this study by highlighting 
the issues of contention concerning the Kurdish Question, the Kurds and 
Kurdistan, as well as the scholarly interpretations of the rise of Kurdish 
nationalism. After suggesting an appropriate methodology based on 
Historical Sociology, I explain the choice to select the history of the Kurdish 
movements in Turkey and Iraq as the case studies. The introduction ends 
with an outline of the organisation of the thesis around seven pivotal 
moments in the history of Kurdish nationalism in the past century. 
 
Kurdish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question  
This thesis investigates the class politics that lies behind the competing 
Kurdish nationalist projects that developed over the past century. It is a 
study of Kurdish nationalism that treats nationalism as a historical product 
the meaning of which shifted depending on which social group raised the 
national flag. The next section highlights the complexity of pinning down the 
Kurds and Kurdistan but also shows that we can adopt some viable 
definitions without reproducing the nationalist paradigm that presents Kurds 
and Kurdistan as natural or perennial entities. In these terms, this is a study 
of Kurdish nationalism and not a national history of the Kurds, a distinction 
reflecting a fundamental methodological concern that drives the research 
and shapes its scope. 
National histories, defined as “one of the most successful exports of Europe 
in the imperial age,”3 inherently create and reproduce national teleologies 
that present the nation as a natural fact,4 endowed by history with unique 
 
3 Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz, The Contested Nation : Ethnicity, Class, Religion 
and Gender in National Histories (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2. 
4 In these terms, natural does not only mean biological in the sense of informed by 
some form of pseudo-scientific racism. Naturalising the nation means also 
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features and often a unique mission that distinguishes it from all other 
nations. Nationalism thus becomes the historically inevitable process of the 
‘awakening’ of an objectively existing and yet dormant nation. Nationalist 
historians “read national histories backward” to find fundamental dates that 
mark the stages of national formation and the awakening of national 
consciousness.5 In these terms, national histories are not only controversial 
from a political perspective, as a form of historiography that is in itself the 
product of nationalism and that is deployed as a tool of nation-building. 
They are also problematic in analytical terms. By treating nationalism as an 
autonomous force only caused by the very existence of the nation, they 
conflate explanandum and explanans, producing a circular narrative in 
which the awakening of national identity is both the object of investigation 
and its explanation.  
In this thesis, I try to do the opposite. While acknowledging the existence of 
the Kurdish nation as a historical and not as a natural fact, Kurdish 
nationalism is studied here with a sociological lens to identify the historical 
contexts of its development and the reasons for its ever-shifting meaning in 
the material interests it serves and legitimises. The different and competing 
forms that Kurdish nationalism took in over a century of history are treated 
as alternative political projects rather than stages of the same process. The 
best antidote to the idealism inherent in national histories is a materialist 
approach that allows us to discuss Kurdish society as a locus of conflicts 
and opposing interests rather than an organic community whose threats can 
only come from outside or from an immature national consciousness. 
The first consideration that follows the commitment to avoid writing a 
national history is that being a Kurd implies by no means being a Kurdish 
nationalist. At no point in history have Kurdish nationalist movements 
represented the totality of the Kurds. The past century of struggles is a 
 
identifying its origins in a remote past that far preceded the awakening of modern 
nationalism. 
5 Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, and Kevin Passmore, eds., Writing National 
Histories: Western Europe Since 1800 (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 
10. 
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history filled with uncountable examples of Kurds who, because of tribal 
rivalry, class antagonism, or ideological differences, fought against the 
national movement or that simply identified with the states from which they 
were supposed to be liberated. If these considerations apply to virtually all 
examples of national liberation movements, the contested nature of 
nationalism in the Kurdish case is particularly significant for two reasons. In 
the first place, the dominant role of tribal structures in the Kurdish region 
led to the inevitable overlapping of any new form of political divide with 
older tribal rivalries. This meant that in virtually all cases in which a Kurdish 
tribe took part in the national movement, rival tribes were driven to the 
opposite side regardless of ideological considerations. Secondly, the 
partition of Kurdistan between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria after World War 
I put these states in the position to generously reward Kurdish loyalism at 
home while supporting Kurdish nationalism abroad to destabilise their 
neighbour with the consequence of deepening the divide between 
nationalist and non-nationalist Kurds. 
The next chapter will outline the theoretical framework of this study by 
extensively reviewing established theories of nationalism. The aim is to find 
avenues that avoid treating nationalism as an autonomous force and allow 
studying it as embedded in political and social conflicts. Ernest Gellner 
defined nationalism as “a political principle that holds that the political and 
the national unit should be congruent.”6 The next chapter will problematise 
this popular definition and particularly its implications on the relationship 
between nationalism and culture. However, Gellner’s take on nationalism is 
a useful starting point for it suggests that nationalism always involves a re-
definition of political boundaries and not simply the expression of a cultural 
identity. This means that the existence of a collective cultural identity, that, 
in the Kurdish case, dates back to literary work of the sixteenth century, is 
a necessary but insufficient condition for nationalism to develop. 
Nationalism comes into being only with the idea that the borders the nation 
 
6 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1983), 1. 
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and the borders of the state – must coincide. It can, therefore, be expressed 
in both the demand for independence or regional self-government whereas 
a mere call for cultural recognition does not per se constitute a nationalist 
programme.  
In these terms, nationalism is an eminently modern phenomenon and 
nationalist discourse had, among the Kurds, little or no political significance 
before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918.7 The partition and 
incorporation of Kurdistan into the newly-established states of Turkey, Iraq, 
Iran, and Syria, the assimilationist nation-building process these states 
pursued, and the uneven socio-economic development that this 
incorporation engendered for the Kurdish regions are all historical reasons 
for the rise of Kurdish nationalism. As a result, this rise can be freed from 
the teleology inherent in the idea of the national awakening and treated as 
a framework, made possible by the abovementioned historical 
circumstances, within which Kurdish political actors could frame their claim 
to power over the region. 
These reflections on nationalism and on the risks involved in writing national 
histories circumscribe the scope of this study clarifying what this thesis is 
and is not about and enable some viable working definitions of the Kurds 
and Kurdistan. 
 
The Kurds and Kurdistan 
As this thesis is about Kurdish nationalism in its historical expressions, the 
definition of the Kurds and Kurdistan is not its subject of investigation, 
except insofar as these terms are historically framed by Kurdish nationalists. 
However, to avoid blindly reproducing the nationalist discourse, it is 
important to outline the problematic nature of these questions to anticipate 
the way the words ‘Kurd’ and ‘Kurdistan’ will be used in this thesis. The most 
common characterisations of the Kurds as “a people without a country” and 
 
7 See Chapter 3.  
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“the world’s largest stateless nation”8 suggest that defining the border of 
the Kurdish nation – both in terms of land and members – is an inherently 
problematic task or, better, an eminently political decision. However, even 
if the Kurdish nation does not have a state to issue passports and set the 
boundaries of its membership, millions of people around the world identify 
as Kurds, regardless of their Turkish, Iraqi, or German passports or even the 
lack thereof. It is precisely the resilience of Kurdish national identity and its 
persistent political significance in the absence of a state that make Kurdish 
nationalism such a compelling subject. 
The Kurds are normally identified with the speakers of a number of Iranic 
languages hailing from the region that straddles the borders of Turkey, Iran, 
Iraq and Syria. The self-identification of these linguistic groups within a 
collective Kurdish identity is the result of a long historical process. Kurdish 
nationalist historians and political organisations have defined these 
boundaries by attributing a common ancestry to these groups and traced 
the origins of the Kurds in the Medes, an ancient Iranic people that settled 
in present-day north-western Iran around the seventeenth century BC.9 In 
the words of Mustafa Barzani – arguably the single most prominent Kurdish 
nationalist leader of the twentieth century – “deeply rooted in history since 
before 3000 BC, our people, with distinct characteristics, undeniably 
inhabited the Zagros mountains.”10 This idea served the political purpose of 
constructing a common past for people speaking languages that are only in 
part mutually intelligible even if the ‘Median hypothesis’ has been challenged 
on philological grounds.11 Kurdish scholar Mehrdad Izady does not go that 
 
8 Gerard Chaliand, ed., A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan 
(London: Zed Books, 1993); ‘Who Are the Kurds?’, Al Jazeera, 1 October 2017, 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/kurds-170516072934887.html>. 
9 See, for example: Taufiiq Wahbi, The Origins of the Kurds and Their Language 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). 
10 Mustafa Barzani, ‘Speech Presented to the Congress of the Kurdish Exiles in the 
Soviet Union: Baku, January 19, 1948’, The International Journal of Kurdish Studies, 
XI.1–2 (1997), 35. 
11 David MacKenzie argues that the Kurdish languages belong to the south-western 
Iranic group, unlike ancient Median, that belongs to the north-western group. See, 
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far back and yet claims that the Kurds were a defined ethnic group before 
the Islamic conquest in the sixth century and that since then the “Kurds are 
a multi-lingual, multi-religious, multi-racial nation, but with a unified, 
independent, and identifiable history and culture.”12 In historical records, 
Kurdistan – literally the land of the Kurds – was first mentioned in the work 
of early Arab geographers and, in the twelfth century, the Seljuk Sultan 
Sanjak established a Koordistan province in present-day north-western 
Iran.13 In the early sixteenth century, the term became of common usage to 
define the mountainous borderlands between the Ottoman and the Persian 
empires along a line that still roughly coincides with the current north-
western borders of Iran.  
Calling the region Kurdistan did not imply, however, the demarcation of 
defined ethnic boundaries. In a region historically dominated by tribalism 
and nomadism, Kurdish tribes coexisted with Turkish and Arab tribes, 
merged and split over the centuries: the tribal confederations that ruled the 
area in the fifteenth century – the Aq Qoyunlu and Kara Qoyunlu, the White 
and the Black Sheep – were mixed Turkish and Kurdish.14 The ‘Turkish’ 
Safavid dynasty was probably originally Kurdish and was Turkified first, and 
then Persianised, while at the same time claiming an ‘Arab’ descent via the 
Prophet Muhammed. When the region was ruled by the Ottomans (1516-
1918), the use of the word Kurd often had a social rather than a linguistic 
connotation since it was used to collectively identify the tribal and nomadic 
people of the region as opposed to the sedentary population. In the early 
1920s, Turkish sociologist Ziya Gökalp observed this dynamic at play in his 
native Diyarbakır where the distinction between a Turk and a Kurd largely 
 
David N. MacKenzie, Kurdish Dialects Studies I-II. (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1961). 
12 R. Mehrdad Izady, The Kurds: A Concise Handbook (Washington: Taylor & 
Francis, 1992), 185. 
13 T. Maria O’Shea, Trapped between the Map and Reality: Geography and 
Perceptions of Kurdistan (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 230.  
14 McDowall, A Modern History, 9. 
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overlapped with that of an urban and a rural dweller.15 It was the 
development of nationalism in the region in the early twentieth century – the 
very subject of this thesis – that forced people with different and fluid 
identities “to opt for an unambiguous [Kurdish] ethnic identity.”16  
Historical evidence seems  to dispel the idea of a primordial ethnogenesis 
of the Kurds as a distinct group. In the course of the twentieth century, the 
Kurds were increasingly identified with the speakers of the Kurdish 
language as the trait that most significantly distinguished them from their 
neighbours. This characterisation based on language – albeit more solid 
than other features discussed below – comes with two problems. First, there 
is hardly such a thing as a Kurdish language. Kurdish people speak several 
dialects, that are only in part mutually intelligible,17 but the absence of a 
Kurdish state prevented the rise of one of them to a unified national Kurdish 
language. As modern sociolinguists taught us in the past century, “a 
language is a dialect with an army and navy” and distinguishing between a 
national language and a vernacular dialect is always a political statement.18 
The two most widely spoken Kurdish dialects are Kurmanji – predominant 
among the Kurds of Turkey, Syria and the Dohuk province in Iraq – and 
Sorani – spoken by most Iraqi and Iranian Kurds. Kurmanji and Sorani are 
both official languages in the autonomous Kurdish Region of Iraq and use 
respectively the Latin and Arabic scripts. There are many other Kurdish 
 
15 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Kurds and the City’, in Joyce Blau: l’éternelle Chez Les 
Kurdes, ed. by Hamit Bozarslan and Clémence Scalbert-Yücel  (Istanbul: Institut 
Français d’études anatoliennes, 2018) 
<https://books.openedition.org/ifeagd/2199?lang=en>. 
16 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Kurdish society, ethnicity, nationalism and refugee 
problems’, in The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, ed. by Philip G. Kreyenbroek 
and Stefan Sperl, The Kurds, 35-37. 
17 Iranologist Philip Kreyenbroek argues that the two most-spoken Kurdish ‘dialects’ 
Kurmaji and Sorani differ from one another as much as German and English. Philip 
G. Kreyenbroek, 'On the Kurdish Langauage', in The Kurds, ed. Kreyenbroek and 
Sperl, 53-56. In my experience, this statement exaggerates the difference and 
speakers of the two languages seem to communicate fairly easily. However, the 
growing mutual intelligibility might also be a recent phenomenon driven by the rise 
of the Kurdish-language mass media since the early 1990s. 
18 The quote is widely attributed to Yiddish linguist Max Weinreich. Cited in Ronald 
Wardhaugh, An Introduction to Sociolinguistics (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1997), 28. 
 
 
22 
 
dialects such as Zaza in Turkey, as well as Gorani and other southern 
dialects in Iraq and Iran. The second problem with a linguistic definition of 
the Kurds is that not all Kurds speak Kurdish. The troubled history of the 
Kurds over the past century, the policies of assimilation imposed on them, 
and the mass forced and spontaneous migration meant that it is fairly 
common to meet people who identify as Kurds even if they can barely – or 
not at all – speak any of the Kurdish dialects.  
In religious terms, most of the Kurdish speakers are also Sunni Muslims of 
the Shafi'i school, a trait that distinguishes them from both the neighbouring 
Arab and Turkish Sunnis, who follow the Hanafi school, and the Persian and 
Azeri Twelver Shias.19 However, many Kurdish speakers are Alevi in Turkey 
and Twelver Shia in Iran, and the two religious minorities of the Yazidis and 
the Yarsanis use respectively Kurdish Kurmanji and Gorani as their liturgical 
language. Islam in Kurdistan has also been historically characterised by the 
dominance of Sufism in particular of the Naqshbandi and Qadiri orders. 
Religion, however, only played a prominent role in the first phase of Kurdish 
nationalism, during the Kurdish revolts of the interwar period discussed in 
Chapter 3. After that phase, Kurdish nationalist movements tended to be 
secular and to define the Kurdish nation in terms of language to mark a 
clearer distinction from the (fellow Muslim) neighbouring peoples.  
An important aspect of Kurdish society is tribalism. Kurdish rural society 
was, up to the mid-twentieth century largely organised in tribes. In the 
richest scholarly account of Kurdish tribal society, Martin van Bruinessen 
describes the Kurdish tribe as a 
socio-political and generally also territorial (and therefore economic) 
unit based on descent and kinship, real or putative, with a 
characteristic internal structure. It is naturally divided into a number 
of sub-tribes, each in turn again divided into smaller units: clans, 
lineages, etc.20 
 
19 Veli Yadirgi, The Political Economy of the Kurds of Turkey: From the Ottoman 
Empire to the Turkish Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 
24-25. 
20 Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political 
Structures of Kurdistan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 51. 
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Van Bruinessen emphasises the importance of the two social and political 
roles in tribal society. First, the agha, the tribal chief, who seats on top of 
each unit of the tribal hierarchy – clan, sub-tribe, tribe – and commanded a 
degree of political authority over his fellow tribespeople. Second, the 
shaykh, the leader of a Sufi brotherhood, who does not belong to any tribe 
and thus maintains a super-tribal mediatory authority. Kurds were never all 
tribal and, up to the twentieth century, tribes were the dominant form of 
social organisation among nomadic Kurds. Settled Kurdish peasants were 
generally not part of any tribes and, along with most Christians living among 
the Kurds, were unfree and politically subjected to Kurdish aghas or 
shaykhs.21 
Van Bruinessen goes a long way to explain that we should move beyond the 
traditional dichotomy between tribe and state, as conceptual opposites, and 
instead look at tribes as shaped by the policy of the states they gravitate 
around to the point that they “can even be seen as creations of the state.”22 
In the history of the Kurds, the tribal policy of the Ottoman Empire was to 
have long-lasting consequences: from the creation of Kurdish tribal 
confederacies and their elevation to borderland princedoms in the sixteenth 
century to their destruction during the administrative centralisation of the 
nineteenth century and the state-sponsored tribal revival of the closing 
decades of the Empire. During the twentieth century, tribes suffered a 
gradual decline of their social function accelerated by the process of 
urbanisation. Particularly, the role of the agha and the shaykh changed 
dramatically. With the spread of capitalist relations in the Kurdish 
countryside, aghas and shaykhs were in the position to register in their 
name land that was customarily owned by the tribe or by the Sufi lodge and 
gradually became large landowners while their fellow tribespeople became 
waged labourers. This process was heavily supported by the central states 
who kept relying on these traditional powerholders to maintain order in the 
Kurdish periphery. This transformation heavily affected the traditional 
 
21 Ibid., 50. 
22 Ibid., 134. 
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kinship-based solidarity that held tribes together and tribal loyalties 
gradually waned. It was by no means an even process and many tribes 
continue to play an important social role.  
Highlighting the complexity of these transformations is important because, 
in this thesis, I almost exclusively speak about the ‘tribal elite’ rather than 
tribes. That is because the class stratification that occurred in tribal society 
is by far its most relevant aspect in regard to the development of 
nationalism. Where ‘tribes’ are mentioned, it is to emphasise episodes in 
which people mobilise as members of the tribe regardless of the position 
they hold in it. As will become clear, these episodes became rarer and rarer 
in the twentieth century.  
As mentioned before, the land of Kurdistan is normally identified with a 
region that, straddling state borders, includes south-eastern Turkey, the far 
north and north-east of Iraq, north-western Iran, and north-eastern Syria. 
Kurdish nationalists make a point of stressing the unity of the Kurdish land 
and use the cardinal directions to identify each of the regions under foreign 
occupation. So, the Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria are called 
Northern, Southern, Eastern, and Western Kurdistan, or simply by using the 
Kurdish for north (Bakur), south (Başur), east (Rojhelat) and west (Rojava).  
This form, however, does not help define the ‘external borders’ of the 
Kurdish nation, that is to say, to identify which areas are predominantly 
inhabited by Kurds. This predominance is problematic to assess for a 
number of reasons, the first of which is the region’s cultural diversity. Before 
the indigenous Christian population was virtually wiped out during the First 
World War, the eastern-Anatolian homelands of the Kurds and the 
Armenians largely overlapped. Even today, there are no defined linguistic 
borders between Kurdish, Turkish, Persian, and Arabic speakers, and large 
areas, as well as important cities, have mixed populations, while linguistic 
enclaves exist throughout the region. Secondly, in the twentieth century, 
the Kurds were victims of Arabisation policies in Iraq and Syria and forced 
assimilation in Turkey that changed the demographic balance of many 
mixed areas. In addition to that, the state of semi-permanent warfare, the 
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scorched-earth and mass deportation strategies deployed by the states to 
quell the various Kurdish revolts, as well as poverty and structural 
underdevelopment, forced millions of Kurds to leave their homes. Forced 
and voluntary migrations contributed to the Kurdification of previously 
mixed cities and the creation of large Kurdish diaspora communities in non-
Kurdish cities. The third problem with defining predominantly Kurdish areas 
is that Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran systematically prevented large-scale 
statistical research on the ethnic composition of the region, making a 
reliable assessment of the Kurdish population impossible. To overcome 
these shortcomings, I refer to the predominantly Kurdish areas as the 
Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, or Turkish, Iraqi, Iranian, and 
Syrian Kurdistan with unspecified borders. The terms south-eastern Turkey, 
northern Iraq, north-eastern Syria, and north-western Iran will be used when 
the Kurdish regions are referred to from the perspective of the central 
states. To make these terms meaningful, they will be associated, where 
possible, to clear topographical reference points and to the administrative 
divisions of the states, such as the Turkish provinces (iller) and the Iraqi 
governorates (muhafazat). The borders of the predominantly Kurdish areas 
drawn in Map 1 are a rough approximation and must be used only to 
geographically place the events analysed in the following chapters. 
Due to the abovementioned scarcity of statistical data on the ethnic 
composition of these states, estimates of the size of the Kurdish population 
are often loaded with political significance. Moreover, when such surveys 
did exist, state authorities had an interest in ‘correcting’ the number while 
interviewees might have been reluctant to disclose their Kurdish identity to 
state officials. For example, in the last of such surveys conducted by Turkey 
in 1965, the people who declared Kurdish as their mother tongue were 2.3 
million people or 7.7 per cent of the country’s population,23 far below the 
estimates of most scholars. Even by using the same data, Servet Mutlu has 
recalculated the 1965 Kurdish population as 3.13 million and 10 per cent of 
 
23 Servet Mutlu, ‘Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study’, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, 28 (1996), 517–41. 
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the total population.24 Table 1 collects estimates of the Kurdish population 
worked out by scholars. Those numbers can serve as a reference point to 
inform the historical analysis but, given the lack of reliability, will not be cited 
here to support a particular argument. For the purposes of this study, Kurds 
are those who identify as such. 
 
The next section surveys the existing literature on Kurdish nationalism 
showing how it often failed to depart from the national-history paradigm. 
However, it also discusses the works that can inform the study of Kurdish 
nationalism as embedded in social conflicts.   
 
The Literature on Kurdish Nationalism 
The study of Kurdish politics is a relatively recent scholarly enterprise. 
Before the events of the Kurdish insurgencies in Turkey and Iraq in the late 
1980s and early 1990s attracted a great deal of international attention, 
scholars of Kurdish politics had to rely on few works of historical and 
anthropological scholarship.25 Even after the 1990s, when the literature on 
the subject grew exponentially, interest in the Kurds has followed the pace 
of events and has been dominated by works of political science and its 
subdisciplines, and, to a lesser extent, sociology and anthropology. A lot of 
 
24 Ibid. 
25 To mention some of the most influential: Vladimir Minorsky, 'Les origines des 
Kurdes', Actes du XXe Congres Internationale des Orientalistes, Louvain (1940), 
143-152; Fredrik Barth, Principles of Social Organization in Southern Kurdistan 
(Oslo: Universitet i Oslo, 1953); Vasily Nikitin, Les Kurdes: Etude Sociologique et 
Historique (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1956); Derk Kinnane, (1964), The Kurds and 
Kurdistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, 
Kurdistan and the Kurds (London: Collets, 1965); Vanly, Survey. 
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this literature tended to age fast hindering the creation of a body of 
cumulative knowledge on Kurdish politics. This is a common tendency in 
political science – especially when event-driven – and in the case of Kurdish 
studies, this short-sightedness of the literature is also due to the objective 
scarcity of background work in Kurdish history that could provide social 
scientists with well-informed historical analyses.26 A symptom of this issue 
is the proliferation of edited volumes that, even when insightful, tend to offer 
fragmented knowledge.27 Moreover, a considerable amount of literature on 
Kurdish politics belongs to the field of security studies written from a 
profoundly ideological counterterrorism or counter-insurgency angle and 
aimed directly or indirectly at policy-makers.28  
Within this vast literature, this section reviews some of the most influencial 
works on Kurdish nationalism, briefly surveying the literature that 
reproduces a culturalist and identity-based explanation and more 
extensively discussing works that give space to socio-economic factors and 
that were thus more relevant to the present study on class and nationalism. 
Before delving into the analysis of the literature, it is important to note that 
the relationship between nationalism and social classes is largely absent 
from literature on the Kurds. This is due mostly to the scarcity of specialist 
 
26 For a discussion on this, see Jordi Tejel, ‘New perspectives on writing the history 
of the Kurds in Iraq, Syria and Turkey: A history and state of the art assessment’, 
in The Kurdish Question Revisited, ed. by Gareth Stansfield and Mohammed 
Shareef (London: Oxford University Press, 2017), 3-16. 
27 To name just a few titles published solely in 2019: Michael Gunter, ed., Routledge 
Handbook on the Kurds (London and New York: Routledge, 2019); A. Faleh Jabar, 
and Renad Mansour, eds., The Kurds in a Changing Middle East: History, Politics 
and Representation  (London: I.B. Tauris, 2019); Anwar Anaid, and Emel Elif Tugdar, 
eds., Iraqi Kurdistan’s Statehood Aspirations: A Political Economy Approach 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Mehmet Gürses, David Romano, and Michael 
Gunter, eds., The Kurds in the Middle East: Enduring Problems and New Dynamics 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019).  
28 For example: İhsan Bal and Sedat Laçiner, Ethnic Terrorism in Turkey and the 
Case of the PKK: Roots, Structure, Survival, and Ideology, (London: Frank Cass 
2004); Mitchel P. Roth and Murat Sever, ‘The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as 
Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study’, 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30.10 (2007), 901–20; Mustafa Cosar Ünal, ‘The 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Popular Support: Counterterrorism towards an 
Insurgency Nature’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 23.3 (2012), 432–55. 
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political economy literature and the virtual absence of Marxist scholarship 
on the Kurds – with some exceptions discussed below. Therefore, this 
overview of the literature, rather than discussing the missing alternative 
arguments on the role of social classes, focuses on analysing the space 
given by the literature to the role played by socio-economic structures in 
the rise of Kurdish nationalism. Finally, this section discusses the works on 
Kurdish politics in Iraq and Turkey that most significantly influenced the 
arguments I developed on the two case studies of this thesis. 
As already described earlier in this chapter, many Kurdish nationalists – like 
most nationalists in general – tend to see the Kurdish nation as a perennial 
entity that has existed since far before nationality became a principle of 
state organisation. The development of nationalism in the twentieth century 
was thus a natural consequence of the oppression of the Kurds by other – 
Turkish, Arab, Persian – nations. This discourse is reproduced by Kurdish 
and non-Kurdish scholars who attribute the development of nationalism first 
and foremost to the suppression of Kurdish identity. For Wadie Jwaideh, 
after World War I:  
The Kurds, now in a resentful mood, were rendered even more 
restive and unmanageable by the heightened impact of Western 
civilization […] a development they felt threatened to undermine 
their way of life. The Kurdish masses, with the encouragement of 
their leaders, were determined to resist this influence. The various 
Kurdish rebellion, besides being violent manifestations of Kurdish 
nationalist sentiment, were also waged in defence of the Kurdish 
way of life.29  
The Kurdish revolts of the interwar period are framed by Jwaideh in cultural 
terms, as a movement of the entire Kurdish nation in defence of its identity. 
In Ofra Bengio’s triumphalist account of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, the story 
takes an epic tone: 
The amazing story of the Kurdish revival in Iraq, following the 
genocidal war of 1988–1989, very much resembles that of the Jews 
following the Holocaust. Within the first four years after that war, the 
Kurds managed to launch an ambitious project for Kurdish nation 
 
29 Wadie Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 292. 
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building and state building […]. And although the Kurdish national 
project encountered enormous internal and external obstacles […] 
its success was […] achieved through the accumulated fruit of 
eighty-five years of ongoing struggle.30  
These works refuse to problematise Kurdish nationalism by erasing its 
contested nature and the conflicts within Kurdish society. They are 
problematic both in analytic terms, because they provide a simplistic 
historical picture, and in political terms, as they reproduce a narrative that 
legitimise the power claim of the Kurdish elite, especially in the context of 
Kurdish self-rule in Iraq.  
A large part of the literature on Kurdish nationalism, however, emphasises 
the fundamental role played by the socio-economic transformations of the 
twentieth century – such as urbanisation, mass literacy, the role of modern 
states – in the development of Kurdish nationalism. In some authors, these 
premises are implicitly framed within an approach based on modernization 
theory, a power-free way of analysing the political economy, that inevitably 
leans towards culturalist explanations. For instance, the democratic deficit 
of the Kurdish autonomous region in Iraq is then attributed to the resilience 
of tribal social structures – as in Hussein Tahiri – or to the development of 
an rent-driven ‘culture of dependence’ – as in Denise Natali.31 This line of 
argument ends up depoliticising social conflicts and – even beyond the 
intention of the authors – absolving the Kurdish elite by moving practices 
such as corruption and patronage from the realm of politics to the one of 
culture. Even more problematic is the case of a more recent strand of 
literature produced within Iraqi-Kurdish universities in which mainstream 
political economy is deployed to depoliticise the power relations of the 
region.32 David Romano’s account of the rise of Kurdish nationalism in 
 
30 Ofra Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2012), 315; 
31 Hussein Tahiri, The Structure of Kurdish Society and the Struggle for a Kurdish 
State (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2007); Denise Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-
State: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War Iraq (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 2010). 
32 See, for example, Nyaz Noori Najmalddin, ‘The Failure of Economic Reform in the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (1921-2015): The Vicious Circle of Uncivic Traditions, 
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Turkey offers some interesting insights – including the attention towards the 
role of rural conflicts – and yet suffers from similar theoretical limitations.33 
His rational-choice theoretical framework reduces political projects to 
strategic decision failing to account for the alternative avenues – such as 
assimilation, Islamism, the Turkish left – that were available to the Kurds.34  
Martin van Bruinessen’s Agha, Shaikh and State and David McDowell’s A 
Modern History of the Kurds need to be mentioned for their importance in 
the field.35 Van Bruinessen’s anthropological study is one of the foundational 
text on Kurdish politics. Despite its little engagement with nationalism, this 
text remains an essential read on Kurdish politics and its interesection with 
the traditional structures of Kurdish society. David McDowall’s book is by far 
the most comprehensive history of the Kurds to date. Despite not always 
complying to academic standards, McDowall provides a rich account on 
Kurdish history in the twentieth century with a high degree of attention for 
the socio-economic transformation of the region. Even if neither of these 
texts provide a particularly significant interpretation of nationalism and lack 
systematic analysis of its relation to the class structure, they both 
immensely contributed to this author’s understanding of Kurdish history and 
politics.  
A number of specific studies on the Kurds of Iraq and Turkey constituted 
the most important sources of empirical material and theoretical reflections 
on the two case studies of this thesis. Of the less sizeable literature 
published on the Iraqi Kurds – compared to those of Turkey – two books 
 
Resource Curse, and Centralization’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 45.2 
(2018), 156–75, as well as the various contributions included in Anaid and Tugdar, 
eds., Iraqi Kurdistan’s Statehood Aspirations; Aram Rafaat, ‘The Fundamental 
Characteristics of the Kurdish Nationhood Project in Modern Iraq’, Middle Eastern 
Studies, 52.3 (2016), 488–504. 
33 David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and 
Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
34 For a more extensive critique along this line, see Cengiz Güneş, The Kurdisn 
National Movement in Turkey: From Protest to Resistance (Milton Park, Abingdon, 
Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 19-24. 
35 Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State; McDowall, A Modern History; 
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stand out for their attention to the political-economic trajectory taken by the 
Kurdish region of Iraq in the 1990s, Gareth Stansfield’s Iraqi Kurdistan: 
Political Development and Emergent Democracy and Denise Natali’s The 
Kurdish Quasi-State.36 Despite Stansfield’s focus on governance rather than 
nationalism and leaving aside Natali’s abovementioned moralistic 
conclusion, these two books offer a compelling description of the politics 
and political economy of the region that deeply influenced the analysis of 
Iraqi-Kurdish nationalism in this thesis. These are by far the most 
comprehensive studies on Kurdish self-rule in Iraq after 1991, and yet, 
despite their attention paid to the political economy of the region, neither of 
them gives any space to the radical transformation of its class structure and 
the consequent transformation of Kurdish politics and of the social function 
of Kurdish nationalism.37 
The two texts – both about the Turkish Kurds – that most heavily influenced 
this study, especially in terms of the development of the argument, are 
Cengiz Güneş’s The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey (2012) and Vali 
Yadirgi’s The Political Economy of the Kurds of Turkey (2017).38 The fact that 
 
36 Gareth Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent 
Democracy (London and New York: Routledge, 2003). Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-
State. 
37 Two recent articles do emphasise the function played by Kurdish nationalism in 
the power structure of the Kurdish region of Iraq even if they are not focused on 
the political economy. Dylan O’Driscoll & Bahar Başer’s article on the 2017 
independence referendum and Andrea Fischer-Tahir’s chapter on the construction 
of a collective memory emphasise the instrumental use of nationalism made by the 
Iraqi-Kurdish elite reaching conclusion similar to those developed in Chapter 6 of 
the present work. See Andrea Fischer-Tahir, ‘Searching for Sense: The Concept of 
Genocide as Part of Knowledge Production in Iraqi Kurdistan’, in Writing the Modern 
History of Iraq: Historiographical and Political Challenges, ed. by Jordi Tejel, Peter 
Sluglett, Riccardo Bocco, and Hamit Bozarslan (Singapore: World Scientific, 2012), 
227-43; Dylan O’Driscoll, and Bahar Başer, ‘Independence Referendums and 
Nationalist Rhetoric: The Kurdistan Region of Iraq’, Third World Quarterly, 40.11 
(2019), 2016-2034. 
38 Yadirgi, The Political Economy; Güneş, The Kurdish National Movement. I need 
to mention also the work by Joost Jongerden on the relocation of the Kurdish 
peasantry in his Joost Jongerden, The Settlement Issue in Turkey and the Kurds: 
An Analysis of Spatial Policies, Modernity and War (Leiden: Brill, 2007), as well as 
the work he co-authored with Ahmed Akkaya on the origins and trasformation of 
the ideology of the Kurdish movement in Turkey (see bibliographical references in 
Chapter 8 and 9). 
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Güneş focuses on the political discourse of the Kurdish movement and 
Yadirgi on the political economy of the region makes their books 
complementary for research on nationalism and class. Güneş deploys post-
Marxist Discourse Theory as developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe to stress the multiple historical articulations of Kurdish nationalism 
discourse.39 As nationalism is analysed as an empty shell, devoid in itself of 
ideological content, a discourse analysis of the primary sources reveals the 
ideological content of each historical articulation of Kurdish nationalism. 
Thus Güneş can place the expressions of Kurdish nationalism in twentieth 
century’s Turkey in their particular historical context and explain that 
nationalism was articulated “initially within the Islamist-conservative 
discourse (the early 1920s), as a modernist discourse (1920s and 1930s), 
underdevelopment (1960s), Marxist-Leninism (1970s and 1980s), and, 
finally democracy (1990 onwards).”40 Even if Güneş is not directly concerned 
with political economic issues, his analysis of the evolution of the political 
discourse produced by Kurdish nationalists makes it a fundamental read to 
understand the development and diversification of nationalist projects.  
On the contrary, Veli Yadirgi’s work represents a rare case of recent 
scholarship on the political economy of the Kurds. Since the 1970s, Turkish 
and Kurdish Marxists came to see the relationship between the Turkish state 
and the Kurdish region through the prism of colonialism, building on the 
theoretical premises of Dependency Theory. While acknowledging its 
merits, Yadirgi departs from this tradition criticising its “static 
conceptualisation of the relation between ‘powerless and peripheral’ 
Kurdish areas and the ‘all-powerful and dominant’ Turkish state” and its 
economist premises.41 Yadirgi re-politicises this literature by framing the 
underdevelopment of the Kurdish region as an example of ‘de-development’ 
resulted from the policies of nation-building pursued by Turkish nationalist 
 
39 See Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy : 
Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985) and Ernesto Laclau, 
New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (London: Verso, 1990). 
40 Güneş, The Kurdish National Movement, 11. 
41 Yadirgi, The Political Economy, 53-57. 
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governments since the Young Turk Revolution (1908). Deportations, 
dispossession, and cultural suppression contributed to forestall the 
development of Kurdistan not just by simply maintaining the region poor but 
actively rescinding “the prospect of autonomous indigenous existence”.42 
By combining the study of the different ideological trajectories developed 
within the Kurdish national movement with a thorough analysis of the 
political economy of the region, this thesis builds upon the existing literature 
to provide a novel account of the relationship between the evolving class 
structure and the nationalist projects.  
The initial motivations for this study, outlined earlier in this introduction, 
were strengthened by the analysis of the literature on Kurdish nationalism. 
Despite the great deal of interest in the subject among social scientists, our 
understanding of Kurdish nationalism remains fragmented and the debates 
around its origin are still quite underdeveloped. Although many of the 
authors do not show any particular ideological hostility towards the study of 
class structure and give a great deal of weight to socio-economic dynamics, 
none of the abovementioned works provide a systematic analysis of the role 
of classes in Kurdish politics and their relationship to Kurdish nationalism. 
 
Methodology and Methods 
This investigation of Kurdish nationalism was conducted as a work of 
Historical Sociology based on the comparison between the history of the 
Kurdish national movement in Iraq and Turkey. Comparative historical 
analysis has traditionally been the best candidate in the social sciences to 
answer the “questions about large-scale outcomes that are regarded as 
substantially and normatively important by both specialists and 
nonspecialists.”43 This focus on the ‘big questions’ drive historical 
sociologist to use the work of historians with a sociological end, to formulate 
 
42 Ibid., 58-59. 
43 Dietrich Mahoney James and Rueschemeyer, ‘Comparative Historical Analysis in 
the Social Sciences’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7. 
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theoretical arguments on long-term processes. It tends to rely thus on 
secondary sources as its subject is too broad to be based on primary 
research. In this thesis, events of war and insurgency, the rise and fall of 
organisations and leaders, and the emergence of different expressions of 
Kurdish nationalism are played against the backdrop of the longue-durée of 
the evolution of the region’s class structure. Alternating these two 
dimensions is particularly important to avoid economic determinism that 
treats political events as mere epiphenomenal expressions of structural 
processes. Even though between the 1980s and 1990s the class structure 
of Iraqi Kurdistan changed substantially, the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) remained the political actor that best represented the interest of the 
Kurdish ruling class. It remained so through the structural transformation of 
the ruling class but was also the actor that most significantly contributed to 
the reshaping of the relations of power in the 1990s.  
The form of comparison used in this thesis is that of the ‘method of 
difference’ needed to explain different outcomes – the different forms of 
Kurdish nationalism in Iraq and Turkey – to similar initial circumstances – 
Kurdistan at the time of its partition.44 This form of comparative work 
showed its great explanatory power in some of the classics of Historical 
Sociology that originally inspired this study.45 However, this thesis follows 
the Marxist tradition in studying social reality in its unity and resisting the 
isolation of individual factors and the reduction of broad transformation to 
a single explanatory variable. In these terms, this thesis remains a ‘soft 
comparison’ to avoid letting the methodology determine the conclusion and 
to maintain an open approach that allows for multi-causal explanations.  
That is to say that the diversification of the balance of class forces in the 
 
44 As opposed to the ‘method of agreement’ which serves to explain why different 
circumstances lead to similar outcomes. 
45 Such as Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord 
and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1966); 
Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, 
Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist 
Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992). 
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two Kurdish regions – the main explaining factor – is analysed in its 
interactions with local and contingent specificities, the unevenness of 
economic development, as well as an ever-changing international 
environment.46  
However, this study tries to take seriously the criticism advanced by non-
Marxist scholars to study not only “very long-run economic development” 
but to account for the role played by “immediate transformations that occur 
in the structure and functions of state organizations” and in “the relations 
between the state and social classes.”47 If the balance of power among 
social classes is the condition for the rise of a certain form of nationalism or 
certain organisations, it is by no means the only determinant of the political 
outcome. To give an example, the Kurdish revolt in Iraq of 1961-1975 had its 
origins and found its strength in the power of the traditional landowning 
class. Yet, the reason it could last for so long and constitute such a 
challenge to Baghdad is that several foreign powers were – due to 
exogenous Cold War dynamics – interested in weakening the Iraqi 
government. When foreign support was withdrawn, the revolt abruptly 
collapsed. In a similar vein, the counter-insurgency strategy adopted by Iraq 
in the 1980s and Turkey in the 1990s brought Kurdish rural society to violent 
and rapid destruction and radically transformed the class structure of the 
two Kurdish regions with durable political consequences. 
Besides its methodological advantages, the choice to carry on a 
comparative work is partly imposed by the Kurdish reality. Incorporated into 
four different states since the early 1920s, the ‘histories’ of the Kurds 
diversified to a point that it is impossible not to follow a country-by-country 
narration. This is particularly true for the political economy – the focus of 
this thesis – of each Kurdish region, shaped by the policies imposed by the 
state centres.  
 
46 Simon Bromley, Rethinking Middle East Politics: State Formation and 
Development (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 119-121. 
47 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 35. 
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There are three reasons for the choice of the Kurdish movements in Iraq and 
Turkey as the case studies. First of all, Kurdish organisations from Iraq and 
Turkey have dominated Kurdish politics for the past few decades, exercising 
their influence in a competitive way over the Kurds of Iran and Syria. The 
comparison is thus almost imposed by the circumstances. Moreover, the 
Kurdish insurgencies in Turkey and Iraq in the twentieth century were the 
longest and their protagonists shaped transnational Kurdish politics in a far 
more profound way than any organisation from Iran and Syria. In these 
terms, telling the stories of Kurdish nationalism in these two countries is the 
closest way of telling the whole story of Kurdish nationalism. Kurdish 
national forces in Syria and Iran had enough power to be politically 
significant in the two countries only in a few historical moments, namely 
1945-46 and 1979-80 in Iran, and after 2012 in Syria. Those are exactly the 
periods in which their stories most significantly intersects with that of the 
Kurds in Iraq and Turkey and this is when they feature in this thesis 
(respectively in Chapters 3, 4, and 9). 
Secondly, Kurdish nationalism in Iraq and Turkey is also particularly 
significant because of the strikingly different forms of its development. The 
facts that they started from very similar structural conditions – in the Late-
Ottoman and interwar periods – and that they were always fighting for the 
same Kurdish nation – in terms of who the Kurds are and where Kurdistan is 
– makes it particularly significant that these nationalist movements radically 
differed along ideological lines. As Kurdish nationalist movements with 
different class bases developed two politically opposite national projects, 
their comparison constitutes a vantage point to investigate the relationship 
between class and nationalism. In these terms, Iranian and Syrian Kurdistan 
did not lend themselves to such a ‘clean’ comparison. Iranian Kurdistan was 
not part of the Ottoman Empire and was separated from the other parts of 
Kurdistan since the sixteen century and – despite important commonalities 
– presented different starting conditions that would have compromised the 
value of the comparison. Since the Kurdish population in Syria was always 
smaller and territorially discontinuous constituting a majority in only a few 
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limited areas, chosing Syria as as a case would have led to an ‘unbalanced’ 
comparison.  
Finally, the choice to exclude the history of Kurdish nationalism in Iran and 
Syria from the comparison also had a practical reason. The available 
literature on the Iraqi and Turkish Kurdish movements is far wider and 
provides enough material for a historical sociological work covering a 
century of Kurdish history. The literature on the Kurds of Iran and Syria is 
much more limited and focusing on those to cases would have forced me to 
change the nature of this study and to rely more heavily on primary 
research. Considering the difficulties of carrying on fieldwork research in 
Iranian and Syrian Kurdistan, this was not a feasible option.  
In terms of methods, this thesis is largely based on the analysis and 
comparison of secondary sources as is generally the case in historical 
sociological analyses covering a long time span and aimed at answering 
theoretical questions. Different sets of literature were combined in a novel 
vein, especially the histoire événementielle of the Kurdish movement, and 
the literature on the economic and social history of Iraq and Turkey. In 
regard to Iraq, these fields were especially disconnected with scholars of 
Iraq as a whole disregarding the Kurdish region, and students of the Kurds 
often failing to link Iraqi Kurdish politics to that of the rest of the country. 
The combination of these two strands of literature was particularly fruitful. 
For example, reading the history of Iraqi Kurdish nationalism against the 
backdrop of the history and economic history of Iraq allowed for a much 
deeper understanding of the motivations and dynamics of the 1961 Kurdish 
revolution.48 The secondary sources also include literature produced by 
international organisations, government bodies, or think tanks, and 
especially political economic reports. 
Primary sources were not central in the development of this thesis mostly 
due to the long historical period covered – over a century – that did not leave 
much space to analyse events in detail. For the most recent period – the 
 
48 For a discussion on these issues, see Chapter 4. 
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2000s and 2010s, analysed in Chapters 6 and 9 – newspaper articles 
constituted an important source of raw information that informed the 
analysis. Moreover, the scarcity of historical literature on the Kurds, and its 
frequent gaps, necessitated complementing the secondary sources with 29 
semi-structured interviews with Kurdish politicians, former combatants, 
journalists, and intellectuals. The interviews were conducted in two long 
trips to the Kurdish region of Iraq (in summer 2018 and spring 2019), in short 
trips to Brussels, Berlin, and Paris (winter 2019-2020), as well as in London 
and over the telephone. They were conducted in English, Kurdish, Turkish, 
Arabic, Dutch, and German, and most of them with the help of a translator. 
The information collected in this form helped illuminate some obscure 
historical passages. However, and most importantly, the contribution given 
by these conversations – and by the many more I had during my fieldwork 
trips – to my understanding of Kurdish politics and to the reflections that led 
to the formulation of the argument goes far beyond the space that 
interviews occupy in the final draft of this thesis. 
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is built around seven chapters on the history of Kurdish 
nationalism. The first chapter presents a broad picture of Kurdistan in the 
interwar period, while the following six are divided by the two cases with 
three chapters on Iraq and three on Turkey.  
The first part of the thesis sets the stage for the study of Kurdish nationalism 
in Iraq and Turkey. This introductory chapter is followed by the theoretical 
framework (Chapter 2) which assesses modernist approaches to the study 
of nationalism, highlighting how they tend to treat nationalism as an 
autonomous force. After having problematised the Eurocentric and idealist 
tendencies of this literature, the chapter suggests setting aside abstract 
theorising on the (a)historical nature of nationalism. It proposes instead to 
study nationalist movements as context-specific expressions of the 
struggle for state power embedded in class conflicts.  
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Within this theoretical framework, Chapter 3, the first historical chapter, 
discusses the earliest politically significant expressions of Kurdish 
nationalism in interwar Turkey and Iraq as a unitary phenomenon. The 
Kurdish ‘feudal’ revolts that took place in both countries in the 1920s and 
1930s were the results of the reluctance of the Kurdish traditional elite to 
be integrated into the newly established states of Turkey and Iraq after the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire.  
After the defeat of these revolts, however, Kurdish nationalism in Turkey 
and Iraq took two opposite trajectories shaped by the different outcomes of 
the feudal revolts but even more importantly by the different nation-building 
strategies deployed by the new states, their different degrees of 
development and integration into the capitalist world-system, as well as the 
different geopolitical status of the two countries – initially an autonomous 
middle power the former and a colonial subject the latter, later on the 
opposite sides of the Cold War divide. All these factors conspired to shape 
and diversify the class structure of the two Kurdish regions. In the following 
six chapters, the history of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq (Chapters 4, 5, and 
6) and in Turkey (Chapters 7, 8, and 9) is reconstructed through pivotal 
historical moments in which Kurdish nationalist movements rose and fell 
against the backdrop of the evolving political economy of the region. The 
two cases run parallel chronologies, to emphasise the different trajectories 
of Kurdish nationalism in (roughly the same) historical periods: Iraq and 
Turkey during the Cold War (Chapters 4 and 7), the 1990s and early 2000s 
(Chapters 5 and 8), and the increasingly fragmented and unstable Middle 
East of the 2010s (Chapters 6 and 9). However, each chapter is also a story 
on its own, in which the evolution of the social and economic structures of 
the region as well as the agency of the Kurdish political actors change the 
class basis and politics of the Kurdish national movement.  
The concluding chapter of the thesis (Chapter 10) brings together the two 
cases in a comparative manner, analysing the patterns of political behaviour 
of the Kurdish social classes. Building on previous chapters, it shows how 
the diverging structural contexts of Iraqi and Turkish Kurdistan drove the 
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same social classes – the landowning class, the middle classes, and the 
peasantry – to develop forms of Kurdish nationalism with different strategies 
and ideologies. This final chapter connects the historical analysis to the 
theoretical framework of the thesis and shows that the study of the Kurdish 
national movement constitutes an extraordinary vantage point to make 
wider considerations on nationalism and class politics. 
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Chapter 2 
Nationalism and Class Politics 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The term ‘nationalist’ is commonly used to describe a wide variety of political 
movements. The fact that a Marxist anti-colonial movement in southern 
Africa and a neo-Nazi group in western Europe can be both and 
unproblematically called nationalist reflects the ambiguity of the term. 
Historians and social scientists have grappled with the issue since the 
nineteenth century, but it was only in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century that a blossoming of publications on the subject created the 
interdisciplinary field of Nationalism Studies. Scholarly interest was driven 
by an apparent revival of nationalist identities and a parallel demise of class 
as the principal source of political divide. As workers in the Global North 
turned their back to social democratic politics and the national liberation 
movements of the Global South gave way to authoritarian regimes and 
ethnic conflicts, scholars identified in the nation a source of identity stronger 
than any ‘rational’ approach to politics based on material interests or 
universal values. Even if most students of nationalism profess the modernist 
belief that the nation is a historical construct, their explanations often fall 
into the circular argument whereby nationalism is important because it is 
important.  
This circularity derives primarily from the idea that the nation-state had its 
origin in nineteenth-century Europe where it arose out of long-term 
historical developments and then diffused to the rest of the world. The 
failure to explain nationalism outside the north Atlantic region as anything 
but an imported idea reflects a Eurocentric bias of the field but it also reifies 
the idea that nationalism is an autonomous force whose relationship to 
contextual political struggles is only contingent. Conceptualised in this way, 
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nationalism exists regardless of other social and political conflicts. For this 
reason, the theories of nationalism have little to say about the actual political 
content of nationalist struggles and the evident diversity of nationalist 
movements, the progressive character of some and the reactionary 
character of others. Ultimately, they tell us very little about the politics of 
nationalism. To re-politicise the study of nationalism, this thesis follows 
critical geographer James Blaut in studying nationalist struggles ultimately 
as struggles for state power embedded in class conflicts.49 Nationalist 
movements struggling for state power – to win power in an existing state or 
to create a new state – are always embedded in conflicts between classes, 
class fractions, and class coalitions outside which we cannot understand 
their ideological outlook and political programme. Placing nationalist 
movements within their society’s specific set of class relations, shaped by 
local history, geopolitics and their location in the global division of labour, 
opens the study of nationalism to empirical investigation. Eschewing grand 
theories which inevitably compare any expression of nationalism to an 
original (European) standard, this chapter proposes an alternative way to 
study the politics of nationalist movements.  
 
Diffusionism and Eurocentrism 
The issues outlined above already suggest that the theoretical approach 
built in this chapter excludes the existence of any primordial root of 
nationalist feelings. As Roger Brubaker observes, “no serious scholar today 
holds the view that is routinely attributed to primordialists in straw-man 
setups, namely that nations or ethnic groups are primordial, unchanging 
entities.”50 The primordialism held by many real-world nationalists who 
naturalise and de-historicise the nation has been long demystified by 
modernist scholars of nationalism. Modernist authors such as Ernest Gellner 
 
49 James M. Blaut, The National Question: Decolonizing the Theory of Nationalism 
(London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1987). 
50 Roger Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in 
the New Europe (Cambrdige: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 15.  
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turned upside down the primordialist notion that nationalism is the process 
of awakening of dormant – yet pre-existing – nations. On the contrary, they 
successfully demonstrated that nations are the product of nationalist 
movements that create them by setting boundaries and identifying their 
essential cultural features.51 Accepting the validity of the modernist critique 
of nationalism, this chapter stays within this tradition and proposes solutions 
to overcome its limits.  
Going through some of the foundational works of nationalism studies written 
by modernist and Marxist scholars, the reader will notice an undertone of 
contempt towards nationalists. With a certain arrogance, Gellner claims  
that the prophets of nationalism were not anywhere near the First 
Division, when it came to the business of thinking (…) It is rather that 
these thinkers did not really make much difference. If one of them 
had fallen, others would have stepped into his place (…) The quality 
of nationalist thought would hardly have been affected much by 
such substitutions. Their precise doctrines are hardly worth 
analysing.52 
For Eric Hobsbawm, “no serious historian of nations and nationalism can be 
a committed political nationalist,” implying that real existing nationalisms 
can only be primordialist.53 Tom Nairn – a (Scottish) nationalist himself! – 
thinks that the contradictions of modernity found their solution in “the 
crudity, the emotionalism, the vulgar populism, the highly-coloured 
romanticism of most nationalist ideology (all the things intellectuals have 
always held their noses at).”54 As Nairn, like Hobsbawm, is also Marxist, his 
statements are imbued with a profound pessimism for the prominence of 
irrational – even deplorable – nationalist feelings over universalist and 
emancipatory politics. He adds: 
Nationalism [worked] because it actually did provide the masses 
with something real and important—something that class 
 
51 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. 
52 Ibid., 124. 
53 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, 
Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 12-13. 
54 Tom Nairn, ‘The Modern Janus’, New Left Review, 1.94 (1975), 22. 
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consciousness could never have furnished, a culture which however 
deplorable was larger, more accessible, and more relevant to mass 
realities than the rationalism of our [emphasis added] Enlightenment 
inheritance.55  
The apparent demise of class politics is, for Nairn, the evidence for the 
strength and autonomy of nationalist feelings. In this famous essay, Nairn 
describes nationalism as a ‘Modern Janus’ that, like the ancient Roman god 
with two faces. is, with no exceptions, “both healthy and morbid […] both 
progress and regress” while “fascism tells us far more about nationalism 
than any other episode.”56  
These considerations can only make sense if nationalism, as an idea, is 
given an autonomous force and can be theorised upon without connection 
to material reality. In these accounts, nationalism has an autonomous 
existence which means that it can reproduce itself in any context and that 
the presence of nationalism is enough to explain nationalism away. The next 
section will delve more deeply into the problems that this conceptualisation 
carries as well as the circularity of the argument that it engenders. But first, 
it is important to explain the origin of the idea that nationalism is not only 
autonomous from but also stronger than universal values and class-based 
politics. To be clear, this thesis has no intention to dismiss the work of 
Gellner, Hobsbawm, Nairn, or Benedict Anderson whose research provided 
an invaluable contribution to our understanding of nationalism. On the 
contrary, the point is to highlight the limits of their approaches, including the 
theoretical issues that hinder our capacity to investigate the politics and 
ideologies of contemporary nationalist movements, especially outside the 
Euro-Atlantic area.   
The most consequential outcome of treating nationalism as an autonomous 
force is the diffusionism that this approach engenders. Modernist authors 
explain the rise of nationalism and the nation-state in its original European 
or American cradle with highly sophisticated arguments and paint 
 
55 Ibid., 22. 
56 Ibid., 17. 
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convincing pictures of the process in those specific historical contexts. After 
its original emergence, however, nationalism simply spreads to the rest of 
the world, pursued by local elites eager to follow the European way of 
success. This ‘diffusionism’ significantly undermines the explanatory 
capabilities of these theories, relegating most contemporary nationalist 
movements to the realm of irrationality and primordial allegiances. In other 
words, it denies their politics. This attitude fuels the abovementioned 
contempt that these authors show towards real-world nationalist struggles: 
if one thinks that nationalism was merely the result of historical processes 
taking place in nineteenth-century Europe, then, any expression of 
nationalism occurring later or elsewhere will inevitably be autonomous from 
those historical processes. It will simply be an idea that spreads across the 
world. 
For Tom Nairn, the diffusion of the idea of nationalism from Europe to the 
rest of the world is central. Nairn sees nationalism as a catching-up strategy 
that, rather than developing in the most advanced countries – Britain, 
France, and the United States – originated in late-coming Italy and 
Germany.57 It was the Italian and German elite, frustrated by the 
underdevelopment of their countries and preoccupied with catching up with 
their western neighbours that invented nationalism as a strategy of 
development. It was the Italian and German nationalist movements that 
provided the blueprint for the elites of other latecomers such as Japan and 
south-eastern Europe first and the colonised peoples later in the twentieth 
century. That the Italian and German unification became points of reference 
for other national movements is certainly true but not that consequential.58 
Nairn’s account presents these frustrated nationalist elites as a given, failing 
to notice how the Italian and German national movements were diverse and 
 
57 Ibid., 14. 
58 As Nazih Ayubi explains, the influence exercised by Hegelian idealism of the 
German and Italian schools in the Arab world was motivated by the search for a 
form of organicist society as opposed to Anglo-Saxon individualism. It was not a 
model of nationalism. Nizah N. Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and 
Society in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 17-21. 
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conflictual. In both countries, the national movement was initially led by the  
urban middle and lower classes that found the only way to obtain liberal or 
even democratic constitutions in the liberation from direct and indirect 
Austrian domination. In both cases, the Royal Houses of Savoy and 
Hohenzollern and the landed interests associated with them were less 
motivated by national feelings than traditional dynastic ambitions and were 
often in conflict with the respective national movements. The nature of 
Italy’s and Germany’s nation-building process was the result of the context-
specific compromise between different forces – and the exclusion of others 
– rather than the desire of an unspecified elite to catch up with mighty 
Britain. Nairn’s argument is even more problematic when applied to colonial 
contexts especially considering the almost universal opposition of national 
liberation movements to the indigenous comprador elites compromised with 
the colonial power.   
In Benedict Anderson’s 1983 Imagined Communities, the blueprint of 
nationalism, composed of “nation-states, republican institutions, common 
citizenships, popular sovereignty, national flags and anthems, etc.” spread 
from the Atlantic Revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century that made the model “available for pirating.”59 Particularly, Anderson 
gives centrality to ‘Creole nationalism’ in Latin America showing how the 
political modern vocabulary of the French revolution was deployed to create 
a regional system of functionally equal and sovereign constitutional 
republics.60 These reinterpreted concepts then travelled back to Europe and 
provided the basis for nineteenth century nationalism. However, the spread 
of these political norms to Europe intertwined with the existence of 
vernacular communities created by print capitalism that did not coincide 
with the existing polyglot polities of feudal origin – which was a problem 
unknown to the Spanish-speaking creoles fighting Spanish colonialism. This 
specific European problem generated a form of nationalism built upon the 
 
59 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflecting on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), 81. 
60 Ibid., 47-66. 
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centrality of vernacular languages in setting the boundaries of nations.61 In 
Europe, nationalism triumphed to such a degree that even the most 
reactionary royal houses, previously fierce opponents of the principle of 
nationality, had to come to terms and compromise with the new standard of 
political legitimacy. This process generated yet another autochthonous form 
of nationalism, its most reactionary expression, that Anderson calls ‘Official 
Nationalism’ and that was to lead to scientific racism and the tragedies of 
the early twentieth century.62 Anderson’s superb description of these 
processes and, especially, of how political movements were capable of 
adopting ideas developed elsewhere and reinterpreting them according to 
their particular predicament, is lost when the book turns to nationalism in 
Africa and Asia, where  
[a] blend of popular and official nationalism has been the product of 
anomalies created by European imperialism: the well-known 
arbitrariness of frontiers, and bilingual intelligentsias poised 
precariously over diverse monoglot populations. One can thus think 
of many of these nations as projects the achievement of which is still 
in progress.63 
The punctual and evocative terms (creole, vernacular, official), so 
effectively deployed by Anderson to stress the originality of each 
expression of nationalism in Europe and the Americas, have no 
corresponding term to describe the anticolonial of movements of the 
peoples of Africa and Asia. The anti-colonial movements of the twentieth 
century are instead defined merely as “the last wave” and described as only 
able to ‘pirate’ concepts from previous forms of nationalism. 
Ernest Gellner’s account of nationalism is heavily informed by Max Weber’s 
distinction between traditional and modern societies. Nationalism is the 
response to a qualitatively more complex social and economic system: 
The level of literacy and technical competence, in a standardized 
medium […] which is required of members of this society if they are 
to be properly employable and enjoy full and effective moral 
 
61 Ibid., 67-82. 
62 Ibid., 83-112. 
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citizenship, is so high that it […] can only be provided by something 
resembling a modern 'national' educational system, a pyramid at 
whose base there are primary schools, staffed by teachers trained 
at secondary school, staffed by university-trained teachers, led by 
the products of advanced graduate schools. […] The monopoly of 
legitimate education is now more important, more central than is the 
monopoly of legitimate violence.64 
The most significant marks of nationalism are thus, in Gellner, the political 
pursuit of a standardised language and the extension to the masses of the 
high and abstract culture that was previously reserved for the elite and that 
is now needed for society to function. Gellner’s account illuminates the 
process of nation-building in many European countries in the nineteenth 
century, convincingly stressing the role played by the standardisation of 
culture and mass education. Yet, his theories tell us virtually nothing beyond 
that context. Even when accepting that all modern societies need to reach 
a degree of cultural unity and a standardised medium of communication, this 
process is by no means necessarily associated with the construction of the 
nation. One needs just to think about the numerous countries in which the 
colonial language kept playing that role – officially or not – after 
independence: from the Latin American, to the British white-settler colonies, 
to vast polyglot societies such as India, Congo, or Nigeria. Gellner’s stress 
on language is revealing of a deep Eurocentric bias. It is not a coincidence 
that his Ruritania, the fictional nation used in the book with an illustrative 
purpose, is evidently inspired by a handbook case-study of small-nation 
nationalism from nineteenth-century Mitteleuropa. 
As geographer James Blaut explains, most theories of nationalism follow a 
common diffusionist model that fails to provide a materialist explanation for 
the spread of nationalist movements in the Global South: 
[Nationalism Theory describes nationalism as] a concrete, 
observable, social or socio-political process, but its cause, or 
source, or mainspring, or motor, is an idea or ideology. This idea is 
itself uncaused; or rather it sprang forth in France and Britain 200 
years ago as simply the logic of advancing civilization, of creating a 
modern nation state; and then the idea diffused to the rest of Europe 
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and eventually the colonies. Note, therefore, that the idea is 
primordial; save perhaps in the original West European ‘homelands’ 
it arises for no local geographical or historical reason, no reason of 
economic impoverishment, political oppression or whatever. It 
results only from the diffusion of an idea.65 
This diffusionism – a form of idealism of Hegelian origin – pervades most 
modernist approaches regardless of the geographical area of the Euro-
Atlantic region – different in each author – where nationalist ideas are 
thought to have originated first.  
The problem with Nairn’s, Anderson’s, or Gellner’s account is not that 
political ideas did not travel back and forth across the Atlantic or that 
nationalists around the world did not learn from each other. The problem 
with these accounts is rather that they depict nationalism as emerging out 
of objective material forces but then spreading purely at the level of political 
discourse. While Europeans and Creole elites can incarnate – in Hegelian 
terms – the spirit of history, the colonised can only imitate. Nationalism, after 
its original emergence, is therefore given an autonomous force that needs 
not to relate to contextual material dynamics and conflicts with the result of 
de-politicising nationalist struggles. 
  
Is Nationalism an Autonomous Force? 
As outlined in the previous section, the most popular scholarly works on 
nationalism tend to fall into the trap of diffusionism: nationalism emerged in 
a specific context due to specific historical circumstances but then it simply 
spreads and can be adopted by political actors even in the absence of those 
originating circumstances. This approach seems to be inevitable to authors 
trying to build a ‘grand theory’ of nationalism able to grasp this elusive 
concept across time and space with a parsimonious and elegant theoretical 
construction.  
Within such a theoretical framework, nationalism can only survive the 
structural context in which it developed due to its intrinsic autonomy from 
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those conditions. Then nationalism becomes an autonomous force that 
exists regardless of contextual factors. Treating nationalism as autonomous 
is analytically problematic as it conflates explanandum and explanans, 
producing a circular narrative in which national identity is both the object of 
investigation and its explanation (nationalism matters because it matters). 
However, this approach is also extremely problematic in political terms, as 
it depoliticises nationalism concealing the social and political conflicts in 
which nationalist struggles are always embedded. Commenting on Nairn’s 
book, Blaut observes that foreign domination engendering nationalist 
movements 
seems to consist in nothing worse than a denial to the elite classes 
in the dominated society of the opportunities for greater wealth (…) 
Nationalism, then, emerges as a psychological frustration-reaction 
on the part of the elites of backward countries to the trauma of 
uneven development.66  
Presenting nationalism as an autonomous force not only hides social 
hierarchies and dismisses conflicts by legitimising the conservative claim 
that nationalism is an expression of transclass solidarity. But, even more 
problematically - especially for Marxists – it reifies the fictitious separation 
between the economic and political spheres that is typical of capitalist 
modernity. In pre-capitalist societies, the economic realm is embedded in 
cultural and political structures of social reproduction.67 Economic 
structures and political, cultural, social (super-)structures are thus 
indistinguishable and it is meaningless to speak of a separate economic 
realm. As Ellen Meiksins Wood explains, in advanced capitalist societies the 
political nature of the appropriation surplus is mystified, and capitalist 
reproduction is presented as happening only in the economic sphere and as 
compatible with a democratic framework. For example, workers’ struggles 
for higher wages “may be perceived as merely 'economic'” while we would 
not think that about “the rent struggle waged by medieval peasants, even 
 
66 Blaut, The National Question, 79-80. 
67 For a classic exposure of this view, see Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: 
The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001). 
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though the issue in both cases is the disposition of surplus labour and its 
relative distribution between direct producers and exploiting 
appropriators.”68 This separation is reproduced by the positivist social 
sciences, first of all, through the creation of a separate discipline of 
economics based on technical knowledge and ‘apolitical’ general laws.  
The fictitious separation of the two spheres is the reason why mainstream 
social science can erect boundaries and divide our knowledge of the social 
world into separate fields of studies or ‘autonomous’ disciplines. If 
international politics follows its own laws that are not dependent on 
domestic dynamics, we will need the autonomous discipline of International 
Relations. If nationalism is an autonomous force existing regardless of the 
way politics and society ‘normally’ work, we will need an autonomous field 
of Nationalism Studies. Obviously, a certain degree of disciplinary division 
within the social sciences is indispensable to limit the scope of research and 
to organise professional academic life. Yet, the strict adherence to 
disciplinary boundaries fragments our understanding of the social world and 
has long been rejected by all strands of critical scholarship from Marxism to 
post-structuralism, from feminism to post-colonialism. 
The reproduction of this separation in modernist accounts of nationalism is 
most evident in the assumption that capitalism needs no boundaries and 
that there is an intrinsic contradiction between the spread of state borders 
– engendered by nationalist movements – and the globalising tendency of 
capitalism. The multiplication of independent states since the mid-twentieth 
century is for Nairn “anachronistic” and in contradiction with the spread of 
capitalism and, therefore, evidence that nationalism is a force autonomous 
from both class and capitalism.69 Hobsbawm’s entire account of the history 
of nationalism, while extremely rich, is based on the idea that nationalism 
was rational in the nineteenth century when unified national markets were 
conducive to the development of capitalism, and irrational in the twentieth 
 
68 Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical 
Materialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 44-45. 
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century when nation-states were increasingly in contradiction with a 
globalising capitalism.70 The idea that capitalism does not need the state 
and that tension between the two is ever-present was particularly popular 
in the last quarter of the twentieth century and had a prominent role in the 
development of the theory (and ideology) of globalisation. On the contrary, 
again following Meiksins Wood, it is the separation of the political and the 
economic spheres that makes the state even more necessary under 
capitalism as “the powers of surplus appropriation and exploitation do not 
rest directly on relations of juridical or political dependence” such as that 
between masters and slaves or lords and serfs:  
Absolute private property, the contractual relation that binds 
producer to appropriator, the process of commodity exchange - all 
these require the legal forms, the coercive apparatus, the policing 
functions of the state. Historically, too, the state has been essential 
to the process of expropriation that is the basis of capitalism.71 
The proliferation of states engendered by nationalist movements is thus, 
rather than in contradiction to, functional to the spread of capitalism. This 
becomes even more evident in the age of global capitalism when huge profit 
is made precisely through the exploitation of different wage structures 
across countries and labour can be disciplined under the threat of 
delocalising production. In these terms, the spread of nationalism and the 
spread of capitalism are by no means autonomous from each other. 
These reflections can introduce a way to investigate nationalist movements 
as embedded in and mutually reinforced by context-specific social conflicts. 
The separation of the political and the economic is typical of the advanced 
capitalist society and is absent not only from pre-capitalist societies but also 
from societies in transition towards capitalism as well as from societies that 
occupy a peripheral position in the world economy. Outside the core, 
capitalism often maintains a brutally extractive nature and the appropriation 
 
70 At the end of the book, Hobsbawm even concedes to an ‘End of History’-type of 
argument (it was published in 1990!) suggesting, through the metaphor of 
Minerva’s owl, that we might be at the end of the history of nationalism. Hobsbawm, 
Nations and Nationalism, 192. 
71 Meiksins Wood, Capitalism against Democracy, 29-30. 
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of surplus is performed via extra-economic – that is to say, political – means, 
an arrangement that hinders the establishment of formal democracy and 
favours authoritarian solutions. This distinction is extremely relevant to the 
study of nationalism because the presence or absence of the formal 
separation between the political and economic and, more generally, a 
country’s location in the core or periphery of the global economy shape its 
class structure and political institutions and, in turn, class conflict and 
potential coalition. These considerations can provide an initial explanation 
to the reason why nationalist movements against colonialism and neo-
colonialism tend to be progressive and often socialist politics because 
distinguishing between political oppression and economic exploitation is 
meaningless.   
 
Culture, Ideology, and the Struggle for State Power  
Before delving more deeply into the relationship between class and 
nationalism, it is necessary to get rid of the proverbial elephant in the room. 
As discussed above, modernist accounts tend to attribute an autonomous 
force to nationalism. The result is that they end up unintentionally 
legitimising the culturalist discourse of real-world nationalists – that is to 
say, that national identity is stronger than any other political divide – a result 
that defeats the purpose of the modernist critique itself. The relationship 
between nationalism and culture is clearly a very complex one. This section 
will discuss first the case of nationalisms which stress the role of cultural 
homogeneity in setting the boundaries of nations, and then the case of 
nationalisms developing within pre-existing borders of pre-national states 
or colonies. The comparison of these two historical expressions of 
nationalism shows that nationalism comes very close to coincide with the 
struggle for state power. 
The tendency to conflate nationalism with its nineteenth century European 
manifestation leads scholars and laymen to overemphasise the importance 
of cultural uniformity in setting the boundaries of nations. This tendency is 
most evident, again, in Gellner and in the popularity of his definition of 
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nationalism as the principle demanding the congruity between cultural and 
political borders (each nation a state).72 As discussed before, this 
conceptualisation has little or no applicability to the anti-colonial 
movements of both the nineteenth and the twentieth century where cultural 
unity was simply neither the issue of contention nor an objective to pursue. 
But even in Europe, where language remains the most common cultural 
criterion to determining national boundaries, many nations are multi-
linguistic (such Belgium, Switzerland, Spain) while some linguistic 
communities are divided into separate nations (such as Germany and 
Austria; Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia). But even assuming than 
the abovementioned are all exceptions and that nations fundamentally 
coincide with linguistic communities, there were always countless more 
languages than there are nations.  
The apparent arbitrariness of the cultural criteria defining the nation is in 
reality the result of historical contingency, and of the different conflicts and 
divides running through a given society. Working within the modernist 
tradition, Paul Brass presents the adoption of specific cultural criteria as the 
result of the conscious politicisation of culture by the local elite. Nation-
building, is for Brass essentially     
the process by which elites and counter-elites within ethnic groups 
select aspects of the group’s culture, attach new value and meaning 
to them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to defend 
its interests, and to compete with other groups.73  
In the struggle for power and resources, elites mobilise objective cultural 
features that characterise their ethnic group but that were previously 
unfixed and apolitical and turn them into political symbols with a fixed 
character.74 These cultural features – language, religion, tradition, collective 
 
72 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 1. 
73 Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (London: SAGE 
Publications, 1991), 74-75. 
74 For Brass, an ethnic group is “any group of people dissimilar from other peoples 
in terms of objective cultural criteria and containing within its membership, either 
in principle or in practice, the elements for a complete division of labor and for 
reproduction forms an ethnic category.” The internal division of labour 
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memory – are objective in the sense that they really exist but their meaning 
in pre-national and pre-modern societies was continuously shifting as 
linguistic boundaries were blurry and cultural contamination and religious 
syncretism were the rule rather than the exception. In the process of ethnic 
and national identity formation, elites select the cultural features that best 
serve their political purpose, freeze their meaning, and set the boundaries 
of the ethnic community. In doing so, social elites politicise culture and “the 
ethnic community or nation created in this way does not necessarily 
constitute an entirely new entity but one that has been transformed, whose 
boundaries have in some ways been widened, in other confined.”75  
Brass identifies several sources of elite conflict that constitute opportunities 
for elites to politicise culture: the resistance of a local aristocracy against an 
‘alien’ conqueror, the struggle between competing religious elites, and 
between religious elites and local or alien aristocracies.76 The variety of 
situations that drive elites to stimulate ethnic and national identities requires 
a definition of elites that only partly overlaps with that of classes. If in 
agrarian societies the political elite is often the landed aristocracy and thus 
coincides with a social class, the class extraction of the religious elite often 
matters much less. In other cases, the elites can be just a fraction of a social 
class, like in a modernising society where the political elite might be 
constituted by the most educated fraction of the middle class as well as 
military officers, bureaucrats, or the leadership of political parties and the 
interests that they represent are less often defined by their class than by 
their institution.77  
By eschewing treating nationalism as an autonomous force and by 
grounding it instead in the social conflicts that generated it, Brass offers 
 
distinguishes ethnic groups from “non-self-sufficient” forms of social categories 
like class, gender, or age. Ibid., 19. 
75 Ibid., 244. 
76 Ibid., 26. 
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“contextual rather than teleological explanations”78 and yet gives us more 
applicable theoretical insights than each grand theory of nationalism. 
Brass’s approach allows us to look at the construction of national identities 
as an eminently political process through which new and old elites can 
legitimise their claim to power and mobilised subordinate classes belonging 
to the same ethnic group. Their claim to cultural homogeneity is, in these 
cases, used to hide opposed class interests. This approach is particularly 
effective to understand nationalist movements that aim at independence 
and investigate the particular interest that lay behind the call to national 
awakening. 
In many other cases, nationalism is actively promoted by the elites of states 
that evolved from pre-modern and pre-national polities – China, France, 
Afghanistan, Thailand, Iran, Russia, Britain, Japan, etc. – whose boundaries 
were initially determined with no concern for cultural homogeneity. In these 
cases, the nation is an ex-post construct, imposed over borders previously 
set by dynastic wars of expansion. Even in those cases, nationalism is often 
promoted from the top to play down class antagonisms and stress trans-
class solidarity. This is the case, for example, of the ‘official nationalism’ – 
as Anderson calls it – of the late nineteenth century that grew especially in 
opposition to the rise of organised labour. As Anderson explains, the link 
between nationalism and pre-existing political borders is also fundamental 
in the case of colonialism. Administrative colonial borders – as arbitrary as 
they are – proved to be extremely resilient, limiting the possibilities of 
nation-building available. Anderson cites the example of the creole 
republics in Latin America where the borders of the provinces of the Spanish 
empire became – roughly – the borders of the new states.79 This aspect is 
even more evident in the current borders of most of the post-colonial world 
– especially Africa, South-East Asia and the Middle East – which coincide 
with administrative colonial divisions. Most attempts to overcome these 
artificial borders to build culturally-homogenous nation-states – the Patria 
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79 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 47-66. 
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Grande in Spanish America, the United Arab Republic, the Indonesia Raya – 
failed. 
What all these different forms of nation-building have in common is that they 
all represent forms of struggle for state power: either to gain political 
independence or to gain power within an existing state. However, this 
argument cannot tell us much about the reason why nationalist movements 
adopt such different ideologies spanning from fascism to Black liberation. If 
nationalism is essentially the struggle for state power, what determines the 
programmatic content of a nationalist movement, its progressive or 
reactionary character?  
This idea that nationalism is an empty shell devoid of ideological content is 
shared by a wide range of political theorists. Liberal scholar Michael 
Freeden, for example, claims that “in order to be a distinct ideology, the core 
of nationalism, and the conceptual patterns it adopts, will have to be unique 
to itself alone” because “ideologies compete over the ‘correct’ meanings of 
political concepts.”80 However, the core concepts of nationalism are vague 
and empty as they do not provide “answers to the political questions that 
societies generate.”81 The core principles of nationalism82 “are too vacuous 
[…] to provide interpretations of political reality and plans for political action” 
and each of them “logically contains a number of possible meanings” and 
answers “to questions of social justice, distribution of resources, and 
conflict-management which mainstream ideologies address.”83  In the first 
half of the twentieth century, the period that we normally associate with ‘the 
apogee of nationalism’,84 all the major political ideologies were framed within 
the principle of nationality: from Wilsonian liberal internationalism to the 
 
80 Michael Freeden, ‘Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?’, Political Studies, 46.4 
(1998), 750. 
81 Ibid., 750. 
82 For Freeden: (a) the priority given to the nation; (b) its positive valorisation; (c) 
the desire to give to it institutional expression; (d) the role of time and space in 
determining national identity; (e) the role of sentiment and emotion. Ibid., 751-752. 
83 Ibid., 751. 
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Soviet Marxist revision of the ‘national question’ in Lenin and Stalin; from the 
racial nationalism of European fascisms to the national liberation 
movements in the colonial world. The Marxist Benedict Anderson presents 
the principle of nationality, rather than as a modern ideology, as something 
akin to religion or dynasticism, “taken-for-granted frames of reference.”85 
Nationalism can then assume, as Anderson shows in his Imagined 
Communities, radically different political forms. 
These considerations lead to the central claim of this theoretical chapter 
that, rather than another grand theory of nationalism, is essentially a 
methodological proposal. If we consider nationalism as the expression of 
the struggle for state power devoid, in itself, of programmatic political 
content, and we reject – as discussed earlier in the chapter – the idealistic 
and Eurocentric premises of treating nationalism as an autonomous force, 
then we need to turn to the context-specific, material conflicts that 
accompany nationalist struggles. Studying the class structures and 
trajectories of conflicts within a given society can tell us a great deal about 
the opposing material interests at stake and thus the ideological tenants 
that each party is more likely to profess. In these terms, investigating the 
class character of a nationalist movement – the class that leads it, the 
classes that take part in it, the classes it opposes – can tell us far more about 
the politics of nationalism than each of the grand theories developed within 
the field. As James Blaut suggests, maintaining an empirically open 
approach is vital if we are to treat nationalism as a form of struggle for state 
power embedded in class conflicts:  
[W]e should not expect [nationalism] to be associated with one 
specific ideology, because each class or class combination in each 
kind of nationalist struggle would have an ideological position of its 
own and these would moreover differ for different historical epochs 
and geographical circumstances.86 
In these terms, studying nationalism as embedded in class struggles does 
not mean ultimately reducing it to an expression of the conflict between 
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producers and appropriators. On the contrary, it means analysing the 
conflicts that take place in a given society and the material interest of social 
classes, class fractions, and class coalition which determine the allies and 
enemies a nationalist movement will choose for itself. Earlier in this section, 
Brass was mentioned to show an effective approach to empirically study 
how nationalism intertwines with and carries existing local conflicts. We can 
thus turn to sociological approaches that can help investigate the political 
posture adopted by class actors. 
 
Studying Class 
Studying class does not mean disregarding other societal divides such as 
gender, culture, or race. On the contrary, class formation is a historical 
process and the historical expressions of class identity – and including its 
political manifestations – are imbued with contextual norms. The study of 
class thickens our understanding of other forms of identity – including 
national identities. On the one hand, it helps us make sense of them within 
the social context in which they develop and identify their function in the 
reproduction of society and its hierarchies. On the other hand, studying 
normative and cultural structures in relations to material life guards us 
against shallow forms of cultural essentialism. These considerations are 
important in order to avoid the forms of economic determinism suffered by 
orthodox strands of Marxist theory and class analysis in the twentieth 
century that contributed to discrediting the study of class in the social 
sciences.  
The theoretical reflections elaborated in this chapter hint at an 
understanding of class as embedded in power relations. Weberian and 
Marxist scholars developed approaches to class analysis that, albeit in 
different ways, focus on the centrality of power relations in understanding 
class structures. Neo-Weberian scholars tend to focus on the concept of 
‘opportunity hoarding’ that see relations among classes as determined by 
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socially-imposed mechanisms of mobility closure.87 Accessing high-income 
jobs and powerful positions are restricted to individuals satisfying certain 
conditions that vary according to contextual social norms – from boasting a 
prestigious patrilineal lineage to holding certain university degrees. The 
restrictions placed to limit access to these position of privilege are what 
make classes sticky and the mobility across classes limited, allowing for 
continuity in their reproduction over time. This approach is particularly 
effective in identifying the role of cultural, religious, and racial discrimination 
in reproducing class hierarchies. Racializing classes has been a particularly 
effective way of limiting social mobility in forms as varied as legal 
mechanisms such as Jim Crow or Apartheid or pre-emptively dismissing job 
applicants with Muslim names. Focusing on opportunity hoarding 
acknowledges the relations of power embedded in class structures 
highlighting that “the economic advantages people get from being in a 
privileged class position are causally connected to the disadvantages of 
people excluded from those class positions.”88  
The opportunity hoarding approach to the study of class introduces a 
relational element. However, this relation is only unidirectional: the privilege 
of the few is guaranteed by the exclusion from privilege of the many. In 
Marxist and neo-Marxist work the relational nature of class is based on 
interdependency. What constitutes the ruling class is the capacity to 
appropriate surplus created by – the capacity to exploit – the working class. 
Erik Olin Wright illustrates the difference between the Marxist relational 
approach and the Weberian mobility-closure approach through two 
“classical cases”: 
in the first, large landowners seize control of common grazing lands, 
prevent peasants from gaining access to them, and reap economic 
benefits from having exclusive control of that land for their own use. 
In the second, the same landowners, having seized control of the 
grazing lands and excluded the peasants, then bring some of those 
 
87 This is, for instance, the approach taken by Charles Tilly in his famous study on 
the persistence of social inequality. Charles Tilly, Durable Inequality (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998). 
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peasants back onto the land as agricultural labourers. In this second 
case, the landowners not only gain from controlling access to the 
land (opportunity hoarding), they dominate the farm workers and 
exploit their labour. This is a stronger form of relational 
interdependency than in the case of simple exclusion, for here there 
is an ongoing relationship between not only the conditions but also 
the activities of the advantaged and disadvantaged.89 
In these terms – as claimed by Wrights himself – the Weberian and Marxist 
approaches to the study of class are not only compatible but they can be 
even seen as complementary due to their emphasis on two different ways 
power shapes relations among classes.90 
These approaches to the study of class focus on its ‘objective dimension’ as 
a social structure observable in all modern societies. But identifying the 
configuration of the class structure of society does not in itself tell us much 
about the expressions of class politics. The distinction between the 
objective and the subjective dimensions of class is present in both Marx – 
respectively ‘class in itself’ and ‘class for itself’ – and in Weber, through his 
distinction between economic classes and status groups.91 While classes as 
an objective phenomenon have objective interests rooted in the conflictual 
relations between each other, the actual identity developed by class groups 
is inevitably socially constructed and historically contingent. Classes are not 
social agents but structures. Saying that political movements are driven by 
material interests does not imply that they are the direct political expression 
of a class and that they represent the interests of a class in its totality. Class 
identity is always shaped by the most diverse range of social phenomena 
and must be studied on empirical grounds.  
 
89 Ibid., 10. 
90 Erik Olin Wright already highlighted this compatibility claiming that “inside every 
leftist neo-Weberian is a Marxist struggling to stay hidden”. Combining the qualities 
of both approaches was actually the intellectual aim of Wright in the last part of his 
career. Approaches to Class Analysis, ed. by Erik Olin Wright (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1-18, 27. 
91 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. by Hans Gerth and C. 
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Two elements affecting class identity are particularly central to the 
development of class consciousness. Firstly, the transnational spread of 
political ideas that shapes class consciousness. Secondly, and relatedly, the 
process of political organisation. However, recognising that class interests 
are socially and historically constructed does not mean denying that there 
needs to be some degree of consistency between culturally loaded 
expressions of politics and class interests. Most often, political conflicts are 
the expression of narrower material interests and see fractions of the same 
class on opposite sides: the national bourgeoisie versus the comprador elite; 
the ‘native’ working class versus migrant workers; the international financial 
capital versus the domestic market-oriented capital. Such groups are 
historical and context-specific expressions of the class structure but do not 
strictly overlap with social classes. On the contrary, it is common to see 
coalition-building happening among fractions of different classes around 
narrow objectives.  
These theoretical considerations on the study of class help us identify the 
class motives that lead nationalist movements. If nationalist movements are 
the expression of classes, class fractions, and class coalitions in their 
struggle for state power then the political – programmatic – content of these 
movements will reflect a political project for the state they want to conquer 
or establish. This approach makes the study of nationalism – as nation-
building projects – quite similar to the study of political regimes as the result 
of a certain set of class relations.  
The study of the class origins of political regimes and particularly that of the 
class configuration that is more likely to lead to democratic and authoritarian 
regimes has been for long a central research question within Historical 
Sociology. Pioneered by Barrington Moore with his 1966 classic The Social 
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,92 this approach brought together, 
on the one hand, a structuralist study of the origins of social cleavages 
rooted in the institutional history and political economy of the context and, 
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on the other hand, a more actor-oriented approach that looks at how social 
actors pursue their strategy through conflict, competition and coalition 
building. In this literature, class dynamics occupy a central role in social and 
political conflicts as political interests are largely derived from the common 
material interest of the members of the group. Within a framework that 
explains regime outcomes through the relative distribution of power among 
social classes, Moore claimed a positive causal relationship between the 
strength of the bourgeoisie and the development of democracy. Building 
upon his historical and comparative methodology, a number of scholars 
have criticised the liberal bias underpinning Moore’s conclusion and 
enriched the field by bringing in the role of the modern state and of the 
international system on the one hand, and a problematisation of the role of 
the capitalist class in economic development.93  
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John Stephens have 
most convincingly built upon these critiques in their 1992 book Capitalist 
Development and Democracy.94 Rueschemeyer et al. expanded Moore’s 
class-based approach to include the role of the state apparatus and 
transnational economic processes. However, class remains the central 
element “to understanding the social structuring of interests and power in 
society”.95 Through their ‘relative class power’ model, Rueschemeyer et al. 
survey democratisation processes in the capitalist North Atlantic core, the 
Caribbean, and South America to reach the opposite conclusion to that of 
Moore. They show that, in virtually all cases, it was the working class that 
drove democratic development and that “the classes that benefitted from 
 
93 For example, in her critical review of Moore’s work, Theda Skocpol introduced 
some of the elements that will be central to the development of her on work on 
social revolution. See, Theda Skocpol, ‘A Critical Review of Barrington Moore’s 
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy’, Politics and Society, 4.1 (1973), 1–
34. 
94 Rueschemeyer and others, Capitalist Development. Interestingly enough, the 
conclusions qualitatively reached by this book have been recently tested and 
confirmed quantitatively through a large-n study. See Sirianne Dahlum, Carl Henrik 
Knutsen, and Tore Wig, ‘Who Revolts? Empirically Revisiting the Social Origins of 
Democracy’, Journal of Politics, 81.4 (2019), 1494–99.  
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the status quo nearly without exception resisted democracy.”96 Despite 
reaching the opposite empirical conclusion, the authors are confident in the 
validity of Moore’s framework and particularly in the combination of 
historical and comparative research. The two dimensions are seen as a way 
to avoid the voluntaristic nature of single-case historical work on the one 
hand and the overly structural analysis of comparative research on the 
other:  
to construct a framework of enquiry that is in principle equally well 
attuned to the study of process and to the recognition of structural 
constraints. […] The voluntaristic bias of case-oriented research is 
counterbalanced by comparison. Even in single-case studies 
comparative awareness and especially a longer time span of 
investigation can […] make the structural conditions of different 
event sequences more visible. It is, however, actual comparison of 
cases featuring different structural conditions that really turns things 
around.97  
While this approach offers a convincing framework to study political actors 
as social forces as well as the structures constraining their action, it also 
calls for a clearer definition of the unit of analysis. The need to 
operationalise the concept of class in social research in order to study 
political action also as class action requires moving away from a dichotomic 
division of capitalist societies between the two classes of those who sell 
and those who buy labour. Building upon the Weberian tradition, 
Rueschemeyer et al. define class through the concepts of mobility closure – 
the tendency of moving between similar class positions – and of interaction 
closure – the tendency to interact mostly with members of the same class. 
This definition opens up social classes and brings a more complex picture 
to the surface, in which different fractions of the same class might have 
opposing interests:  
 
96 If capitalist development favours democracy it is not due to but, if anything, 
despite of, the capitalist class. According to Rueschemeyer et al. what enhances 
the chances of democracy is the structural transformation brought by capitalism 
that weakens the landowning pre-capitalist elite and strengthens the urban 
working classes. Ibid., 41-47.  
97 Ibid., 33-34 
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With these analytical tools […] we can distinguish the owners of 
capital who employ labor on a sizeable scale – the bourgeoisie 
proper – from the urban petty bourgeoisie. We can identify the lower 
non-manual employees – such as clerical workers and sales clerks 
without much of a supervisory role – as a class distinct from middle-
level managers and professional experts outside the chain of 
command.98  
This approach allows for a much more flexible reading of class dynamics 
and is able to account for intra-class conflicts and processes of coalition 
building between fractions of different classes.  
The methodology deployed by historical sociologists aimed at explaining 
the social origins of political regimes as grounded in relations between social 
classes, can help us investigate the political content of nationalism. 
Nationalist movements – like all social movements – reflect a class coalition 
that shapes their political content and programme and that determines what 
kind of nation they aspire to build. Acknowledging that the political posture 
– in this case, the approach to nationalism – of social classes in each specific 
context must be assessed on empirical grounds, the next section sketches 
the historical patterns of political behaviours adopted by social classes 
which can guide the empirical analysis to follow.  
 
Sketches of Nationalisms 
The last two sections of the chapter discussed the role of existing material 
conflict in shaping nationalist movements as well as the political posture of 
social classes. In both cases, I emphasised the context-specific nature of 
every expression of nationalism and the necessity to study nationalist 
movements on empirical grounds. However, after acknowledging that the 
“political posture of class actors cannot be read off the underlying class 
structure in any one-to-one fashion,” Rueschemeyer et al. claim that there 
“are not infinitely variable either. […] we expected classes to exhibit 
definitive central political tendencies.”99 If class conflicts are one of the 
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fundamental drivers of politics, we can make use of history to identify 
general patterns of behaviour for class actors in different contexts.  
Even if social classes always find their political expression in a subjective 
form, shaped by cultural norms and local history, classes are ultimately 
made of objective social relations that present similarities across different 
contexts: we talk about a Bengali peasantry and a Salvadoran peasantry 
because we identify a number of similarities such as a particular relation of 
property to the land. Class analysis is particularly effective to carry 
comparative research on nationalist movements precisely because it allows 
us to pin down differences and similarities across different cultural systems 
that, with different approaches, would remain incommensurable. Every 
social class tends to develop a discourse about the nation and to develop a 
form of nationalism loaded with grievances and demands that reflect the 
understanding that class has of itself and its material interests. 
The following section identifies historical patterns in the political posture 
developed by social classes towards nationalism. It shows that identifying 
the structural location of each class and the material interests that derive 
from it can tell us a great deal about the political programme of a nationalist 
movement, its ideology, and its progressive or reactionary character. 
 
Classical Bourgeois Nationalism 
The ‘classical’ form of nationalism is the one expressed by the capitalist 
bourgeoisie and deeply associated with the nineteenth-century transition 
from the Ancien Régime to the modern nation-state in Europe. In pre-
modern Europe, political power was restricted to the aristocratic and clerical 
castes and society was regulated through a complex net of historically 
sedimented privileges. The bourgeoisie that started acting according to a 
capitalist logic found its rise restricted by insurmountable legal and political 
obstacles. It was against this system that the bourgeoisie developed its 
nationalism as a political project to transform the state at its own image. 
Bourgeois nationalism was thus anti-feudal – aiming at replacing particular 
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privileges with universal rights enshrined in a liberal constitution – and 
secular – aiming at breaking the alliance of ‘throne and altar’. It aimed at 
replacing parochial traditions and local dialects with a uniformed high 
culture and standardised language. All these political ideas have an obvious 
connection to the material interests of the class that produced them. This 
national project created centralised states and unified markets in which 
capital could develop and labour was ‘freed’ from feudal and corporatist 
constraints. Even for Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, witnesses to this 
process, the creation of this form of state was the historical mission of the 
capitalist bourgeoisie.  
This is the form of nationalism that was of interest for most of the academic 
discipline of Nationalism Studies and that can be prototypically exemplified 
by the national movements in Italy and Germany in the nineteenth century. 
If we limited our interest in nationalism to this historical expression, Tom 
Nairn’s Modern Janus, criticised above, would become significantly more 
relevant. The industrial bourgeoisie was indeed a class deeply concerned 
by the competition of more advanced economies. The cases of Japan, Italy, 
and Germany, cited by Nairn, were all characterised by an economic elite 
determined to shelter local production and in all these cases nationalism 
came to be associated – although to a different extent – with protectionist 
trade policy.  
The political content of bourgeois nationalism varied depending on the 
specific weight gained by this class in each context as well as the alliances 
it developed. In mid-nineteenth century Europe – especially during the 1848 
revolutions – European bourgeoisies largely participated in the revolutionary 
movements led by the urban working and middle classes on a platform of 
liberal nationalism, although ambivalent towards their democratic 
tendencies. However, when the European bourgeoisie had consolidated its 
power in the second half of the century, bourgeois nationalism became the 
strongest support of the monarchy and was used to justify militarism and 
colonial expansion – Anderson’s ‘official nationalism’ – as well as to keep in 
check the rising power of organised labour. 
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Bourgeois nationalism was, in these terms, a largely European phenomenon 
deeply connected to the rise of capitalism in the continent and, as noted 
earlier, the tendency to subsume all forms of nationalism under this is the 
result of the Eurocentric bias of the field of Nationalism Studies. In the 
decolonising countries of Asia and Africa in the twentieth century, the 
bourgeoisie was nowhere close to being a hegemonic class, also due to the 
constraints imposed by colonial domination on capitalist development. 
While bourgeois nationalism was in itself a virtually insignificant 
phenomenon, the posture of the bourgeoisie towards nationalism most 
often depended on its economic relation with the colonial power. In these 
contexts, the most relevant distinction is that between the national 
bourgeoisie, with economic interests in the domestic market and thus 
nationalist and anti-colonial, and the comprador bourgeoisie, economically 
dependent on the colonial power and thus opposed to independence. 
 
Middle-Class Nationalism 
Another ideal-typical form of nationalism is the one developed by the middle 
class. However, setting the boundaries of this class is more difficult. By 
‘middle classes’ we mean a diverse set of intermediate social positions that 
are not directly related to the process of production and that include both 
the civil society – professionals such as lawyers and doctors, white collars, 
traders – and the state apparatus – bureaucracy, army officers and teachers. 
Nationalism is particularly appealing to these groups because they are most 
likely to provide the staff for a newly-independent or strengthened state 
due to their education and social status, but also their location ‘outside’ the 
production process that allows the bureaucracy to claim a mediatory role in 
conflicts between capital and labour. Schematically speaking, in cases in 
which the natives are excluded by the administration and the security 
forces, middle-class nationalists are most often interested in replacing 
foreign staff. In the case of colonial states, the anti-colonial nationalism of 
the native bureaucrats and officers most often reflects their ambition to shift 
from a position of executors of colonial policies to that of the ruling elite of 
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an independent state. On the one hand, middle-class nationalism opposes 
the traditional ruling class by proposing a progressive ideology – liberal or 
socialist – whereby some sort of meritocracy takes the place of the privilege 
of birth as the main mechanism of social mobility. On the other hand, it tends 
to assume a state-centric, developmental and technocratic character that 
limits the involvement of the popular masses in the political process.  
These considerations are consistent with the findings by Rueschemeyer et 
al. about the historically “ambiguous” posture of the middle classes towards 
democracy:   
They pushed for their own inclusion but they are most in favor of full 
democracy where they were confronted with intransigent dominant 
classes and had the option of allying with a sizeable working class. 
However, if they started feeling threatened by popular pressures 
under a democratic regime, they turned to support the imposition of 
an authoritarian alternative.100 
With regards to nationalist movements like in the democratisation process, 
the intermediate position of the middle classes allows for a variety of 
coalition-building strategies. On the one hand, fascism developed often a 
middle class reaction – driven by frustration and fear of social downgrading 
– to the rise of the labour movement and resulted in an alliance with the 
dominant classes. On the other hand, decolonisation was often the product 
of a progressive coalition led by the middle classes and enpowered by the 
support of the organised working classes or peasantry. 
The latter case is particularly significant because in many postcolonial 
societies, army officers state bureaucrats ended up becoming – thanks to 
their control of the state – the dominant social group. In the words of 
Guinean anticolonial leader Amilcar Cabral, colonialism – due to its 
extractive nature – imposes severe limits on the integration of the educated 
middle class into the colonial elite:  
a feeling of bitterness or, a frustration complex is bred and develops 
among the indigenous petite bourgeoisie. At the same time, they are 
becoming more and more conscious of a compelling need to 
 
100 Ibid., 8. 
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question their marginal status, and to re-discover an IdentIty. […] 
Thus, they turn to the people around them, the people at the other 
extreme of the socio-cultural conflict: the native masses.101 
In this sense, the limits posed on their upward mobility is the strongest 
material motive that drives the native middle classes against the colonial 
power that heavily contributed to their own formation as a class. 
Colonialism tends to shape public institutions according to the extractive 
interests of the colonial power and to rely on traditional pre-capitalist elites. 
On the hand, this generates security-oriented colonial states in which the 
army and the bureaucracy tend to be oversized and state officials constitute 
an educated and connected mass, concentrated in the major urban centres 
and easy to mobilise. On the other hand, the weakness or sheer absence of 
a capitalist bourgeoisie whose development is actively hindered by the 
traditional elite in power allows the middle classes to claim the leadership of 
the national liberation. This position of leadership in such contexts is shown 
by the capacity of middle-class nationalists to incorporate the struggles of 
the subaltern classes. An exemplary case is that of Arab nationalism in the 
1950s and 1960s. Largely led by military officers and state officials, Arab 
nationalists in Egypt, Iraq, and Algeria conquered state power thanks to their 
capacity to integrate workers’ and peasants’ struggle within the national 
liberation movement.  
As Aijaz Ahmad explains, the apparently contradictory ideological 
expressions of these classes in power have all in common 
a certain fetishization of the State, and the creation of a whole range 
of disparate and mutually contradictory ideologies – e.g. Western-
style developmentalism, the ‘socialism’ of the radical-nationalists 
with its emphasis on ‘nationalizations’, the ethno-religious fascism of 
the Khomeini variety – which are none le less united in viewing the 
state as the principal agency of social transformation.102 
 
101 Amilcar Cabral, Return to the Source: Selected Speeches (New York and London, 
Monthly Review Press, 1973), 63. 
102 Aijaz Ahmad, ‘Class, Nation, and State: Intermediate Classes in Peripheral 
Societies’ in Dale L. Johnson (ed.) Middle Classes in Dependent Countries (Beverly 
Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1985), 44-45. It could be argued that the 
statolatry of European fascisms comes from the same class dynamics. 
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Feudal Nationalism  
In the classical forms described above, nationalism remains largely a ‘Tiers 
État’ phenomenon. The feudal classes are, in the conventional narrative, the 
defenders of the old order and the most strenuous opponents of the 
egalitarian principles inscribed in the idea of the nation. Yet, history is 
punctuated with examples of landed aristocracies raising the national 
banners and it is so especially in nineteenth-century Europe, the classical 
locus of nationalism. As eastern Europe was dominated by the multi-national 
Austrian, Russian, and Ottoman empires, nationalism often emerged from 
the local landlords concerned with the distribution of land to ‘alien’ 
aristocrats from the imperial core, the exclusion from public offices, or the 
abolishment of ancient privileges. In Hungary and Poland, the nationalism of 
the powerful feudal class was directed against the absolutist tendencies of 
the Austrian and Russian empire. In the latter case, the memory of the 
‘Golden Liberty’ the collective aristocratic rule of pre-partition Poland that 
excluded both the towns and serfs, motivated the anti-Russian feelings of 
the landed class: 
Polish nationalism remained, even after the revolutionary crisis of 
the seventeen-nineties, essentially an affair of the landed gentry as 
well as of those social strata which, like the emerging inteligencja, 
originated from, and were still linked with, the traditional feudal elite 
[that] failed to inject into the Polish bourgeoisie and the peasant 
masses a feeling of national solidarity strong enough to outlast the 
loss of political independence.103 
But this form of nationalism is by no means limited to eastern Europe and 
similarities can be spotted in the example of the role played by planter class 
in the national movements of Latin America mentioned before in this 
chapter. Benedict Anderson offers an interesting and original account on 
the deep motives of the Hispano-American nationalisms and of the use that 
the creole elite made of the ideas of self-determination and 
 
103 Michael G. Muller, ‘Poland’ in Nationalism in the Age of the French Revolution, 
ed. by Otto Dann and John Dinwiddy (London and Ronceverte: The Hambledon 
Press, 1988), 113-114. 
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constitutionalism. While in France, these ideas were used to take down the 
Ancien Régime, in Latin America the same ideas were used by the creole 
landowning class to oppose the metropole when Madrid became more and 
more inclined to make concessions towards the indigenous peasants and 
the Black slaves and less and less willing and able to protect the local elite 
against major revolts.104 The deployment of the same set of ideas had 
radically different outcomes in France, where it helped dismantle feudal 
structures, and in Latin America, where it helped preserve or even 
strengthen the local racialized class hierarchies.  
For Paul Brass, this ‘landed-class nationalism’ is a common case in contexts 
characterised by cultural differences – linguistic or religious – between the 
imperial centre and the local aristocracy which legitimise the claim to local 
power of the latter.105 Feudal nationalism is thus often triggered by the 
imperial centre’s attempts to replace the local elite with loyal nobles from 
the core, or by the alliance between the imperial centre and other local 
classes – the burghers or even the peasantry – to bypass local powerholders 
and promote state centralisation. It is thus a form of nationalism 
characterised by reactionary – in the literal sense – demands. Even in regard 
to the feudal class, the findings of historical sociological work on 
democratisation point to a consistently reactionary posture of this class. In 
Barrington Moore’s classic study, “labour-repressive” agriculture – such as 
feudalism or plantation slavery – that “require political methods to extract 
surplus, keep the labour force in place and make the system work” is 
characterised by a landowning class that is the most irreducible opponent 
of democratisation as the emancipation of agricultural labourers would 
inevitably bring the end of their power.106 
 
104 Anderson mentions the ‘Indian revolt’ in Peru, led by Tupac Amaru in the early 
1780s and the Haitian Revolution of 1791-1804. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 
48-49. 
105 Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, 26-27. 
106 Moore, Social Origins, 434. 
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In decolonising societies, the ‘feudal class’ was generally identified with the 
traditional landed elite opposed to the national movement. One of the 
almost107 universal tendencies of colonialism is to rely on the existing 
traditional elite to sustain colonial domination. As in the abovementioned 
case of the comprador bourgeoisie, these classes are empowered by the 
foreign rulers – and even revitalised where they were in decline – giving 
them a stake in the continuation of colonial rule. They thus tend to oppose 
national liberation movement. The case of the Arab world is one of the most 
significant in this sense. British colonialism actively turned traditional 
notables and tribal leaders in Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq, in a powerful class of 
landowners which became the most strenuous defenders of the monarchies 
backed or even imposed by Britain.108 As mentioned earlier, Arab nationalism 
and Pan-Arabism in the Cold War era found their most significant supporters 
in the urban middle classes and their direct target in the traditional elites 
compromised with colonialism. 
 
Nationalism and the Subaltern Classes  
The term ‘subaltern classes’ begs a definition. In Antonio Gramsci, the 
subaltern groups coincide collectively with the dominated masses, defined 
in terms of their exclusion from the political process but fragmented along 
the lines of different forms of exclusion constituted by relations of 
exploitation, race and nationality, gender, religion.109 Exclusion and 
fragmentation, imposed by the dominant classes, are the reasons why 
Gramsci’s subalterns do not constitute a class for itself and live “on the 
 
107 Of course, except for the cases of settler colonialism where the indigenous 
population – elite and commoners – is subject to complete exclusion and 
suppression.   
108 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, 86-134. 
109 Marcus E. Green, ‘Rethinking the Subaltern and the Question of Censorship in 
Gramsci's Prison Notebooks’ Postcolonial Studies, 14.4 (2011), 387. 
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margins of history” or, as in postcolonial scholarship, they “cannot speak.”110 
It is through the process of political organisation that the subalterns 
overcome their fragmentation and gain political agency and autonomy as a 
class and thus are able to create an alternative social bloc and “become 
state.”111 The relevance of this concept to the present discussion on 
nationalism is that through political organisation the subaltern classes, like 
all the other classes, can speak, as they can develop their own discourse on 
the nation and launch their own bid for state power. Due to their 
subalternity, their position of social subordination, subaltern politics will 
have an intrinsic emancipatory character and will tend to develop in 
combination with a progressive ideology. 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the movements that led to the pan-European 
1848 Revolution had a strong working-class component that was both 
patriotic and radical democratic or even proto-socialist and no contradiction 
was seen between the two. It was only towards the end of the century that 
Nationalism and socialism were often presented as the competing products 
of mass politics in the industrial era respective expressions of the middle 
classes and the working class. As an expression of working-class politics, 
socialism was characterised, since the early nineteenth century, by a strong 
internationalism that claimed a commonality of interest among workers 
beyond national borders. This allowed right-wing nationalists to present 
socialists and labour organisers as ‘anti-national’ and saboteurs when they 
rejected chauvinism or colonial expansion. Yet working-class social 
democratic parties in western Europe, the closer they got to political power, 
the keener they were to reject this accusation and to frame their claim to 
power in national terms: In France, Germany, and Britain, they ultimately 
supported their countries’ war effort in 1914-1918, and developed an 
ambiguous approach towards colonialism proving their willingness to 
 
110 Gayatri C. Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in Marxism and the Interpretation 
of Culture, ed. by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1988). 
111 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. By Quintin Hoare 
and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 53. 
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support even an expansionist form of nationalism. At the time of the Russian 
revolution, both communists and social democrats debated intensively the 
‘National Question’ and Bolsheviks proclaimed their support for the 
liberation of the colonised world.  
In the course of the twentieth century, the working classes and the 
peasantry became the backbone of virtually the entirety of the global 
movement for decolonisation to the point that Marxism became the – almost 
universally – shared language of the struggle against colonialism. The 
subaltern classes, where politically mobilised, were more consistently anti-
colonial than the other classes as they had to bear the heaviest brunt of the 
transformation imposed by colonialism of traditional social relations and 
property regimes. In semi-colonies such as Egypt and Iraq in the 1950s, the 
subaltern classes were part of wider political coalitions in favour of 
independence, and workers’ and peasants’ mobilisation were decisive in 
giving the final shove that allowed the nationalists to win. In China, the 
communist mobilised the working class and the peasantry to fight a 
liberation war against the Japanese invaders, parallel to the one waged by 
the ruling-class nationalists of the Kuomintang. After the war, the two sides 
fought for state power proposing radically alternative national projects.  
Thought through in theoretical terms, subaltern class nationalism primarily 
aims at a restructuring of the power relations within the state from which 
the subordinate has much more to gain than they have from external 
expansion. Foreign rule and colonial domination are most often 
characterised by hyper-exploitation and extractive practices which push 
the subordinate classes to support independence and to lead 
independentist movements. If nationalism is defined in class terms, as a 
struggle for independence and state power, it is also hardly in 
contradistinction with the internationalism historically developed by 
working-class movements. Internationalism literally presupposes the 
division of the world into nations prescribing fraternity among them. That is 
the reason why we see no contradiction in the expressions of solidarity 
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towards the struggle for self-determination of oppressed nations, such as 
the Palestinians or the Kurds.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter proposed an alternative way to study nationalist movements. 
Established theories of nationalism present sophisticated accounts of the 
origins of nationalism explaining its development as the result of objective 
historical circunstances and placing its origin in a specific time and space – 
most often nineteenth century Europe. However, after its ‘rational’ origin, 
nationalism simply diffused to the rest of the world even in the absence of 
the original conditions of its emergence. Nationalist struggles in the colonial 
world appear to be driven by the autonomous force of the principle of 
nationality disconnected from pre-existing social and political conflicts. 
Nationalism is thus depoliticised as the political content of nationalist 
movements – their progressive or reactionary character – is only given 
secondary importance. 
However, if both academic and public discourse can use the term 
nationalism to describe movements as far apart as a neo-Nazi group and a 
Marxist national liberation movement, the term inevitably loses meaning and 
analytical usefulness. To shed light on the ideological content and 
programme – that is to say, on the actual politics – of nationalist movements, 
this chapter proposed to study nationalism as the expression of the struggle 
for state power embedded in class conflict and coalition building. Studying 
the class politics behind a nationalist movement allows us to understand 
their ideological positions and political posture in the interests it represents 
and serves within society. This means that nationalist movements must be 
ultimately studied on empirical grounds in light of the specific class structure 
and relations of power out of which they developed.  
The chapter showed how the study of class origins of political regimes 
within Historical Sociology can provide a point of reference to identify 
historical patterns of the political behaviour of social classes. The last 
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section of the chapter sketched these historical patterns surveying the 
forms of nationalism developed by social classes across history and 
formulating theoretical considerations that can guide the study of nationalist 
movements on empirical grounds, which is the subject of the following 
chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
Feudal Nationalism in Kurdistan 
(1918-1946) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter reconstructs the social origins of Kurdish nationalism in the 
interwar period showing that the first phase of the Kurdish national 
movement was essentially a class project promoted by the tribal landowning 
elite. Until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the Kurdish traditional 
elite largely identified with the Ottoman state and legitimised its position of 
power through tribal and religious sources. With the establishment of the 
Middle East state-system after World War I, the Ottoman successor states 
of Turkey and Iraq experienced a series of revolts whereby the Kurdish tribal 
elite attempted to renegotiate their power over the tribal periphery 
threatened by the centralising ambitions of the new states. Kurdish identity, 
only elaborated in cultural terms in the Ottoman context, was thus 
politicised in the form of a feudal nationalism, loaded with the conservative 
demands of the tribal elite and deployed to legitimise their claim to power 
over the region. The pre-nationalist Kurdist discourse that had developed in 
the previous decades, was thus emptied of its initial progressive and 
modernising character and filled with political demands that reflected far 
narrower class interests of the Kurdish traditional ruling class. 
The Kurdish revolts that took place in Turkey, Iraq, and, to a lesser extent, 
Iran, between 1919 and 1946, followed a well-established pattern of state-
tribe relationship and presented a number of shared features that allow us 
to study them as a unitary phenomenon. Despite their narrow class basis, 
the feudal-nationalist revolts – and particularly the short-lived Kurdish 
Mahabad Republic – assumed a central role in the nationalist narrative and 
the development of a pan-Kurdish identity. This step is particularly 
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important because the different extent of the defeat of feudal nationalism – 
and of the Kurdish traditional class – in Iraq and Turkey engendered two 
divergent paths of development for Kurdish nationalism.  
 
Kurdistan in the Late Ottoman Period 
Kurdish nationalism developed in a time of great transformation. Between 
the early sixteenth century and the First World War, Kurdistan constituted 
the border region between the Ottoman and the Persian empires. Given the 
remote and mountainous nature of Kurdistan, the two empires allowed a 
higher degree of autonomy for the local elite and the region was organised 
in a system of vassal emirates functioning as border marches. The Kurdish 
emirs were paramount chiefs ruling over a tribal confederation and their 
legitimacy rested on their vassalic relationship with the Ottoman Sultan or 
the Persian Shah. Their courts thrived on their location along the Silk Road 
and allowed for the first development of several Kurdish languages in the 
written form.  
The power of the Kurdish emirs on the Ottoman side of the border ended in 
the mid-nineteenth century when the modernisation project promoted by 
the Porte in Istanbul required – and allowed for – a stronger presence of the 
central authority in the periphery of the empire. One by one, the emirates 
were suppressed through a series of military campaigns. However, the 
actual presence of the Ottoman government was all but ineffective and the 
local elite, composed by aghas, the tribal chiefs, and shaykhs, the heads of 
Sufi brotherhoods (generally Qadiriyah and Naqshbandiyyah) maintained a 
strong political role. As a matter of fact, tribal leaders were empowered by 
the replacement of the paramount authority of the emirs with the distant 
rule of Istanbul. The suppression of the emirates led to increasing inter-tribal 
violence. Unrelated to any of the local tribes, the shaykh traditionally held 
the position of mediator between aghas and, with the spread of tribal 
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conflicts in the late nineteenth century, the shaykhly caste experienced a 
political golden age.112  
The transformation of the region was accelerated by the inclusion of 
Kurdistan into the imperialist projects of the European powers through the 
disruptive effects of the Christian missionaries active among the religious 
minorities and the looming threat of Russian expansion. Moreover, the 
Kurdish areas were severely impoverished by the decline of the land routes 
of long-distance trade weakened by the growth of European maritime 
power. With trade, the Kurds also lost a significant part of their rich 
manufacturing production, especially textile, due to the competition of 
cheap industrial products from Europe. Distance from the sea denied 
Kurdish agriculture the opportunities brought to farmers of coastal Anatolia 
by the increasing European demand for agricultural goods. If between the 
1830s and 1912 Istanbul and Izmir almost tripled their population, the 
Kurdish Diyarbakır lost a quarter of its inhabitants.113 
Part of the long-term process of modernisation and centralisation of the 
Ottoman Empire – known as Tanzimat (reorganisation) period – the Land 
Code of 1858 had a deep impact on the Kurdish region. The Land Code 
promoted the private property of the land with the aims of boosting 
agricultural production and creating an easily taxable class of landowners. 
In Kurdistan and other peripheral regions, the project had also the objective 
of sedentarising nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes by turning herders into 
farmers. The year of 1858 should be seen as the starting point of a long 
historical process of transformation, since the actual enforcement of the 
Land Code took decades and, in some areas, was only implemented by the 
states that succeeded the Ottoman Empire. The Kurdish tribal elite, 
 
112 For more on the instability created by the suppression of the emirates, see van 
Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, 175-181; McDowall, A Modern History, 38-53; 
Hamit Bozarslan, ‘Tribal Asabiyya and Kurdish politics: a socio-historical 
perspective’ in The Kurds: Nationalism and Politics, ed. by Faleh A. Jabar and 
Hosham Dawod (Beirut: Saqi, 2006), 134-138. 
113 Charles Issawi, The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914 (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1980), 34-35. 
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empowered by the suppression of the emirates, greatly benefitted from this 
long-term process of agrarian reform. In his work on the tribal structure of 
Kurdish society, anthropologist Martin van Bruinessen explains that Kurdish 
rural life gradually lost its communal features.114  The aghas and – and even 
more frequently – the shaykhs took advantage of their position to register 
communal, tribal, and religious lands under their name and then to enforce 
their property rights.  
This process of class stratification of Kurdish society was accelerated in 
1891 when the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II tried to incorporate the Kurdish 
tribes into the Ottoman state and army through the institution of the 
Hamidiye, a corps of irregular cavalry modelled after Russia’s Cossacks. By 
distributing weapons directly to the tribal chiefs, the Hamidiye increased the 
power of the aghas and brought about a sort of tribal revival. It was never 
fully controlled by the Ottoman authority and was often involved in sectarian 
violence contributing to the collapse of the fragile intercommunal 
relations.115 The establishment of the Hamidiye cavalry increased the 
coercive power of the tribal leadership and their capacity to grab communal 
lands through violence.116  
The transformation of Kurdish tribal society induced by the suppression of 
the emirates, the Land Code, and the institution of the Hamidiye led to a 
deep restructuring of the class structure of the region. As the cultivators 
were deprived of their traditional collective rights, the tribal elite gradually 
evolved into a class of large landowners. Most of their non-tribal serfs, as 
well as many tribespeople, became their sharecroppers or waged labourers, 
a process that gradually reduced the difference between the two groups 
and that enormously increased the power of the tribal elite over the rest of 
 
114 Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, 181-184. 
115 Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). 
116 Yadirgi, The Political Economy, 160-120. According to Robert Olson, in 1910, the 
Hamidiye cavalry enlisted 53.000 men. Robert Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish 
Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925 (Houston: University of 
Texas Press, 1989), 10-11. 
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the Kurdish rural population. This process of social stratification, that was 
still ongoing in the early decades of the twentieth century, is essential to 
understanding the social context in which Kurdish nationalism developed 
and spread. The modernising reforms of the Ottoman sultans resulted in a 
radical transformation of the Kurdish tribal elite with many leaving the 
countryside and turning into a class of absentee landlords.117 However, their 
tribal lineage continued to serve as a source of legitimacy to the power that 
they exercised over their constituencies, often their former fellow tribesmen 
turned peasants.118   
In the rapidly changing social context of the Ottoman Kurdish provinces, 
nationalist discourse had, up to World War I, an almost insignificant 
presence. The Kurdish elite kept drawing its power from traditional sources 
of legitimacy and therefore they neither challenged that of the Ottoman 
sultan nor imagined themselves outside the boundaries of Ottoman 
citizenship and Muslim identity. Only at the end of this period, the Young 
Turk Revolution of 1908 boosted the development of ethnic nationalism in 
the Empire and especially that of Turkism.119 The Young Turks, even though 
officially supportive of Ottoman unity,120 gave way to the development of a 
specific Turkish identity. As the term Kurd was at that time still commonly 
associated with a tribal condition and not a national identity, most members 
of the urban Kurdish elite saw themselves as Ottoman citizens and even 
 
117 Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, 81. 
118 The process described in this paragraph regards largely the Muslim population. 
Most of the autochthonous Christians living in the region (Armenians, Syriacs, 
Assyrians) had always been politically subjected to the Kurdish (or Turkish) tribes. 
However, the condition of the Christian population is less relevant to this study 
since most of the Christians in the region were killed, assimilated or forced to leave 
during World War I. 
119 In Erik Zürcher’s account of Turkish history, the Young Turks Revolution on 1908 
represents the decisive moment that divides Late-Ottoman and modern Turkish 
history. Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London and New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 1997), 1-8.  
120 For a definition of the late Ottoman political identity see Zürcher’s concept of 
Muslim nationalism. Eirk J. Zürcher, ‘The Vocabulary of Muslim Nationalism’, 
International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 137 (1999), 81–93. 
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embraced Turkish nationalism.121 Nevertheless, the idea of ‘Kurdishness’ as 
a distinctively cultural, rather than social, identity started to rise in the years 
between the 1908 revolution and the First World War. The first manifestation 
of Kurdish national identity was still expressed within the framework of 
Ottomanism and its promoters called for autonomy for the Kurds within the 
Ottoman state, rather than independence. Kurdish national consciousness 
was in that sense neither particularly different nor particularly late, 
compared to Turkish or Arab nationalisms. In general terms, promoters of 
national identity among the Muslim peoples of the empire did not imagine 
themselves out of the framework of a reformed – for Turks – and 
decentralized – for Arabs and Kurds – Ottoman state.  
The first Kurdist clubs and papers were established in Istanbul in the early 
twentieth century to demand administrative, economic, and educational 
reforms for the Kurdish provinces. They were promoted by a cohesive group 
of aristocratic Kurds mostly working for the Ottoman state as public 
servants and “connected to one another through kinship ties or the 
Naqshbandi network”.122 A prominent role was assumed by once-powerful 
Kurdish princely families, such as Bedirkhans and Babans, exiled to Istanbul 
after the suppression of the emirates and their following was largely 
constituted by Kurds hailing from leading tribal families but based in the 
capital. They share an urban lifestyle and cosmopolitan education but also 
a deep disconnect with Kurdish tribal and rural society which they viewed 
with a “kind of paternalism” as composed by infants in need of their 
leadership to enter the modern world.123 The efforts to spread their views in 
the Kurdish provinces met little enthusiasm and, the few branches of the 
Kurdist clubs that were opened in Kurdish cities like Diyarbakır or Bitlis, 
 
121 A case in point is that of Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), a half Kurd from Diyarbakır 
who became one of the most enthusiastic ideologues of Turkish nationalism. See: 
Heper, The State and Kurds, 52-57. 
122 Hakan Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2004), 87. 
123 Keith Hitchins, ‘Kurdish Elites and Nationhood in Anatolia, 1890s-1938’, in Joyce 
Blau, ed. by Bozarslan and Scalbert-Yücel. 
 
 
84 
 
“became, in effect, local organizations, where, in the absence of 
intellectuals of the sort active in Istanbul, local elites, espousing more 
traditional ideas, used the clubs to further their own interests.”124 Alienated 
from their lands and with a narrow social base, these early pioneers of 
Kurdish identity had very few followers in the Kurdish provinces and even 
fewer among the masses.125 As Janet Klein argues, describing these early 
Kurdist organisations as proto-nationalists fits into an Orientalist and 
Eurocentric historical narrative that portraits the Ottoman Empire as 
destined to collapse as the result of the inevitable spread of opposing 
nationalisms.126 On the contrary, as long as the Ottoman Empire existed, 
nearly all political expressions of Kurdish identity remained within the 
framework of the Ottomanist ideology. It was only after the end of the 
empire that Kurdish identity came to express a more unambiguous demand 
for separation. 
 
Defining Feudal Nationalism  
This section conceptualises the first stage of Kurdish nationalism from 1918 
to 1946 showing that it largely constituted a unitary phenomenon 
transcending the political fragmentation of the region after the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire. In the few years following the Armistice of Mudros 
(October 1918), the Ottoman Middle East was permanently partitioned into 
several new states,127 which divided the Kurdish lands and deprived the 
Kurdish elite of their main source of political identity, the Ottoman Muslim 
citizenship. Moreover, the centralising ambitions of the new states 
 
124 Hitchins, Kurdish Elites. 
125 Hamit Bozarslan, 'Some Remarks on Kurdish Historiographical Discourse in 
Turkey (1919-1980)' in Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism, ed. by Abbas 
Vali (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2003), 27. 
126 Janet Klein, ‘Kurdish Nationalists and Non-Nationalist Kurdists: Rethinking 
Minority Nationalism and the Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1909’, 
Nations and Nationalism, 13.1 (2007), 135–53 
127 Turkey, Iraq and Syria for what the Kurds are concerned, but also Jordan, 
Lebanon and Palestine. 
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threatened the local power of Kurdish tribal landowners who feared a more 
invasive presence of the central authorities on their lands. The response 
was a form of ‘feudal nationalism’ due to the dominant role played by the 
Kurdish traditional ruling class in both contexts. 
The rest of the chapter will discuss the events in Turkey and Iraq showing 
how similar uprisings resulted in different outcomes loaded with 
consequences for the development of Kurdish nationalism in the two 
countries. Although the focus is on the developments in Turkey and Iraq, 
Iran was the theatre of similar events. In the interwar period, Iran was going 
through a process of modernisation partly inspired by Turkey128 and the 
reaction of the Kurdish tribal elite can be read within the same framework 
of feudal nationalism.129 What is particularly significant about Iran in this 
period is that the experience of the short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad 
of 1946 can be seen as the final act of this first phase of the Kurdish 
movement and as a decisive moment for construction of the transnational 
dimension of Kurdish politics.  
The concept of feudal nationalism was used in reference to the Kurds by 
Amir Hassanpour in his book Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan (1992), 
to describe the first literary expressions of Kurdish cultural distinctiveness 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.130 The term is intentionally 
oxymoronic, as Hassanpour meant to point out the historical contradiction 
inherent in the development of national feelings among a tribal aristocracy, 
 
128 Erik Zürcher and Touraj Atabaki’s comparative work on the projects of 
modernisation in Turkey and Iran in the 1920s emphasises the learning process 
between the two regimes: “The denial of a Kurdish identity after 1928 in Iran echoes 
that in Turkey after 1926. The influence of the Kemalist example seems to have 
grown after the shah’s 1934 state visit to Turkey.” Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. 
Zürcher, Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Ataturk and Reza Shah 
(London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 110. 
129 For example, the revolt led by the tribal chief Simko Shikak between 1918 and 
1922, and again in 1926. 
130 Amir Hassanpour, Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan, 1918-1985 (Lewiston, 
NY: Mellen Research University Press, 1992).  
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rather than a national bourgeoisie, due to the absence of the latter.131 
Despite Hassanpour’s problematic application to the context of the Kurdish 
emirates, the concept to feudal nationalism greatly captures the peculiar 
class nature of the Kurdish revolts in the interwar period. Rather than a 
contradiction, Kurdish ‘feudal nationalism’ is a convincing refutation of the 
standard account of nationalism as the historical expression of the 
nineteenth-century European bourgeoisie. As argued in Chapter 2, if 
nationalism is freed from a teleological and diffusionist perspective and 
framed as a struggle for state power embedded in class conflicts, the term 
feudal nationalism assumes a much more consistent meaning. Framed in 
those terms, the nationalism of the traditional landowning classes is a fairly 
common phenomenon in rapidly modernising societies characterised by a 
degree of ethnic differentiation. Modernising states, with their bureaucracy, 
aim at establishing a direct presence in peripheral areas which was 
previously mediated by local elites. This process implies a significant loss of 
political power for the local elite and, if a cultural difference between the 
centre and periphery exists, the local elite is likely to try to politicise the local 
culture – promoting nationalism – to mobilise the population against the 
central state.132 
The term ‘feudal’, in the Kurdish context, identifies the tribal aristocracy – 
aghas and shaykhs – that by the end of the nineteenth century had 
transformed into a class of large landowners through the accumulation of 
land that was previously the collective property of the tribes or mortmain 
(waqf). Like in a pre-capitalist feudal system, the appropriation of the 
agricultural surplus was pursued by the tribal elite via extra-economic 
means thanks to their military prowess and their position of power within 
 
131 Hassanpour, Nationalism and Language, 56-57. For a discussion on the use of 
this term in the context of the Kurdish emirates, see Abbas Vali, 'Genealogies of 
the Kurds: Constructions of Nation and National Identity in Kurdish Historical 
Writing' in Essays, ed. by Vali, 87-97. 
132 See, Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, 272-275.  
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the Ottoman state.133 This transformation took place in a context in which 
Christian and non-tribal Kurdish peasants were already politically subjected 
to Kurdish aghas. Van Bruinessen compares the conditions of the Kurdish 
peasantry to that of the serfs in medieval Europe: “Their lords considered 
them as their private property, owned in the same way as their sheep and 
mules”.134 A British traveller of the early nineteenth century described the 
tribal elite and the peasantry as “totally distinct races” adding that 
A tribesman once confessed to me that the clans conceived the 
peasants to be merely created for their use; and wretched indeed is 
the condition of the Koordish cultivators [that] much resembles that 
of a Negro slave in the West Indies.135  
The expansion of the private ownership of the land in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and the land-grabbing practices of the tribal elite drove 
many tribesmen into a similarly subordinate condition. As they lost their 
customary rights over the land, they became sharecroppers or waged 
labourers in the estates of their agha or shaykh.  
Given this context, the Kurdish elite had no reason to dream of a Kurdish 
nation-state. In the Ottoman Empire, a polity based on dynastic and religious 
legitimacy in which the Sultan was both head of the imperial Ottoman house 
and Caliph of the Muslims, the Kurdish elite never challenged its place within 
an Ottoman society that was hierarchically divided along religious lines. The 
members of the Kurdish elite were either of prestigious tribal lineage or the 
heads of the Sufi brotherhoods, the most powerful religious organisations 
in the region. When conflicts between the local elite and the central 
government arose, it was nearly always to negotiate the degree of local 
autonomy rather than to claim independence. Kurdish revolts in the Ottoman 
Empire must be thought of within the mechanism that Şerif Mardin calls the 
 
133 For a definition of feudalism in these terms, see Perry Anderson, Lineages of the 
Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1974), 401. 
134 Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, 50. 
135 Cited in Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement, 27. 
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Ottoman ‘tacit contract’.136 As Hamit Bozarslan explains, although the tacit 
contract did not legitimise open revolt against the Sultan, “the Ottoman 
state tradition conceived of rebellion, or at least resistance, as a means of 
bargaining and negotiation by the subordinate peripheral groups for 
improving their status within the state.”137 The frequent tribal revolts in the 
Ottoman Empire – as well as Qajar Persia – must be understood within this 
framework of state-tribe relationship. However, the end of the empire left a 
number of smaller states each pursuing a nation-building project led by its 
Turkish, Arab, or Persian majority and each of them promoting 
modernisation and centralisation policies that challenged the political power 
of traditional elites. Most important of all, the new states appeared 
determined to claim the monopoly of violence – thus to disarm local elites – 
and the administration of justice taking away from the tribal elites their most 
fundamental sources of power over their tribesmen and peasants. That was 
the context in which the Kurdish elite adopted a nationalist discourse to 
legitimise its revolts against the new authorities.  
As mentioned earlier, the promotion of Kurdish identity had been initiated 
by Istanbul-based intellectuals in close association with a project of 
modernisation, albeit in a top-down and paternalistic fashion. Even though, 
after the fall of the empire, these Kurdist groups largely adopted a more 
defined nationalist agenda, they were incapable of starting a social 
movement of their own due to their lack of a power base in the Kurdish 
region. When the Kurdish tribal elite revolted against the modernisation 
projects promoted by the new states, these nationalist political 
organisations had to join the movements from a subordinate position and to 
give up on the progressive character of their nationalism. Examples of this 
phenomenon can be drawn from each of the Kurdish regions: the Azadi 
Committee in Turkey that supported Shaykh Said’s rebellion (1925) but also 
the Iraqi-Kurdish Hiwa (1939) and the Iranian-Kurdish Komala (1942) that 
 
136 Şerif Mardin, “Freedom in an Ottoman Perspective,” in State, Democracy, and 
the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, ed. by Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 1988), 23-35. 
137 Bozarslan, Some Remarks, in Essays, ed. by Vali, 185-186. 
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had to surrender the leadership to two tribal landowners, respectively Mam 
Vasta Hilmi and Qazi Muhammad. Moreover, the first modern Kurdish 
political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of both Iran (1945) and Iraq 
(1946) elected as presidents two religious leaders, Qazi Muhammad and 
Mullah Mustafa Barzani. The support lent by urban intellectuals provided a 
degree of national legitimacy to the feudal revolts and allowed to inscribe 
these early episodes within the nascent narrative of a Kurdish national 
movement. However, these revolts were overwhelmingly led and fought by 
members of the tribal elite and virtually all led by shaykh, due to their 
traditional inter-tribal authority. 
Moreover, the Kurdist intellectuals utterly failed to serve as a link between 
the feudal nationalist leaders and the popular masses. One of the other 
prominent features of the phase of feudal nationalism was precisely the lack 
of popular participation and the apathy, if not outright hostility, of the 
Kurdish rural masses. As Van Buinessen points out:  
Contemporary reports […] suggest that the subject peasantry, even 
if they had vague nationalist feelings, were more strongly motivated 
by resentment against their landlords. Indeed, in the later Kurdish 
risings in Iraq, which were more widespread than Shayk Said's 
revolt, the non-tribal peasants did not participate in any significant 
scale, but they did rise against their landlords several times.138 
From the perspective of the peasantry, as Bruinessen continues, these 
revolts were “not directed against their own exploiters, but against a 
government that promised to curtail the power of these exploiters”.139 The 
passive attitude of the peasantry is relevant as it confutes the 
characterisation, by contemporary Turkish nationalists, of the Kurdish 
revolts as a Turkish Vendée, in which the Kurdish masses were deceived 
into rebellion by their backward shaykhs.140  
 
138 Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, 294. A similar point is made by Olson, 
The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, 98. 
139 Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, 294. 
140 Mesut Yeğen cites, for example, the 1925 tribunal that sentenced to death 
Shaykh Said: “Everybody must know that as the young Republican government will 
definitely not condone any cursed action like the incitement and political re action 
[…]. The poor people of this region who have been exploited and oppressed under 
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The point at stake is that the Turkish effort to deny any national character 
to the feudal revolts of the interwar period pushed authors sympathetic with 
the Kurds to over-emphasise it. Robert Olson, in his detailed account of the 
1925 Shaykh Said Revolt, goes to great lengths to show the rebels’ 
commitment to the Kurdish national cause. Despite his acknowledgement of 
the narrow class basis of the rebellion, the sheer lack of involvement of the 
urban population, the material and religious grievances driving the tribal 
elite, Olson defines it as “the first large-scale nationalist rebellion of the 
Kurds” and even a “proto-type of a post-World War I nationalist rebellion.”141 
This discussion is meaningful only if framed within an understanding of 
nationalism as a completely autonomous force and national identity as 
sufficient motivation for action. On the contrary, if the feudal revolts are 
placed within the material reality of interwar Kurdistan, with its social and 
political conflicts, then there is no reason to doubt their national character. 
Feudal nationalism is the natural outcome of the grievances and demands 
of the Kurdish ruling class whose reproduction as a class was threatened by 
the new states and who thus understandably turned towards separatism to 
establish their own state. The next two sections show how the events of 
Turkey and Iraq fit into the feudal nationalism paradigm. 
 
Kurdish revolts in Kemalist Turkey  
When, in September 1914, the Ottoman Empire joined the Great War, its 
north-eastern provinces became the front-line of the war against Czarist 
Russia. The Caucasus front was characterized by an increasingly sectarian 
dimension of the conflict, in which the local Christian population was seen 
as a ‘fifth column’ of the enemy and, episodes of ethnic cleansing multiplied. 
Tribal Kurds, enrolled as irregular forces in the Hamidiye cavalry, 
 
the domination of sheikhs and feudal landlords will be freed from your incitement 
and evil, and they will follow the efficient paths of our Republic which promises 
progress and prosperity.” Mesut Yeǧen, ‘Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish 
Question’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 30.1 (2007), 128. 
141 Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, 153-164. 
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participated in the massacre and deportation of the Armenian population 
moved by the fear of future Christian domination but also, more prosaically, 
to take over their properties. When, in 1919, after the surrender of the 
Ottoman Empire, sectors of the army led by Mustafa Kemal (later known as 
Atatürk) rose against the post-war settlement that had imposed a colonial 
partition of Turkey, most of the Kurdish tribes joined Atatürk’s rebellion. The 
Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923) was largely fought under the 
banner of Islam, to defend the Sultan-Caliph, and to protect the Ottoman 
land from the Christian powers. Kurdish tribal leaders were particularly 
concerned by the expansion of the newly-established and internationally-
backed Armenian state in eastern Anatolia and feared the consequences of 
their involvement in the Armenian genocide.142  
These international dynamics frustrated the aspiration of part of the Kurdish 
nationalist intelligentsia who had seen in the collapse of the empire a brief 
window of opportunity for Kurdish statehood. Most Kurdish tribes answered 
the appeal to Islamic brotherhood and sided with the Turkish forces. In 
December 1919, the Kemalist army defeated the Armenians and asserted its 
control over eastern Anatolia, including most of the Kurdish areas. If, during 
the war of independence, the stress had been placed on Muslim 
brotherhood, the more the new Ankara-based Kemalist government 
consolidated its power, the more the official ideology shifted towards 
Turkish nationalism, modernisation, and secularism. The victory in the 
liberation war had given Mustafa Kemal a degree of power and prestige that 
allowed him to move towards the implementation of a far more radical 
programme. With the abolition of the sultanate (1923) and the caliphate 
(1924), the source of legitimacy chosen for the new republic was the 
Turkishness of its people. The promise to establish an autonomous Kurdish 
region in south-eastern Anatolia, approved in February 1922 by the national 
 
142 Hamit Bozarslan, 'Kurds and the Turkish State'. In The Cambridge History of 
Turkey, Volume 4, ed. by Reşat Kasaba (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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assembly but never implemented,143 was put aside and assimilation became 
the only response to Turkey’s ethnic diversity.  
The denial of Kurdish identity at the inception of the Turkish Republic can 
be seen as the historical beginning of the Kurdish question in Turkey. 
However, explaining the outbreak of the Kurdish revolts of the interwar 
period solely as a response to the ideological shift of the Kemalist republic 
towards Turkish nationalism and secularism is problematic. On the one 
hand, this argument reproduces a teleological perspective that sees in the 
rise of nationalism the endpoint of Ottoman history and Kurdish nationalism 
as its last – and unsuccessful – manifestation. This is the case of Robert 
Olson’s reading of the 1925 Shaykh Said Revolt as the culmination of a four-
stage Kurdish national awakening that started in the closing decades of the 
nineteenth century.144 As pointed out before, the traditional elite of the 
Kurdish provinces had not yet shown any particular manifestation of 
national feelings and tended to see itself as part of the Ottoman Muslim elite.  
On the other hand, this argument obscures the material dynamics that seem 
to be the actual trigger of the Kurdish revolts. After the abolition of the 
monarchy and the caliphate, the Kemalist project proved to be antithetical 
to the traditional sources – tribal and religious – upon which the local power 
of the Kurdish elite rested. Moreover, the abandonment of any project of 
regional autonomy revealed the ambition of the new Turkish state to impose 
its much more intrusive presence in the periphery of the country. This 
process became increasingly apparent to the Kurdish elite as, with the end 
of the war, Ankara started filling the administration of the predominantly-
Kurdish south-east with loyal officials coming from western Turkey.145 While 
these tangible threats to their power were the prime reason for the Kurdish 
revolts, the assimilationist policy of the Kemalist was almost exclusively a 
concern for the small circles of urban-based Kurdists who joined the revolts 
 
143 Heper, The State and the Kurds, 118-123. 
144 Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, 1-25. 
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in a subordinate position. The fact that the culturalist explanation had such 
a long-lasting impact is likely due to a choice of historical narrative. After 
the failure of the feudal revolts, the history of the genesis of the Kurdish 
national movement was written by the intellectual vanguard in exile rather 
than the tribesmen who actually led the revolts.146 
The Kurdish revolts in interwar Turkey must be understood within the 
framework of a long period of tribal agitations in the periphery of the new 
republic. In the two decades following the establishment of the state, 
Yadirgi counts twenty-seven episodes of Kurdish revolts while seventeen 
of the eighteen military campaigns conducted by the Turkish army between 
1924 and 1938 took place in Kurdish areas.147 These numbers signal that the 
inquietude of the tribal elite was widespread even though only a few major 
uprisings made use of Kurdish nationalist discourse.  
The most significant episode that showed the potential of nationalism to 
give voice to growing tribal anxiety in the Kurdish areas was the 1925 
rebellion. Led by Shaykh Said, this revolt mobilised the Kurdish tribes to the 
point that it constituted a real threat to the stability of the Kemalist regime. 
The abolition of the caliphate and the imposition of Turkish as the sole 
national language of the Republic in 1924 were seen as affronts to the 
Kurdish elite. Besides their immediate religious and cultural meaning, these 
initiatives were politically loaded and put in doubt the idea that all Muslim 
elites would be treated equally by the new republic as they were in the old 
empire. Moreover, the wave of Turkish civil servants sent to the Kurdish 
region threatened the prerogative of the Kurdish elite to enforce their will 
on their peasants and to administer justice among their tribesmen. In the 
same years, the Kemalist government discursively showed its hostility 
towards the backwardness of the tribal elite, even threatening to 
expropriate and redistribute their land.148  
 
146 Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, 266-267. 
147 Yadirgi, The Political Economy, 168. 
148 Despite the government’s threatening statements, a very limited form of land 
redistribution was implemented in 1929 (Law 1505) with only negligible effects on 
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Shaykh Said of Palu, a prominent Naqshbandi master and powerful landlord, 
planned and organise the revolt with the Azadi (freedom) committee. Heirs 
of the late-Ottoman Kurdist clubs, the founders of Azadi had a background 
similar to the previous organisations – urban and state employees – but it 
was predominantly formed by action-oriented Ottoman army officers.149 In 
early 1925, in a climate of rising tensions in the Kurdish provinces, Shaykh 
Said declared the restoration of the caliphate and called for a member of 
the Ottoman house to become the King of Kurdistan. The revolt did not last 
for more than a few months and exhausted its force around the siege of 
Diyarbakır which remained loyal to Ankara. Notwithstanding its limited 
duration, Ankara had to organise a massive military intervention and guerrilla 
activities by tribal forces continued for years. The Ararat revolt (1927-1930) 
can be seen as a continuation of Shaykh Said’s, also due to a similar 
interaction between nationalist and tribal elements.150 Moreover, the social 
engineering project aimed at dispersing the Alevi Kurdish population of the 
Dersim region through mass deportation provoked a popular revolt in 1936 
that was led by Sufi leaders and answered with the mass extermination of 
rebels and civilians.151 
The Shaykh Said rebellion is the most significant episode of Kurdish feudal 
nationalism in Turkey. The rapid adoption of nationalist jargon by the tribal 
elite had been a consequence of the reforms that directly threatened its 
power in the region. This discourse had been borrowed by nationalist 
organisations that saw Kurdish nationalism as a progressive force for the 
re-birth and modernisation of the south-east. But its employment by Shaykh 
Said and the other rebel leaders reflected more closely traditional sources 
of legitimacy or at least a mixture of modernity and tradition. The nationalist 
nature of the proclamation of a Kingdom of Kurdistan, for example, is 
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contradicted by the invitation of an Ottoman Turkish prince to take the 
throne. As Hamit Bozarslan points out, the Azadi Committee was filled with 
intellectuals and former Ottoman officers of Kurdish extraction but educated 
in Western-style schools and academies and often with a background in the 
Young Turks’ and Kemalist movements. This urban elite “considered the 
tribal chiefs and religious brotherhoods to be mutegallibiyya (usurpers) or 
obstacles preventing the Kurds from accessing ‘civilisation’. They rejected 
the state mainly because it was a Turkish – i.e. non-Kurdish – state”.152 
However, the lack of social bases of this group forced them to lend their 
national credentials to the tribal forces “which initially rejected the state not 
because it was a Turkish state but simply because it imposed and militarised 
borders.”153  
The defeat of the Shaykh Said rebellion convinced the Kemalist elite that 
the militarization of the Kurdish region was the only way to avoid the 
resurgence of reactionary forces. The wave of repression, executions and 
deportation employed by the Turkish state in the following two decades 
transformed the relations of power in the region. The implementation of the 
Kemalist reforms was even accelerated by the Kurdish revolts. For example, 
in 1925, Atatürk took advantage of the Shaykh Said revolt to close down all 
the Sufi brotherhoods of the country, seen as representative of a backward 
and irrational form of Islam but also as powerhouses for supporters of the 
previous regime.154 The repression vertically hit the whole society of the 
Kurdish region and particularly curbed the power of the tribes which, by the 
1940s, had lost all their capability of military mobilization. Prominent tribal 
families were decimated, and the survivors had to come to terms with the 
Kemalist regime. The outcome of this process was the transformation of the 
Kurdish elite, a process completed with its gradual re-integration into the 
political system in the 1950s. Tribal dynamics gradually gave way to a new 
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form of social stratification in which the members of the elite were less and 
less tribal and religious leaders and more and more absentee landlords.  
Despite their national character, these revolts can still be read within the 
framework of the Ottoman ‘tacit contract’ to negotiate power between the 
centre and the periphery and, according to Bozarslan, that is probably the 
mindset with which the majority of the participants joined the revolts.155 
However, unlike the Ottoman Empire, the new Turkish state had no intention 
to negotiate sovereignty over its border areas with the local elite. The result 
of this process was that the Kurdish elite had to abandon their allegiance to 
both traditional forms of power and to any political form of Kurdish identity. 
However, as Chapter 7 will show, they soon realised that adopting a mild 
version of Kemalism – generally that of the conservative parties that 
dominated Turkish politics from the 1950s – was enough to be integrated 
into the national political system and to have the Turkish security apparatus 
protecting their property from a more and more turbulent peasantry. In this 
context, feudal nationalism disappeared from the Turkish context and 
Kurdish nationalism only re-emerged in a radically different form as the 
instrument of a new generation of Kurds of peasant extraction. Turkey’s 
Kurdish nationalists in the 1960s and 1970s will draw upon different 
ideological sources and will direct their actions against both the Turkish 
state and the very same Kurdish landowning class that led the feudal revolts 
in the interwar period. 
 
Kurdish revolts in Hashemite Iraq  
The situation of the Kurds who remained south of the Turkish border was 
quite different. After the surrender of the Ottomans in October 1918, British 
forces recognised the authority of the Kurdish tribal leaders who controlled 
the mountainous eastern and northern parts of Mosul province. Since the 
British were promising autonomy for the Kurdish areas, Kurdish chiefs 
tended to recognise British rule and seemed to be much more worried by 
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the possibility of being incorporated into the Arab state centred in Baghdad. 
Their first concern was to keep state officials as far away as possible from 
their estates and distant British rule could have allowed them the same 
degree of autonomy they had enjoyed under the Ottoman Empire. In these 
years and in those that followed the establishment of the British mandate of 
Iraq in 1921 under the Arab Hashemite monarchy, the Kurdish tribes rose 
numerous times against the intrusiveness of the new state and its colonial 
patron and demanded the fulfilment of the early promises of local autonomy. 
Britain repressed the early revolts and, once Iraq was given partial 
independence in 1932, ultimately sided with Baghdad as the stability of the 
Hashemite state was regarded as strategically important to its wider 
colonial interests. The Kurdish revolts that took place in the interwar period 
in Iraq present the traits of feudal nationalism. They were led by powerful 
religious leaders and the Kurdish nationalist urban intelligentsia was absent 
at least until the late 1930s. Townspeople tended to be hostile to the tribal 
leaders often welcoming British and Iraqi repression while the peasantry 
was indifferent to the revolt when not in revolt itself against their abusive 
Kurdish landowners.  
In the last months of 1918, British authorities started making deals with 
Kurdish tribal leaders to stabilise the region after the withdrawal of Ottoman 
forces. Among them, Shaykh Mahmud Barzanji was appointed as governor 
of Sulaymaniyah, the biggest Kurdish town in Iraq. Mahmud Barzanji hailed 
from a centuries-old family of Qadiri shaykhs and was a large landowner 
who held great authority over the tribes of the Sulaymaniyah hinterland.156 
The recognition of local authority by British officers was sought by these 
tribal leaders as a form of external legitimation that did not imply any actual 
control since, in this early period, the British had little or no military presence 
in the region. Shaykh Mahmud from his position of governor of 
Sulaymaniyah claimed to be the ruler of the entire Kurdish region, a position 
that the tribal leaders who had been assigned different districts had no 
 
156 Michael Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 
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intention to acknowledge.157 Moreover, Shaykh Mahmud was extremely 
unpopular among the townspeople of Sulaymaniyah who were concerned 
by his authoritarian and violent methods.158  
In spring 1919, the British attempts to mediate among the various actors 
pushed Shaykh Mahmud to start a revolt that British troops took a few 
months to quell. Despite the references made by the rebels to the Kurdish 
nationalist character of the revolt, this first episode of feudal nationalism in 
Iraq was extremely localised and both the people of Sulaymaniyah and many 
Kurdish tribes of the area remained neutral when not openly siding with the 
British. The revolt was followed by a long period of tribal disorders. Shaykh 
Mahmud’s nationalist claims must be put into perspective. On the one hand, 
his contacts with Mustafa Kemal, intent on fighting Turkey’s independence 
war, show that he had not yet abandoned the ideal of Muslim unity. On the 
other hand, Shayk Mahmud’s revolt was part of the wider tribal agitations 
against the British that affected both Arab and Kurdish provinces of Iraq in 
the immediate aftermath of the war and that escalated in the 1920 country-
wide revolt.    
As Chapter 4 will discuss more extensively, British colonial authorities were 
extremely keen to appease tribal leaders. To restore order, they recalled 
Shaykh Mahmud from his exile in southern Iraq in November 1922 but, at 
the beginning of the following year, the shaykh was again in revolt. Iraqi and 
British forces were able to retake Sulaymaniyah only in May 1924 and 
Shaykh Mahmud kept raiding the area until 1932 when he was defeated. In 
the meantime, a new revolt had been initiated in 1931 by another shaykh, 
Ahmed Barzani,159 who claimed his right to collect revenues among his tribe 
and refused to accept an Iraqi garrison in his lands. Baghdad suppressed 
the revolt only in 1933 and Ahmed Barzani was sent into exile. 
 
157 Tahiri, The Structure of Kurdish Society, 55-56. 
158 For Mahmud Barzanji’s rule of Sulaymaniyah and the revolts discussed below, 
see Mcdowall, A Modern History, 151-183. 
159 Despite the assonance, there is no relation between the Barzanji and the Barzani 
families. 
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The feudal nationalist revolts of the 1920s and 1930s in Iraqi Kurdistan did 
not have any real followers apart from a small number of tribal landowners 
and their fellow tribesmen. Despite the early usage of a nationalist 
vocabulary, the urban middle class of the towns kept fearing the 
abusiveness of the tribal leaders and refused to bend to their rule. 
Moreover, the Kurdish towns, located in the valleys, were economically 
connected to the Mesopotamian plain far more than they were with each 
other and only Sulaymaniyah, the biggest of them, demanded a degree of 
administrative autonomy.160  
It was precisely in Sulaymaniyah that a group of middle-class intellectuals 
established, in 1922, the first Kurdish nationalist organisation in Iraq, the 
Association for the Independence of Kurdistan.161 The association, 
established by former Ottoman officer Mustafa Pasha Yamulki strongly 
opposed Shaykh Mahmoud’s rule over the city due to his violent methods 
and was closed down by the shaykh. Urban-based Kurdish nationalism 
experienced significant growth in the 1930s. The nationalist circles in 
Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk, along with Kurdish students in Baghdad and 
Mosul, found several nationalist organisations almost exclusively of 
progressive, socialist, and – more and more – anti-colonial orientation.162 In 
addition to the aforementioned hostility of the townspeople to the tribal and 
landowning elite, this urban intelligentsia was pushed to the left by the Iraqi 
Communist Party (ICP) that, established in 1934, was the only national party 
officially in favour of Kurdish self-determination.163 Like in Turkey, Kurdish 
nationalist organisations in Iraq initially strongly opposed the power of the 
tribal landowners whom they saw as a backward force that prevented the 
modernisation of the region. However, as the events unfolded in the 1940s, 
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the lack of military prowess and manpower of the urban intelligentsia forced 
them to cooperate with the tribal leaders from a subordinate position. 
In 1943, Ahmed Barzani’s brother Mullah Mustafa started a new revolt.164 
Despite the small size and limited geographical reach of the revolt, the 
mountainous nature of the terrain helped Barzani keep the Iraqi army at bay 
for two years.165 Due to the relative success of the revolt, elements of the 
emergent urban national movement became more and more aware of the 
necessity of collaboration with tribal forces. Some groups started 
supporting the revolt providing national legitimation to what would have 
otherwise been a merely tribal uprising. Barzani was simply demanding 
amnesty for those involved in the 1931 revolt and the possibility to settle 
again in Barzan, his ancestral land. Kurdish historian Fared Assasard claims 
that, when Sulaymaniyah-based nationalists asked him to include 
administrative autonomy in his demands, he could not understand what they 
meant.166 When Barzani’s forces were overpowered by the Iraqi army in late 
1945, he and large part of his men were forced to cross the Iranian border.  
North-western Iran had been under the occupation of the Soviet Union since 
1941 and nationalist elements of both the Azeri and the Kurdish minorities 
had set up their own Soviet-backed provisional governments. In December 
1945, local Kurdish nationalists proclaimed a Kurdish republic in the town of 
Mahabad and elected Qazi Muhammad as its president. The fact that Qazi 
Muhammed was a member of a prestigious religious family167 shows that the 
Kurdish movement in Iran was following similar dynamics of those in Turkey 
and Iraq, where the weak urban nationalists had to compromise with the 
traditional elite.168 The arrival of Mustafa Barzani from Iraq gave the 
 
164 McDowall, A Modern History, 290-293. 
165 Kerim Yıldiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future (London: Pluto 
Press, 2005) 169-170. 
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168 This dynamic of interaction is particularly interesting in the context of the 
Mahabad Republic, as Kurdish forces had the chance to experiment with a degree 
of self-government. According to Hamit Bozarslan, the Mahabad experiment 
resulted in a mix of modernising reforms and tribal and religious politics. Hamit 
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Mahabad Republic a pan-Kurdish dimension and strengthened its nationalist 
credentials. In summer 1946, Qazi Muhammed promoted the establishment 
of a unified political party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDPI) and was 
elected as its president. This example was followed by Mullah Mustafa who 
sent a letter to most of the Kurdish organisations in Iraqi Kurdistan asking to 
unite in a single Kurdish national party.169 Despite the widespread hostility 
towards the tribal leadership, most Iraqi-Kurdish nationalists followed 
Barzani’s request and founded the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).170 
The congress also elected Mullah Mustafa as the president of the party. The 
Mahabad Republic did not survive the year.171 As the Red Army withdrew, 
Iranian troops entered Mahabad in December 1946 and sent Qazi 
Muhammed to the gallows. Mullah Mustafa was able to flee and, with a 
handful of his men, found shelter beyond the Soviet border. Ibrahim Ahmed 
– who was to become one of the most prominent Kurdish nationalists in Iraq 
– claimed that Mahabad taught them to “never again let tribal leaders lead 
their national liberation revolution and to take a new enlightened true 
liberation course that will match the changing world condition and 
progress.”172  
The relations of power on the ground had forced Kurdish urban nationalists 
in Iraq to accept the alliance with the tribal elite and to surrender the 
leadership of the emerging national movement. However, the experience of 
Mahabad marked also the beginning of complex and troublesome relations 
between urban and tribal Kurdish nationalists in Iraq. Tensions between 
 
Bozarslan, '"Being in Time": The Kurdish Movement and Universal Quests' in The 
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of the relationship between Kurdish nationalism and traditional social structure in 
Iran, see Farideh Koohi-Kamali, The Political Development of the Kurds in Iran: 
Pastoral Nationalism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 165-196. 
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these two components and their conflicting class bases were to become a 
constant feature of the Kurdish national movement in Iraq. As Chapter 4 will 
show, the continuous conflicts within the KDP will finally lead to the split of 
the urban and leftist component that, in 1975, established the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK). 
 
Conclusion 
After a brief introduction to the social and political context of the Kurdish 
region between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this chapter 
discussed the emergence of the Kurdish national movement in the interwar 
period. The Kurdish revolts that took place in Turkey and Iraq after World 
War I had some common characteristics that allow us to group them under 
the label of feudal nationalism. In these countries, the Kurdish traditional 
elite revolted against the centralisation project promoted by the new nation-
states that succeeded the Ottoman Empire. These revolts had a 
predominantly tribal character and Kurdish urban nationalists, unable to 
take up arms against the state on their own, joined in a subordinate position 
despite their ideological opposition to the conservative tribal elite. The form 
of nationalism that this process generated was filled with the particular 
demands of the Kurdish tribal elite which emptied it of its initial progressive 
character. As the chapter argued, denying the national character of these 
revolts, due to the prominent role played by the tribal aristocracy, 
reproduces a narrow understanding of nationalism as a bourgeois and 
European phenomenon. On the contrary, reducing the Kurdish revolts to a 
selfless expression of nationalist feelings triggered by the denial of Kurdish 
identity erases their conflictual nature and fails to explain the lack of 
participation of the Kurdish masses. This chapter thus deployed the concept 
of feudal nationalism to explain the undisputable national character of these 
revolts – as their goal was the establishment of a Kurdish state – but also 
their extremely narrow social basis. Rather than a contradiction of history, 
feudal nationalism was the consistent response of the Kurdish landowning 
class to the modernisation process of the new states that, by challenging 
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their power over the Kurdish periphery, threatened their reproduction as a 
class.  
The era of feudal nationalism shaped the subsequent developments of the 
Kurdish national movement in two important ways. First, the creation of a 
Kurdish transnational political space. Each revolt, even if not directly linked 
to the others, was part of a single phenomenon that presented similar 
characteristics in all the Kurdish regions. The Kurdish leaders of these years 
took inspiration from the Kurdish revolts in the neighbouring countries and 
many Kurds started looking at Kurdistan as a single trans-border political 
space. Cooperation among the Kurdish rebels had its highest moment in 
1946, when Mustafa Barzani and his tribesmen from Iraqi Kurdistan 
participated in the short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in Iran. 
Mahabad acquired a central role in the narrative of Kurdish nationalism.  The 
Kurdistan Democratic Party founded in Mahabad established a sister party 
in each of the Kurdish regions and, despite never achieving operative unity, 
became the first Kurdish transnational party.173  
The second long-term consequence of the feudal revolts was the 
diversification of the Kurdish movement. This chapter sets the stage for the 
development of the different trajectories of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey 
and Iraq as rooted in the different outcomes of the initial and unitary ‘feudal 
phase’. The Kurdish feudal elite that led the revolts of the interwar period 
underwent different processes of incorporation into the new states of 
Turkey and Iraq. As Chapter 4 shows, the Kurdish revolts of the 1920s and 
1930s in Iraq must be placed within the broader context of the tribal 
agitations that took place throughout the country. The response of the 
British colonial authority was to appease the tribal elite by legally legitimising 
their land-grabbing tendencies and turning them into a powerful landowning 
class in support of the Hashemite monarchy. The empowerment of the Iraqi-
Kurdish traditional elite made it the best candidate to raise the Kurdish 
national flag when – with the end of the monarchy in 1958 – the revolutionary 
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Iraqi regime directly threatened their power over the land. Chapter 7 shows 
how, in Turkey, the crushing defeat of the Kurdish revolts of the interwar 
period forced the Kurdish elite to accept a position of subordination into the 
new Turkish state and to give up the political meaning of their Kurdish 
identity. Given this context, Kurdish nationalists in the 1970s turned to the 
peasantry to challenge both the Turkish state and the Kurdish tribal 
landowners. In these terms, the present chapter showed the origins of the 
divergence for the unfolding of two – opposite in their class dimension – 
trajectories of Kurdish nationalism. 
 
 
105 
 
  
 
 
106 
 
     Chapter 4 
Land Reform and Kurdish Revolt in 
Postcolonial Iraq (1946-1991) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter covers the history of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq from the 
development of the anti-colonial movement in the 1940s to the 
establishment of Kurdish self-rule in 1991. After the failure of the feudal 
revolts of the interwar period, Kurdish nationalism became temporarily a 
marginal force in Iraq as the Kurdish tribal and landowning elite was 
integrated into the country’s ruling class. This process was actively 
promoted by Britain, Iraq’s colonial overlord, according to the project of 
creating a class of large landowners in support of the Hashemite monarchy. 
As the chapter shows, the history of Iraq and its Kurdish provinces in the 
1940s and 1950s can be told with virtually no reference to Kurdish 
nationalism. In these decades, politics in the Kurdish region was, as in the 
rest of Iraq, dominated by the growing movement against the monarchy and 
its colonial protector as well as by the anti-landlord mobilisation of the 
impoverished peasantry. The resurgence of Kurdish nationalism in the early 
1960s must thus be placed within the history and political economy of 
postcolonial Iraq and the restructuring of its class structure under British 
rule that tremendously empowered tribal landowners. Kurdish nationalism 
only emerged as an important political force after the Iraqi Revolution of 
1958 that brought an end to the Iraqi monarchy and to British influence 
threatening the interests of the Kurdish elite. The Kurdish landowners 
revolted in response to the project of land redistribution and taxation 
promoted by the post-revolutionary Iraqi government, giving the Kurdish 
revolt that started in 1961 and lasted until 1975 a strong class character.  
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The 1961 uprising was triggered by the spontaneous revolt of tribal 
landowners against the empowerment of the peasantry and the 
implementation of the land reform, rather than by Kurdish nationalist forces 
who only reluctantly lent their support. Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the leader 
of the Kurdish revolts of the 1930s and early 1940s, became the natural 
point of reference of the uprising thanks to his status in Kurdish tribal 
society and the justified perception that his nationalist project was 
compatible with the class interest of the revolting aghas. The urban-based 
and leftist nationalists leading the KDP, unable to link their national claims 
to the wider struggle for democracy in Iraq, were forced – like in the interwar 
period – to follow Barzani from a subordinate position. The KDP provided 
nationalist legitimacy to the tribal revolt of the 1960s and put aside its 
demands for social transformation. The situation only changed in the 
second half of the 1970s, when the defeat of Barzani’s revolt and the growth 
of the Kurdish left – fuelled by a tumultuous process of urbanisation – 
allowed for the establishment of the PUK, a Kurdish nationalist force 
alternative to Barzani’s KDP. This chapter explains the social origins of the 
Kurdish revolt of 1961-1975 in the set of class relations imposed on Iraq by 
colonial rule. The relations of power between the peasantry, the urban 
middle classes, and the tribal landowners shaped the development of 
Kurdish nationalism in Iraq and imposed the conditions for long-term 
dynamics such as the division between KDP and PUK. Moreover, the events 
of the 1960s were central to the development of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq 
as they determined a set of power relations between the different class 
actors that gave the Kurdish national movement in the country a 
predominantly conservative character. 
 
Class and Politics in Colonial Iraq 
The participation of Iraqi-Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani in the 
Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 1946, was a critical moment for the history 
of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq. The establishment of the KDP in the same 
year constituted the culmination of the Kurdish revolts that followed the 
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creation of the Iraqi state in the 1920s and 1930s. This momentous year 
marks, however, also the end of the first phase of Kurdish nationalism in 
Iraq. As Mullah Mustafa took refuge in the Soviet Union, the KDP went 
underground and remained marginal until its re-emergence after the Iraqi 
revolution of 1958 when Brigadier ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim overthrew the 
Hashemite monarchy. 
The forms in which the Kurdish movement re-emerged after the 1958 
revolution were shaped by the structural transformation that Iraq underwent 
in its first decades of existence. Largely the ‘invention’ of British colonial 
administrators, the mandate-state of Iraq was created in 1920 by the 
merging of the Ottoman vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra according to 
the broader geopolitical interests of the British Empire.  The new state 
included an extremely diverse population, with a clear Arab Shia majority 
and two significant Arab and Kurdish Sunni components as well as 
numerous smaller groups including Sunni and Shi’a Turkmen, Christians of 
different denominations, Kurdish-speaking Yazidis, and a sizeable Jewish 
community that largely fled to Israel in the 1950s. The dominant role that the 
Sunni minority had played in Ottoman times was preserved by the British 
who imposed on the country a ‘foreign’ Sunni king, Faisal of the Hashemite 
family from Hejaz that had supported them during World War I. Apart from 
drawing borders in disregard of ethnic and religious identities, the projects 
of social and institutional engineering promoted by the colonial overlord 
shaped the history of the country for decades to come. The relations 
between Britain and Iraq were regulated by a series of Anglo-Iraqi treaties 
the first of which, in 1922, established the mandate state of Iraq. The 1930 
treaty – revised and renewed in 1948 – recognised Iraq’s nominal 
independence – proclaimed in 1932 – though ensuring wide British influence 
in the form of military presence and control over the country’s foreign policy 
and oil resources. Until the new revolutionary government in 1958 
repudiated the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, the relationship between the two 
countries was, in all but name, that of semi-colonial rule.  
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Britain’s approach to Iraq was largely shaped by two contradictory 
objectives.174 On the one hand, the colonial power had to make sure that the 
new institutional arrangement would not threaten British monopoly over the 
oil of Iraq and would preserve the colony’s geopolitical function of protecting 
wider British interests in the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, to reduce its 
own financial burden, Britain needed a viable Iraqi government seen by its 
people as legitimate enough to maintain public order. This contradiction was 
ultimately resolved in favour of Britain’s colonial interests and at the expense 
of the King’s legitimacy and popularity and the early Iraqi state was thus 
based on a “duality of power”, as “cabinet ministers, as well as provincial 
governors, district executives, and city mayors, were assigned British 
‘advisors’ whose views were expected to be taken “into careful 
consideration” and who deeply shaped the early stages of state-building.175  
British colonial rule had long-term consequences on the process of class 
stratification of Iraq, particularly through its tribal policy. The social and 
economic history of this period has been masterfully captured by Hanna 
Batatu’s monumental work on the social structure of monarchical Iraq. In his 
1978 The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movement of Iraq, Batatu 
provides a wealth of data on the structural transformation of the first four 
decades of Iraqi history.176 He describes in length the process through which 
British administrators empowered tribal leaders177 - both in Arab Iraq and in 
the Kurdish areas – in order to create a ruling class of conservative 
landowners that would be inherently pro-British. Already in 1916, in the 
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midst of the war, the British instituted the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes 
Regulation – confirmed by royal decree in 1924 – that made the tribal chiefs 
responsible for administrating justice among their tribesmen, giving them 
tremendous power and little accountability in the process. The gradual 
process of de-tribalisation which Iraq had been undergoing since the end of 
the nineteenth century due to its gradual integration into the global markets 
was suddenly reversed, “the progress of villages toward independence from 
surrounding tribes forbidden, and the escape of peasant tribesmen from the 
shaykhs’ lands prevented.”178  
The process of privatisation of communal lands initiated by the Ottoman 
Land Code (1858) was greatly accelerated by the Land Settlement Laws of 
1932 and 1938, “which facilitated the transfer into [the shaykhs’] hands of 
vast expanses of state and customary tribal land.”179 This process took place 
evenly in both Arab and Kurdish Iraq: in 1958, five of the twenty largest 
landowners of the country were Kurdish (or Arabized Kurds), including the 
single largest one (Table 2). With the intent of creating a solid class of 
landowners, the British rigidly classified tribes and subtribes and coercively 
imposed the shaykhs over their fellow tribesmen, through a process of 
social engineering that “decisively transformed the shaykh’s place in Iraqi 
society and the character of his political role.”180  
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which British policy aims were to be realized.” Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The 
Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2003), 83-84. 
 
 
111 
 
 
The new power of the tribal elite was sealed in the political institutions of 
the new state. When Iraq had sent its representative to the Ottoman 
parliament in 1914, none of them was a tribal leader. By contrast, among the 
99 members of the Iraqi Constitutional Assembly elected in 1924, “no fewer 
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than 34 were shaykhs and aghas.”181 Before the inaugural session of the 
assembly, these tribal chiefs took a public oath “to support the [Anglo-Iraqi] 
Treaty and not to take any action without common consent,” to expand the 
Tribal Disputes Regulation, and to prevent the government from alienating 
the land they had recently appropriated.182 The oath showed that, at the 
very moment of the establishment of the Iraqi state, this group already 
demonstrated a significant degree of class consciousness that transcended 
ethnic and sectarian divides as well as the awareness that their class 
interests were best served by British colonial rule. As Batatu points out, the 
decaying power of the shaykh was resuscitated by colonialism as “life was 
pumped into it artificially by an outside force that had an interest in its 
perpetuation.”183 The consolidation of the shaykhly class as the dominant 
economic and political group made direct colonial rule redundant: Britain 
recognised Iraq’s nominal independence in 1932 while maintaining control 
of its oil and foreign policy. 
The concentration of a large part of the county’s arable lands in the hands 
of a few – largely tribal – families who were also the holders of political power 
prevented economic development and fuelled social conflicts. Even if 
agriculture constituted the largest sector of the economy, landowners were 
barely taxed and the state’s revenues had to rely on unequal indirect 
taxation. Moreover, as long as the landlords could use their political power 
to expand their estates at the expenses of small farmers and uncultivated 
lands, they had no incentive to invest capital in the modernisation of 
agriculture. The system was therefore characterised by a very low level of 
productivity and accumulation was sustained through land-grabbing – 
favoured by the collusion of the state apparatus – and the increasing 
exploitation of the peasantry.184 Low productivity and exploitation drove the 
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peasants towards forms of passive and active resistance. Land desertion 
was the most common reaction: As hungry peasants fled the countryside, 
the urban population of Iraq increased from 30 per cent in the 1930s to 42 
per cent in 1958 and Baghdad’s population doubled. However, one of the 
most important characteristics of the two decades preceding the 1958 
revolution was the spread of rural conflicts. Batatu points out that the 
enrichment of the shaykhs at the expenses of their fellow tribesmen 
undermined tribal loyalties which made the shaykhs “simultaneously rising 
as a class and decaying as a traditional status group.”185 From 1947 to 1958, 
nine major peasant revolts broke out in Iraq, three of which in the Kurdish 
region.186 The first of these revolts, in 1947, took place in the countryside of 
Sulaymaniyah and was directed against Shaykh Latif, the largest landowner 
of the area and son of Mahmud Barzanji who had led the allegedly Kurdish 
nationalist revolts of the 1920s.  
This overview of the structural transformations of Iraq between 1920 and 
1958 shows that the early history of the country can be told with no mention 
of the Kurdish movement. The tribal revolts that took place in the Kurdish 
province of Sulaymaniyah in the early 1920s and that were led by Shaykh 
Mahmud Barzanji, when placed within the history of Iraq, do not look much 
different than the tribal revolts that took place in the rest of the country in 
the same period. In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, a time 
of wide geopolitical transformation and redefinition of borders and 
hierarchies, tribal shaykhs and aghas were in the position to mobilise sizable 
military forces and to renegotiate their power vis-à-vis the new imperial 
rulers. The nation-wide tribal agitations of 1920 – Including Shaykh 
Mahmoud’s Kurdish revolt in Sulaymaniyah – was a decisive moment that, in 
the words of Samira Haj, convinced “colonial officers [to take] systematic 
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measures to legitimize the power of the shaykhly class and their claims to 
the land.”187 As Hanna Batatu’s central argument goes: 
The tribal rebellions of the first decades of the monarchy […] appear 
in retrospect as the gasps of a tribal world approaching its end. The 
rural rebellions of the last decade of the monarchy were of an 
entirely different character. They were rebellions not under shaikhs 
but against them, and were made by tribesmen whose customary 
ideas and norms of life had been shaken to their foundation. […] The 
old, patriarchal, life-furthering relationship which once tied the 
tribesmen to their shaikh had given way to an overlord-quasi-serf 
relationship which chained them to distress and privation, and the 
idea now sank into them that this was not an unalterable state of 
things. The idea was, of course, spread by Communists.188 
This social arrangement was bound to generate the opposition of the 
exploited peasantry. The next section shows how the mobilisation of the 
peasants gave the chance to other class actors such as the industrial 
workers, the urban middle classes and the – thin yet existent – non-tribal 
bourgeoisie to express their grievances against a state organised around 
the interests of the tribal landowning class and of the colonial power. Even 
in the context of growing opposition and unrest of the 1950s, Kurdish 
nationalism maintained a marginal role and social and political struggle in 
the Kurdish region was characterised by anti-landlord and anti-colonial 
mobilisation just as in the rest of Iraq.  
 
The Iraqi Revolution of 1958 
Rising tensions in rural areas, as well as the increasing presence of 
impoverished peasants in the largest cities, constituted fertile ground for 
the growth of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) since its foundation in 1934 
and throughout the 1930s and 1940s. The communists’ demand for land 
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reform resonated among the landless peasants and the party built a strong 
base in the Kurdish north thanks also to its official commitment toward 
Kurdish self-determination. Jalal Jawhar remembers the political 
atmosphere in the Kurdish village where he grew up: 
when communism spread in the 1930s and 40s, there was a lot of 
support in Iraq and Kurdistan for the party. They were against the 
aghas and tribal leaders whom they accused of collaborating with 
the imperialists. They were telling the people that [the ICP] would 
bring back all the land that the aghas and the tribal leaders had taken 
from them.189   
The ICP grew even stronger among the workers of the small industrial sector 
and, in the 1940s, came to dominate a rapidly growing labour union 
movement.190 Despite the fierce repression faced by the labour movement, 
the clandestine work of the ICP to organise and mobilise the urban and rural 
masses provided the opposition to the monarchy with a significant degree 
of popular support. The other two major components of the opposition were 
the National Democratic Party (NDP), expression of the liberal-minded and 
non-tribal bourgeoisie, and the Ba’ath Party, on pseudo-socialist and pan-
Arabist positions, strong among the urban middle class.191  
The reluctance of the other opposition parties to co-operate with the 
communists was only slowly overcome thanks to the national uprisings of 
1948, 1952, and 1956. During the 1940s, all opposition forces came to blame 
Iraq’s underdevelopment on the combined power of the dominant shaykhly 
class and British imperialism sealed in the Hashemite monarchy. The first 
uprising took place on the occasion of the renewal of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty 
in 1948, that confirmed all the privileges previously awarded to Britain. The 
second uprising, in 1952, was partly inspired by the nationalisation of the oil 
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industry in Iran (March 1951) and the Egyptian Revolution (July 1952) that 
exposed the weakening of Britain’s position in the Middle East. The third 
uprising, in 1956, broke out in response to the Baghdad Pact (1955) – that 
locked Iraq in an anti-communist regional alliance sponsored by Britain – and 
in solidarity with Egpyt, under attack during the Suez Crisis. All of these 
revolts were preceded by waves of rural uprisings and workers’ strikes, and 
the social and anti-colonial characters of the opposition to the monarchy 
gradually welded together. After the 1956 uprising, the opposition forces 
formed the United National Front – this time with the inclusion of the ICP – 
that prepared the ground for the revolution of 1958.192 
The coup d’état that overthrew King Faisal in July 1958 was led by Brigadier 
‘Abd al-Karim Qasim and supported by a heterogenous republican front that 
included all the major parties. Qasim’s first major challenge came from within 
this coalition. The pan-Arabist fringes of the NDP and the Ba’athists pushed 
for Iraq to merge into the United Arab Republic, the federation between 
Egypt and Syria established in February 1958 and led by Egyptian President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser. Qasim feared that a union with Egypt would have 
turned him into Nasser’s lieutenant while the National Democrats felt 
anxious about the competition of Egypt’s relatively more advanced industry 
and stronger financial sector. Qasim relied heavily on the ICP to garner 
enough popular support to resist the pan-Arabist sympathies of the urban 
masses. The alliance with the communists helped Qasim crush his pan-
Arabist enemies but turned the ICP into the most powerful political 
organisation of the country. Allowed to operate legally and often supported 
by the government, the ICP experienced, in the first year of the republic, the 
apex of its strength and popularity.193 
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The growth of the ICP was met with apprehension by National Democrats in 
power. Tensions came to the surface when, after the purge of the Ba’athists 
in late 1958, the communists resumed the issue of land redistribution, one 
of the crucial demands of the revolution against the monarchy. In 
September 1958 the government had passed a limited land reform.194 The 
law compensated large landowners for their losses and allowed the 
peasants to buy the confiscated land. However, only rich farmers had the 
means to benefit from the reform whereas most of the landless peasants 
were unable to access the credit necessary to buy the land.195 The land 
reform was supposed to take place in the span of five years, but its 
implementation proved to be very slow. By the end of 1958, the communists 
were pushing for more radical land redistribution and started mobilising the 
peasantry to occupy large estates. Qasim was, however, determined to 
resist the demands of the communists. In summer 1959 the government 
started to systematically dismantle popular organisations such as trade 
unions and peasant societies and to arrest communist cadres 
indiscriminately. In September 1959, Qasim reinstated Martial Law and the 
ICP received an organisational blow from which the Iraqi communist 
movement would never completely recover.  
 
Land reform and Kurdish Revolt  
When the KDP resumed its legal activities after the revolution, the ICP was 
the leading political actor in the Kurdish region. In the preceding decades, 
the political trend of Iraqi Kurdistan had been consistent to that of the whole 
of the country: The Kurdish tribal elite took advantage of their position to 
appropriate communal land and tied their destiny to that of the Arab 
landowning class and the monarchy. The communists were making gains 
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among the peasantry as the land-grabbing and exploitative practices of the 
Kurdish elite loosened tribal and religious loyalties. Kurdish nationalism and 
the KDP survived only thanks to the support of non-tribal middle-class 
Kurds living in the towns – Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk, but also Baghdad – playing 
a role that in terms of class representation was similar to that played by the 
Arab nationalist Ba’ath Party in the rest of Iraq. However, their influence was 
limited by the small size and little political significance of the Kurdish towns. 
Moreover, the Kurdish nationalists were facing the competition of the ICP 
that, unlike the other Iraqi political parties, acknowledged the ethnic 
specificity of the Kurdish region. Between 1946 and 1958, when Mullah 
Mustafa Barzani and his tribesmen were in exile in the Soviet Union, the KDP 
was led by Ibrahim Ahmed, a lawyer from Sulaymaniyah, and his left-leaning 
supporters. As most of these Kurdish nationalists were Marxist and opposed 
tribalism and colonialism, their political discourse often overlapped with that 
of the ICP.196  
Following the fall of the monarchy, the KDP was allowed to resume its 
activities and, in October 1958, Mullah Mustafa returned from exile. At the 
time, the Kurds were natural allies of Qasim’s attempt to avoid the merger 
of Iraq with the United Arab Republic that would have turned them into an 
insignificant minority within a larger Arab polity. The KDP particularly 
benefitted from its close relationship with the communist party, at the time 
the key ally of the government and in November 1958 KDP and ICP signed 
a Covenant of Cooperation.197 In this period, Mullah Mustafa’s role as 
chairman of the KDP was largely symbolic and reflective of his prestige 
among the wider Kurdish population rather than of his influence over the 
party itself that was run by secretary-general Ibrahim Ahmed. Returning 
from a 12-year-long exile, Mullah Mustafa was determined to maintain a low 
political profile vis-à-vis the government and to regain his place within 
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Kurdish tribal society. He toured the region, meeting aghas and shaykhs, 
building alliances but also reactivating dormant tribal rivalries. 
The fall of the King and the advent of a new revolutionary government had 
made the traditional elite countrywide increasingly anxious. A monarchy that 
recognised and legitimised traditional forms of power had been replaced by 
a government that spoke a language of modernisation and that painted 
tribal leaders and shaykhs as forces of the past. Moreover – and more 
importantly – the land reform represented a direct threat to their position 
within the class structure of the country and the alliance of Qasim with the 
communists indicated that the state was no longer going to protect them 
from revolting peasants. In the Kurdish region, the inquietude of the tribal 
chiefs did not only have the social dimension of a landowning class scared 
by the rise of the communists and their cooperation with the KDP. The return 
of Mullah Mustafa and his good relationship with Baghdad had also a 
disrupting effect on inter-tribal relations, making the tribes historically 
hostile to the Barzanis and their associates increasingly nervous. It is in this 
context of a rapid deterioration of the established relations of power that 
the tribal agitation of the post-revolutionary periods must be understood. In 
the spring of 1959, the Kurdish tribes of the Baradost area took up arms 
against the government. The suppression of the Baradost uprising was a 
joint effort by the Iraqi Army, the peasant societies backed by the 
communists and the KDP, and Barzani’s tribesmen.198 For Kurdish historian 
Wadie Jwaideh, the revolt of the Kurdish Baradosts was, like that of the Arab 
Shammar in Mosul just a couple of months earlier, a “belated reaction of the 
conservative and feudal elements against the July revolution.”199 
In the course of 1959, however, alliances began to shift again. As Qasim 
gradually turned against the ICP, Barzani pressured the KDP leadership to 
break with the communists and, in November 1958, the KDP suspended its 
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cooperation with the ICP.200 Several decades of work of the left-leaning 
intellectuals based in Sulaymaniyah to link the Kurdish question to the 
broader struggle of the subaltern classes were swept away as Ibrahim 
Ahmed and his followers were marginalised. As the Kurdish movement re-
emerged as a political force in post-revolutionary Iraq, the relations of power 
within it proved to be the same as in the interwar period. The urban and 
progressive elements had to capitulate once again to the preponderant 
power of their tribal allies. Barzani had cared little about the KDP since his 
return, he had independently pursued his tribal diplomacy and developed a 
direct relationship with Baghdad. But when the policies and alliances of the 
KDP did not match his own, he imposed his view on the party. For the 
moment, Ibrahim Ahmed remained secretary-general of the party but the 
centre of power of the Kurdish movement was no longer the politburo of the 
KDP but Mullah Mustafa and his men. 
By the end of 1959, Qasim had eliminated his pan-Arabist rivals, significantly 
curbed the power of the communists, and was growing increasingly wary of 
the dominant position built up by Mullah Mustafa Barzani in the Kurdish 
region. The tribes hostile to the Barzanis were aware that Qasim’s concerns 
matched their own and, in November, the chiefs of the Zebari, Surchi, and 
Raikani tribes turned to Baghdad for protection.201 Clashes between 
Barzanis and Zebaris resumed in spring 1960 – the climate of the Kurdish 
valleys discouraged wintertime warfare – and, this time, Baghdad started to 
supply the latter with weapons. Throughout 1960, Qasim and Barzani 
deployed their tribal diplomacy to gain the support of the Kurdish tribes, 
including the ones that they had fought against just one year before.202 This 
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conflict by proxy had nothing to do with Kurdish nationalism and followed 
the traditional pattern of state-tribe relations: As a tribal chief became too 
powerful, the central government armed the rival tribes to restore the 
balance of power in the region and to avoid the creation of alternative 
centres of power in the country’s periphery.  
In 1961, since tribal warfare was resumed after the winter pause, Barzani’s 
forces made significant progress against their foes and, in summer, the 
Zebaris were increasingly isolated as their tribal allies, one by one, left the 
anti-Barzani coalition. Qasim was still reluctant to confront Barzani directly 
in the hope that they could eventually reach an agreement.203 However, 
different dynamics were to precipitate the situation. Since 1960, the 
government had started implementing the Land Reform in the Kurdish areas 
and, in the spring of 1961, had imposed a land tax.204 In June 1961, a 
delegation of tribal chiefs from the southern part of the Kurdish region 
travelled to Baghdad to petition Qasim to abolish the and amend the reform. 
As Qasim refused to meet them, the tribal chiefs returned to the Kurdish 
region committed not “to pay the tax or to allow the implementation of the 
agrarian reform.”205 The rebellion spread rapidly, easily gaining the support 
of the Kurdish landowning class. In the course of the summer, the rebels 
were increasingly in contact with Barzani who was fighting his tribal enemies 
further north. In September, the revolt escalated when tribal forces in the 
rebel areas attacked a column of Iraqi troops.206 Although the revolting 
landowners naturally looked to Barzani for help, Mullah Mustafa was still 
determined to avoid open warfare with Baghdad and tried to leave with his 
men for Syria. However, the situation was decided by Qasim bombing 
 
When the Barzanis appealed to the Baradost for aid that autumn, Qasim gave 
Shaykh Rashid 60,000 dinars to turn them down.” Ibid., 365-366. 
203 Ibid., 366-368. 
204 Rony Gabbay, Communism and Agrarian Reform in Iraq (London: Croom Helm, 
1978), 108-122. 
205 Saʻad Jawad, Iraq and the Kurdish Question, 1958-1970 (London: Ithaca Press, 
1981), 77-78. 
206 O’Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt, 76. 
 
 
122 
 
Mustafa’s position and preventing him from crossing the border.207 The cold 
war between Barzani and Qasim turned into open conflict and Barzani 
became the leader of a wider Kurdish revolt.  
In the Kurdish nationalist narrative, this moment is seen as the beginning of 
the Kurdish Revolution in Iraq both because the fight involved, for the first 
time after the revolution, the Iraqi Army but also because, for the first time, 
a significant proportion of the tribes – yet never all of them – joined the 
forces led by Mustafa Barzani. Interviewed on the subject, the current head 
of the Jaf tribe in the Dukan area Ibrahim depicts the revolt as a national 
revolution: 
It was a national movement. The first step was taken by the tribes, 
then the local police, the KDP […] followed. My dad was a tribal 
leader in the movement. […] my uncle was the first martyr in the 
movement along with three other people. They were the first martyrs 
of the Kurdistan movement, killed on September 11, 1961, near 
Chamchamal. They were killed when they confronted an Iraqi unit 
that was heading to Sulaymaniyah and Dukan. They wanted to stop 
them.208 
Insisting that the Land Reform played a very small role in the uprising, he 
emphasises the chaos brought about by the “communist rule” over the 
country that followed the fall of the monarchy as one of the drivers of the 
tribal revolt revealing its strong class dimension:   
The communist party at that time was influential all over Iraq, 
including Kurdistan. The KDP was weak. […] the shaykhs and aghas 
were assaulted, sometimes even clashes broke out, and people 
were killed! […] The communist chaos was very strong in 1959 and 
1960. […] It continued until 1961 and then tensions between aghas 
and peasants ended because […] in all of the region, the aghas, the 
shaykhs, the bags, the mullahs united. This is how the revolution 
started.209 
As the Barzani forces were increasingly coordinating their war efforts with 
those of the anti-Qasim tribes, the KDP was torn apart by the contradiction 
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between its socialist and its nationalist identities. The tribal agitation in the 
south of the region had an evident class and tribal character that 
contradicted the commitment of the KDP to land redistribution and the party 
initially condemned the revolt as reactionary.210 Moreover, the revolting 
tribes were adamant that they were only going to accept the leadership of 
a fellow tribal chief such as Barzani.211 However, the success of Barzani’s 
tribesmen and the rapid territorial spread of the violence was turning it more 
and more into a Kurdish revolt and the KDP could not afford to be excluded 
by a potentially national revolution. Again, Qasim preferred to choose his 
own enemies and decided on their behalf. On September 23rd, two weeks 
after his first attack on Barzani’s forces, Qasim banned the KDP, forcing the 
entire leadership to join the revolt.212 The support of the KDP was a priceless 
gift to the tribal elite allowing its leadership to present the revolt as a 
national revolution and to hide its original class motives. On the contrary, 
the party gained very little. Several left-leaning intellectuals left the KDP 
claiming that the party had capitulated to the reactionary aghas.213 
Moreover, the party leadership was aware that their contribution to the 
military effort was going to be insignificant and that they risked becoming a 
mere instrument in the hands of Barzani. To maintain a certain degree of 
independence, in December 1962, the KDP established its own military 
forces, the peshmerga, (‘those who face death’) and set up its headquarters 
in Mawat, near Sulaymaniyah and far away from Barzani’s northern 
heartlands.214  
After the winter pause, Barzani started attacking Iraqi troops in March 1962. 
Over the course of the year, the rebel tribal forces gradually developed a 
more defined command structure and the semblance of an army as tribal 
fighters were reinforced by more and more Kurdish deserters from the Iraqi 
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Army.215 Unable to pursue the Kurds in the mountains, the Iraqi Army fought 
a defensive war and made large use of the air forces. The indiscriminate 
bombing and raiding of Kurdish villages by the army contributed 
significantly to the growing popular support for the uprising.216 With the ICP 
gone and the KDP on the side of the uprising, the anti-landowning 
sentiments of the Kurdish rural masses gave way to the terror of the Iraqi 
army. As Jalal Jawhar – a rare Kurdish politician with a peasant background 
– recalls: 
[the Iraqis] saw no difference between a tribal leader and a peasant, 
between a teacher and a student. […] I was a kid in 1963 when they 
looted and burned down our village […] they saw no difference 
between the aghas, the shaykhs, and the people […]  This is why 
people started to think that national oppression is more important 
than the oppression of the aghas. Because national oppression 
meant displacement and death [whereas] the oppression of the 
aghas meant giving up a third of your harvest. It is not the same as 
being displaced and killed.217 
In these conditions, the Kurdish revolt gradually assumed a trans-class 
character though at the cost of framing away any demands for democracy 
and redistribution and accepting the leadership of the conservative aghas.  
The Kurdish forces that were still on the government’s side – and that the 
rebels derogatorily called jash, ‘little donkey’ – were declining vertiginously. 
By the end of summer, most of the anti-Barzani tribes had given up, 
switched to the rebels or became neutral.218 Moreover, the rebels affiliated 
to the KDP were operating in the Kurdish cities of Kirkuk, Erbil, and, 
especially, Sulaymaniyah, where they had virtual control of the streets at 
night.219 The inconclusiveness of Qasim’s efforts to quell the Kurdish revolt 
eventually contributed to his downfall. On February 8th 1963, Ba’athist 
officers seized power and executed Qasim. Mullah Mustafa and the KDP 
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welcomed the provisional government and agreed on a ceasefire.220 
However, negotiations between Baghdad and the Kurds failed due to 
Barzani’s demands to establish a large Kurdish autonomous region including 
all the ethnically mixed areas and especially the oil-rich Kirkuk as well as a 
separate Kurdish army with its own air forces.221 The talks collapsed in early 
June 1963 and the Iraqi Army attacked again Kurdish positions. 
The war continued until November 1963, when another military coup 
overthrew the government in Baghdad. The new Nasserite faction in power 
agreed on a ceasefire and, after secret negotiations, Barzani and the 
government reached an agreement on February 10th, 1964, that only listed 
vague commitments towards Kurdish rights and did not mention territorial 
autonomy. The KDP leadership, excluded from the negotiations, protested 
the agreement and refused to comply. Tensions rose between Barzani and 
the KDP throughout the spring and, in July, Barzani unilaterally convened a 
party congress. Only a handful of delegates loyal to Ibrahim Ahmed made it 
to the Congress and were arrested by Mullah Mustafa’s men while the entire 
faction was expelled. In mid-July, Barzani’s forces marched on the KDP 
headquarters in Mawat and forced Ibrahim Ahmed and his followers to flee 
to Iran.222 Soon after Mullah Mustafa had ridden himself of his Kurdish rivals, 
relations with Baghdad soured and, in April 1965, an incident precipitated 
the war.  
Mullah Mustafa was, at this point, the undisputed leader of the Kurdish 
revolt, recognised by a large part of the Kurdish tribes but also by what was 
left of the KDP. His rapid turnaround in the negotiations with Baghdad – from 
demanding virtual independence in 1963 to accepting vague and limited 
promises one year later – showed that, by 1964, he felt strong enough to 
take a break from the war with the government and to focus on his internal 
rivals. From its inception as the uprising of a group of disgruntled 
landowners, in just five years, the Kurdish revolt had expanded to the towns 
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and even acquired a certain degree of peasant support. The KDP had 
sacrificed its progressive programme and given nationalist legitimacy to the 
revolt only to be forcibly taken over by Barzani’s forces while its leftist 
leadership was purged. The expulsion of Ibrahim Ahmed’s faction from the 
KDP formalised the historical fracture between the tribal and urban strands 
of the Kurdish movement beyond repair.  
 
The Cold War, and the Collapse of the Kurdish Revolution 
After a new ceasefire in 1966, the war continued only via proxies, with 
Baghdad arming the pro-government tribes hostile to the Barzanis. 
Moreover, the government invited the KDP expellees to return from exile 
and started subsidising them as a counterweight to Barzani’s forces. Ibrahim 
Ahmed, whose leadership of the Kurdish left was increasingly shared with 
his son in law and rising star Jalal Talabani, re-organised his military force 
and clashed with Barzani’s men on numerous occasions.223  
In July 1968, the Iraqi government was removed by a new coup. The Ba’ath 
Party, in power again, showed an unprecedented will to approach the Kurds 
and, between August and September, a series of decrees introduced 
education in the Kurdish language, established a Kurdish Cultural Academy 
and a university in Sulaymaniyah, and recognised Newroz, the Kurdish new 
year, as a national holiday. The main author of this advanced Kurdish policy 
was Iraq’s vice-president Saddam Hussein, a Ba’athist officer, who was 
rapidly emerging as the strongman of the new regime. The Ahmed-Talabani 
faction was, at this time, the main Kurdish partner of the government. The 
Ba’athists had a clear interest in delegitimising Barzani but the partnership 
with Ibrahim Ahmed and Talabani also had an ideological underpinning. Both 
groups linked their nationalism to a broader project of modernisation and 
socialist policies and viewed Barzani as a reactionary feudal leader and as 
the fifth column of imperialism due to his growing relationships with all of 
 
223  Ibid., 205. 
 
 
127 
 
Iraq’s enemies such as Iran, Israel, and the United States.224 In autumn, 
clashes between Kurdish factions led to a new phase of direct – if low-
intensity – fighting.225  
Rising tensions with Iran convinced Baghdad to reopen negotiations with 
Barzani and a peace agreement was signed in March 1970. The agreement 
promised the institution of an autonomous Kurdish region and the Kurds 
gained ministerial posts as well as the governors of the Kurdish provinces 
of Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, and Dohuk.226 By the end of the year, the government 
had amended the constitution, took steps towards the economic 
development of the Kurdish north, and, while the pro-government jash were 
disbanded, Barzani’s peshmerga started receiving a salary from Baghdad.227  
After this initial phase of optimism, however, the relationship between 
Barzani and Baghdad gradually deteriorated. On the one hand, the Kurds 
accused the government of promoting an Arabisation policy to change the 
demographic balance of Kirkuk. On the other hand, Baghdad was aware that 
Barzani had never stopped smuggling weapons from Iran. Emboldened by 
Tehran’s supply of heavy weapons and anti-aircraft systems, Barzani 
demanded Kirkuk as the capital of the Kurdish region. Negotiations lingered 
on until the beginning of 1974 when, in March, the government decided to 
promulgate a unilateral and limited Autonomy Law for the Kurdish region.228 
As Barzani rejected the plan, war with Baghdad broke out again. 
The escalation of the first half of the 1970s was closely related to broader 
regional and international dynamics. As the Shah of Iran was growing more 
assertive – and more pro-active in his support for Barzani – Baghdad 
became inclined to make unprecedented concessions to the Kurds. 
However, neither side was willing to compromise on the question of Kirkuk 
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that, at the time, provided a large part of the country’s oil revenues. The 
control of Kirkuk would have made the Kurdish region virtually independent 
which was what Barzani ultimately wanted. In 1972, the signature of the 
Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and the nationalisation of the oil industry 
in Iraq added new reasons for the United States and Iran to push the Kurds 
to revolt. In 1973, combined financial efforts from the United States, Iran, 
and Israel provided the Kurds with one million dollars per month, a figured 
that was further increased in 1974.229 The new phase of the Iraqi-Kurdish 
war reached unprecedented intensity, due to the heavy weaponry at 
Barzani’s disposal and the direct assistance of Iranian special forces.230 On 
the other hand, the Iraqi Army had been reinforced by Soviet supplies and 
by the much greater resources made available by the nationalised oil 
industry.  
However, the deeper involvement of foreign powers in the war was also the 
reason for its sudden end. On March 6th, 1975, Saddam Hussein and the 
Shah met in Algiers and signed an agreement that settled their border 
dispute in favour of Tehran. On the same day, Iran and its allies ceased to 
support the Kurds in all forms and the entire front collapsed. About 100.000 
Kurdish fighters and civilians took refuge in Iran, many others surrendered 
to the Iraqi Army. Complying with the iron laws of the Cold War, the United 
States made clear that their interest in the Kurdish cause went only as far 
as it was compatible with the foreign policy of their regional ally.231 Mullah 
Mustafa spent the following four years under strict surveillance between 
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Tehran and Washington, where he died of cancer in March 1979, leaving the 
leadership of his movement to his sons Idris and Masoud.232 
With the collapse of the Kurdish forces in 1975, Baghdad restored its 
authority over the region. However, Mullah Mustafa’s exile allowed different 
Kurdish forces to emerge and compete for the leadership of the national 
movement. Within the context of the rapid urbanisation and social 
transformation of the country, the urban and leftist strand of Kurdish 
nationalism took the chance for an unexpected comeback.  
  
Iraq’s Two Kurdish Nationalisms 
The expulsion of Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal Talabani from the KDP in 1966 
marks a turning point in the history of the Kurdish nationalism in Iraq. The 
Kurdish revolt of 1961 had followed the script of previous Kurdish uprising 
since the interwar period: The progressively minded and left-leaning 
nationalist intellectuals had to surrender the leadership of the national 
movement to tribal chiefs due to the far superior military means of the latter. 
Ibrahim Ahmed and his followers in Sulaymaniyah and other Kurdish towns 
had tried to give Kurdish nationalism a modernising mission. Like 
progressive intellectuals in the rest of Iraq and in much of the decolonising 
world, they viewed traditional social structures such as tribalism as deeply 
intertwined with colonialism. The ties between the KDP and the communist 
party in the 1940s and 1950s had been based on a strikingly similar agenda 
that combined the recognition of Kurdish national rights in a federal and 
democratic Iraq and social progress. However, the social and economic 
structure of the Kurdish region did not play in their favour. The peripheral 
location of the Kurdish lands in the broader economy of Iraq reinforced its 
rural character. The Kurdish towns remained small and economically 
marginal and the urban middle classes did not have any link with the 
overwhelmingly rural masses. Unable to rally popular support, the 
leadership of the KDP was forced, in the early 1960s, to follow the tribal elite 
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in a rearguard struggle against land redistribution, out of fear of siding with 
Baghdad against fellow Kurds. However, this contradiction was doomed to 
explode and, when the Ahmed-Talabani faction was expelled from the KDP, 
they became an alternative political force. 
Rather than being the promoters of a specific political ideology, Mullah 
Mustafa Barzani and his followers were characterised by a lack thereof. 
During his decade-long exile in the Soviet Union, between 1946 and 1958, 
Barzani vaguely adopted some Marxist rhetoric yet strongly rejected class 
struggle. In a speech delivered at the Congress of the Kurdish Exiles in Baku 
in 1948, Barzani seemed to perfectly understand that, as a member of the 
tribal elite, he had no interest in talking the language of class politics: 
Our Party defends the interests of all Kurdish classes including 
chieftains, mercantilists, workers, small landowners, skilled workers, 
farmers and intelligentsia. It brings all these together under the 
banner of national liberation of the homeland and defending the joint 
interests of all classes. Under the banner of this party, class struggle 
in Kurdistan is not appropriate.233 
This language set Barzani apart from most of the national liberation 
movements hosted and supported by the USSR in those years, forces that 
emphasised the link between anti-colonial struggle and social revolution.  
Mustafa Barzani’s political project is more easily discernible through the 
study of his practices and his approach to power. Since the beginning of his 
political career in the 1930s, Barzani seemed to give little importance to the 
role of political organisation.234 He seems to have regarded his chairmanship 
of the KDP more as a prestigious title that gave him a degree of super-tribal 
authority rather than an office within the organisational structure of the 
political party. For all his life, Barzani pursued his personal tribal diplomacy, 
ignoring the KDP as a decision-making body and distributing party offices 
to please his tribal allies. This attitude reflected a mindset by fellow tribal 
 
233 Barzani, Speech Presented, 46. 
234 This aspect was heavily stressed by both Fared Assasard and Kamran 
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chiefs for whom ideological differences had little or no weight in determining 
patterns of alliances. Modern political ideologies have been mostly used to 
retroactively justify decisions that had been made according to the relations 
of power at a certain time. The Zebari tribe, for example, had consistently 
opposed Mullah Mustafa throughout the 1960s, but, after the 1970 peace 
agreement and when Barzani seemed triumphant, they suddenly became 
Kurdish nationalists. Hoshyar Zebari, who was also the brother-in-law of 
Mullah Mustafa, joined the Kurdish movement after 1970 and presents a 
telling picture of Barzani’s attitude:  
Well, it's a long story… I was brought up more or less in Mosul, I 
completed my high school in Mosul. At the time there were some 
tribal differences between us the Zebari tribe and the Barzanis. But 
when Mullah Mustafa and the KDP signed the 11 of March 1970 
autonomy deal with Iraq, there was a boom of Kurdish nationalism. 
[…] that was the beginning of change or reconciliation and Mullah 
Mustafa was a true statesman, a historical leader. Really… with all 
those Kurds who had opposed him, […] he pardoned everybody.235 
Hoshyar Zebari rapidly rose to prominence in the KDP and, in the 1980s, he 
had already become one of its most powerful leaders. 
When the KDP was established by Sulaymaniyah-based intellectuals in 
1946, Barzani accepted to become its chairman under the condition that two 
powerful landowners and members of the tribal elite were elected as vice-
chairmen:  Muhammad Kaka Ziyad, an agha from Koya and Latif Barzanji, a 
shaykh.236 The ideological shallowness of these personalities is well 
represented by Latif. Son of Mahmoud Barzanji, the feudal nationalist leader 
of the 1920s, Shaykh Latif was, like his father, a land-grabbing shaykh and 
became the target of a major peasant revolt in 1947.237 Latif’s official role in 
the KDP did not prevent his brother Baba Ali from becoming a minister in 
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Baghdad several times: first under the King, then under Abd al-Karim Qasim, 
and once again under the Ba’ath.238 In the same way, during the Kurdish 
revolts in the 1960s, Barzani relied on local tribal leaders as commanders of 
the section of the front where they had their land.239 This strategy created 
a direct and quasi-feudal relation between the paramount leader and the 
local chiefs. But, even more importantly, this strategy demonstrated to the 
tribal elite that for them the Kurdish revolt was the best way to preserve 
their power over the land, threatened by a mobilised peasantry and by the 
land reform. Consistent with this strategy, Barzani’s demand for regional 
autonomy lost all the elements of development and modernisation and 
revealed its nature as a project of personal rule underpinned by the 
traditional structures of Kurdish society. It is then not surprising that in the 
early 1970s, the survival of the Kurdish revolt depended exclusively on the 
active support of Iran and the United States that systematically opposed 
progressive movements and regimes throughout the Middle East.  
Mullah Mustafa’s power over the Kurdish national movement in Iraq was a 
direct consequence of the structural weakness of its urban middle-class 
component. The birth of the KDP in 1946 had followed the pattern of class 
relations that had characterised the Kurdish movement in the interwar 
period. Intellectuals living in the main Kurdish towns saw nationalism as a 
project of modernisation and development. Mostly drawn from the urban 
middle-classes – lawyers, doctors, army officers, government employees – 
they viewed the tribal structure of Kurdish society as an obstacle to 
progress. However, unable to confront the government militarily, they had 
to surrender the leadership of the movement to the powerful tribal chiefs. 
The presence of part of the tribal elite in the KDP is one of the reasons why 
the party was unable to take advantage of the period of mass mobilisation 
against the monarchy in the 1950s. At the time, the Kurdish region was torn 
apart by rural conflicts and the KDP failed to lead and even struggled to take 
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part in the mass movement leaving a vacuum that was filled by the 
communist party. Behind the reluctance of the KDP leadership to link their 
progressive nationalism to the agrarian struggles there was their 
unwillingness to break with the sector of the tribal elite with whom they had 
allied despite the fact that they were exploitative and reactionary 
landowners, as the example of Latif Barzanji showed. The ICP became the 
natural point of reference for progressively minded Kurds in the 1950s and 
the KDP remained a marginal force in the struggles against the landlords 
and the monarchy.240  
When the Kurdish revolt of 1961 broke out and Barzani allied with the tribal 
landowners threatened by land reform, the KDP lost all room for political 
initiative and was forced into a rearguard struggle against the Iraqi 
government. Unable to link their action to that of other progressive forces 
in the country, the KDP put itself at the mercy of Mullah Mustafa, and as 
soon as a disagreement between the two sides emerged, the latter could 
simply take over the party with his armed men. Expelled by the KDP in 1966, 
Ibrahim Ahmed and his followers were reduced to an instrument in the 
hands of the Iraqi government. 
However, the Kurdish uprising that started in 1961 and that continued 
intermittently until 1975 had more far-reaching consequences for the social 
structure of the region. On the one hand, Barzani’s movement gradually 
acquired a mass dimension as the repressive measures and scorched-earth 
tactics of the Iraqi Army were driving a wider portion of the Kurdish 
population towards the rebels. On the other hand, these practices created 
continuous waves of rural refuges to the Kurdish towns that added to the 
ongoing structural process of urbanisation. In 1977, the urban population of 
 
240 One example of this trend is Kamran Karadaghi, a Kurdish student in Baghdad 
in the 1950s, for whom the ICP represented the only option for progressive 
activism. Karadaghi fell victim to the anti-communist repression of 1961 and fled to 
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early 1970s, the ICP was no longer a competitive political actor and Karadaghi 
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the Kurdish region reached almost 50 per cent.241 Once they had moved to 
an urban environment, rural refugees tended to lose their tribal identity. As 
Kurdish historian Fared Assasard explains in reference to the Sulaymaniyah 
area, “In the 1970s tribalism wasn’t a significant force, […] the heads of the 
tribes were respected, but people would not particularly listen to them.”242 
The rural migrants would be more easily politicised over issues of 
employment, basic services or the brutality of the security forces. These 
demands were answered by the far-leftist political organisations that were 
mushrooming in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The growth, mostly among 
high-school and college students, of radical leftist groups was a global 
phenomenon but, in Iraq, it was strengthened by the continuous 
government crackdowns that targeted the communist party, systematically 
weakening the strongest force on the left. More generally, there was a 
widespread belief among urbanised Kurds that the 1975 defeat of the 
movement had been largely due to its tribal and reactionary character. Qadir 
Haji Ali, who at the time was a high school student and far-left activist in 
Sulaymaniyah, recalls: “our problem with the [KDP] was that it was a tribal 
party, the aghas and the shaykhs were with them, and [we] were against 
tribalism and the bourgeoisie!”243  
These transformations constituted the underlying social conditions for the 
establishment of a Kurdish force alternative to the Barzani-controlled KDP. 
When the Kurdish revolt collapsed in 1975, Jalal Talabani and other Kurdish 
leaders of the left took refuge in Syria, while the old Ibrahim Ahmed went 
into exile in London. On June 1st, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) was 
established as the federation of three groups: Jalal Talabani and his 
followers, Komala, a well-organised Maoist group led by Nawshirwan 
Mustafa, and the Socialist Movement of Kurdistan (Bezutnawa) led by Ali 
Askari and Rasul Mamand. The party was formed as “a broad democratic 
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and patriotic front that allows the fighting unity and coexistence of the 
different progressive tendencies under the leadership of a Kurdish 
revolutionary vanguard.”244 They ascribed the collapse of the revolt to “the 
inability of the feudalist, tribalist, bourgeois rightist and capitulationist 
Kurdish leadership” and proclaimed the PUK's commitment to autonomy for 
the Kurds and democracy for Iraq.  
 
War, Genocide, and Liberation   
The establishment of the PUK gave new vigour to the Kurdish movement. 
While the KDP was still reorganising its forces inside Iran, the PUK, thanks 
to its cells active in the Kurdish towns, was able to start low-key military 
operations in the region. Between 1976 and 1980, the KDP had little or no 
presence in the Kurdish region but clashed several times with the PUK in the 
border areas. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 triggered events with far-
reaching consequences for the Kurdish movement. Hoping to take 
advantage of the country’s post-revolutionary instability, Saddam Hussain 
invaded Iran in September 1980. The Iran-Iraq War, that lasted for much of 
the 1980s, was one of the bloodiest and most destructive conflicts of the 
Cold War era and allowed Kurdish forces to resume large-scale military 
operations in Iraq.  
During the following years, the Iran-Iraq war was mostly concentrated in 
southern areas on the Persian Gulf far from the reach of Kurdish groups. The 
situation changed in the mid-1980s when Iran started pushing on the 
northern side of the front with the support of KDP fighters. As the war 
expanded to the Kurdish region, Saddam started mass recruitment of tribal 
Kurds into irregular ‘jash’ forces and Talabani found himself squeezed 
between the Iraqi Army and the advancing Iranian and KDP forces.245 He had 
no choice but to reach out to his Kurdish enemies. Sponsored by Tehran, 
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the KDP and PUK agreed to join efforts against Baghdad. In May 1987, Jalal 
Talabani and Masoud Barzani246 established the Kurdistan Front with a 
unified command and a clear division of the frontline. The KDP operated in 
the north of the Iraqi-Kurdish region – the provinces of Dohuk and Erbil – 
and the PUK in its southern part – in Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk.247  
Saddam perceived the unity of the Kurds with the backing of Iran as a mortal 
threat and responded by appointing his cousin Ali Hasan al-Majid as 
governor of the north with absolute power. In the spring of 1987, the Iraqi 
Army started using chemical weapons against Kurdish villages, deporting 
the villagers and often executing all adult men. These genocidal practices 
were extended to the entire Kurdish region when, in January 1988, the army 
initiated the infamous Anfal Campaign. On March 16th, about 5,000 people 
were killed by Iraqi chemical weapons in the town of Halabja. The Anfal 
campaign continued even when, in August 1988, Iran and Iraq agreed on a 
ceasefire. By June 1989, between 50,000 and 100,000 Kurds had been 
killed, thousands of villages had disappeared, and their populations 
massacred or moved to concentration camps to be finally resettled in 
newly-built towns where the government could much more easily exert 
control.248 Hundreds of thousands of refugees found shelter in Iran and 
Turkey. The Kurdish revolt, once again, collapsed. As former PUK 
peshmerga Jalal Abdullah Hamarahim recalls, “small groups remained active 
but, once the villages were eradicated, the bulk of the insurgency could no 
longer survive without their support and we had to withdraw from Iraq.”249 
In August 1990, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait triggered the intervention of 
the United States that easily defeated and pushed back the Iraqi Army. In 
February 1991, American President George H. W. Bush invited the people of 
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Iraq “to take the matters into their own hands.”250 On March 1st, most of the 
Shiite south revolted forcing the army to withdraw. On March 4th, the Kurdish 
town of Ranya rose against the government and, in a matter of days, Iraqi 
troops were expelled from the entire Kurdish region. As KDP and PUK had 
maintained only a very marginal presence in Kurdish areas since the end of 
the Iran-Iraq war, the revolt was largely spontaneous. While the leaders of 
the Kurdistan Front hesitantly joined the rebels, the withdrawal of Iraqi 
troops was most often negotiated by local tribal chiefs and jash 
commanders.251 On March 19th, Kurdish forces took Kirkuk.  
However, both the US and the rebels had underestimated the resilience of 
Saddam’s military capability. By the end of March, the government had 
recaptured most of the south and, on March 28th, Iraqi troops retook Kirkuk. 
The Iraqi Army launched a massive air-bombing campaign and swiftly 
recovered much of the Kurdish region. One and a half million Kurdish 
civilians tried to leave the region under the bombs of the Iraqi air forces. The 
brutal repression of the Kurdish uprising became the justification for direct 
American intervention in Iraq.252 On April 5th, the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council passed a resolution condemning the repression and, on the 
following days, the US, Britain and France imposed a no-fly zone over 
northern Iraq. Unable to use his air forces, Saddam struggled to contain the 
Kurdish peshmerga. In July, the Kurdistan Front re-took control of Erbil and 
Sulaymaniyah and, in October, the Iraqi Army again withdrew from the 
Kurdish areas. At the end of 1991, the KDP and PUK were in control of most 
of the Kurdish region of Iraq, with the notable exception of Kirkuk. 
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Conclusion 
The American intervention of 1991 marked a turning point in the history of 
Iraq. After decades of struggle, Kurdish forces took control of large part of 
the Kurdish-inhabited areas in the country to which the Iraqi Army no longer 
had access. Kurdish autonomy, though finally achieved via international 
intervention, was the result of a long liberation struggle that this chapter has 
presented as rooted in the class relations of the region. The overview of the 
structural transformations of Iraq during the colonial and monarchical 
periods showed that the resurgence of the Kurdish movement in the 1960s 
cannot be disentangled from the broader social and political dynamics of 
the country. Most of the literature on the Kurdish movement in Iraq follows 
the path of military campaigns and negotiations and overlooks the structural 
dynamics that constitute the conditions for the Kurdish movement to 
emerge and to become a political force able to challenge the central 
government.253 Historians of Iraq have instead paid much more attention to 
the role of colonialism and class stratification in the process of state 
formation but, in their work, the political events of the Kurdish movement 
rarely take up more than a few footnotes.254 By comparing these two sets of 
literature, a more complex picture of the Kurdish movement emerges. In 
particular, the comparison reveals the centrality of the colonial period in the 
process of class formation that sets the conditions for the Kurdish revolts 
of the 1960s. The strength of the tribal landowning class became an element 
of primary importance that forced the other strand of the Kurdish movement 
– the urban and left-leaning nationalists – to a position of subordination. The 
analysis in this chapter showed that the main issue of contention in Kurdish 
politics from the 1940s to the 1970s was that of the ownership of land, as in 
any other largely agrarian society. The anti-landlord mobilisation of the 
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peasantry in the 1940s and 1950s, in Kurdistan as in the rest of Iraq, gave 
an essential contribution to the success of the Iraqi national movement 
against the monarchy and colonialism that culminated in the 1958 
Revolution.  
The Kurdish tribal uprising of 1961 was first and foremost a reaction against 
the empowerment of the peasantry and, therefore, an episode of class 
struggle. The strength of the tribal landowning class forced the urban 
middle-class nationalists to join the revolt in a position of subordination that 
allowed its framing in terms of national liberation. Within this conflict – and 
in conjunction with the repression suffered by the communists countrywide 
– the peasantry lost its political agency and villages were forced to pick one 
side and face retaliation from the other. The result of continuous warfare in 
the Kurdish region was the gradual destruction of Kurdish rural society. As 
shown by this chapter, the first consequence of this process was the growth 
of the Kurdish towns and the emergence of an alternative force of Kurdish 
nationalism expressed by the establishment of the PUK in 1975. The next 
chapter will trace the long-term consequences of this process of forced 
urbanisation, that war and genocide in the 1980s dramatically accelerated. 
This new ‘war society’ created a radically different class structure and 
gradually eroded the ideological differences between KDP and PUK that, 
since 1991, imposed their power duopoly over the – finally ‘liberated’ – 
Kurdish region of Iraq. 
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     Chapter 5 
The Class Structure of Kurdish 
Self-Rule in Iraq (1991-2014) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The social structures and class relations out of which the Kurdish national 
movement in Iraq developed in the 1960s and 1970s – the subject of Chapter 
4 – were radically transformed by the conflict that ravaged the Kurdish 
region in the 1980s. When the KDP and the PUK, the two dominant Iraqi-
Kurdish parties, gained control of the region in 1991, the – largely rural – 
Kurdish economy had been devastated. In the absence of any source of a 
productive economy, the two parties competed to coopt the local elite and 
to gain control of smuggling routes and foreign humanitarian aid. This 
chapter argues that the result of this competition was the development of a 
new class structure in which the political leaders and the members of the 
old elite gained military control over the few sources of accumulation 
available in the region keeping the population unproductive and dependent 
on handouts. This set of class relations established in the 1990s was 
strengthened by the recognition of Kurdish autonomy and the establishment 
of a unified Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) after the 2003 US-led 
invasion of Iraq. As the security apparatus remained under the command 
structure of the two ruling parties, the Kurdish political elite was able to 
appropriate most of the wealth generated by the sale of the region’s oil and 
had no interest in investing in the development of industry and agriculture. 
With no alternative available, a large part of the Kurdish population was 
forced to survive on government handouts tying them to the patronage 
network of the political elite. This chapter shows that the political structure 
of the KRG characterised by the absence of the rule of law and the partisan 
control of security forces and public institutions cannot be understood 
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without reference to the specific class structure that emerged in the region 
in the 1990s.  
 
Liberation and Civil War  
The withdrawal of Saddam Hussein’s army from the Kurdish region of Iraq 
in October 1991 marked a turning point in the history of the Iraqi Kurds. 
Protected by the no-fly zone imposed by the United States over northern 
Iraq, the peshmerga militias of the two major Kurdish parties – the KDP and 
the PUK – gained complete control over the predominately Kurdish 
governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah. The economic and social 
situation of the region was dire: After more than a decade of destructive 
fighting and the international sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1990, the Kurdish 
region faced an additional internal blockade put in place by Saddam upon 
the withdrawal of his army. 
One of the first measures taken by the Kurdistan Front dominated by the 
KDP and PUK was a general amnesty for all the jash, the Kurdish tribal forces 
that had fought alongside the Iraqi Army and that numbered in the hundreds 
of thousands. Some of the jash had been forcibly recruited by the regime 
and had maintained a rather passive attitude during the war and in some 
cases even kept active communications with the Kurdish insurgency. Many 
jash leaders had played a major role in the 1991 uprising that triggered the 
liberation of the region. However, the intent of pacifying Kurdish society 
went hand in hand with the determination of the KDP and PUK to incorporate 
vast chunks of the population in their constituency by negotiating directly 
with their tribal leaders. 
The liberation of the Kurdish region brought with it a geopolitical dilemma. 
Neighbouring Turkey, Iran, and Syria – each hosting their ‘own’ Kurdish 
minority – were extremely uncomfortable with the idea of Kurdish self-rule 
in Iraq while the United States remained committed to the territorial integrity 
of the country. At the same time, the internal blockade meant that Baghdad 
had stopped appointing and paying civil servants in the Kurdish 
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governorates and the region was in dire need of restoring a functioning 
administration. To reassure the neighbouring powers that they did not aim 
at secession, the Kurdistan Front decided to unilaterally implement the old 
Autonomy Law issued by Iraq in 1970, that had established a regional 
parliament based in Erbil and organised regional elections in May 1992. 
Since no other party passed the 7 per cent threshold the KDP and PUK 
obtained respectively 51 and 49 seats.255 While all participants accused 
each other of fraud, tensions were running high between the two parties 
which had only come together in 1986, after two decades of rivalry and 
intra-Kurdish fighting. However, keen to maintain international support the 
KDP and the PUK went through a few days of intense negotiations that 
ushered in a comprehensive power-sharing agreement.  
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) created by the two-party 
agreement established a ‘50:50 system’ that Gareth Stansfield – in the most 
extensive study of the Kurdish region of Iraq in the 1990s – describes as an 
equal division of “all executive and legislative positions […] with real power 
being unofficially vested in the political bureaux of the KDP and PUK.”256 The 
legitimacy of the new system was significantly undermined by the absence 
of the two party leaders, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani who did not 
take any direct role in the KRG government and preferred to exercise their 
power through lesser political figures showing their half-hearted 
commitment to the agreement. In 1993, the relationship between the two 
parties was already deteriorating. The KDP accused the PUK of using the 
office of the KRG Prime Minister to control the regional institutions and to 
increase its influence over the Kurdish capital Erbil. Moreover, as both 
parties had only partly given up their sources of revenues to the 
government, the PUK was growing wary of the rapid increase in wealth of 
the KDP due to the latter’s control of the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing with 
Turkey that constituted by far the greatest source of revenue in the region. 
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The peshmerga, the party militias meant to become the armed forces of the 
KRG, were never unified and remained under the separate command 
structures of each political party.  
In a matter of months, tensions escalated into full-blown civil war. In the 
winter of 1993-1994, the PUK became more and more aware that the KDP’s 
close relations with Iran and the revenue from Ibrahim Khalil were rapidly 
changing the balance of power in the region. In May 1994, while incidents 
between followers of the two parties spread, the PUK took over the Kurdish 
parliament in Erbil definitively breaking the power-sharing agreement.257 
The lack of minimum trust between the two parties made the 50:50 
agreement so fragile that the first perceived change in the balance of power 
was fatal. Moreover, this zero-sum mentality was fed by the new political 
economy of the region, which made territorial control essential to access 
the only available sources of revenues, namely the border-crossings and 
the distribution of international aid.  
For about two years, the Kurdish civil war that started in spring 1994 took 
the form of a low-intensity conflict between the KDP controlling Dohuk and 
the PUK holding Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. Despite its historical alliance with 
Iran, the KDP had also been able to build a friendly relationship with 
Baghdad especially thanks to their cooperation on cross-border 
contraband. This development inevitably drove Iran and the PUK closer, 
turning the Kurdish conflict into a proxy war that contributed to its 
significant escalation. In July 1996, the PUK allowed the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards to enter the Kurdish region and attack the Iranian-
Kurdish guerrilla that had found shelter in the town of Koya. In response, the 
KDP attacked Erbil with the direct support of the Iraqi Army and took the 
Kurdish capital on August 31. The Iraqi-backed KDP offensive continued to 
the point that the PUK was forced to leave Sulaymaniyah until the end of 
the year when the heavy weapons provided by Iran allowed Talabani’s 
forces to recover the city. The fighting of 1996 heavily involved the civilian 
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population forcing up to 70.000 followers of the two parties to leave their 
homes as the frontline moved.258 The year 1997 saw a series of failed 
negotiations as well as the direct intervention of another foreign power, 
Turkey, into the conflict. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Ankara’s 
involvement in the region had been a spillover of its own Kurdish war against 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that had set its bases in the Qandil 
Mountains north of Erbil. In May 1997, Ankara carried out a large operation 
against the PKK and kept some of its forces in the region.259 Given their 
geographical proximity, Turkey started building a close relationship with the 
KDP which brought the PUK closer to the PKK but also increased its 
dependence on Iran’s support. When, in October, the PUK launched an 
offensive to retake Erbil, the KDP managed to thwart the attack with the 
help of Turkey’s air force.260 
The failed PUK-offensive of October 1997 marked the end of hostilities and, 
in November 1997, the KDP and PUK signed a truce. The United States, 
worried about the growing influence of Baghdad and Tehran – its regional 
foes – over the warring Kurdish parties, took the lead. In September 1998, 
the negotiations ushered in the Washington Agreement that committed the 
two parties to re-establish the KRG and to solve all pending issues, such as 
the sharing of revenues and the freedom of movement within the region, 
with an American guarantee against the intervention of the regional powers. 
However, none of those issues was resolved. Each party established its own 
administration and thousands of followers had to move to the area 
controlled by their party. The region remained divided into two security 
areas named after the respective party colours: a KDP-controlled Yellow 
Zone in the governorates of Dohuk and Erbil and a PUK-controlled Green-
Zone in Sulaymaniyah.  
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Urbanisation and Dependence  
The economic situation and class relations of Iraqi Kurdish society in the 
1990s was primarily the result of the destruction brought by a decade and 
a half of warfare. The Iran-Iraq War and the genocidal Anfal Campaign were 
followed by the Kurdish uprising of 1991 and by the Kurdish Civil War 
between 1994 and 1997. These tragic events largely destroyed the rural 
society of Iraqi Kurdistan and led to a massive process of urbanisation. In 
the 1990s, the Kurdish region was also subjected to a dual blockade brought 
by the combination of the UN-imposed sanctions on Iraq and the domestic 
embargo imposed by Saddam Hussain on the Kurds. Moreover, the 
withdrawal of the I raqi army allowed for the flow of a large amount of 
humanitarian aid that, while providing indispensable relief, further 
undermined the productive capacity of the Kurdish economy. All these 
factors together contributed to turning Iraqi Kurdistan into a rentier society 
militarily controlled by the two major parties. 
The long cycle of violence of the 1980s and 1990s drove many Kurdish 
peasants to leave their villages and find refuge in the Kurdish towns. 
Baghdad’s counter-insurgency campaigns – that ultimately led to the 
genocidal Anfal Campaign (1986-1989) – were primarily aimed at removing 
the sources of supply for the Kurdish guerrilla by evacuating thousands of 
villages and depopulating the countryside. This policy resulted in the 
displacement of hundreds of thousands of peasants that “were relocated 
into mujamma'at, crude new settlements located on the main highways in 
army-controlled areas of Iraqi Kurdistan”.261 The Iraqi Army cleared several 
miles of territory along the Iranian border of villages and forest and entire 
areas of the countryside were rendered unviable with defoliant chemicals, 
landmines, deforestation, and the destruction of wells and irrigation 
systems. The result of this process was the devastation of Kurdish 
agriculture and a massive process of forced urbanisation. Rural migrants 
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swelled the Kurdish cities which grew exponentially. Between 1977 and 
1997, the urban population of the three Kurdish of governorates (Dohuk, 
Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah) grew from below 50 per cent, to over 70. The 
average growth of 23 per cent in the urban population of the Kurdish 
provinces contrasts starkly with the rest of Iraq that experienced virtually 
none.262  
The situation became catastrophic in the early 1990s, when the Iraqi 
government withdrew from the Kurdish region, stopping the payment of civil 
servant salaries as well as food subsidies and other forms of public 
assistance while unemployment rose to 70-80 per cent.263 The end of 
financial support from Baghdad was part of the economic embargo put in 
place by Saddam Hussein against the newly-established KRG. The domestic 
embargo was an additional burden on the Kurdish provinces already hit by 
the international sanctions on Iraq that were having a devastating effect on 
the country’s economy. The hardship imposed by this dual blockade was 
mitigated by a wave of humanitarian assistance. Given the restrictions 
posed by the Iraqi regime on aid delivery in the rest of the country, between 
1991 and 1996 the Kurdish region received two-thirds of total aid delivered 
to Iraq worth over $1 billion.264 The aid provided essential goods and 
services that allowed for the survival of the most vulnerable sectors of 
society at a time where prices skyrocketed and food and energy had 
become inaccessible to a vastly unemployed population.  
In her well-informed study on the topic, Denise Natali identified two issues 
with humanitarian aid that structurally affected the Kurdish region. First, 
despite the sanctions, the UN remained committed to the territorial integrity 
of Iraq and, to be able to operate in the country, could not directly interact 
with the Kurdish Government that Baghdad deemed illegal. Therefore, 
humanitarian aid could not be channelled through the KRG.265 As most of the 
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essential goods and services were delivered directly by non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), the KDP and PUK had no interest in hiring civil 
servants to run the ministries, setting up government agencies, and 
developing a public sector. The two parties remained military organisations 
focused on security rather than political machines working within a 
parliamentary system. As Natali explains “without the ability to implement 
its own tax programs, acquire capital or foreign exchange, or negotiate with 
a foreign government to attract investments, the regional economy 
experienced no real structural change.”266 The redundancy of the KRG 
institutions meant that the KDP and PUK had little incentive to work within 
shared institutions and much to gain from territorial control, a dynamic that 
ultimately precipitated the outbreak of the civil war in 1994. 
The second issue with humanitarian aid highlighted by Natali is the 
structural undermining of the productive sectors of the economy. 
Humanitarian assistance was rarely aimed at capability building, a tendency 
reinforced by the prohibition to work directly with Kurdish institutions. For 
example, when the electricity broke down in the Dohuk governorate in 1993, 
the UN, rather than repairing the grid or funding the creation of an 
alternative source of energy, “distributed generators that provided 
temporary but costly power dependent upon imported diesel.”267 Still, in 
2002, the UN purchased four massive generators for the city of Erbil, each 
of them costing $2.5 million and requiring 360 oil barrel per month, instead 
of repairing the Bakhma dam for a total estimated cost of $2 million.268 
The role of foreign aid in generating dependence was strengthened by the 
so-called oil-for-food programme instituted in May 1996 through an 
agreement between the UN and Baghdad that allowed Iraq to sell oil in order 
to buy foodstuff and medicines despite international sanctions. The KRG 
institutions were excluded from the agreement that explicitly stated that the 
distribution of supplies in Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah was to be 
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“undertaken by the United Nations […] with due regard to the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Iraq”.269 Compared to the $1 billion worth of aid 
received during the relief phase, the share of oil revenues destined for the 
Kurdish governorates (13 per cent) amounted to almost $10 billion.270 
However, as in the first phase of humanitarian aid, the programme failed to 
invest in development. The most devastating consequences of this 
approach were experienced by local agriculture. In the early 1990s, Kurdish 
agriculture was gradually recovering thanks to the reconstruction of 2.800 
villages271 and, especially, to the effects of the sanctions and the blockade 
on food prices.272 In 1996, with the oil-for-food programme, food aid flooded 
the region and prices dropped, forcing thousands to abandon the 
countryside and go – sometimes back – to the cities. Rather than buying 
wheat from local farmers, the UN purchased it from Australia, spending half 
of the allocated budget in transportation.273  
 
Warlords and Chiefs: the Formation of a New Ruling Class  
With the withdrawal of the Iraqi Army in 1991, the KDP and PUK gained 
permanent military control of the Kurdish region. As mentioned before, one 
of the first issues that the two parties had to face was that of the jash, the 
mostly tribal Kurds who had fought alongside the Iraqi Army as irregular 
forces. Rather than carrying on a punitive policy towards the former 
collaborators of the regime, the Kurdish parties issued a general amnesty 
and entered into a fierce competition to gain the support of their previous 
enemies. The result of this process was the creation of a new ruling class, 
formed by the integration between the old jash elite and the peshmerga 
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commanders. Thanks to its military orientation, this new elite was in the 
position to take advantage of the two major economic activities available – 
the management of foreign aid and the control over smuggling – to amass 
great wealth. 
The jash leaders were more than military commanders. Almost exclusively 
the members of leading Kurdish tribal families and often historical rivals of 
the tribes that had joined the Kurdish liberation movement, these figures 
had been greatly empowered by the policies promoted by Saddam Hussein 
in the 1980s. In 1980, the Kurdish economy was still largely based on 
agriculture and produced a third of Iraq’s barley and nearly half of its 
wheat.274 However, the devasting consequences of the war combined with 
the depressing effects of oil revenues over all the non-oil sectors of the 
economy triggered a rapid decline in profits in agriculture. The decline of 
agriculture and the growing availability of state funding contributed to a 
gradual shifting of the traditional elites from landownership towards other 
more profitable activities. In Iraq as a whole, tribal leaders loyal to the 
government – along with Ba’ath Party officers – were the main beneficiaries 
of the privatisation policies promoted by the regime during the Iraq-Iran 
War.275 Moreover, the government rewarded political loyalty by assigning 
lucrative contracts for state-funded infrastructural projects. Gradually, this 
process led to the transformation of declining tribal landowners into a class 
of regime-backed entrepreneurs whereby capital – rather than land – 
became the main source of power.276  
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In the Kurdish region, tribal chiefs were also those with enough social power 
to set up the jash units – officially National Defence Battalions – the loyalist 
forces raised among pro-government Kurdish tribes to fight the insurgency. 
The jash leaders were directly funded by the government to set up their own 
units by recruiting fellow tribesmen. This practice did not only provide the 
tribal elite with another opportunity for enrichment, but it also strengthened 
their power over their constituencies. Joining the jash was often the only 
opportunity for rural Kurds to receive a decent salary and avoid being 
enlisted in the army and sent to the Iranian front. Moreover, this system 
provided tribal leaders with semi-private armies that could be used for 
private purposes.277 The attachment of this ruling class to the Ba’athist 
government was, however, a marriage of convenience and, when Kurdish 
forces returned to the region in 1991, they were quick to change side. 
The competitive nature of the relationship between the KDP and the PUK 
forced the two parties to battle to coopt the jash commanders. In the words 
of Hoshyar Zebari, a powerful KDP leader, the general amnesty was a 
triumphant process of “Kurdish national reconciliation” whereby the old 
enemies “were integrated [into the political parties], their properties 
protected, all cases against them were dropped.”278 Some leaders hailing 
from traditionally anti-Barzani tribes made peace with the KDP, others 
joined the PUK, while those who resisted were brutally murdered.279 The 
amnesty allowed them to keep their forces and they often became local 
warlords enjoying a direct relationship with the party leadership and even 
switching side whenever it suited them.280 Not only did the regime change 
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involve no loss of power or status for the old Kurdish elites, it actually 
strengthened them. The replacement of the overpowerful Ba’ath regime 
with the quarrelsome Kurdish parties gave them more leverage and 
autonomy. The result was the creation of a new elite composed of former 
jash and peshmerga commanders turned politicians both – although to a 
different degree – tied to the political parties and whose military power gave 
them the possibility to benefit from the economic opportunities offered by 
the Iraqi Kurdish context of the 1990s. As some of these personalities, as 
collaborators of Saddam Hussein, had also been involved in the mass killing 
of Kurdish civilians in the late 1980s, they desperately needed the protection 
of the KDP and PUK, as in the case of Qasim Aghay Koya who was involved 
in the Anfal campaign and who joined the KDP after 1991.281  
The integration of these personalities impacted on the ideological positions 
of the two dominant parties which lost any trace of difference. The PUK, 
given its defined leftist orientation, was to be more deeply changed by this 
process than the tribal and traditionalist KDP. During the liberation war, the 
PUK was still a federation of nominally independent parties. In 1992, the 
three parties decided to merge into the same organisation to run for the 
regional elections. Jalal Jawhar, at the time, one of the rising cadres in 
Komala, the most organised and ideologically defined component of the 
PUK, remembers his and his comrades' reluctance to accept Talabani’s 
leadership of the new unified PUK:  
we suggested to change the name of the party but not the beliefs 
and structure of the party. […] At the time, I had the belief that we 
needed to change our direction because the Soviet Union was 
collapsing.  We were willing to renew our ideology. […] but in terms 
of leadership, Komala was different […] shaykhs or [tribal leaders] 
did not exist in our party.282  
Locked within a wider and more fluid structure centred around Talabani’s 
personality and network, the more-ideologically defined Komala activists 
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lost their political weight. At its founding congress in 1992, the PUK 
abandoned its radical socialist positions and announced a ‘social-
democratic turn’, gradually assuming the ideological shallowness that was 
typical of the KDP.283 In its first manifesto as a unified party, the PUK erased 
any reference against tribalism and the traditional structures of Kurdish 
society.284 As KDP Hoshyar Zebari could proudly claim, the KDP and PUK 
were by then as different as “Pepsi and Coca-Cola.”285 With the primary aim 
of coopting the old elite, the 1992 electoral campaign was centred around 
the leaders’ personalities with little or no difference in the parties’ 
programmes.286 However, thanks to this re-branding of the party, the PUK 
was able to co-opt powerful personalities such as Shaykh Muhammad 
Kasnazani, a Sufi leader and long-term Saddam collaborator who in the 
1970s was even using his pro-government militias against Talabani’s 
forces.287 
As discussed before, the flow of foreign aid to the Kurdish region in the 
1990s offered essential emergency relief but also negatively impacted the 
economic structure of the region. The UN and other organisations could not 
deal directly with the KRG institutions but they did hire local staff and had 
to rely on local NGOs for the delivery of aid and on local construction 
companies to build essential infrastructure. Given the level of militarization 
of the region, local warlords – both members of the old elite and peshmerga 
commanders – and the two dominant political parties could easily take 
control of the process. The KDP and PUK “set up, or gained control over, 
numerous local NGOs, which were quickly perceived as lucrative sources of 
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income, and as powerful instruments of clientelization.”288 On the one hand, 
the politicisation of aid delivery strengthened the ongoing process of class 
formation by increasing the opportunities for enrichment for the local elite. 
On the other hand, as the political affiliation of NGOs, evident to the public, 
reinforced the idea that the provision of essential services was the task of 
the political parties and not of public institutions like the KRG, crystallising a 
pattern of party-state relations that was already familiar to the people who 
had lived under the Ba’athist regime. Within these relations of power, the 
large amount of aid brought by the oil-for-food programme from 1996 
onwards multiplied the opportunities for private enrichment triggering “an 
exponential increase in personal wealth for local entrepreneurs” holding the 
contracts for the sale of crude and the delivery of food.289 
Stimulated by the international sanctions and the domestic blockade, illegal 
trade constituted the other lucrative economic activity of the region. 
Smuggling took place on a vast scale on all borders of the Kurdish region 
and became the biggest source of revenue for the political parties and a 
source of enrichment for the dominant personalities within them. The 
Ibrahim Khalil border crossing with Turkey near Dohuk, mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, was by far the most lucrative with an estimated annual $750 
million revenues from illicit trade,290 and its control by the KDP contributed 
to the outbreak of the civil war. The embargo stimulated the smuggling of 
all sorts of products into the region and created a “privatised oil trafficking” 
with Iraqi oil illegally sold in Turkey based on the cooperation of high-ranked 
KDP and Ba’athist officers in violation of both the international sanctions and 
the internal blockade.291 Moreover, the dire conditions of the civilian 
population created a market for the smuggling of passports, exit visas, and 
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actual people who were asked to pay up to $5000 to cross the Turkish 
border.292 
The lack of stable revenues, combined with the fact that the peshmerga 
forces continued to respond to the command structures of the political 
parties, undermined the autonomy of the KRG institutions making them 
somewhat redundant. As the economic and military sources of power 
remained in the hands of the political parties and their allies, the competition 
between the KDP and PUK for the co-optation of the old elite and that for 
the control of territory and border crossings was bound to create conflicts 
that ultimately escalated into the civil war of 1994-1997. With the failure of 
the PUK offensive of 1997, the war front stalled along a line that roughly 
divided the governorates of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. The consolidation of 
the dividing line coincided with the exponential growth in foreign aid brought 
by the oil-for-food programme that gave the local elite greater opportunities 
for accumulation and contributed to the end of hostilities.293 Given the 
importance of territorial control for these strategies of accumulation, it is not 
surprising that the Washington Agreement of 1998, which included the 
commitment to re-unify the KRG, remained a dead letter. 
According to Gareth Stansfield, the two Kurdish statelets – each dominated 
by one of the political parties – that emerged from the civil war, represented 
a more efficient and stable system than the previously unified KRG.294 The 
50:50 arrangement of 1992 had pushed the two parties to use the KRG 
offices against each other and it was precisely the perceived change in the 
balance of power that pushed the PUK to break the agreement in 1994. This 
argument is also based on the assumption that the post-civil war single-
party statelets were more suitable to the context than a multi-party system, 
given the legacy of Ba’athist rule that had made the population accustomed 
to the identification of the state with a political party. However, what 
Stansfield downplays is that the biggest incentive to maintain the separate 
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administrations was the opportunities for accumulation that that system 
offered. Unchecked by their rival, each political party was able to 
consolidate the grip over its respective sub-region especially when the start 
of the oil-for-food programme promised unprecedented profit. Under the 
tight military control of their peshmerga forces, the KDP and PUK created a 
system ruled by the party politburos and for the benefit of their dominant 
families and political and economic allies. Unlike the context of a limited 
political plurality of the early 1990s, the new single-party statelets were also 
far more capable to repress any form of dissent and political opposition. 
This process of accumulation had long-term effects on the structuring of 
class relations in the Kurdish region. In a region devastated by violence and 
dependent upon humanitarian aid, the Chamber of Commerce of 
Sulaymaniyah could boast about a thousand millionaires.295 At the same 
time, over half of Kurdish families survived with an income of $25 a month 
supplemented by a food basket worth $50 a month funded by the oil-for-
food programme.296 Deprived Iraqi Kurds, made dependent on international 
aid by the destruction of agriculture and other productive activities, were 
forced into the condition of clients of a burgeoning patronage system.  
 
The 2003 Invasion of Iraq and the unification of the KRG  
The system of governance of Iraqi Kurdistan established in the 1990s and 
based on two separate single-party administrations came to a sudden end 
with the US-led invasion of Iraq of 2003. The fall of the Ba’athist regime 
forced the KDP and the PUK to re-establish a unified KRG framework now 
finally recognized by Baghdad. However, the class structure developed in 
the 1990s was strengthened by this new institutional arrangement. 
The participation of Kurdish forces in the invasion of the country was a 
condition for the KDP and PUK to secure the recognition of Kurdish 
autonomy by the Americans and the Arab forces in post-Ba’athist Iraq. 
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Months before the invasion, in October 2002, the Kurdish parliament in Erbil 
was convened – for the first time since 1994 – with the presence of both 
KDP and PUK members. In February 2003, the two parties reopened each 
other’s offices in the respective areas.297 The KDP and PUK then formed the 
Kurdistan Alliance and, in January 2005, ran together in the first post-war 
Iraqi parliamentary elections. The widespread boycott of the elections in the 
Arab Sunni areas ravaged by the anti-occupation uprising left the country’s 
Arab Shi’a majority and the Kurds in a strong position to determine the future 
of the country. The PUK leader Jalal Talabani was elected President of Iraq, 
starting an unwritten norm that would assign the presidency to the Kurds. 
The country’s new constitution was drafted in a very short time and 
approved by a referendum in October 2005. The constitution recognized 
Kurdish as the second official language of Iraq and the governorates of Erbil, 
Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah as a federal Kurdish region with its parliament and 
government.298 However, the rush to approve a constitution left several 
issues unsolved. Kirkuk and other mixed Arab-Kurdish areas remained 
under the central government waiting for a referendum to be held by 2007. 
The referendum never took place and the issue of the disputed territories 
kept haunting the relationship between Baghdad and Erbil. 
The elections for the Kurdish Parliament – the first since 1992 – were held in 
conjunction with the federal elections of January 2005 and saw the KDP-
PUK alliance winning almost 90 per cent of the votes. This triumph was a 
secure starting point for a new power-sharing agreement. Masoud Barzani 
was elected President of the Kurdish region and, in January 2006, the two 
parties signed the Unification Agreement meant to restore the unified 
Kurdish administration. The agreement, signed by Barzani and Talabani in 
their role as party leaders, explicitly detailed the distribution of the major 
political offices between the two parties including a plan of for the following 
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parliamentary term.299 Forced by the new conditions to find a synthesis, the 
two leaders established a permanent line of communication to run the 
region and to confirm their parties’ duopoly over the new institutions. As 
Kamran Karadaghi – then the spokesperson for President Talabani – recalls:  
When Talabani became president of Iraq his attitude changed, that 
was his ultimate aim. Talabani recognized that Barzani was more 
suitable to become president [of the KRG]. This created a trust 
between the two and I witnessed it. They solved things together.300 
The 2006 agreement marked the beginning of a new system, similar to the 
50:50 power-sharing deal of 1992, in which all the KRG institutions were 
monopolized by the two major parties. Compared to the 1992 attempt, the 
new system had a stronger territorial character since the two parties had 
been in control of the respective areas – the KDP in Erbil and Dohuk and the 
PUK in Sulaymaniyah – for over a decade. This territorial dimension was 
strengthened by the organisation of the region’s armed forces that were 
never unified and remained subject to the command structures of the 
respective political parties. The KDP-controlled Yellow Zone and the PUK-
controlled Green Zone continued to be divided by an actual border with 
checkpoints flying the respective party flags. The Ministry of Peshmerga 
Affairs had no real control over the peshmerga making these military units 
effectively party militias.301 The fact that the loyalty of the peshmerga forces 
went primarily to the political parties – or even personalities within the 
parties302 – rather than to the region’s institutions, constituted a major 
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obstacle to the establishment of an effective rule of law in the KRG. As all 
the opposition parties claim “as long as they [PUK and KDP] control the 
peshmerga, after the elections, they can do what they want.”.303 Moreover, 
this system represented an extraordinary source of patronage for the 
dominant parties which, by distributing stipends and pensions to the 
peshmerga and their families, secured the loyalty of hundreds of thousands 
of Kurds.304  
However, the partisan use of the KRG institutions was not the only 
consequence of the ruling parties’ control over the military. As Hoshyar 
Omar claims “they can't control the economy - especially the oil - if they 
don't have the military.”305 Even after the reunification of the KRG, the power 
of the Kurdish elite kept resting on the control exercised by the two parties 
over the region’s resources. The wider opportunities for accumulation in 
post-2003 Iraqi Kurdistan reinforced the power and cohesion of the ruling 
class that had emerged in the 1990s. 
 
The Kurdish Economic Boom and Its Contradictions  
In the years following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Kurdish region 
experienced a period of rapid economic growth. The end of the blockade 
and sanctions that suffocated the Kurdish economy in the 1990s allowed 
the local elite to open up the Kurdish economy which led to a massive flow 
of international investment. The KRG, ruled by the KDP-PUK duopoly, 
particularly benefitted from a high level of political stability in comparison to 
 
presidential peshmerga brigades personally controlled by Jalal Talabani or his wife, 
Hero Ibrahim Ahmed”. Van Wilgenburg and Fumerton, Kurdistan's Political Army, 5. 
303 Interview with Aram Saeed (Sulaymaniyah, 2018). 
304 The peshmerga were said to be 120.000 in 2014. However, all the security 
forces – including the police and the internal and external intelligence agencies – 
are controlled by the KDP and PUK, making the number of Kurds working in the 
security sector on behalf of the political parties far bigger than that. Van 
Wilgenburg and Fumerton, Kurdistan's Political Army, 3. 
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the rest of Iraq that was ravaged by the insurgency against the American 
occupation and the spread of sectarian violence.  
Given the recognition of Kurdish autonomy by the 2005 constitution, the 
KRG could finally count on a relatively stable source of revenue. Based on 
the estimate of the population of the three Kurdish governorates (3.9 million 
in 2003),306 the regional government was entitled to 17 per cent of Iraq’s 
budget almost exclusively derived from the export of oil. In the period 
between 2006 and 2014, the budget transfer from Baghdad amounted to 
roughly 80 per cent of the KRG revenues,307 while revenues from taxes never 
reached 5 per cent of the total.308 This flow of revenues combined with the 
political stability of the region allowed for a tumultuous economic growth. 
Despite the absence of reliable GDP data separate from that of Iraq, the 
economy of the KRG was estimated to have grown from $18 billion in 2008 
to $27 billion in 2012.309 
Rather than using these resources to rebuild the Kurdish economy through 
the development of its productive sectors, the Kurdish elite adopted a 
model of development based on the oil-producing monarchies of the 
 
306 Regional Development Strategy for Kurdistan Region 2012-2016 (KRG - 
Ministry of Planning, 2011) <http://www.mop.gov.krd/resources/MoP Files/PDF 
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307 The Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Assessing the Economic and Social Impact of the 
Syrian Conflict and ISIS (World Bank Group, 2015) 
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and Protecting the Vulnerable (World Bank Group, 2016) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/672671468196766598/Main-
report>, XI. 
309 ‘Kurdistan Region Facts & Figures’, Invest in Group (IIG), 2019  
<https://investingroup.org/country/kurdistan/facts-figures/>. The Rand 
Corportation estimated the Gross Regional Product (GRP) excluding natural 
resources because of the lack of reliable data. According to their report, the GRP 
of the KRG amounted to 20,954 billion Iraqi Dinars in 2008 and to 27,381 billion 
Iraqi dinars in 2012. Calculating the Gross Regional Product of the Kurdistan 
Region - Iraq (KRG and Rand Corporation, 2016) 
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Persian Gulf.310 In July 2006, just a few months after the reunification of the 
KRG, the Kurdish Parliament approved a very generous investment law and 
established a Board of Investment. The law, defined by the KRG Foreign 
Minister Falah Mustafa Bakir as “amongst the most investor-friendly laws in 
the wider region”,311 is largely modelled after the ones in place in the Gulf 
countries but it allows an even higher degree of freedom and capital returns 
to foreign investors who are allowed to repatriate their profits in full, to buy 
land, and enjoy a 10-year non-custom tax break.312 The KRG encouraged 
partnership with local businessmen and companies and the Board of 
Investments has a high degree of discretion in issuing the licences largely 
favouring economic actors affiliated with the KDP and PUK.313 Moreover, the 
KRG established a visa regime that circumvents Iraqi immigration law, 
allowing most foreigners to obtain an entry visa upon arrival. 
These policies paid off. Between 2006 and 2012, the Kurdish region 
received $22 billion in investment, 21 per cent of which were foreign direct 
investment or joint ventures with local partners.314 In 2012, investment in the 
KRG amounted to 55 per cent of total investment in Iraq.315 However, given 
the extremely favourable fiscal conditions enjoyed by foreign corporations, 
 
310 Nicky Woolf, ‘Is Kurdistan the next Dubai?’, The Guardian, 2010 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/may/05/kurdistan-next-
dubai-iraq>;  
311 ‘“KRG’s Investment Law Is amongst the Most Investor Friendly Laws in the Wider 
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friendly-laws-wider-region-minister-falah-mustafa-bakir/>. 
312 ‘Investment Law’, KRG Department of Foreign Relations, 2006 
<https://dfr.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?p=69&l=12&s=050200&r=377>. 
313 This dynamic was so widely recognised that “even Prime Minister [Nechirvan] 
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the effect of this flow of capital on the KRG revenues has been negligible.316 
Moreover, without substantial limitations on the hiring of foreign staff and in 
combination with the lax visa regime, the KRG investment policy has 
generated huge profit for the foreign companies and their local partners and 
yet has had hardly any impact on the overall employment and the wider 
population.317   
The flow of foreign capital had its largest and most visible effect in the 
construction boom which, in just a few years, transformed the skyline of the 
main Kurdish cities. Private investments built large housing complexes, 
residential compounds, luxury hotels, and huge shopping malls. In the city 
of Erbil, the price for 250-square meter plot rose from $5,000 in 1996 to 
$153,000 in 2010 and the cost of housing reached $423 per meter making 
large areas of the cities unaffordable for most locals.318 The country that 
benefitted the most from the KRG’s investment-friendly policy in the 
construction sector was Turkey that in the mid- and late 2000s was 
experiencing a tumultuous economic growth. In 2012, Turkish investment in 
Kurdish real estate reached $4.3 billion and Turkish construction companies 
played a central role in restoring essential infrastructure in the Kurdish 
region.319 
The end of the sanction regime as well as the following reduction or outright 
cancellation of customs allowed for the recovery of international trade, even 
though it did not eliminate smuggling. The Kurdish region of Iraq gained a 
role as a transit area but, most significantly, as a market for foreign 
products. The Kurdish unproductive rent-based economy became an 
extraordinarily important market for Turkey’s burgeoning economy as well 
as for Iranian manufacture and agricultural products. The territorial 
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distribution of this trade partly overlapped with the political ties between 
the two dominant Kurdish parties and the neighbouring countries, with a 
predominance of Turkish products in the KDP-controlled area and a 
significant role of Iranian exports in the area controlled by the PUK. Turkey, 
however, had the lion’s share. Already in 2007, Turkish exports to the KRG 
amounted to almost $1.5 billion and constituted roughly 50 per cent of its 
total exports to Iraq. In 2013, the total value of Turkish exports was worth 
over $8 billion and constituted 67 per cent of its exports to Iraq.320 This 
tumultuous increase meant that in 2013 approximately 80 per cent of all 
goods sold in the region were made in Turkey, making daily life in the KRG 
completely dependent on its political relationship with Turkey and the state 
of the Turkish economy.321  
These trade and investment policies had the most damaging effects on the 
productive sectors of the Kurdish economy. Cheap products coming from 
Turkey, Iran, and East Asia flooded the Kurdish markets undermining the 
recovery of local production. In the first phase of the Kurdish economic 
boom between 2006 and 2010, industry and agriculture received a low 
share of the capital invested in the region, respectively 12.08 per cent and 
1.89 per cent.322 The result of this paucity of investment is clearly shown by 
the insignificance of these sectors in the Kurdish economy. According to 
data produced by the Rand Corporation, in 2012, industry amounted to 6.1 
per cent of the non-oil value-added of the KRG, while agriculture – once the 
driving sector of the Kurdish economy – to a staggering low of 3.1 per 
cent.323 Even if the rainfall was mostly in or above the average in the 
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2000s,324 the lack of investments and the flow of cheaper products from 
abroad hit hard. Between 2000 and 2007, agricultural production nearly 
halved and the number of Kurds who lived off agriculture dropped from 35 
to 23 per cent.325   
 
The Promises of Kurdish Crude 
Since the reunification of the KRG in 2005, oil was the sector that most 
attracted attention from foreign and local actors. Besides the interests that 
large oil reserves normally mobilise, oil has, in this case, the particular 
significance of providing the conditions of viability for an independent 
Kurdish state but also to immensely strengthen the autonomy of the ruling 
elite vis-à-vis the rest of Kurdish society.  
In 2006, the oil sector in the Kurdish region was extremely underdeveloped 
due to the internal blockade and the international sanctions over Iraq. The 
2005 Iraqi constitution states that the country’s oil and gas reserves belong 
to the Iraqi people as a whole and assigns their management to the federal 
government in exchange for the equal distribution of its revenues – the 17 
per cent share of the KRG – but only explicitly refers to “the present 
fields.”326 Estimates that were available when the constitution was being 
drafted and that was confirmed by geological surveys described the Kurdish 
region of Iraq as sitting on a massive unexploited 41 billion barrels of oil and 
1.5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas.327 Despite the vastity of these oil and 
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gas resources, in 2006 the Kurdish region was still importing all of its 
electricity.328 
It is not surprising then that the development of the oil and gas sector 
became the top priority for the local political elite. Kurdish policy in this field 
has been largely dominated by the personality of Ashti Hawrami. Appointed 
Minister for Natural Resources by the KDP in 2006 and – reconfirmed in 
every cabinet until 2019 – Hawrami promoted an extremely investor-friendly 
policy determined to quickly develop a Kurdish independent oil sector even 
at the cost of confrontation with Baghdad. In 2007, the Kurdish parliament 
approved an oil and gas law that authorised the regional government to sign 
independent contracts for exploration and production, despite strong 
opposition from Baghdad. The new law accorded singularly favourable 
conditions to foreign companies. Unlike the rest of Iraq, where oil companies 
are treated merely as contractors and are normally entitled to $1-2 per 
barrel, the KRG granted to private companies co-ownership of the field in 
exchange of a royalty of 10 per cent of their gross income. Attracted by 
these favourable conditions, several medium-sized corporations started 
operating in the region between 2007 and 2011.329   
These early operations convinced larger actors to move in. In November 
2011, the KRG assigned exploration blocks to the giant ExxonMobil and, in 
2012, to the Emirati TAQA, the French Total, the American Chevron, and the 
Russian Gazprom Neft.330 Strengthened by the geopolitical significance of 
these partnerships, the KRG started exporting oil independently via trucks 
through Turkey and Iran, rather than using the Iraqi pipeline infrastructure. 
In the meantime, the KRG started building its own pipeline to Turkey that 
became operative in late 2013. The arrival of these oil giants meant that the 
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central government could no longer downplay the Kurdish energy policy and 
inevitably perceived it as a threat to the country’s territorial integrity. In 
response, Baghdad began international legal and diplomatic action against 
the KRG. As oil started flowing to Turkey through the new Kurdish pipeline 
the Iraqi government decided to retaliate and, on February 2014, blocked all 
its budget transfer to the KRG.331   
Baghdad’s strong opposition to the Kurdish oil policy was motivated by both 
domestic and international concerns. Domestically, the new contracts 
signed by the KRG undermined the central government’s control over the 
most important economic and geopolitical asset of the country. Erbil’s 
moves were observed with interest by other oil-producing governorates 
such as Nineveh and Basra, raising the spectre of a dangerous 
fragmentation of the country and putting at risk its long-term viability as a 
unitary state.332 This process would undermine the redistributive capabilities 
of the central government creating huge disparities between oil-producing 
and non-oil-producing governorates. Moreover, the decentralisation of 
Iraq’s oil policy would inevitably create local power centres significantly 
more susceptible to foreign interference. Turkey’s strong support for the oil 
policy of the KRG conveyed a clear message in this direction to the Iraqi 
government. Turkey is a neighbouring country with a long history of 
interference in northern Iraq and the development of the Kurdish oil sector 
took place in a context of growing economic influence and warming ties 
between Ankara and the KDP. The new KRG pipeline has strengthened this 
relationship, tying the Kurdish region even more strongly to the growing and 
energy-thirsty economy of Turkey. In the virtual absence of a Kurdish 
banking sector, the revenue from the export of oil was transferred to the 
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KRG through the Turkish state-owned Halk Bankası, de facto putting Ankara 
in control of the process.333 
Political independence through oil has been the project consistently 
pursued by the elite of the KDP in charge of the sector, even more 
systematically, since Nechirwan Barzani, nephew of Masoud, took office as 
KRG prime minister in 2012. The development of the oil sector and the 
growing ties with Turkey were pursued with the hardly-hidden intention of 
building the conditions – independent revenues and geopolitical support – 
to full autonomy or even independence from Iraq. However, this project is 
not primarily about Kurdish self-determination as it is often presented by 
both local politicians and foreign experts.334 The deep relationship between 
oil and political power will be more extensively discussed in Chapter 6, as it 
will become more evident with the post-2014 events. However, in the early 
2010s, oil had already become an extremely lucrative business for powerful 
Kurds. Moreover, more economic and geopolitical autonomy from Baghdad 
meant even less accountability and more opportunity for accumulation for 
the Kurdish elite over the territory that they militarily control. Since its very 
beginning, the Kurdish oil policy has been, first of all, an instrument of class 
power that accelerated the transformation towards a rentier class structure 
initiated in the 1990s. 
 
Subaltern Classes and Opposition in a Rentier (Quasi-)State 
The economic growth of the Iraqi Kurdish region after 2003 took place 
within the set of the class relations established in the 1990s and discussed 
earlier in this chapter. Despite the unification of the KRG institutions in 2006, 
the KDP and PUK retained territorial control over the respective areas 
through the party-affiliated security forces. This allowed the political elite to 
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maintain nearly absolute control over the economy and the increased 
opportunities for accumulation offered by the oil rent after 2006.  
Even in the 1990s, the revenues of the local institutions and political parties 
as well as the sources of private accumulation came largely via streams of 
rent, namely the fees generated by the border-crossings and the 
management of foreign humanitarian aid. In this context, the 
institutionalisation of the KRG in the 2000s contributed to completing its 
transition towards a rentier economy. Given its complete control of the KRG 
institutions and military apparatus, the ruling class formed in the 1990s was 
in the position to siphon off a significant share of the revenues from the 
regional budget. Rather than investing in productive activities, the Kurdish 
ruling class followed a consistent strategy of accumulation based on the 
appropriation of public wealth through corruption, misappropriation, and the 
assignment of public contracts – namely in the construction sector – to 
companies controlled by political leaders or their allies. This strategy was 
enabled by the lack of transparency and the partisan control of the KRG 
institutions. As mentioned before, looking at these practices in terms of 
class relations sheds a different light on the role of the independent oil 
policy promoted since 2007. Unlike the budget transfer from Baghdad, the 
creation of revenues directly within the border of the KRG exponentially 
increased the amount of money that could be directed to private pockets as 
well as multiplied the ways through which this process could take place. 
Maybe: Despite the impossibility to determine exact numbers, but 
independent investigations locate the numbers in the order of billions of 
dollars.335  
This predatory strategy of accumulation went hand in hand with the 
redistribution of a large part of the KRG budget among the Iraqi Kurdish 
population in the form of civil servants’ salaries, pensions and subsidies. Due 
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to the weakness or sheer absence of a productive economy, most of the 
population was made dependent on government handouts, strengthening 
the patronage nature of the system and increasing the cost for public 
expressions of political dissent.  
In 2013, more than 50 per cent of the KRG budget was spent on salaries for 
public servants and pensions and roughly 1.4 million Iraqi Kurds were on the 
regional government payroll out of a population of just over 5 million.336 
Between 2007 and 2012, more than 80 per cent of the 750.000 new jobs 
created in the KRG were in the public sector that, in 2014, employed 53 per 
cent of the region’s working population.337 A significant proportion of public 
employees earned $150-200 per month338 and, in many cases, an entire 
family relied on one salary making it completely dependent to the local KDP 
or PUK powerholders in control of public employment. Through this system, 
a large part of the population was forced into the patronage networks of the 
two parties and their leading politicians. Even if one salary barely kept a 
family above the poverty line, public employment remained a far better 
option than the uncertainty of the private sector. According to official – likely 
conservative – estimates, unemployment stood at almost 18 per cent in 
2009.339 Moreover, working conditions in the private sector were far from 
inviting: according to the World Bank, in 2012, a great majority of the 
employed poor population worked for private employers.340 Kurdish 
businessmen in construction, agriculture and in the service sector 
increasingly relied on migrant labour from Asia and Africa but often also on 
seasonal workers from Iranian Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq. 
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The KDP and PUK were able to limit the expression of public dissent towards 
this system thanks to their control of the security apparatus and the 
dependence created through public employment and other limited forms of 
redistribution. However, the uneven nature of the KRG development and 
extremely unequal distribution of power and wealth in the region was bound 
to generate opposition. The first significant expression of political 
opposition to the KDP-PUK duopoly came in the form of the rise of Islamist 
forces. The Kurdistan Islamic Group and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated 
Kurdistan Islamic Union combined the critique of corruption and nepotism 
with that of secularism and, until the late 2000s, were the strongest 
opposition forces in the Kurdish region and particularly in the rural areas 
where the control by the KDP and PUK was less tight.341  
However, the most significant challenge to the ruling parties came from 
within their ranks. In 2009, Nawshirwan Mustafa, one of the most popular 
veterans of the liberation struggle and the leader of the left-wing of the PUK, 
split from Talabani’s party and established the Gorran (‘change’) Movement. 
Campaigning against corruption and for political liberalisation, Gorran 
boomed in the July 2009 elections, winning 23 per cent of the votes and 
beating the PUK in Sulaymaniyah. The rise of Gorran has shaken the Kurdish 
political establishment and generated widespread enthusiasm among the 
public but it has also shown the democratic limits of the KRG system. As 
journalist Kemal Chomani explains, even if Gorran won the majority of the 
Sulaymaniyah council in 2013, they had to reach an agreement with the PUK 
as they soon realised that controlling the local administration was in vain as 
long as the security apparatus, the civil servants, and most economic 
activities kept responding to the command structure of the PUK.342 
Although Gorran’s electoral success did not substantially change the 
relations of power within the regional politics, it was certainly the sign of a 
wider erosion of the political legitimacy of the local political elite. In February 
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2011, encouraged by the popular revolts that were shaking the Middle East, 
thousands gathered in Sulaymaniyah to protest corruption and demand 
political reform.343 Despite the violent reaction of the local security forces, 
protests continue for the following two months and five demonstrators were 
killed and 150 injured. The repression of the protests was accompanied by 
the action of masked armed men who attacked the demonstrations as well 
as the offices of the opposition parties and independent media stations.344 
Major protests in Erbil and Dohuk were avoided by preemptive actions by 
the KDP and by the exemplary brutality of the response in Sulaymaniyah. 
The 2011 protests were a watershed moment in the history of the region by 
significantly undermining the relationship between the ruling parties and 
large chunks of the population. The images of Kurdish security forces 
shooting peaceful protests made many realise that the rule of fellow Kurds 
could be as oppressive as that of any non-Kurdish dictator.  
 
Conclusion 
The establishment of a unified KRG, within the framework of the 2005 Iraqi 
Constitution, crystallised a set of class relations in the Kurdish region that 
had taken shape in the 1990s. After the liberation of the region in 1991, the 
KDP and PUK competed for the co-optation of the old Kurdish elite. This 
process led to the creation of a new ruling class, born from the alliance 
between the KDP and PUK commanders turned politicians and the local elite 
composed of former Ba’athist collaborators, such as tribal leaders, regime-
backed entrepreneurs, and former commanders of the counter-insurgency 
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jash battalions.    Through the control of the security forces, this new ruling 
class was able to appropriate large parts of the wealth created by various 
sources of rent, particularly the export of oil after 2005.  
As this chapter argued, the inability of the two Kurdish parties to establish 
functioning institutions and a competitive democracy can be explained by 
the strategy of accumulation employed by a ruling class largely 
characterised by its military background – either in the Kurdish insurgency 
or in the former pro-government forces. The direct control of the armed 
forces – which were never allowed to become a politically neutral regional 
army – has enabled the Kurdish elite to appropriate the wealth created by 
different forms of rent: smuggling and foreign humanitarian aid in the 1990s 
and the sale of oil after 2005. In turn, the reliance of the Kurdish subaltern 
classes on different forms of public handouts is not the result of the lack of 
a work ethic or a culture of dependence but rather the only strategy of 
subsistence available in that context. The Kurdish ruling class showed no 
interest in investing in the development of a productive economy. By 
distributing parts of the region’s wealth through public salaries, pensions, 
and subsidies, the political elite forced a large part of the population into 
their patronage network, increasing the cost of political dissent. This system 
gradually led to the erosion of the legitimacy of the KDP and PUK but the 
combination of military coercion and economic dependence allowed the 
ruling class to survive the rise of political opposition in the late 2000s.  
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Chapter 6 
The Crisis of Kurdish Nationalism in 
Iraq (2014-2019) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The structure of power and class hierarchy that developed in the Kurdish 
region of Iraq in the 1990s and 2000s were deeply shaken by the crisis that 
started in 2014. Under attack by ISIL and with the oil price falling to record 
lows, the KRG suddenly became unable to pay public salaries throwing 
hundreds of thousands of Kurds to the edges of poverty. The austerity 
policies implemented by the KRG broke the mechanism of redistribution on 
which the Kurdish rentier system was based. To counter mounting popular 
rage – manifested in frequent and tense public protests – the ruling KDP and 
PUK deployed a combination of coercion and persuasion. On the one hand, 
force was the most immediate response. While the protestors were met with 
fire by the security forces, the government shut down the parliament for two 
years (2015-2017) and illegally extended Masoud Barzani’s presidential 
term. On the other hand, the Kurdish elite invested in aggressive nationalist 
rhetoric that led to the decision of holding an independence referendum, in 
September 2017, and to the heavy retaliation from Baghdad and 
neighbouring powers. The combination of these two strategies within the 
context of the KRG political and economic crisis reveals the class nature of 
Iraqi Kurdish nationalism and of the separatist project pursued by the 
political elite. Among the Kurdish subaltern classes, who had to pay the 
highest price of the economic crisis, the frustrated aspirations to political 
change gave way to a widespread sense of disillusion and a crisis of Kurdish 
nationalism as a source of legitimacy for political power in the region. 
Besides reconstructing the events surrounding the crisis and the 
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referendum, this chapter also delves into the evolution of the power 
structure of the region in the 2010s and the growing importance of 
neighbouring powers. The function of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq is thus 
revealed as upholding and legitimising the political and class hierarchies of 
the region. However, the more the nationalist credentials of the ruling elite 
weakened, the more they had to rely on coercive means to stay in power.  
 
War and Economic Crisis 
When the political and economic crisis hit the KRG in 2014, the Kurdish 
region of Iraq was experiencing a period of rapid growth. Per-capita wealth 
was almost twice as high as the national average and, despite rapidly 
growing inequalities, only 3.4 per cent of Kurds were living in acute poverty 
compared to 13.3 per cent of Iraqis.345 Poverty remained largely 
concentrated in the rural areas contributing to a process of continued 
urbanisation.346 This period of growth consolidated a set of class relations 
that had started forming in the early 1990s when the KDP and the PUK took 
control of the region. As we saw in Chapter 5, the party leaders and their 
affiliates were able to appropriate most of the wealth generated by the 
export of oil and kept the rest of the population in a position of subordination 
and dependent on public handouts. However, this system started crumbling 
in 2014 due to a combination of political and economic events.  
The rift between Erbil and Baghdad over the independent export of oil by 
the KRG that Baghdad deemed unconstitutional escalated in February 2014 
when the Iraqi government blocked all its budget transfer to the Kurdish 
region. Compared to the IQD 14.3 trillion received in 2013 – 77 per cent of 
the region’s total revenues – in 2014 the KRG only received IQD 1.1 trillion 
 
345 Iraq Human Development Report 2014: Iraqi Youth Challenges and 
Opportunities, (UNDP, 2014) <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/undp-
iq_iraqnhdr2014-english.pdf>, 128-129. 
346 From 1997 to 2012, the urban population grew from 74.2 to 81.7 per cent in KRG 
and only from 67.3 to 69.2 per cent in the rest of Iraq.  Iraq Human Development 
Report, 140, 145. 
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from Baghdad.347 Given its very narrow tax base, the KRG could rely only on 
its independent oil export. As the Iraqi government threatened the KRG with 
war, a military confrontation was likely avoided only due to the sudden turn 
of events.348 In early June, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
invaded northern Iraq and, while the Iraqi army collapsed, the Islamists took 
control of Mosul and pushed southwards to Baghdad and eastwards to the 
Kurdish region. ISIL, the evolution of al-Qaeda in Iraq, had thrived in the 
context of the Syrian Civil War also thanks to its vast use of performative 
brutality against non-Sunni civilians and prisoners of war that significantly 
curtailed the morale of the overwhelmingly-Shia Iraqi army. While most of 
ISIL’s pressure was directed towards Baghdad, the Kurdish peshmerga 
managed to take control of long-disputed Kirkuk after the Iraqi Army 
evacuated the city. However, when in August 2014 ISIL attacked the areas 
of the Nineveh Governorate inhabited by the Yazidi Kurds, the KDP-
affiliated peshmerga withdrew. As ISIL initiated a genocidal campaign of 
slaughtering and enslavement of this religious minority, 50.000 Yazidis 
under siege on Mount Sinjar were only rescued by intervention from Syria 
and Turkey of fighters affiliated with the PKK.349 
The war on ISIL imposed a 1000-km long frontline on the KRG forcing Erbil 
to significantly increase its defence spending. A flow of displaced people 
from Syria and northern Iraq fled to the Kurdish region increasing the local 
refugee population from the already-present 250.000 to 1.5 million by the 
 
347 DeWeaver, Mark, The State of the Economy: Economic Issues in Iraq and the 
Kurdistan Region (IRIS, March 2017) < https://auis.edu.krd/iris/publications/iris-
booklet-series-state-economy>. 
348 Gareth Stansfield, ‘The Kurdish Experience in Post-Saddam Iraq’, in The Kurdish 
Question Revisited, ed. by Stansfield and Shareef, 355-374. 
349 The Kurdish-speaking Yazidis practice a syncretic monotheistic religion 
autochthonous to the Mesopotamian plain. ISIL sees them as worshipers of the 
devil which in their eyes gives them right to kill all Yazidi males and enslave the 
women. Between 2,000 and 5,500 Yazidis were killed and more than 6,000 were 
kidnapped by ISIL in August 2014. Valeria Cetorelli and others, ‘Mortality and 
Kidnapping Estimates for the Yazidi Population in the Area of Mount Sinjar, Iraq, in 
August 2014: A Retrospective Household Survey’, PLoS Medicine, 14.5 (2017) 
<https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002297>. 
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beginning of 2015 and inflicting a huge burden on the KRG’s budget.350 
Moreover, as ISIL advanced to just a few kilometres from Erbil, thousands 
of foreign staff left the region and tourism, trade and custom revenues 
collapsed.351 Licenced investment fell from $12.4 billion in 2013 to just $4.4 
billion in 2014.352 However, the heaviest blow to the region’s finances was 
struck by the rapid drop in oil prices. The price per barrel fell from $108 in 
June 2014 to $49 in January 2015 – and continued dropping to reach a low 
of $29 in February 2016.353 Since Baghdad had cut its budget transfer to the 
Kurdish region, the KRG had been keeping its finances from collapsing 
through the independent sale of oil but the sudden price drop dashed 
expected earnings putting the KRG on the brink of bankruptcy.  
The financial crisis further highlighted the limits of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq: 
Unable to print money or issue debt,354 the only option available to the KRG 
was cutting expenses. However, public spending – in the form of salaries, 
pensions and subsidies – was a political pillar of the Kurdish rentier system. 
Political stability was maintained only through the redistribution of part of 
the oil-generated rent to the wider population while the ruling class 
appropriated a large part of it. As the KRG started introducing austerity 
measures that threw ordinary Kurds into poverty, the dormant popular 
opposition to the political elite exploded.   
 
Protest and Political Crisis 
The combination of the war effort and its economic consequences, and the 
sudden drop in the price of oil brought the region’s finances on the brink of 
 
350 The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (2016), 2. 
351 The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (2015), 36-40. 
352 The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (2016), 2. 
353 ‘Imported Crude Oil Prices’, US Energy Information Administration, 2019 
<https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/>. 
354 An attempt made in June 2015 to issue KRG bonds was met with little 
enthusiasm by international investors despite the high remuneration (11-12 per 
cent) offered. Mills, Under the Mountains, 27. 
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collapse. The KRG halted the payment to contractors and suppliers causing 
the bankruptcy of numerous companies in particular in the construction and 
oil sectors and slashing the confidence of domestic and international 
investors. At the end of 2014, the KRG owed contractors $12.5 billion which 
amounted to almost its entire 2013 revenues.355 As these measures proved 
to be insufficient to cover the spiralling budget deficit, the Kurdish 
government proceeded to cut salaries and allowances. In 2015, the 
government came short of paying four months of salaries.356 In March 2016, 
all public employees received cuts for an average of 60 per cent of their 
wages.357 As noted in the previous chapter, more than half of the KRG’s 
workforce was employed by the state and hundreds of thousands of families 
relied on a single public salary.  
The effects of these measures on the life of ordinary Kurds were 
devastating. An independent study estimated a jump in the poverty rate 
from just above 3 per cent to 12 per cent in 2015 while average meat 
consumption dropped from 45 kg to just 23 kg a year.358 Due to the collapse 
of the private sector unemployment rose particularly among the youth.359 
Total consumption in the region declined by 14 per cent in 2014 and 24 per 
cent in 2015.360 The salary cuts of politicians and high-ranked officials did 
not produce a sense of collective national sacrifice given the widespread 
awareness that their salaries were little compared to what they gained 
through corruption and misappropriation. For example, in January 2015, just 
 
355 In Best of Times and Worst of Times: Addressing Structural Weaknesses of the 
Kurdistan Region’s Economy (MERI, 2016) <http://www.meri-k.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/MERI-Economic-Report-January-2016-2.pdf>, 15. 
356 In Best of Times, 15. 
357 The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (2015), 11. 
358 This information comes from observants from the region and was collected in 
DeWeaver, The State of the Economy, 3-4. 
359 On this, the data is contradictory. For the year 2014, the KRG estimated youth 
unemployment at 17.6 per cent while for the UNDP it was as high as 36.7 per cent. 
See Capacity Building at the Kurdistan Regional Statistics Organization Through 
Data Collection (KRG and Rand Corporation, 2014) <https://doi.org/10.1214/07-
EJS057>, 27-28; and Iraq Human Development Report, 53. 
360 The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (2016), 4. 
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before implementing harsh austerity measures, the KRG covered $375 
million of taxes owed to the Iraqi government by Korek a telecommunication 
giant widely known to be indirectly owned by Prime Minister Nechirvan 
Barzani.361 The lavish lifestyle of the Kurdish elite was more and more in 
sharp contrast to the impoverishment of most of the region’s population.  
In October 2015, after months of delayed and frozen salaries, protests broke 
out in the Sulaymaniyah province targeting mostly the offices of the KDP. 
As the party-affiliated security forces responded with fire, five protestors 
were killed.362 The deadly outcome of the demonstrations discouraged 
protests for a while. However, when the KRG extended the austerity 
measures to the peshmerga forces – dangerously increasing the rate of 
desertion on the ISIL front –363 and to the police, popular rage exploded. 
Protests took place again in February and then intermittently for the whole 
of 2016 and 2017.364 While ordinary Kurds were draining their savings and 
taking loans to make ends meet, popular opposition to the ruling KDP and 
PUK reached an unprecedented level. It is impossible to determine the exact 
class composition of these protests but the austerity measures severely hit 
the vast majority of the population. Besides the public employees – over half 
of the workforce –365 the crisis had devastating effects on the poorest 
components of Kurdish society especially those relying on daily salaries that 
found themselves without an income overnight.  
The austerity policies adopted by the KRG in the aftermath of the 2014 crisis 
brought about the collapse of the rentier system established in the 2000s. 
 
361 Michael Rubin, 'The Continuing problem of KRG Corruption', Routledge 
Handbook on the Kurds, ed. by Gunter, 331-332. 
362 ‘Iraqi Kurdistan: Ruling Party Forces Fire on Protesters’, Human Rights Watch, 21 
October 2015 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/21/iraqi-kurdistan-ruling-
party-forces-fire-protesters>. 
363 Florian Neuhof, ‘Unpaid Peshmerga Are Voting with Their Feet’, Deutsche Welle, 
2 February 2016 <https://www.dw.com/en/unpaid-peshmerga-are-voting-with-
their-feet/a-19020152>. 
364 ‘Protests Intensify in Iraqi Kurdistan amid Economic Crisis’, Human Rights Watch, 
9 February 2016 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-
protests-idUSKCN0VI11X>. 
365 See Chapter 5. 
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As discussed in Chapter 5, the rapid economic growth of the previous year 
had allowed the Kurdish ruling class to appropriate huge amounts of wealth 
mostly through corruption and non-transparent budgetary practices. 
However, the political implications of this process of accumulation at the top 
had been mitigated by the distribution of part of the oil rent to the larger 
population mostly through public handouts. Due to the weakness of the 
private sector, most Iraqi Kurds were forced to rely on public employment 
distributed by the ruling parties. By keeping people’s income dependant on 
their loyalties to the parties, the political elite was able to silence the 
expressions of popular opposition against their predatory practices. 
However, as soon as the effects of the salary cuts in the public sector kicked 
in, this political arrangement broke down and protests started taking place 
regularly. The response of the ruling KDP and PUK was to use the security 
apparatus to crack down on dissent and to unlawfully shut down the Kurdish 
parliament where the opposition could give political expression to popular 
anger. 
When the economic crisis started, the KDP and PUK invited the opposition 
parties to form a national unity government to have them share the political 
burden of the crisis. The Gorran Movement – which had boomed in the 2013 
regional elections on an anti-corruption platform – joined the government in 
a short-lived atmosphere of national unity driven by the threat posed by 
ISIL.366 Gorran received important ministerial posts as well as the speaker of 
the parliament. Their experience in power was, however, rather 
disappointing. Their promises of fighting corruption and imposing 
transparent practices in the administration were frustrated by the resistance 
posed by the KRG bureaucracy filled with personnel affiliated to the KDP 
and the PUK that kept responding to their political parties rather than the 
ministers. For the Minister of Finance, it proved impossible to track down 
revenues and expenditure to construct a transparent budget as high-ranked 
bureaucrats kept hiding the size and directions of each stream of revenues. 
 
366 The Islamist parties Kurdistan Islamic Union and Kurdistan Islamic Group also 
joined the national unity government. 
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Moreover, Gorran’s plan to transform the peshmerga forces from party 
militias into a regional army was destined to fail as the KDP and PUK made 
clear they were never going to give up their most powerful instrument of 
social control.367 The control of the armed forces proved to be essential to 
the KDP when its position of power was directly threatened.  
The national unity government lasted for little more than a year. In summer 
2015, Masoud Barzani’s presidential term was coming to an end. As 
mounting popular anger was mostly directed against the KDP and the 
Barzani family, the other parties were resolute to block Masoud’s re-
election. However, when public demonstrations exploded in October 2015, 
Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani accused Gorran of being behind the 
protests and sacked their ministers. Thanks to its military control of Erbil, 
the KDP could just shut down the parliament and prevent the speaker from 
entering the capital.368 Despite an attempt to mediate, the United States, 
leading the anti-ISIL coalition, never withdrew its support to the Barzanis 
providing a degree of legitimacy that allowed the KDP to keep the 
parliament shut for two years without any repercussion on their international 
standing.369 
 
The Evolving Power Structure of the KRG 
The economic collapse and political unrest that started in 2014-2015 
accelerated the crisis of legitimacy of the Kurdish political elite and, by 
extension, threatened the position of the entire ruling class. To understand 
 
367 Interviews with Hoshyar Omar (Sulaymaniyah, 2018) and Kamal Chomani 
(personal communication, 2019). 
368 Mohammed A. Salih, ‘KRG Parliament Speaker: Barzani’s Term Extension 
“against the Law”’, Al-Monitor, 28 August 2015 <https://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/kurdish-parliament-speaker-challenge-
barzani-legitimacy.html>. 
369 Veteran peshmerga commander Kaka Hama claims that “American and British 
representatives […] told us [that] if Kurds distract themselves with internal issues, 
they won’t have the support of the UK and the US in fighting the Islamic State.” 
‘Kaka Hama: Parties Warned by US Officials to Keep Barzani President’, Rudaw, 18 
August 2015 <https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/180820156>. 
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why popular protests represented such a danger, it is important to step back 
and discuss the evolution of the Kurdish ruling class between the 2000s and 
2010s and its relationship to the political elite. The suspension of the Kurdish 
parliament on October 2015 represents just the most blatant example of the 
authoritarian nature of the two-party rule and particularly of the increasing 
reliance on coercion that followed the rise of a meaningful challenge with 
the establishment of Gorran in 2009 and the 2011 anti-corruption 
protests.370  
In these years, the function of the KDP and PUK and the power relations 
within them changed. As discussed earlier, the massive amount of wealth 
accumulated at the top strengthened the hierarchical structure of these 
organisations. The long period of relative peace that started with the end of 
the Kurdish civil war in 1997 reduced the importance of party cadres in 
charge of the peshmerga units vis-à-vis that of the higher-ranking leaders 
controlling the sources of rent and hence its redistribution downwards.  The 
power of the dominant families increased substantially to the point that the 
organisational bodies of the parties – such as the politburo and the party 
congress – lost their political relevance and were replaced by informal 
relations of clientelism between powerful families and the middle party 
cadres. Political bargaining at the regional level has been less between 
political parties than between families that even built cross-party alliances. 
The KDP and PUK have maintained their role as political institutions that run 
the affairs of the region but the power relations lie in informal power chains 
that run downwards from a dominant politician through loyal party cadres 
and further down to the ordinary constituents in need of employment and 
protection.371 
The KDP has been centred around the Barzani family since its foundation 
and the weakening of the decision-making bodies of the party was less 
 
370 See Chapter 5. 
371 For an analysis along these lines, see After Iraqi Kurdistan’s Thwarted 
Independence Bid (International Crisis Group, 2019) 
<https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/199-after-iraqi-kurdistan.pdf>. 
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dramatic. The leadership has been undisputedly in the hands of the lineage 
of the ‘immortal leader’372 Mullah Mustafa Barzani with his son Masoud as 
the head of the family. The line of succession informally proceeds via 
seniority with Nechirvan, the son of Masoud’s prematurely-dead elder 
brother Idris, as the second in line and Masoud’s oldest son Masrour as the 
third. Consequently, when Masoud Barzani was the KRG president, 
Nechirvan was the Prime Minister and when Masoud resigned in 2017, 
Nechirvan succeeded him as the president and Masrour became Prime 
Minister. The KDP does little to conceal its quasi-monarchical structure and 
individuals within the family are treated as public officials even if they do 
not hold any office.373  
These practices have become dominant also within the PUK but in a context 
of increasing fragmentation. Until 1992, the PUK was a federation of formally 
independent parties and, under Jalal Talabani’s leadership, the party always 
contained independent powerful individuals. The encroaching of nepotistic 
practices and corruption was the main cause of the 2009 split by 
Nawshirwan Mustafa and his followers and their new party Gorran became 
a powerful challenger to the PUK in Sulaymaniyah in a way that would be 
unimaginable in the KDP-controlled areas. However, as the most vocal 
opponents left with Gorran, the power shift from the PUK party structures 
to family politics inevitably accelerated. The PUK did not hold any party 
congress between 2010 and 2019 despite its constitution requiring one 
every four years.374 Especially since the death of Jalal Talabani in October 
2017, the party has been divided into two factions: One led by Talabani’s 
widow Hero Ibrahim Ahmed and their sons and the other by Kosrat Rasul, 
 
372 See ‘Congresses of Kurdistan Democratic Party (1946-1999)’, KDP, 
<https://www.kdp.se/index.php?do=congress> 
373 In April 2019, Masrour Barzani’s teenage son was photographed at a sport event 
rewarding athletes with medals side by side with the French Consul in Erbil. See 
Kamal Chomani (@KamalChomani), ‘Son of Masrour Barzani, could be around 15 
yrs old (…)’, Twitter, · 28 April 2019, 17:05 
<https://twitter.com/KamalChomani/status/1122532218298097664>.   
374 After Iraqi Kurdistan’s Thwarted Independence Bid, 6. 
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the acting leader of the PUK after Talabani’s death.375 In the years of the 
economic and political crisis, the PUK was unable to pursue a coherent 
strategy. On the one hand, they tried to recover some of the electoral 
ground lost in favour of Gorran by blaming the region’s problems on the KDP 
and joining the other parties to stop Masoud Barzani’s re-elections in 2015. 
On the other hand, they have kept a higher level of negotiations with the 
KDP and resorted – as described later in the chapter – to even more virulent 
electoral fraud to regain the positions lost in Sulaymaniyah. 
The rise of a new generation of Kurdish leaders hailing directly from the 
dominant families heavily tarnished the legitimacy of the two ruling parties. 
Whereas Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani could still enjoy popularity and 
respect due to their prominent role in the liberation struggle,376 the rise of 
their sons and nephews to power reveals the real nature of the KDP and 
PUK as family-run enterprises. The consequence of this process on the two 
ruling parties has been a dramatic loss of their credibility as the champions 
of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq and the weakening of their legitimacy of the 
rule over the region.377  
This was the context in which the collapse of the Kurdish economy and 
political system occurred in 2014-2015. The refusal of the two ruling parties 
to address the public’s demands for a more equal distribution of the – now 
scarce – KRG resources cannot be explained solely with the greed of an elite 
accustomed to a lavish lifestyle. The appropriation of the KRG’s public 
revenues was an indispensable component of their rule. Without siphoning 
money off the public budget and maintaining control over the provision of 
public contracts, the Kurdish leaders could not keep feeding the pyramid of 
 
375 Ibid., 8. 
376 In Sulaymaniyah, Jalal Talabani’s figure is still surrounded by an aura of purity. 
Corruption and nepotism within the PUK are then often attributed to the greed of 
his family – his wife Hero Ibrahim particularly – who took charge while Talabani was 
based in Baghdad and then fell ill. 
377 For an analysis of the increasingly dynastic nature of Iraqi Kurdish politics, see 
Kamal Chomani, ‘Kurdistan Region at a Time of Crown Princes’, 1001 Iraqi Thoughts, 
28 December 2018 <https://1001iraqithoughts.com/2018/12/28/kurdistan-region-
in-a-time-of-kurdish-crown-princes>. 
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interests that sustain their power. The network of businessmen, high-
ranked civil servants, private security companies but also tribal leaders in 
the rural areas on top of which high-level politicians sit would simply 
collapse if the stream of money and contracts were interrupted and these 
local power holders would just migrate their loyalty to some political 
competitor. In these terms, corruption and misappropriation are not solely 
bad practices but also an indispensable tool that allows the political elite to 
feed the wider ruling class of the region and maintain cohesion at the top of 
the class structure. This cohesion became increasingly important as the KDP 
and PUK were losing popular support. 
 
External Relations and Domestic Rule 
The erosion of the legitimacy of the KDP and PUK went hand in hand with 
their increasing reliance on the external support of, respectively, Turkey and 
Iran. As all opposition forces claim, the Department of Foreign Relations of 
KRG held a purely ceremonial function and external relations were the 
exclusive domain of the two ruling parties, also due to their direct control 
over the security apparatus.378 The close relationship built up by KDP and 
PUK with their neighbours had a dual function for the Kurdish elite. On the 
one hand, the economic penetration of the region by Turkish and Iranian 
actors is an extremely beneficial business for politically-connected Kurdish 
companies. On the other hand, the KDP and PUK tied their geopolitical 
survival in an increasingly unstable Middle East to the military might of 
Turkey and Iran, also gaining insurance against the possibility that domestic 
unrest escalated into a full-blown revolution.  
However, such a close partnership with two foreign powers which 
themselves oppress their Kurdish minorities heavily undermines the 
nationalist credentials of the KDP and PUK. Kurdish nationalism is inherently 
 
378 Interviews with Mustafa Abbas Abbas (Sulaymaniyah, 2018), Aram Saeed 
(Sulaymaniyah, 2018), Hoshyar Omar (Sulaymaniyah, 2018), Muhammad Hakim 
Jabar (Sulaymaniyah, 2018), and Muthanna Amin (Sulaymaniyah, 2018).  
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irredentist as the Kurds are spread as minorities across four countries. The 
feeling of solidarity among Kurdish speakers across Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and 
Syria made the KRG a natural haven for Kurdish opposition groups from 
neighbouring countries. In the 1990s, both the PKK from Turkey and a 
constellation of armed Iranian-Kurdish organisations settled within the 
borders of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq giving Turkey and Iran a permanent 
excuse to violate the KRG territory.379 The KDP and PUK have had to juggle 
their close relationship with Turkey and Iran with the widespread popular 
sympathy toward Kurdish opposition in those countries. 
The strategic partnership between Iran and the PUK dates back to the 
Kurdish civil war in the 1990s and was largely a response to the KDP’s 
growing ties with Baghdad and Ankara.380 While the PUK was at war with the 
KDP and under blockade by Baghdad, the Iranian border became the only 
window to the world for the Sulaymaniyah-based PUK. But Iran’s support 
did not come for free and, in 1996, Talabani allowed Iranian troops to cross 
the border and attack the Iranian Kurdish fighters of the KDPI hosted in the 
PUK-controlled area.381 Since then the PUK was forced into the 
uncomfortable position of having to police the activities of the KDPI on 
behalf of Tehran.382 Despite the paralysis of the Iranian-Kurdish party, Iran 
kept hitting its enemy across the KRG as shown by targeted assassinations 
of opposition leaders,383 and the 2018 bombing of the KDPI bases that killed 
 
379 Tahiri, The Structure of Kurdish Society, 276-299. 
380 Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament, 111-112. 
381 According to Asso Hasanzadeh, the son of the then-leader of the KDPI Abdullah 
Hasanzadeh, Jalal Talabani warned the Iranian Kurds so that “when [the Iranians] 
bombed here, only our peshmerga were left here, our families were sent to the UN 
camps in Erbil.” Interview with Asso Hasanzadeh (Koya, 2018). 
382 Loghman Ahmedi, a young member of the KDPI leadership claims that “we made 
a very strategic mistake in the early 1990s when we decided to leave our bases in 
the mountains and came down here. […] We halted some of our activities becuase 
[…] we wanted to give the KRG an opportunity to stabilise and create their own 
institutions and so on. But that weakened our party.” Interview with Loghman 
Ahmedi (Koya, 2019).  
383 Fazel Hawramy, ‘Assassinations Mount as Iranian Kurdish Militants Clash with 
Tehran’, Al-Monitor, 7 March 2018 <https://www.al-
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15 militants.384 Due to its reliance on Iranian support, the PUK is in no position 
to effectively protest these violations.  
The political ties between Tehran and the PUK parallel the economic 
penetration of the PUK-controlled areas by Iranian business. The level of 
economic influence Iran exercises over Sulaymaniyah extends beyond the 
area’s dependence on Iranian-made consumer goods and food supply. The 
Kurdish political elite – in a more or less transparent way – partners with 
Iranian firms and takes a stake in the profits made by Iranian investment, 
while the PUK benefits directly from the control of the border-crossings.385 
Generally speaking, the multi-layered influence exercised by Tehran over an 
important part of the KRG is one of the reasons why Iran supported the 
establishment of the autonomous Kurdish region in 2003. This fits in very 
well with Iran’s broader objective of keeping Iraq fragmented and 
decentralized, to avoid the resurgence of the strong enemy they faced in 
the 1980s. 
Iran’s influence over Sulaymaniyah is, however, surpassed by Turkey’s sway 
over the KDP-controlled area of the KRG. Since the PKK established its 
bases in the Qandil mountain in the north-eastern corner of the KRG in 1991, 
the Turkish-Kurdish conflict intertwined with Iraqi Kurdish politics. The PKK 
took advantage of the remoteness of this area to wage attacks on Turkish 
positions, pushing Turkey to carry on a series of costly but unsuccessful 
cross-border operations on Iraqi soil. The proximity of the KDP-controlled 
area to the Turkish border and Barzani’s interest in limiting the influence of 
the PKK deepened Turkish-KDP relations in the 1990s. However, open ties 
could only develop in the late 2000s, after the Islamist Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan consolidated its 
 
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/03/iran-kdpi-kurdish-opposition-iraq-
assassinations-rahmani.html#ixzz5bkPrbUIC>.  
384 ‘Rockets Hit Iranian Kurdish Opposition Offices in Iraq’s Koya’, Al Jazeera, 8 
September 2018 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/rockets-hit-iranian-
kurdish-opposition-offices-iraq-koya-180908090605503.html>. 
385 ‘Iran to Establish Goods Trading Center in Iraq’s Sulaymaniyah’, Mehr News 
Agency, 29 October 2018 <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/139170/Iran-to-
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power in Turkey and could overcome the resistance of the viscerally anti-
Kurdish nationalist establishment. These efforts culminated in the opening 
of a Turkish consulate in Erbil in 2010. Since then, the rate of Turkish 
economic investments in the KRG grew exponentially, and cross-border 
trade flourished. As in the case of Iranian economic penetration, this 
economic partnership largely benefitted the local Kurdish elite.386 Profits 
increased exponentially when the KRG started selling oil to Turkey. Ankara’s 
thirst for cheap fuel offered the KDP leadership the opportunity to bypass 
Baghdad’s constitutional monopoly over the export of Iraqi oil by selling it 
directly to Turkey. In the early 2010s, the oil partnership with Turkey became 
one of the most significant points of contention between Iraq and the KRG 
increasing Erbil’s bargaining power vis-à-vis Baghdad but reducing its 
autonomy from Ankara.387  
The relationship between Turkey and the KDP held also a significant political 
dimension. Engaged in a long-term campaign against the pro-PKK parties 
for electoral hegemony over Turkey’s Kurdish region, Erdoğan used his 
relationship with Barzani to demonstrate the compatibility between the AKP 
values and Kurdish identity. This attempt culminated in Barzani’s 
participation, in November 2013, in a mass rally in Diyarbakır – Turkey’s 
largest Kurdish-majority city – where he shared the stage with Erdoğan in 
an unprecedented celebration of Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood.388 This 
relationship raised Barzani’s standing as a pan-Kurdish leader who could 
provide Turkey’s Kurds with a conservative alternative to the militant PKK. 
However, the Turkey-KDP political partnership suffered a blow in 2015 with 
the onset of the parliamentary alliance between Erdoğan’s AKP and the 
Turkish far-right characterised by violently anti-Kurdish positions. With little 
 
386 See Chapter 5.  
387 See Bill Park, ‘Turkey, the US and the KRG: Moving Parts and the Geopolitical 
Realities’, Insight Turkey, 14.3 (2012), 109–25. 
388 Çandar, Cengiz, ‘Erdogan-Barzani 'Diyarbakir encounter' milestone’, al-Monitor, 
20 November 2013 <https://www.al-
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or no opposition from the KDP, Turkey resumed airstrikes over the PKK 
camps in Iraqi Kurdistan that regularly kill local Kurdish villagers. The 
violation of the KRG territory and the multi-front war waged by Erdoğan 
against the PKK, the civilian Kurdish opposition as well as the Kurds of 
Syria,389 exposed the contradictions between the KDP’s nationalism and its 
relations with Ankara undermining its credibility among the Kurds.390 
Nevertheless, the KDP’s economic and geopolitical dependency on Turkey 
remained intact as shown by the ban on pro-PKK political activities,391 and 
the opening of two Turkish military bases on KRG soil.392 Turkish military 
presence stirred popular resentments manifested in violent 
demonstrations.393  
When looked at from the standpoint of domestic politics, it becomes clear 
why the benefits of the foreign partnerships of the KDP and the PUK 
outweigh their cost in terms of political legitimacy. Besides the profits 
brought by partnering with foreign companies, the KDP and PUK enjoy the 
backing of a regional power vis-à-vis Baghdad but also their own 
populations. The stronger their ties with Turkey and Iran, the less 
accountable they feel to domestic dissent increasing their authoritarian 
control over the region’s politics and economy. When the 2014 crisis broke 
out, the mounting pressure from below pushed the KDP and the PUK to 
invest in a much more aggressive nationalist rhetoric in open contradiction 
 
389 See Chapter 9. 
390 ‘Iraqi Kurds Protest against Turkish “Genocide”’, Euronews, 8 February 2016 
<https://www.euronews.com/2016/02/08/iraqi-kurds-protest-against-turkish-
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391 The KDP-controlled KRG Electoral Committee banned from the regional 
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Interviews with Aram Saeed (Sulaymaniyah, 2018), Abbas Mustafa Abbas 
(Sulaymaniyah, 2018), and Tara Muhammed (Sulaymaniyah, 2018). 
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with their deep ties to Turkey and Iran. However, this contradiction 
backfired in the occasion of the 2017 independence referendum. 
  
The 2017 Independence Referendum  
As mass anti-austerity demonstrations started taking place regularly since 
late 2015, the KDP and PUK realised that they were standing on increasingly 
shaky ground. As meeting public demands was not an option, the KRG 
leadership responded with a carrot-and-stick strategy combining political 
repression with heightened nationalist rhetoric against Baghdad.  After 
showing no hesitation to fire on protesters, they suspended the parliament 
and expelled the other political forces from the government leaving a KDP-
PUK cabinet to run the affairs of the region without any check while Masoud 
Barzani remained president even after his term expired in 2015. Parallel to 
repression, the ruling parties revamped their aggressive nationalist rhetoric 
to raise the tensions with Baghdad in an attempt to generate a ‘rally-‘round-
the-flag’ effect.   
The attempt to invest in nationalism and to divert public attention from the 
economic crisis was aided by the mass popularity of the peshmerga 
deployed on the ISIL front and by the occupation by Kurdish forces of most 
of the areas disputed by Baghdad and Erbil. In particular, the Kurdish 
takeover of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk from ISIL inflamed nationalist feelings, 
given the city’s highly symbolic value for the Kurds. Riding popular 
sentiments, the KRG president Masoud Barzani raised the issue of Kurdish 
independence as soon as the war started.394 In spring 2017, as Iraqi and 
Kurdish forces liberated Mosul from ISIL while – at the same time – protests 
in the KRG intensified, a high-level meeting between the KDP and PUK 
resulted in the decision to hold a referendum by the end of that year.395  
 
394 ‘Iraq Kurdistan Independence Referendum Planned’, BBC News, 1 July 2014 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28103124>.  
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The KDP heavily invested in the referendum to shift the debate away from 
the political and economic crises and the suspension of the parliament. 
Masoud Barzani presented the referendum as about “the destiny” of the 
Kurdish people and therefore as above “any other political framework, or 
any political parties, or any political problems within the party system.”396 
The KDP managed to present a solid and unified position maximizing their 
appeal to nationalist voters. The situation was more complicated for the PUK 
that was going through a period of fragmentation especially since Jalal 
Talabani fell terminally ill before dying in October 2017. Moreover, the 
referendum was bound to generate tensions in the ethnically-mixed Kirkuk 
and jeopardise Kurdish control of the city which had traditionally been a PUK 
stronghold. The PUK leadership in Kirkuk, supported by the Talabani family, 
was against holding the referendum in the city. However, Kirkuk governor 
Najmaddin Karim appealed to the PUK acting leader Kosrat Rasul who sent 
3,000 peshmerga to the city to enforce the holding of the referendum.397  
The nationalist frenzy promoted by the KDP forced the opposition to 
attenuate their positions. While recognizing the right of the Kurds to self-
determination, Gorran questioned the timing of the referendum and 
demanded to have the regional elections – due in November 2017 – in 
conjunction with it. When the government convened the parliament on 
September 15th, after two years of forced closure, just to ceremonially 
proclaim the referendum date on September 25th, Gorran and other 
opposition forces, as well as part of the PUK boycotted the meeting. 
Observers describe the divide running through the region with the KDP-
controlled areas covered with pro-independence propaganda and nothing 
of the kind in the PUK-controlled areas.398 On the day of the referendum, 93 
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per cent of voters supported independence. However, the huge differences 
in the participation rate present the picture of a very divided region with 91 
per cent turnout in KDP-controlled Dohuk and just 55 per cent in 
Sulaymaniyah.399 
One of the reasons why many were sceptical of the referendum was the 
sheer lack of international support needed to make Kurdish statehood 
viable. The US opposed the referendum and Baghdad threatened retaliation 
while Ankara and Tehran, fearing the effects of Kurdish statehood on their 
own Kurdish minorities, restated their commitment to the territorial integrity 
of Iraq. In the aftermath of the referendum, the KRG leadership found itself 
completely isolated on the international stage and had to face the retaliatory 
actions of the neighbouring powers.400 Turkey and Iran showed their 
muscles by organising a joint military exercise on the border. Supported by 
the two neighbours, Baghdad immediately halted international flights to the 
KRG while Tehran and Ankara closed their airspace to all flights to and from 
the region. On October 15th, Iraqi troops marched on Kirkuk without 
encountering much resistance and possibly in agreement with the PUK 
faction that had opposed the referendum in the first place.401 In just a few 
days, most of the disputed territories gained by the Kurds during the war on 
ISIL were lost. The repercussions of the referendum surpassed the most 
pessimistic expectations and, on November 1st, Masoud Barzani resigned as 
KRG president.  
The size and weight of the punitive measures taken against the KRG 
triggered a debate over the choice to pursue the referendum despite the 
virtually unanimous international hostility. The independence of a 
landlocked Kurdish state without the support of any one of the neighbouring 
powers would inevitably turn into a geopolitical nightmare. Most scholars 
 
399 Turnout figures are estimates. Ibid., 205. 
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and observers explained Barzani’s choice as the result of miscalculations or 
of genuine nationalist aspirations that go beyond any material 
considerations.402 These interpretations ‘orientalise’ the Kurdish leadership 
depicting them as patriotic warriors too naïve to understand geopolitical 
power games and legitimise Barzani’s and the KDP’s victimhood narrative. 
More importantly, these readings dismiss the contested nature of the 
referendum and the opposition of important sectors of the Kurdish society.  
More convincingly, the analyses by Palani and others (2019) and, O’Driscoll 
and Başer (2019) point to domestic political dynamics within the KRG 
explaining the referendum as a political move by the KDP.403 However, 
presenting the referendum solely as Barzani’s gamble to stay in power 
overlooks the structural context that forced the KDP to invest in an 
increasingly aggressive nationalist stance as their last source of political 
legitimacy. The referendum must be seen in continuity with this process as 
well as tied to the increasing reliance on repression and authoritarian 
methods. The referendum was, in these terms, the ultimate tool of the 
strategy of survival of the Kurdish ruling class and it is not coincidental that 
it was promoted and supported by the entire KDP leadership and by a 
significant part of the PUK.  
Even if Barzani made some gross miscalculations, he was aware that a 
parliamentary majority to keep the presidency for himself was simply not 
there. Yet, the chaos generated by the referendum allowed the KDP to 
postpone the regional elections for another year. Ultimately, the KDP – 
unlike the Iraqi Kurds as a whole – did not lose anything from the referendum 
and, as the next section shows, they even came out stronger. Masoud 
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403 O’Driscoll and Başer, Independence Referendums; Kamaran Palani, Jaafar 
Khidir, Mark Dechesne, and Edwin Bakker, ‘The Development of Kurdistan’s de 
Facto Statehood: Kurdistan’s September 2017 Referendum for Independence’, 
Third World Quarterly, 40.12 (2019), 2270-2288. 
 
 
193 
 
remained the head of the Barzani family and arguably the most powerful 
individual in the region. 
Kirkuk was undoubtedly a great symbolic and material loss but the KDP 
managed to shift the blame on the PUK forces that garrisoned the city. The 
traditional hold of the PUK over Kirkuk meant that its inclusion in the 
upcoming regional elections would have significantly boosted the party in 
the Kurdish parliament while the control of the Kirkuk oilfields could have 
allowed the PUK to bridge the gap with the KDP in terms of economic power. 
However, independent studies show that the oil from Kirkuk will not 
constitute a significant part of the KRG production for more than a few years 
and, with the expansion of the oil sector to the region’s vast unexploited 
fields, it will likely become marginal in the course of the 2020s.404 In the long-
term, Kirkuk’s oil output would not make a huge difference for the viability 
of a Kurdish state while its inclusion in the KRG would certainly change the 
internal relations of power and constitute a permanent source of tension 
with Baghdad. Ultimately, even if it was not a calculated move, losing Kirkuk 
was a convenient unintended consequence for the KDP.   
The result of the Kurdish referendum was a renewed political paralysis. 
Under the threat of invasion from Baghdad and the neighbouring powers, 
the KDP managed to postpone the regional elections for another year, 
showing that the resignation of President Barzani was not going to bring any 
step towards the democratisation of the region. The ruling elite had lost its 
legitimacy in the eyes of most of the Iraqi Kurdish population, yet the 
militarization of the region seemed to leave no room for political alternatives.  
 
The Crisis of Kurdish Nationalism 
The 2017 independence referendum marks a turning point in the history of 
the Kurdish region of Iraq. Despite the overwhelming victory, the 
independence of the region was never proclaimed while the KRG had to pay 
the heavy consequences of the vote. The result was a widespread feeling 
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of resentment towards the ruling elite which had lost its legitimacy in the 
eyes of a large part of the Kurdish population, a feeling manifested in the 
frequency and width of public protests. However, the continuous use of 
coercion by the dominant party and the gradual co-optation of Gorran into 
the ruling establishment generated a pervasive sense of disillusionment for 
any prospects of political change within the system. The ultimate victim of 
these dynamics was Kurdish nationalism as the fundamental source of 
legitimacy for political power in the region.  
The hope that the independence referendum would trigger a ‘rally-round-
the-flag’ effect was dashed in just a few days. At the announcement of 
Masoud Barzani’s resignation, a spontaneous crowd stormed the Kurdish 
parliament in Erbil.405 Large anti-austerity protests resumed in the fall of 
2017 and took place frequently throughout 2018. In December 2017, the 
police fired on the protestors killing six.406   
Despite growing popular resentment, the Iraqi federal elections of March 
2018 proved to be a success for the KDP and PUK. The KDP triumphed in 
Dohuk and Erbil, while the PUK became again the first party in 
Sulaymaniyah. Gorran, after two consecutive electoral victories, dropped 
from 39 per cent in 2014 to just 23 per cent. Contributing to Gorran’s fall 
was the establishment of the New Generation Movement, a populist party 
founded by businessman Shaswar Abdulwahid Qadir that managed to 
attract part of the protest vote. However, the most significant 
characteristics of these elections were the dramatic drop in voters’ turnout 
and the allegations of an unprecedented degree of electoral fraud.407 The 
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turnout averagely fell by more than 20 per cent compared to the 2014 
elections, as only half of the registered voters showed up at the ballot. In 
KDP-controlled Erbil, turnout was as low as 43 per cent.408 The opposition 
parties were heavily penalised by this low level of participation driven by the 
widespread sense of disillusionment. A feeling that was well justified. The 
perception that KDP and PUK had manipulated the results – more heavily 
than usual – came not only from civil society groups and the opposition 
parties but also from the Iraqi government and several international 
organisations.409 Unsurprisingly, a very similar picture emerged from the 
Kurdish regional elections held just a few months later on September 2018. 
Both the KDP and PUK increased their seats in the regional parliament while 
Gorran lost almost half. The turnout was as low as 58.4 per cent (-16 per 
cent from 2013) but even this figure might have been manipulated.410  
The elections of 2018, the first after the beginning of the crisis and popular 
protests, showed that KDP and PUK were no longer willing to allow any 
margin to political challengers even at the cost of turning the electoral 
process into a farce. In this context measuring the actual remaining popular 
support to the two ruling parties is futile but the need to resort to even more 
blatant electoral fraud suggests that it is very low. These elections also had 
a profound impact on Gorran. Gorran’s control of the provincial council of 
Sulaymaniyah and their participation in the regional government in 2014-
2015 already showed the narrow margins for change even when its 
members when in executive positions. The widespread disillusionment that 
followed the 2017 referendum heavily affected Gorran especially as the KDP 
and PUK blocked the electoral path to change. With the death of Gorran’s 
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founder Nawshirwan Mustafa in May 2017, the party visibly fell under the 
influence of his sons Nma and Cheya, a dynamic that generated great 
opposition within the party, with cadres accusing the leadership of turning 
the party into a family business like the KDP and PUK.411 While much of the 
youth, as well as veteran peshmerga commanders and early followers of 
Nawshirwan Mustafa, left the party,412 the so-called ‘pragmatist wing’ gained 
strength. The argument put forward by the now-dominant figures in Gorran 
is that the elections showed that the only way for the party to be competitive 
is to be in power where they can distribute jobs and handouts among their 
followers and build a solid support base similar to those of the KDP and 
PUK.413 These considerations reflect the widespread belief that the space 
for a mode of politics alternative to that of the KDP and PUK was closed. In 
the year that followed the regional elections of September 2018, the KDP 
led the negotiation to form a government with both the PUK and Gorran until 
an agreement was found in May 2019. Gorran joined the cabinet and voted 
with the KDP to elect Nechirvan Barzani as President of the region and 
Masrour Barzani as the Prime Minister.   
 
411 Gorran’s Hoshyar Omar explains that the party properties were registered under 
Nawshirwan Mustafa’s name – and are now controlled by his sons – to avoid the 
risk of having them seized in case Gorran’s licence was revoked. “For that purely 
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Hoshyar Omar (Sulaymaniyah, 2018). 
412 One of them was Qadir Haji Ali, a well-respected veteran of the liberation war 
and early follower of Nawshirwan Mustafa. Interview Qadir Haji Ali (Sulaymaniyah, 
2019). For the flight of activists and cadres, see Fazel Hawramy, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
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The co-optation of Gorran into the political establishment marked the end 
of the hopes for a political change within the framework of the KRG. The 
collapse of the electoral turnout shows that the appeal to the nationalist 
feeling is no longer effective. In the meantime, political opposition was more 
and more expressed by public demonstrations. Interestingly enough, 
Shaswar Abdulwahid’s New Generation Movement – the biggest opposition 
party since Gorran joined the government – radically shifted away from 
nationalism and blamed the KRG’s lack of cooperation with Baghdad for the 
problems of the region. New Generation’s Aram Saeed explains: 
it's very important to have partners in Iraq. […] We can help Basra, 
Basra can help us… we think the nationalism of the KDP and PUK is 
a very bad tradition. We discussed with [Muqtada al-]Sadr and 
[Haider al-]Abadi, we don't want to make a coalition of one 
nationality against other nationalities, or Shi'as against Sunnis. We 
need to pass this kind of thinking.414 
Before establishing his highly personalistic and self-funded party, Shaswar 
rose to political prominence at the time of the referendum when he launched 
a No, for Now campaign heavily pushed by his own TV channel NRT. 
Moreover, the crisis of legitimacy of the ruling parties went hand in hand 
with the rising popular sympathy, particularly among the youth, towards the 
more militant PKK and its Syrian-sister party the Democratic Union Party 
(PYD) due to their emphasis on “social justice, freedom, and women’s 
liberation”.415 The PKK is particularly effective at conveying the image of the 
guerrillas’ frugal life in the mountains in stark contrast with the opulence of 
the Iraqi Kurdish politicians.416   
 
Conclusion 
The KRG elections of September 2018 and the solid victory of the KDP and 
PUK suggest that the Kurdish elite has been able to survive the economic 
 
414 Interview with Aram Saeed (Sulaymaniyah, 2018). 
415 Interview with Kamal Chomani (personal communication, 2019). 
416 Interview with Kamal Chomani (personal communication, 2019). 
 
 
198 
 
and political crisis that started in 2014 and that triggered the greatest threat 
to their power since the liberation of the region in 1991. Despite their size 
and frequency, popular protests have not been able to evolve into a political 
alternative to the ruling party. Both the ferocity of the KRG-led repression 
and the weakness of the opposition parties contributed to this failure. The 
KDP and PUK are still in control of the KRG institutions and its security forces 
while their greatest political challenger Gorran has been weakened and co-
opted. In March 2019, as his last act as Prime Minister, Nechirvan Barzani 
announced the end of the austerity measures imposed after 2014.417 The 
current relations of power in the region seem to allow the Kurdish ruling 
class to continue its strategy of accumulation based on corruption and 
misappropriation of public resources. The political elite that organises the 
interests of and mediates within the ruling class defused the challenge 
coming from the parliamentary opposition though repression and cooptation 
ensuring the survival of the system. However, the crisis and the referendum 
have changed the economic picture of the region. The crisis left the KRG 
with a huge debt towards foreign corporations including $3 billion owed to 
oil companies.418 The pre-crisis plans to build a strong oil sector independent 
from Baghdad has been dashed by Turkey’s opposition to the referendum 
and its cooperation with the Iraqi government. The KRG has to send its oil 
to Baghdad and to rely again on the constitutional budget transfer, now 
reduced from 17 per cent to just 12.5 per cent, with the addition of the oil 
that the Kurds manage to smuggle beyond the border.419  
All these conditions raise doubts about the KRG’s ability to rebuild the rentier 
system that was in place until 2014. With less cash available for 
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redistribution and the same needed to keep the power structure of the 
region intact, the KRG will struggle to recover a degree of political stability 
especially since the strategies deployed by the KDP and PUK have heavily 
undermined their legitimacy to rule in the eyes of the wider Kurdish public. 
A long-term victim of the crisis seems to be Kurdish nationalism itself as the 
ideological source of political legitimacy in the Iraqi Kurdistan.  
 
 

Chapter 7 
Underdevelopment and the Kurdish 
Question in Cold-War Turkey 
(1946-1987) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
After the defeat of the Kurdish feudal revolts of the interwar period, the 
political dynamics and class structure of the Kurdish regions of Turkey and 
Iraq diversified substantially as they were shaped by the different nation-
building projects promoted by the two countries. This chapter discusses the 
development of the Kurdish movement in the Turkish republic from the 
suppression of the interwar-period revolts to the rise of the PKK in the 
1980s. After the defeat of the feudal revolts of the 1920s and 1930s, Kurdish 
nationalism in Turkey was brought to silence while the Turkish state worked 
to erase any expression of Kurdish identity. With the beginning of multi-
party democracy in 1950, the traditional elite of the Kurdish region was 
gradually re-integrated into Turkey’s political system. Their authority over 
rural areas allowed them to control the vote of vast peasant and tribal 
constituencies, making their contribution precious to nationwide 
conservative parties. In these years, the economic subordination of the 
Kurdish region to the more developed western Anatolia, combined with the 
mechanisation of agriculture, transformed Kurdish society, increasing 
landlessness and rural migration.  
The alliance between the Kurdish aghas and the Turkish state via the 
dominant conservative parties was the principal reason why Kurdish political 
identity re-emerged within the Turkish left in the 1960s and 1970s. Kurdish 
activists started framing the relationship between Turkey and its Kurdish 
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region in terms of colonialism and the Kurdish elite as the agent class of 
Turkish colonialism. This was the decisive step towards the development of 
an autonomous Kurdish left with the PKK as its most successful expression. 
Unlike its competitors, the PKK developed a strategy aimed specifically at 
winning the support of the Kurdish peasantry through violent actions 
directed against both the Kurdish landowners and the Turkish security 
forces. After the 1980 military coup swept away most of the Turkish and 
Kurdish left, the PKK started an insurgency that had a strong base of 
support among the peasantry and turned into the biggest military challenge 
faced by the Turkish republic since its foundation. 
 
The Kurds in the Early Kemalist Republic 
In the years between the proclamation of the Republic in 1923 and the first 
democratic elections of 1950, Turkey was ruled by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s 
Republican People’s Party (CHP) and underwent a process of authoritarian 
modernisation. As Chapter 3 showed, the suppression of the feudal revolts 
of the 1920s and 1930s became the occasion for Ankara to impose a form 
of tight military control over the Kurdish areas of south-eastern Turkey420 
allegedly to liberate the region from feudalism and tribalism. This brutal 
repression was accompanied by a project of demographic engineering 
aimed at diluting and Turkifying the Kurdish population defined by the 
Kemalist regime as ‘tribal populace that do not speak the Turkish 
language’.421 In the 1930s, over 25.000 Kurds were deported to western 
Turkey and replaced by several thousand non-Kurdish settlers.422 With the 
aim of destroying the tribal structures of Kurdish society, many of the aghas 
and shaykhs involved in the revolts were deported. Obsessed by the threat 
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correspondence between Kurdish presence and Turkish administrative divisions. 
421 Cited in Yadirgi, The Political Economy, 181. 
422 Ibid., 180-185. 
 
 
203 
 
of separatism, Ankara was resolute to erase Kurdish identity and, in 1924, 
the public use of the Kurdish language was prohibited. 
Repression and deportations took place in a region already devasted by war. 
Eastern Anatolia had been the frontline of the war against Russia, a theatre 
of the First World War that had especially heavy repercussions for the 
civilian population. The perception of the Christian element as an internal 
enemy pushed the Ottoman government to undertake a systematic 
campaign of massacres and deportation of the local Christians which 
developed into the genocide of one to two million Armenians and other 
Ottoman Christians. The effect of wartime devastation and depopulation on 
the economy and social fabric of the region were aggravated by the fact 
that the autochthonous Christian population who had been deported and 
massacred represented a significant proportion of the artisans and traders 
of Eastern Anatolia.   
Underpopulated and ruled by martial law, the Kurdish region of Turkey – 
home in 1927 to roughly two million people –423 was unable to benefit from 
the country’s post-war economic recovery. As explained by Veli Yadirgi, in 
the years of Kemalist single-party rule (1923-1950), the gap between 
western and eastern Turkey increased enormously. The policy of 
industrialisation promoted by Ankara was largely directed at the west of the 
country and the share of manufactures located in the south-east dropped 
from 17.8 per cent in 1927 to only 7.7 per cent in 1955 while agricultural 
production was heavily affected by the lack of machinery and infrastructure 
and the scarcity of labour. In 1943 – when Turkish agriculture was booming 
– the income for a hectare of land in south-eastern Turkey was half of the 
national average.424  
The yawning east-west gap was not only due to the uneven distribution of 
state resources but also to the effects of the same economic policies 
applied to two different contexts. The rural structure of western and central 
 
423 Ibid., 189.  
424  Ibid., 188-191. 
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Anatolia was based on small independent farmers and agriculture had been 
commercialised since the nineteenth century thanks to a relatively high 
degree of infrastructural development. In eastern Anatolia, the 
underdeveloped infrastructure and the roughness of the terrain rarely 
allowed for agricultural products to be exported outside the region. 
Ownership patters were not uniform, with the least productive – generally 
mountainous – areas characterised by small farms hardly able to produce 
beyond subsistence and the most fertile lands – such as the Diyarbakır 
plains – often dominated by large estates.425 
The violent quelling of the Dersim rebellion in 1938 marked the end of the 
political agitations of the interwar period in the Kurdish region and the 
beginning of a period characterised by the virtual absence of expressions 
of Kurdish political identity that lasted until the early 1960s. Historian Hamit 
Bozarslan offers three reasons for the beginning of this ‘period of silence’ of 
Kurdish nationalism. First, the Kemalist repression of the early Kurdish 
revolts had been violent enough to discourage open dissent. Second, the 
sudden end of the Iranian Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 1946 showed that 
no regional or global power was willing to support Kurdish separatism. 
However, the most important reason given by Bozarslan is the partial 
opening of the Turkish political system from the mid-1940s. In particular, the 
rise of the Democrat Party (DP) and its electoral victory in 1950 allowed the 
aghas and shaykhs – the Kurdish tribal elite – to be integrated into the 
Turkish political system.426  
 
The ‘Agha-State’ Alliance and the Incorporation of the Kurdish Elite 
Turkish sociologist İsmail Beşikçi, who spent cumulatively seventeen years 
in prison for his research on Kurdish society, explains that: 
once all the focal points of rebellion in Kurdistan had been done 
away with, the state presented the “Kurdish ruling classes” with two 
alternatives: they were either to take the side of the state, or they 
 
425  Çağlar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey (London: Verso, 1987). 
426 Bozarslan, Kurds and the Turkish State, 343-344. 
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would be sent to the gallows like Sheikh Said and Seyid Rıza.427 
Under these circumstances, the sheikhs, landlords, and tribal chiefs, 
in other words, the “Kurdish ruling classes” turned into agents for 
the Turkish government.428 
This passage from Beşikçi’s International Colony Kurdistan is a vivid 
summary of the process of the incorporation of the traditional elite of the 
Kurdish region into the Turkish state that took place in the 1940s and 1950s. 
The dominant class of the Kurdish region described by Beşikçi had gone 
through a process of transformation in the turbulent previous decades and 
assumed more defined characteristics at the moment of its integration into 
the Turkish political system in the early 1950s. 
Most often, large landowners still belonged to the traditional ruling class of 
Kurdish tribal society: aghas and shaykhs who did not participate in the 
feudal revolts of the interwar period due to individual inclinations, local 
rivalries, or geographical distance from the centres of the revolts. The 
Kemalist state’s repression was fierce and at times indiscriminate but it by 
no means hit all Kurds in the same way. While many aghas and shaykhs were 
executed and exiled, many other powerful individuals in the regions were 
rewarded for their loyalty to Ankara. One of these individuals mentioned by 
Beşikçi was Shaykh Ibrahim Arvas, a member of a prominent Kurdish family 
from Van and parliamentarian for the entire single-party period (1920-
1950).429 Beside these representatives of the traditional elite, there were 
also Kurds of peasant extraction who had been able to take advantage of 
both the deportation of the Armenians and the repression of the Kurdish 
revolt to acquire properties left behind and become large landowners 
 
427 The leaders of, respectively, the Shaykh Said revolt (1925) and the Dersim 
rebellion (1938). See Chapter 3 for the background and outcome of the interwar-
period Kurdish revolt. 
428 İsmail Beşikçi, International Colony Kurdistan (London: Gomidas Institute, 2015), 
56. 
429 Volkan Tunç, ‘Van Milletvekili İbrahim Arvas’ın Biyografisi ve Türkiye Büyük Millet 
Meclisi’ndeki Faaliyetleri’, Akademik Tarih ve Düşünce Dergisi, 6.2 (2019), 388–432. 
See also, Beşikçi, International Colony, 77. 
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themselves.430 Nevertheless, the authoritarian nature of the single-party 
rule and the militarisation of the south-east did not allow for the full 
integration of the Kurdish elite into the political system, except for the 
appointment of high-profile personalities like Arvas to parliament. The real 
turning point was in 1950 when the establishment of a multi-party system 
made the south-east electorally attractive to Turkish parties. 
In 1950, forced by domestic and international pressure to hold free 
elections, the CHP was defeated by the DP that largely represented the 
interests of Turkish farmers gradually alienated by the CHP’s industrial 
policies. Adnan Menderes, the leader of the party and the new Prime 
Minister was himself a large landowner.431 Without fully breaking with the 
secularist tradition of the Republic, the DP appealed to the most 
conservative sectors of Turkish society by promising a more liberal religious 
policy.432 The new government intuited the electoral significance of the 
Kurdish region where tribal structures, as well as the ownership of the land, 
gave the local elite the power to control sizable packages of votes. Several 
Kurdish tribal leaders like Mustafa Remzi Bucak, Halis Öztürk, Edip Altınakar, 
Yusuf Azizoğlu, Ziya Serefhanoğlu were elected with the DP in 1950. 
Moreover, the Kurdish agha and shaykhs who had been exiled after their 
participation in the interwar-period revolts were allowed to return to the 
south-east and re-claim their properties, quickly regained their power and 
status. In 1957, the DP elected to parliament Abdülmelik Fırat, the grandson 
of Shaykh Said of Palu, the leader of the Kurdish revolt of 1925.433 This policy 
 
430 Examples of these self-made landowners are present in several accounts 
written at the time. See Nur Yalman, ‘On Land Disputes in Eastern Turkey’, in Islam 
and Its Cultural Divergence: Studies in Honor of Gustave E. von Grunebaum, ed. by 
Girdhari Tikku (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971), 180-217 and  Vanly, 
Survey, 36. 
431 Zürcher, Turkey, 212. 
432 Ibid., 210-218. 
433 Abdülmelik Fırat was to be elected again in 1991 in the ranks of the True Path 
Party (DYP), another conservative force. However, he later adopted an open 
position in favour of Kurdish rights that cost him the expulsion from the DYP and 
even a brief period in prison in 1996. Abdülmelik Fırat, Fırat Mahzun Akar (Istanbul: 
Avesta Kitabevi, 2006). 
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marked the beginning of a de-facto alliance between the Turkish state and 
the Kurdish elite that was to last far beyond the period of DP rule. From the 
1950s onwards, prominent Kurdish families provided most of the members 
of parliament elected from the Kurdish provinces and supported the various 
conservative majorities that dominated Turkish politics since then. From this 
position, the Kurdish elite was able to have their say on Ankara’s policies 
towards the south-east and control the flow of state funding and contracts. 
This power was used not only to prevent social change – including an 
effective land reform – but also to revitalise the traditional social structure 
that sustained their power.    
A major price to pay for the Kurdish elite to enjoy the benefit of the alliance 
with the state was to renounce to any public – not to mention political – 
expression of Kurdish identity.434 South-eastern politicians had to be 
extremely careful: The accusation of pursuing a secret pro-Kurdish agenda, 
even without any evidence, could end a successful political career, as in the 
cases of Health Minister Yusuf Azizoğlu in the early 1960s and Kamran İnan 
in the 1970s.435 
In Beşikçi’s work since the late 1960s, this class is defined as an ‘agent class’ 
due to its relationship with the Turkish state. The Kurdish elite –  not only 
composed of landowners but also of the big merchants and high-ranked 
civil servants of the region – was not a ruling class of its own but rather an 
agent class: unable to determine the wider economic policies that affected 
Turkey’s south-east, their role was that of implementing it and they were 
rewarded by the state through “various types of credit, as well as licenses 
to distribute consumer goods, open petrol stations and so forth, so that 
these agents may increase their influence in the respective areas.”436 
Beşikçi’s idea, influenced by dependency theory, was decisive in the 
development of the approach within the political left that identified 
 
434 Vanly, Survey, 36. 
435 Güneş Murat Tezcür, ‘Kurdish Nationalism and Identity in Turkey: A Conceptual 
Reinterpretation’, European Journal of Turkish Studies, 10 (2009), 10. 
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Kurdistan as an internal colony of Turkey. The Kurdish region then 
constituted a periphery of the Turkish economy supplying agricultural 
products, raw materials, and cheap labour to the growing industry of 
western Anatolia. In The Order of the East,437 first published in 1969, Beşikçi 
rejected the official Kemalist narrative that presented the ‘feudal structure’ 
of eastern Turkey as the cause of its underdevelopment. On the contrary, 
Beşikçi’s sociological work showed that it was precisely the policy of the 
Turkish state that systematically strengthened the traditional social 
structures of the region with the multiple purposes of preventing the 
emergence of Kurdish separatism, serving the economic interests of the 
Turkish core, and providing electoral support to the ruling conservative 
parties.  
Despite the strengths of this argument, describing the Kurdish elite as an 
‘agent class’ – in dependency-theory terms a ‘comprador’ class – is 
problematic. Rather than the agent of a foreign colonial power, the Kurdish 
elite was incorporated in the ruling social bloc dominated by the industrial 
bourgeoisie of western Turkey and the Kemalist bureaucracy.438 Even if the 
Turkish state was primarily organised around the interests of those groups, 
the ruling class of the Kurdish region benefitted from its position as part of 
the ruling bloc. They guaranteed the subordinate position of the south-east 
within the country’s political economy and provided flocks of conservative 
MPs. In exchange, they enjoyed the protection of the state apparatus which 
was willing to turn a blind eye on the violence exercised over the subaltern 
classes. This is why the ‘State-Agha’ alliance survived well beyond the 1960 
coup that removed the DP from power.  
Beşikçi’s early work was decisive in exposing the role of the Turkish state in 
maintaining the south-east underdeveloped: a state that, while preaching 
modernisation, actively empowered the reactionary elite of its Kurdish 
 
437 İsmail Beşikçi, Doğu Anadolu’nun Düzeni: Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller 
(Ankara: Yurt Kitap-Yayın, 1992). 
438 For the reconfiguration of Turkey’s ruling bloc in the DP era see Keyder, State 
and Class, 117-140. 
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periphery. This approach to the political economy of the Kurdish region as 
an internal colony of Turkey was to be widely popularised by the Turkish 
and Kurdish left in the 1970s.  
 
The Underdevelopment of the Kurdish Region 
The alliance between the central government and the local elite had deep 
transformative consequences on the relations of power of the Kurdish 
provinces. When the Democrat Party took office in 1950, most Kurdish 
peasant families still owned small plots of land and lived off subsistence 
agriculture. However, where the land was more productive, such as in the 
Diyarbakır plains, more than a third of the peasant families were landless 
and worked as sharecroppers (yarıcı) or agricultural labourers in large 
estates.439 The DP government had an ambitious programme for agricultural 
development based on the provision of credit to large farmers, the 
distribution of state-owned land and the maintenance of high prices for 
agricultural products.440 These policies paid off: from 1947 to 1953, the 
country’s agricultural output more than doubled.441 However, the DP’s 
agricultural policies were explicitly aimed at rewarding large, highly-
productive, and export-oriented farms. The previous – hardly enforced – 
landownership limit of 500 dunums (50 hectares) was increased in 1950 to 
5000 dunums (500 hectares) which allowed the Kurdish elite to expand their 
estates significantly while limiting the amount of productive land available 
for redistribution.442  
Within this context of growing production and gradual commercialisation of 
agriculture, the introduction of the tractor had a great impact on the Kurdish 
countryside. In the 1950s, the government used Marshall Plan aid to 
 
439 Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, 22-23. 
440 Yadirgi, The Political Economy, 194. See Resat Aktan, ‘Problems of Land Reform 
in Turkey’, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 20.3 (1966), 317–34. 
441 Sevket Pamuk, ‘Economic Change in Twentieth Century Turkey: Is the Glass 
More than Half Full?’, The Cambridge History of Turkey, ed. by Kasaba, 266–300. 
442 Yadirgi, The Political Economy, 195. 
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subsidise the purchase of tractors by farmers: there were 2,014 tractors in 
the Kurdish region in 1963 and 47,861 by 1982.443 The mechanisation of 
Kurdish agriculture was a greatly disruptive process. While almost 
exclusively large landowners were able to afford a tractor, most small 
farmers were forced to hire the machine and – overwhelmed by its hiring 
cost – eventually to sell their lands. In addition to this new wave of landless 
peasants, the tractor-owning landowners needed much less labour to run 
their farms as a single tractor could replace over fifty peasants working with 
oxen and ploughs.444 Expiring sharecropping contracts were not renewed, 
and a large portion of rural labourers found themselves unemployed.445 
Throughout Turkey, the share of peasant families who did not own land 
increased from less than 6 per cent to over thirty per cent between 1950 
and 1962.  
This process was even more devastating in the Kurdish provinces where the 
land was already less evenly distributed while lower infrastructural 
development made it more difficult for small farmers to commercialise their 
products. By the end of the DP era, each of the south-eastern provinces had 
a higher share of landless peasants than the national average with peaks of 
55 per cent in Şanlıurfa and 47 per cent in Diyarbakır.446 As late as 1983, an 
Agence France-Presse journalist described the life of a poor Kurdish hamlet 
in the Mardin province. Located twenty kilometres away from the nearest 
road, “the inhabitants are cut off from the world, without a school, without 
electricity, without a road, without even a transistor”. The village had no 
contact whatsoever with the Turkish administration and the only visible 
source of authority was that of the landowning agha. The entire active 
population of this and the neighbouring hamlets worked eleven hours a day 
 
443 Very low numbers compared to the national total of  51,781 in 1964 and 491,004 
in 1982. Cemal Aladağ, Milli Mesele ve Kürdistan’da Feodalite Aşiret (Frankfurt: 
Komkar Yayınları, 1981), 138. 
444 Yalman, On Land Disputes, 198. 
445 Yadirgi, The Political Economy, 194. 
446 Mustafa Sönmez, Kürtler: Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarih, Doğu Anadolu’nun Hikayesi 
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for $1-2 in the cotton fields of the 1,600-hectares estate owned by the 
agha.447 
The transformation of the country’s rural life triggered a tumultuous process 
of urbanisation. Turkey’s urban population overall grew from around 18 per 
cent in 1950 to 40 per cent in 1980. The eastern provinces present a similar 
picture (from less than 15 per cent to over 40 per cent) but, due to their 
higher birth rates, also greatly contributed to the urbanisation of western 
Turkey.448 In the large cities of the Marmara and Aegean coast, these waves 
of Turkish and Kurdish rural migrants constituted a new class of urban poor 
and provided cheap labour to their growing industry.  
In the 1950s, despite the growth of the agricultural output, the Kurdish 
region remained largely underdeveloped and lagged far behind the rest of 
the country. During the 1960s and 1970s, when following Turkish 
governments promoted import-substitution industrialisation, a large part of 
the state investments and nearly all private investments were directed to 
other regions of the country. In the Kurdish region, most investments were 
directed towards the mining sector and the construction of hydroelectric 
power plants even though the raw materials extracted and the energy 
produced were largely exported overseas or to western Turkey. The share 
of national income of the seventeen eastern and south-eastern provinces – 
including non-Kurdish areas – dropped from 10.39 per cent in 1965 to 8.17 
per cent in 1979.449 
The underdevelopment of the Kurdish region in the 1960s and 1970s was 
partly a consequence of the alliance between the central state and the 
Kurdish ruling class initiated in the 1950s and continued by all successive 
 
447 Jean-Jacques Cazeaux, ‘Turquie: La Grande Misère Des Kurdes’, Le Monde, 16 
June 1983 <https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1983/06/16/turquie-la-
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Modern History, 421. 
448 Yeşim Arat and Sevket Pamuk, Turkey between Democracy and 
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governments. The growing concentration of land and the mechanisation of 
agriculture increased the frequency and violence of rural conflicts in the 
region. However, the attempts by the landless peasantry to occupy lands 
and prevent the introduction of tractors were systematically frustrated by 
the landowners’ hired thugs and the Turkish gendarmerie.450   
 
Kurdish Nationalism and Turkish Socialism 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the transformation of Turkey in terms of capitalist 
development, urbanisation – but also mass schooling and political pluralism 
– led to a gradual re-emergence of the ‘Kurdish question’. Explicit references 
to Kurdistan or the Kurds were still a taboo in mainstream Turkish politics 
and the political elite violently reacted even to the softest expressions of 
Kurdish identity. In response to the poor performance of the economy in the 
late 1950s and Adnan Menderes’ authoritarian turn, the Turkish military 
overthrew the government in 1960, inaugurating its role as the self-
appointed guardian of the Kemalist tradition. The constitution approved in 
1961 – when the junta allowed for new elections – introduced an 
unprecedented level of civil liberties. With Menderes and his party gone, 
most of the Kurdish elite migrated to other mainstream parties and in 
particular to Süleyman Demirel’s Justice Party (AP), the conservative 
successor of the DP. 
The debates on the state of the Kurds within the Turkish republic took place 
outside the framework of mainstream Turkish politics and in two different 
political spaces on the right and the left. On the one hand, a minority of the 
Kurdish elite was inspired by the development of the Iraqi Kurdish 
movement led by a traditional figure such as Mullah Mustafa Barzani and 
framed the Kurdish issue in exclusively nationalist terms. On the other hand, 
 
450 Yadirgi, The Political Economy, 204. Numerous examples of land conflicts in this 
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the emergence of a Turkish socialist left created a space for a new 
generation of Kurds to link the state’s anti-Kurdish policies to the 
reactionary forces that ruled the Kurdish region.  
With the repression of the Kurdish revolts of the interwar period, many of 
the Kurdish ‘feudal’ nationalists that had animated the first Kurdist 
organisations went into exile. Within Khoybûn (independence), an 
organisation founded in Lebanon in 1927, exiled Kurdish aristocrats like the 
Bedirkhan brothers, Nuri Dersimi, and İshan Nuri found a space to write 
about and ‘to imagine’ the Kurdish nation. Despite the limited political 
relevance of these figures, their writings created the canon of modern 
Kurdish nationalism including “a map; a unified historical narration; a flag; an 
idea of martyrdom and glorification of martyrs; the myth of Kawa, liberator 
of the Kurds; the notion of Mesopotamia as the cradle of the Kurdishness”.451 
Influenced by the primordialist approach of contemporary Turkish 
nationalist literature,452 these writers in exile naturalised the Kurdish nation 
creating an intellectual legacy that was to influence the development of the 
Kurdish national movement.  
It was in continuity with this tradition that the years of relative liberalisation 
that followed the 1960 coup saw the blossoming of Turkish-language 
publications on Kurdish history, literature, and poetry – but also more timidly 
on politics and society – such as in the liberal Turkish magazine Barış 
Dünyası (World Peace) in 1962. Attempts to publish journals in Kurdish were 
however frustrated by state censorship as shown by the short life of the 
bilingual monthly Dicle-Fırat (Tigris-Euphrates) and the newspaper in 
Kurdish Deng (Voice) and Riya Newe (New Path). Despite state repression, 
these attempts showed a widespread renewed interests in Kurdish culture. 
As Kendal Nezan, at the time a student in Ankara, recalls 
From time to time there were cultural evenings, like 'Bitlis Cultural 
Evening', people would go, listen to the music and to some 
 
451 Bozarslan, Kurds and the Turkish State, 344. 
452 An influence evident in Celadet BedirKhan’s choice to follow the footstep 
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speeches, they were playing Kurdish songs and it was a way to bring 
people coming from the same places together.453 
It was within this intellectual context that the first explicitly – and yet 
clandestine – Kurdish nationalist party of modern Turkey was established in 
1965. Inspired by the Iraqi Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani and his 
KDP, Faik Bucak established the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey 
(PDKT). Bucak was an agha from Siverek – whose brother Mehmet Tevfik 
Bucak had been a member of parliament for the DP – and the new party 
aimed at the traditional Kurdish elite. For Derwich Ferho, whose brother was 
the founder of the PDKT in Mardin, “the PDKT was the expression of the 
class of the aghas and they had many followers among the mullahs and 
imams.”454 However, despite its conservative nature, the PDKT served as a 
training ground for more radical Kurds especially after the assassination, 
under unclear circumstances, of Faik Bucak in 1966.455 The leader of the 
left-wing of the PDKT, Dr Şivan moved to Iraqi Kurdistan in a very early 
attempt to organise a guerrilla movement but was killed in 1971.  
Dr Şivan’s attempt must be understood in relations to the wider 
development of the political left. The 1961 constitution authorised the 
creation of independent trade unions and the first socialist party, the 
Workers’ Party of Turkey (TİP). At the 1965 elections, the TİP won 15 seats 
mostly from the industrial areas in the west but three of them also from the 
Kurdish south-east. Without explicitly referring to the Kurds, the TİP 
emphasized the so-called ‘Eastern Question’ (Doğu Sorunu) and the 
oppression faced by the people living in the east of Turkey.456 This position 
won the sympathy of leftist-minded Kurds that were critical of the Kurdish 
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Turkey’, in The Kurds, ed. by Kreyenbroek and Sperl, 98.  
455 Michael Gunter, The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma (Boulder: Westview 
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nationalism promoted by the PDKT. The active presence of Kurds within the 
TİP – known as ‘Easterners’ (Doğulular) – gradually pushed the party to 
adopt an even more advanced position. In their 1970 congress documents, 
the TİP stated that “there is a Kurdish people in the East of Turkey” that “the 
fascist authorities representing the ruling classes have subjected […] to a 
policy of assimilation and intimidation which has often become a bloody 
repression.”457 This resolution cost the party dearly and in 1971 the TİP was 
accused of supporting separatism and banned by a Turkish court. 
Both sides of this emerging interest in the Kurdish question in Turkey 
participated in the mass movement that developed in the Kurdish region in 
the late 1960s. In 1967, a series of demonstrations called the Eastern 
Meetings (Doğu Mitingleri) took place in Diyarbakır and other Kurdish cities 
in which the themes of underdevelopment and ethnic oppression welded 
together. In 1969, following this first phase of mass mobilisation, Kurdish 
students in Ankara and Istanbul established the radical Revolutionary 
Cultural Societies of the East (DDKO), the first ‘easterner’ organisation with 
the aim of a socialist revolution, and that soon opened branches across the 
south-east. The DDKO seems to have been composed of a wide range of 
people including cadet members of the landowning class who had turned 
leftist during their university years.458 In their publications, they denounced 
the poverty of the south-east, the oppression of the peasantry by the 
traditional Kurdish elite and the violence of the Turkish state in the region.459 
All of these developments were temporarily interrupted by a new military 
intervention in 1971. With the alleged aim of restoring order, state repression 
heavily targeted the political left – banning both TİP and DDKO – and the 
trade unions. The growing and more explicit interest of Turkey’s left in the 
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Kurdish question had the effect of combining the traditional anti-
communism of the Kemalist elite with the fear of ethnic separatism. This 
attitude was visible in the far more indulgent treatment accorded to the 
violent Turkish nationalist groups that were assertively imposing their 
presence on the streets.460 The 1971 intervention was, thus, the moment in 
which the rightward orientation of the military – in the form of chauvinism 
and anti-separatist paranoia – came to coincide with the interest of an 
emerging industrial capital in western Turkey determined to put down a 
growing and emboldened labour movement.461 The most significant 
consequence of these events was the realisation, by many Turkish and 
Kurdish leftists, that no solution to their problems could come from the 
Kemalist and capitalist state. 
 
The Kurdish Left in the 1970s 
The military intervention of 1971 was mostly directed against the rising 
street violence and political instability and was successful in limiting the civil 
liberties granted by the 1961 constitution and in breaking the labour 
movement. Nevertheless, rather than a return to political stability, 1970s 
Turkey experienced a much more intense wave of street violence and an 
economic crisis that the twelve weak coalition governments that took office 
between 1971 and 1980 were unable to address. The policy of import-
substitution industrialisation generated a chronic lack of foreign currency 
reserves that was aggravated by the spike in the oil price after 1973. The 
government responded by imposing import restrictions while inflation and 
unemployment were on the rise for the entire decade. The process of mass 
urbanisation accelerated in the 1970s increasing the number of urban poor 
often living in shantytowns – called gecekondu – at the outskirts of the main 
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cities. These informal settlements became an ideal recruiting ground for the 
radical organisations of the left as well as for the rising Islamist and far-right 
nationalist groups. At the same time, mass education allowed more and 
more Turks with a working-class background to access high-school and 
university degrees and to seek public employment.  
The suppression of the TİP and the strongest unions strengthened the 
radical character of the student and labour movement that was now even 
more proactive in trying to violently win the control of the streets and the 
campuses. Turkey’s new left “was characterised foremost by its fecund 
parthenogenesis and the resulting sectarianism” that in the 1970s led to the 
multiplication of groups with virtually identical – Leninist, Maoist, Guevarist 
– ideological orientations.462 Their radicalism was fuelled by the admiration 
for the revolutions taking place in the Global South and particularly by “the 
Palestinian struggle [which] exercised a magnetic appeal to all revolutionary 
groups.”463 This radicalism, however, prevented their interactions with the 
established political system. The left was opposed by a much less 
fragmented far-right youth organised around Alparslan Türkeş’ pseudo-
fascist Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the Islamist National Salvation 
Party led by Necmettin Erbakan. Unlike the radical left that lacked any 
interlocutor in institutional politics, the parties of the extreme right joined 
Süleyman Demirel’s AP in several coalition governments and used their 
ministerial posts to pack the civil service with their youth. The colonisation 
of the security forces by the ultra-nationalist MHP made the police passive 
or even complicit in neo-fascist street violence.464 Along with the Turkish 
left, Kurdish activists and religious minorities were natural targets.465  
As mentioned earlier, the 1971 military intervention exposed the democratic 
limits of the Kemalist state and thus had a radicalising effect on the Kurdish 
 
462 Keyder, State and Class, 210. 
463 Interview with Cengiz Çandar (personal communication, 2020). 
464 Zürcher, Turkey, 262-263. 
465 In 1978, more than one hundred Alevis – Turkey’s Shia minority – were killed by 
neo-fascists and Islamists militants in a pogrom in Kahramanmaraş.  
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youth. The establishment of the DDKO in 1969 had already represented a 
decisive step in the process of ‘autonomisation’ of the Kurdish movement.466  
Socialist Kurds were less and less satisfied with the position of the Turkish 
left that, though acknowledging the oppression of the Kurds, subordinated 
their liberation to the socialist transformation of Turkey. While maintaining a 
Marxist framework, the Kurdish leftist groups of the 1970s identified in the 
‘colonial condition’ of the Kurdish region a specific form of oppression to 
which the Kurds in Turkey were subject and the Turkish working class and 
peasantry were not. As Kemal Burkay, founder of the Kurdistan Socialist 
Party (PSK), wrote in the early 1970s, “in Kurdistan, the feudal relations have 
not been defeated and a bourgeois democratic revolution has not occurred. 
Therefore, the main contradiction for the Kurdish people is national.”467 
Burkay rejected the idea – dominant among Turkish leftists – that Kurdish 
nationalism could only be the expression of the Kurdish feudal class and 
proposed an anti-colonial nationalism as a progressive and democratic 
force.468  
This line of thought became the dominant discourse among Kurdish leftist 
after the suppression of the TİP and the DDKO in 1971. Burkay’s PSK was 
still trying to move within the margins of official politics and, at the 1977 
Diyarbakır mayoral elections, helped the tailor Mehdi Zana defeat all the 
notables running for the Turkish mainstream parties.469 However, very much 
like the Turkish left, more radical Kurdish groups multiplied in the mid-1970s 
despite sharing a similar understanding of the colonial condition of 
Kurdistan, inspiration in the anti-colonial struggles, and sympathy for 
Maoism. Among these groups, Rizgari (liberation) evolved from a pro-
 
466 Marlies Casier and Olivier Grojean, ‘Between Integration, Autonomization and 
Radicalization. Hamit Bozarslan on the Kurdish Movement and the Turkish Left’, 
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467 Cited in Güneş, The Kurdish National Movement, 72. 
468 For an in-depth discussion of this ideological shift, see Güneş, The Kurdish 
National Movement, 66-74. 
469 Gilles Dorronsoro and Nicole F. Watts, ‘Toward Kurdish Distinctiveness in 
Electoral Politics: The 1977 Local Elections in Dı̇yarbakir’, International Journal of 
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Kurdish publishing house in 1975. The Democratic Cultural Association 
founded in 1974 established discussion groups throughout Turkey out of 
which Kawa (1976) and the National Liberators of Kurdistan (KUK) emerged. 
Active in both Turkey’s major cities and the Kurdish region, by the second 
half of the 1970s, some of these groups started planning guerrilla activities 
against the Turkish state.  
The proliferation of far-leftist Kurdish groups was the breeding ground for 
the establishment of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the organisation 
that ultimately became hegemonic within the Kurdish movement in 
Turkey.470 The group gathered in the early 1970s in Ankara around university 
drop-out Abdullah Öcalan. In 1975, Öcalan and his followers established 
their presence in the Kurdish region to create a network of support in 
preparation of the liberation war but it was only in April 1979 that they 
officially adopted the name PKK.471 By then, Öcalan’s followers had already 
been involved in some low-key military actions that were symptomatic of 
the broader characteristics of this pre-uprising phase. First, already in 1977, 
they were involved in a feud with another revolutionary group named 
Tekoşin which speaks to the clannish attitude of these organisations. 
 
470 The group was initially known as Apocular, ‘the followers of Apo’, Öcalan’s 
Kurdish nickname. Ahmed Akkaya and Joost Jongerden, in their writings on the 
origins of the PKK, claim that Öcalan’s group was ‘born from the left’ in the sense 
that they were less the product of the Kurdish movement than they were of the 
Turkish left. In the early to mid-1970s –before the establishment of the PKK in 1978-
1979 – Öcalan and his followers were part of the Ankara Democratic Higher 
Education Association (ADYÖD) rather than in the numerous radical Kurdish groups 
active at the time. Joost Jongerden and Ahmet Akkaya, ‘Born from the Left: The 
making of the PKK’, in Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism 
and the Kurdish Issue, ed. by Marlies Casier and Joost Jongerden (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2011), 123-142. 
471 Mehmet Ali Birand, APO ve PKK (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1992), 85-96. The 
long gestation of the PKK is explained by Jongerden as motivated by the need to 
overcome the ideological and organizational weakness of the Turkish and Kurdish 
left and to go through a long period of preparation before starting the insurgency. 
Joost Jongerden, ‘A Spatial Perspective on Political Group Formation in Turkey 
after the 1971 Coup: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’, Kurdish Studies, 5.2 
(2017), 134–56. 
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Öcalan – who at the time could count on 250-300 followers –472 became 
increasingly known among other groups for his brutal treatment of his 
rivals.473 The elimination of rival Kurdish groups was part of the strategy to 
become the only point of reference for the Kurdish masses. But to win a 
popular base, the PKK had to direct its attention towards the exploitative 
components of Kurdish society. In 1978, Öcalan’s followers successfully 
mobilised people from the town of Hilvan against their landowners 
belonging to the pro-government aghas of the Süleymanlar tribe. The 
success of this action convinced the leadership to insist on this strategy. To 
announce the foundation of the party, the PKK decided to perform a highly 
spectacular action, in July 1979, attempting to kill Mehmet Celal Bucak, a 
powerful landowning agha from Siverek famous for his brutality against the 
peasants and the local leftists. Bucak survived the attack but the action 
resonated widely among the Kurdish peasantry.474 
Like the other leftist Kurdish groups, the PKK adopted the ‘colonial thesis’ 
as a starting point for their analysis and the development of their 
revolutionary strategy. The pre-capitalist feudal structure of Kurdish society 
was described as functional to Turkish colonialism as “tribal-feudal interests 
are being watched and forced to live to deepen social fragmentation” and 
prevent the development of Kurdish identity.475 As the agha class was 
complicit with the Turkish state and a structural component of colonial 
domination, the Kurdish working class and peasantry were the only actors 
able to conduct a revolution that was at the same time national and 
 
472 Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence 
(New York: New York University Press, 2007), 38-39. 
473 Aliza Marcus particularly insist on this aspect and supports her argument with 
numerous interviews. Ibid., 40-42. 
474 The Bucak family already appeared twice in this chapter and it is a well-known 
example of leading tribal family that could express members of both pro-state 
aghas like Mustafa Remzi Bucak, DP parliamentarian in the 1950s, or Faik Bucak, a 
Kurdish nationalism, though of conservative orientation. This position in between 
the state and the nationalists is very similar to that of the Barzanji in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
as discussed in Chapter 4. 
475 Abdullah Öcalan, Kürdistan Devriminin Yolu (Cologne: Weşanen Serxwebun, 
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socialist.476 This approach was strengthened through the ‘lesson learned’ by 
the failure of the Barzani revolution in Iraq in 1975.477 In Öcalan’s reading of 
these events, the Kurdish traditional elite had only been able to formulate 
an autonomist project and, unable to mobilise the subordinate classes, 
became dependent on the support of imperialist powers.478 However, in his 
approach to colonialism, Öcalan went further due to the influence of 
Antillean philosopher Frantz Fanon. The struggle against the coloniser 
becomes, as in Fanon, also a struggle against oneself as a colonised 
subject.479 After a long digression on Kurdish history, the 1978 PKK 
Manifesto argued that violence was the only way through which the Kurdish 
people could free themselves from their history of enslavement by foreign 
rulers.480  
The radicality of Öcalan’s Fanonian approach was not the only specific 
feature of the PKK. Derwich Ferho, a member of a prestigious tribal family 
and a student in Midyat (Mardin) when the PKK started operating in the area, 
claims that the PKK was unique among the Kurdish organizations: 
The PDKT was the expression of the class of the Aghas and they 
had many followers among the Mullahs and Imams. But you can say 
that all the [Kurdish] organizations had the same problem. The 
DDKO, DDKD, the KUK... all of them! The leaders of all these groups 
were from the upper classes. Except for the PKK who were university 
students but - like a friend of mine from Midyat who could never go 
to university – also just simple people.481 
Öcalan and his followers were characterized by a particularly humble 
background. Observing the development of the movement in the mid-
1980s, anthropologist Martin van Bruinessen noticed that the PKK was “the 
only organisation whose members were drawn almost exclusively from the 
lowest social classes — the uprooted, half-educated village and small-town 
 
476 Güneş, The Kurdish National Movement, 86-91. 
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youth who knew what it felt like to be oppressed, and who wanted action, 
not ideological sophistication.”482 Öcalan was born to a peasant family in 
Ömerli, a village in the Şanlıurfa province, an hour away from the closest 
school. He managed to attend a vocational school in Ankara, in 1966, that 
allowed him to graduate high school, work for the civil service, and even 
enter Ankara University in 1971. That, in the 1970s, Öcalan’s followers had 
largely a similar background is confirmed by both Aliza Marcus’ book, based 
on a wealth of interview material, and by Güneş Murat Tezcür who has 
collected biographical information of PKK fighters from the obituaries 
published on the party’s magazine Serxwebûn. The 142 ‘martyrs’ of the early 
stages of the PKK – up to 1980 – paint the picture of an organisation largely 
reflecting the class location of its leader. Like Öcalan, most of the killed 
militants share a plebeian or rural background and yet held high-school or 
college degrees.483 Öcalan attracted a group of young Kurds of peasant 
origins who had the chance to partly lift themselves through education and 
were largely “university and teacher’s school students or drop-outs.”484 
The specificity of their background in the peasantry distinguished the PKK 
from the rest of the Kurdish movement in Turkey. The left-ward turn of 
Kurdish activists since the 1960s had allowed them to win vast popular 
support in the Kurdish towns and cities as evidenced by Mehdi Zana’s 
victory in Diayarbakır in 1977. The leaders of these groups were either 
cadets of the Kurdish elite or members of the urban working classes – Zana 
was a tailor. However, the Kurdish countryside remained the realm of feudal 
landowners, where the local agha controlled the votes of the peasants living 
in the villages he literally owned. The peasant origins of Öcalan and the early 
PKK cadres provided them with a specific sensitivity absent in the rest of 
the movement as well as the language to speak with the peasantry. The 
language was not solely the Kurdish language to win the villagers to the 
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national cause but more importantly the language of performative anti-
landlord violence. The decision to celebrate the establishment of the PKK 
with the highly-visible attack on Bucak was intended to speak directly to the 
peasantry, showing them that, besides the sophisticated theories on 
colonialism and nationalism, the PKK was willing and able to act against the 
people directly responsible for their misery. 
In the same days of the Bucak attack, in July 1979, the PKK decided to 
relocate to Syria to organise for a long-term and large-scale insurgency in 
Turkey. Öcalan was in Damascus when the Turkish military, in September 
1980, carried out another coup d’état that swept away anything resembling 
leftist politics in the country. The violence of the repression against the 
Turkish and Kurdish left eliminated most of PKK’s rivals. As Remzi Kartal, 
who had been a member of Dr Şivan’s PDKT, explains “the coup was like a 
bulldozer: it eliminated all the political organisations, only the PKK survived. 
After that, we started looking at the PKK.”485 
 
Preparing the Kurdish Revolution 
The military coup of September 1980 marks a watershed moment in Turkish 
history. The Turkish military’s declared purpose was to end street violence 
and political instability as well as to ostensibly rescue the Kemalist republic 
from the combined threats of communism, Islamism, and Kurdish 
separatism. As the next chapter will show, the 1980 coup also had the 
function of implementing austerity measures deemed indispensable to 
overcome the crisis that Turkey’s economy faced in the 1970s. The military 
showed their clear intention to break with the previous political system, 
disbanding the political parties and arresting the leading politicians. In the 
twelve months following the coup, 122,600 people were arrested, and street 
violence decreased to a negligible level.486 Even if, like in the 1971 coup, the 
 
485 Interview with Remzi Kartal (Brussels, 2019). 
486 Zürcher, Turkey, 279. 
 
 
224 
 
political left was by far the biggest target,487 the Kemalist elite tended to 
present the coup as a last-resort defence of the secular republic against the 
Islamist threat that had just overwhelmed Iran. However, while the Turkish 
left and labour movement were to never fully recover from the 1980 coup, 
both the Islamists and the ultra-nationalists re-emerged in the late 1980s 
and 1990s with the same leaders – Erbakan and Türkeş – and the 
comparable electoral strength of the 1970s.  
Alongside the Turkish left, the other principal target of the military 
repression was the Kurdish movement. The military took unprecedented – 
even for Turkish standards – measures to repress Kurdish identity: the 
public and private use of the Kurdish language was banned and thousands 
of topographic names of Kurdish origins were changed.488 The military 
influence over education even allowed them to give new life to the old 
Kemalist theory that the Kurds were, rather than a people on their own, just 
‘Mountain Turks’ (dağ Türkler).489  
The PKK had relocated to Syria in 1979 and after the military coup, most 
Turkish and Kurdish leftist groups followed suit. At the time, Hafez al-
Assad’s Ba’athist regime acted as a patron to leftist and nationalist 
organisations active against Syria’s neighbours, and particularly to the 
Palestinian resistance.490 Most of the leftist groups from Turkey were 
 
487 Ibid., 269-270. 
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extremely demoralised by the complete lack of resistance to the military 
coup and showed little interest in preparing for an insurgency. One by one, 
the PKK’s competitors left Syria, generally to Europe. Öcalan’s determination 
to build up the PKK’s military prowess allowed the party to attract militants 
from the other declining organisations and was decisive to establish a 
strong bond with the Syrian regime and the Palestinian resistance. Already 
in early 1980, Öcalan convinced left-wing Palestinian groups to train PKK 
members in their camps in Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley, at the time under Syrian 
occupation.491 In 1986, as the number of PKK recruits increased the PKK 
opened its own training camp in the Beqaa, the Mahsum Korkmaz 
Academy.492 Several of the first post-1980 PKK ‘martyrs’ died alongside the 
Palestinians in the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.493 While the Palestinian 
connection enriched the PKK with invaluable guerrilla training, a deal struck 
between Öcalan and Barzani’s KDP allowed the PKK to freely move through 
the KDP-controlled areas of northern Iraq. Unlike the flat Syrian-Turkish 
border, the mountainous nature of the Iraqi-Turkish border made it an ideal 
location from which to start guerrilla activities, and in 1983 the PKK sent its 
first reconnaissance to enemy territory.494 
At the time of the coup, the PKK was already emerging as the strongest 
Kurdish leftist organisation. After the 1980 coup, three-quarters of all people 
tried for secessionism – virtually all Kurdish activists – belonged to the PKK 
and the PKK had the second-highest number of militants under trial, second 
only to the People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (THKP-C).495 In the 
following year, the PKK’s growth in Syria and Lebanon was reflected in the 
increasing visibility of the organisation among the Kurds in Turkey partly due 
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to the complete disappearance of the rival organisations. The PKK inmates 
in the Diyarbakır prison organised highly performative actions of resistance 
against the regime of torture to which they were subject.496 After one of the 
PKK founders, Mazloum Doğan killed himself on March 21st, 1982, eight more 
senior cadres self-immolated in a ‘death fast’ in the following months.497 The 
PKK propaganda was very effective in spreading information about these 
events and in linking heroic acts of resistance to the myth of Kawa the 
blacksmith and the celebration of Newroz. March 21st – the day of Doğan’s 
suicide – is the first of the Persian calendar and is celebrated by the Kurds 
as well as in the wider Iranic world and central Asia. One of the myths on the 
origins of Newroz is based on the figure of Kawa the blacksmith, who led 
the Medes – the putative ancestors of the Kurds –498 to revolt against their 
Assyrian overlords and celebrated the victory by lighting a bonfire on a hill. 
Kurdish nationalists politicised the myth of Kawa and the celebration of 
Newroz – with bonfires – as symbols of the Kurdish resistance.499  
As in its first performative actions in the late 1970s, the PKK continued to 
deploy symbolic politics to build its hegemony over the Kurdish movement 
and wider Kurdish society. After this long period of preparation, the PKK’s 
liberation war officially started, on August 15, 1984, with two coordinated 
attacks in the towns of Eruh and Şemdinli, almost 400 kilometres apart. The 
Kurdish guerrillas took over the towns for about an hour to announce the 
beginning of the insurgency. 
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The PKK Insurgency and the Kurdish Peasantry  
After the August 1984 attacks, the PKK insurgency proceeded slowly due to 
the militants’ inexperience as well as Turkey’s increased military presence in 
the region. However, in the years 1984-1986, PKK fighters started to 
become a known presence to the local peasants. The PKK propaganda 
specifically targeted the villagers presenting the organisation as a force that 
opposed the Turkish security forces as well as the exploitative landowners.  
In the first period of the insurgency, the PKK expanded its base of support 
among the Kurdish peasantry, although it is impossible to measure its 
extent. Güneş Murat Tezcür’s database of killed PKK militants paints a 
picture – though incomplete – of the background of the first wave of PKK 
‘martyrs’. In the period between 1984 and 1989, 31 per cent of the killed PKK 
militants were peasants prior to recruitment, while 38 per cent were low-
skilled workers, and 24 per cent were students. However, 99 per cent of 
them were born in a village.500 Considering that village-born students 
constituted the biggest group of PKK members before 1984, it seems that, 
after the beginning of the insurgency, the PKK largely recruited peasants 
and rural labourers. Another indication of the class background of the early 
PKK is a survey conducted by Turkish police among the 262 PKK-affiliated 
inmates in Ankara in 1996 – thus including people captured throughout the 
1980s – indicating that 21 per cent of the militants were illiterate or semi-
literate and 39 per cent only finished primary school.501 
The PKK’s increasing ability to recruit the Kurdish peasantry and to use the 
villages as shelter and logistical support for its guerrilla activity is also 
suggested by the response of the Turkish state. In 1985, the Turkish 
government established the Village Guards (Köy Korucuları), a paramilitary 
militia recruited among the pro-government Kurdish tribes. In a way very 
similar to the one employed by Baghdad against the Kurdish insurgency,502 
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the Turkish government and military authorities negotiated directly with 
tribal chiefs and landowners who received the funding to pay the guards’ 
salary, strengthening their power over their fellow tribesmen and the 
peasants of the villages they owned.503 For example, McDowall reports that, 
in 1992, the head of the Alan tribe in Van Sadun Şeylan raised 500 guards 
from his 26 villages receiving $115,000 monthly from the government.504 
Lightly armed, the military function of the Village Guards was to prevent the 
guerrilla from finding shelter in isolated hamlets where the Turkish army had 
hardly any access. Moreover, the village guards served the purpose of 
countering the PKK recruitment activity, by arming pro-government villages 
but also to retaliate against the villagers and families with known sympathy 
for the guerrillas. Like in Iraq, the system left wide room for abuses: as the 
guards' commanders were subject to little supervision and even less 
accountability, the Village Guards became an instrument to settle pre-
existing disputes and to serve the private interests of the commanders. The 
institution of the Village Guards increased the civil war (Kurds versus Kurds) 
dimension of the PKK insurgency and divided Kurdish rural society forcing 
peasants to pick a side while massacres of civilians became more frequent. 
This dynamic ultimately favoured the PKK, vindicating Öcalan’s opposition 
to the Kurdish elite as a collaborationist class. 
In the second half of the 1980s, the PKK insurgency intensified exponentially 
and, with it, Turkish repression. In 1986, a report drafted by a group of 
opposition parliamentarians who visited the Kurdish region described the 
south-east as an open-air concentration camp ruled through torture and 
brutality.505 In 1987, in a move that publicly acknowledged the condition of 
war in the Kurdish south-east, the Turkish government imposed the state of 
emergency over the Kurdish provinces of Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, 
Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli and Van. The area took the name of Governorship of 
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the Region in State of Emergency (OHAL) ruled by a military super-governor 
based in Diyarbakır and entrusted with martial law powers. Within this legal 
framework, the military had the authority to relocate entire communities 
anywhere they could serve as sanctuaries for the PKK guerrillas. By 1989, 
around 400 Kurdish villages had been evacuated.506 As the next chapter will 
discuss in length, the evacuation of Kurdish villages was to be pursued on a 
massive scale in the early 1990s triggering a process of forced urbanisation 
that transformed the Kurdish region of Turkey. 
 
Conclusion 
The chapter discussed the economic transformation of the Kurdish region 
of Turkey since its integration into the newly-established Turkish Republic 
and the re-emergence of a Kurdish national movement. After the feudal 
revolts of the interwar period were crushed, a large part of the Kurdish 
landowning elite and tribal aristocracy was incorporated into the Turkish 
political system in the 1950s. Ruling conservative parties nurtured the 
Kurdish elite which, in exchange, provided electoral support thanks to the 
power they held over the peasantry. Unlike the Kurdish elite in Iraq that, 
from 1958, felt its position threatened by the post-revolutionary regime, 
Kurdish landowners in Turkey had no interest in challenging the central 
government. The re-emergence of a Kurdish political identity took place 
among urbanised Kurds – both in the Kurdish region and in the rest of Turkey 
– and found its natural breeding ground and interlocutor in the Turkish left. 
However, most of the Turkish and Kurdish left was swept away by the 1980 
military coup.  
Abdullah Öcalan’s PKK not only managed to survive the coup but was also 
able to start, in 1984, a Kurdish insurgency in Turkey that, in just a few years, 
assumed a massive scale. This chapter showed that the success of the PKK 
was largely due to its ability to mobilise the Kurdish peasantry against both 
their Kurdish landowners and the Turkish state. The development of the 
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uprising in the second half of the 1980s drove large parts of the Kurdish 
countryside into a state of civil war. The Turkish government responded to 
the increasing involvement of the peasantry with the institution of the 
Village Guards, mobilising pro-government tribal chiefs and landowners. 
This process led to a higher involvement of the civilian population but also 
legitimised the discourse of the PKK that presented the Kurdish landowning 
elite as a collaborationist class. The next chapter describes the deep 
transformation of the class structure of the Kurdish region driven by both 
Turkey’s neoliberal turn and by a counterinsurgency strategy aimed at 
depopulating the Kurdish countryside. The virtual destruction of Kurdish 
rural society severely affected the class bases of the uprisings but also 
contributed to extending the hegemony of the PKK far beyond the 
countryside.  
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Chapter 8 
The PKK Insurgency and the 
Transformation of Turkish 
Kurdistan (1987-1999)  
 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the transformation of the Kurdish movement in 
Turkey in the 1990s, highlighting the profound interaction between the 
political events and the structural transformation that occurred in the 
country and its Kurdish region. In the 1980s, Turkey was politically 
dominated by the military which initiated far-reaching neoliberal reforms 
while the Kurdish south-east saw the rise of the PKK-led insurgency centred 
around the mobilisation of the peasantry. In the early 1990s, Ankara 
deployed a strategy of depopulation of the Kurdish countryside by removing 
the peasant population with the aim of destroying the breeding ground of 
the Kurdish insurgency. This counterinsurgency strategy had profound 
consequences for the social structure of the region and turned a large part 
of its peasant population into a class of urban poor. As the character of the 
region shifted from predominantly rural to predominantly urban, so did the 
Kurdish movement. In the 1990s, the PKK vastly expanded its social base 
beyond the peasantry to the urban working and middle classes and became 
the hegemonic force of a much wider Kurdish movement. Over the course 
of the decade, this process allowed pro-Kurdish parties to win a large part 
of the local administrations of the region. In tracing these processes, this 
chapter emphasises the interaction between the political events and the 
structural transformation taking place in the Kurdish region. Turkey’s 
counterinsurgency policy and economic reforms changed the class 
structure of the Kurdish region which in turn led to a deep ideological 
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renovation of the PKK. The outcome of this effort was the creation of a new 
– and wider – class coalition that allowed the Kurdish movement to gain a 
hegemonic position in the region. 
 
Military Rule and Neoliberal Reforms in Turkey 
The transformation of the socio-economic structure of the Kurdish region 
and the growing influence of the Kurdish movement in the 1990s must be 
understood against the backdrop of the military rule and neoliberal reforms 
that characterised Turkey in the 1980s. 
The 1980 military coup was not only a response to the instability and political 
violence of the previous decade but also to the worrying condition of the 
country’s economy. The import-substitution industrialisation strategy 
promoted by Ankara since the 1960s – as by much of the developing world 
– was based on the protection of national industry to foster local production 
and the domestic market. This model allowed Turkey to enjoy an average 
annual GDP growth of over 3 per cent and to double the size of its economy 
between 1950 and 1980.507 As capital accumulation was ensured by state 
subsidies and by the state-induced oligopolistic structure of the market, the 
large industrialists of western Turkey were willing to grant concessions to 
the trade unions. Their factory workers – a small minority of the Turkish 
working class – enjoyed relatively high salaries. The rest of the country – 
particularly the Kurdish south-east – was largely excluded from these 
developments except for its function as a source of migrant labour.  
The main shortcoming of import-substitution industrialisation was the 
constant balance of payment deficit – due to the subsidised imports – that 
was severely aggravated by the four-fold increase of Turkey’s energy bill 
following the 1973 oil crisis. Trying to address the endemic shortage of 
foreign currency reserve, the government imposed severe import controls 
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causing, for instance, continuous power cuts even in mid-winter.508 In 1979, 
inflation was running at a 90 per cent rate while the country’s public debt 
had increased five times from the beginning of the decade.509 The 
continuous growth in size and militancy of the labour movement – from one 
million workdays lost to strikes in 1973-1976, to 3.7 million in 1976-1980 –510  
combined with the poor performance of the economy, started to 
significantly affect the rate of profit and created the consensus among the 
Turkish ruling class for abandoning import-substitution industrialisation and 
for an authoritarian solution to the economic crisis.511 In July 1979, the 
Turkish government reached an agreement with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for a $1.8 billion loan dependent on severe 
austerity measures.512 The unpopularity of these measures and a new wave 
of strikes and factory occupations made the implementation of the package 
impossible for Süleyman Demirel’s minority government.  
The economic crisis of the late 1970s – along with the threats to the 
established order coming from socialists, Islamists, and Kurdish separatists 
–513 led to the military coup of the 12 September 1980, the third in twenty 
years. Turgut Özal, a conservative technocrat and former World Bank 
employee,514 was appointed deputy Prime Minister in the military-led cabinet 
and was entrusted with the implementation of the IMF-led stabilisation 
programme. Özal went beyond these early measures and, as Prime Minister 
from 1983 to 1989, contributed to the dramatic transformation of Turkey 
 
508 Zürcher, Turkey, 267. 
509 Cited in Yadirgi, The Political Economy, 215. 
510 Cited in Caglar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey (London: Verso, 1987), 192. 
511 For an account of the class dimension of the import-substitution industrialisation 
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513 For the political instability leading to the coup, see Chapter 7. 
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into a neoliberal export-oriented economy. Under military rule – with the 
unions banned and most labour activists in jail – Özal greatly devaluated the 
Turkish Lira, liberalised the trade regime, eliminated subsidies and price 
controls, and promoted foreign capital.515 These reforms – that turned 
Turkey into a model country for the IMF – led to a radical restructuring of 
the country’s class structure in favour of capital. The share of wages in the 
national income dropped from 35 per cent in 1978 to 20 per cent in 1986 
and wage suppression favoured the export-oriented shift of the country’s 
economy.516  
After imposing a new constitution in 1982, the military allowed for a return 
of power to civilian hands and Özal’s new Motherland Party (ANAP) won a 
landslide in the 1983 elections. In the decade in which Özal dominated 
Turkish politics,517 the exports’ share of the GDP rose from 2.3 per cent in 
1979 to 8.6 per cent in 1990. In 1989, Özal further liberalised the exchange 
rate and removed restrictions on capital movement, making Turkey’s 
economy significantly more susceptible to external shocks. Even if Özal was 
elected President of the Republic in 1989, the ANAP lost its majority in the 
1991 elections and the return to unruly coalition governments marked the 
end of fiscal discipline. Turkey’s economy in the 1990s, vulnerable to sudden 
outflows of foreign capital, became increasingly dominated by financial 
instability and hyperinflation.518  
As described in Chapter 7, the Turkish economy was characterised by 
extremely uneven development and by the subordination of the 
predominantly Kurdish south-east. The import-substitution industrialisation 
period had only a marginal impact on central and eastern Anatolia, as state 
subsidies were directed towards the large industries based in western 
Turkey. Manufacture in the rest of the country remained marginal, small-
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sized, and heavily labour-intensive.519 Turgut Özal’s reforms hit agriculture 
which in the Kurdish region represented the source of livelihood for most of 
the population. The 1980s were the beginning of a long process of 
transformation that will see the share of agriculture in Turkey’s labour force 
decreased from 50 per cent in 1980 to 25 per cent in 2015 and the sector’s 
output drop from 25 to 8 per cent of the GDP.520 As Özal ended agricultural 
subsidies and price control, subsistence agriculture virtually disappeared, 
forcing many small farmers to sell their land and increasing the unequal 
distribution of land ownership. In 1990, more than half of the agricultural 
land of south-eastern Turkey was owned by only 8 per cent of the farming 
families, while 38 per cent owned smallholdings between 10 and 50 dünüms 
(1-5 hectares), and 38 per cent were landless peasants.521  
Officially, the Turkish government and military identified the region’s 
underdevelopment as the main cause of the PKK uprising. However, this 
underdevelopment was attributed – rather than to Ankara’s policies – to the 
backward landownership structure and survival of tribalism.522 As Turkish 
general İlker Başbuğ later explained 
The PKK is essentially a ‘peasant movement’. [its] energy comes 
from the fact that the PKK has mobilised hundreds of years of anger 
of the Kurdish peasants against their emirs, aghas, and beys. This 
enormous peasant energy represented by the PKK [was not 
generated by] Turkish state, it had rather accumulated over the 
centuries against its own rural structures. In fact, the first armed 
actions of the PKK started in Siverek, against the head of the Bucak 
tribe.523 
Yet, Turkey’s neoliberal reforms only increased the concentration of land 
ownership and worsened the condition of the peasantry. But, even more 
consequentially, the counterinsurgency policies deployed by Ankara 
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strengthened the grip of the traditional landowning elite over their peasants. 
The Turkish military and government showed that maintaining the support 
of the Kurdish landowners remained a priority in the fight against the PKK, 
in particular given their capacity to contribute to the military effort by setting 
up their own semi-private Village Guards battalion.524 With the complicity of 
the military authority that ensured their impunity and generously rewarded 
for the contribution to the anti-PKK operations, these tribal landowners 
turned warlords thrived.    
 
The Destruction of Kurdish Rural Society  
The neoliberal reforms described in the previous section were not the only 
reason for the structural transformation of the Kurdish region of Turkey. 
From 1984 onwards, Turkey’s south-east was the theatre of the war 
between the Turkish army and the PKK that, by the end of the 1980s, had 
assumed a mass character in the rural areas. Military rule was re-imposed 
in 1987 over nine Kurdish provinces in the form of the OHAL regime, that 
gave exceptional powers to a military super-governor based in Diyarabakır. 
The further empowerment of the tribal and landowning elite was by no 
means the only repercussions of the war on the social structure of the 
region. As discussed in the previous chapter, the intensification of the PKK 
insurgency in the late 1980s was due to the growing popularity enjoyed by 
the organisation among the Kurdish peasantry that provided manpower and 
logistical support. It was becoming impossible for the Turkish army to 
maintain a permanent presence in the mountain areas, especially at night. 
In response to this challenge, the military imposed curfews and food 
embargos over communities suspected of aiding the PKK but also started 
to evacuate villages by physically removing their inhabitants and preventing 
their return.525 This practice,  made possible by the OHAL legal framework 
 
524 See Chapter 6. 
525 Jongerden, The Settlement Issue, 78. 
 
 
237 
 
was initially used as a form of collective punishment against communities 
seen as siding with the guerrilla. 
By 1990, the evacuation of villages increased and assumed the character of 
a counterinsurgency strategy aimed at depopulating the countryside. In his 
comprehensive study of the spatial dimension of Turkey’s anti-PKK 
strategy, Joost Jongerden explains that the evacuation of villages 
“constituted a concerted attempt by the Turkish military to bring about a 
conclusive transformation of the regional settlement structure” and the 
“destruction of rural society was simply considered part of the solution.”526 
The figures of evacuated villages and villagers remain highly contested as 
the military rulers of Turkey’s south-east were well aware to be acting in 
violation of the Geneva Convention. Not only did journalists have little 
access to the region, but the military also prevented Prime Minister Tansu 
Çiller and Deputy Prime Minister Murat Karayalçin from visiting the region in 
1993.527 Jongerden compared the contradictory figures coming from Turkish 
official sources with those provided by non-governmental organisations. 
While there is general agreement that the settlements evacuated in the 
course of the 1990s were around 3,000, the estimates on the number of 
displaced people vary: 384,000 according to official sources while 
independent sources claim 1-1.5 million and some even 3-4 million.528 The 
available data shows that the evacuation and destruction of Kurdish villages 
became systematic only from 1991 onwards when this strategy was 
implemented in 109 villages. The number rose in 1992 (295) and 1993 (874) 
to culminate in 1994 when 1.531 rural communities were destroyed, and 
their inhabitants displaced.529 
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The military’s objective of permanently depopulating the Kurdish 
countryside was implemented through the material devastation that 
accompanied the evacuation of villages and that prevented a future return 
of the villagers. Houses were destroyed and livestock was slaughtered up 
to an estimated loss of $2.3 billion in the 1990s.530 A large portion of the 
region’s forest was burned. A 2007 study based on satellite images shows 
that 7.5 per cent of all the forested areas in the province of Tunceli – the 
Kurdish Dersim – were destroyed.531 Forests surrounding villages were 
heavily targeted to affect more directly the livelihood of the local population 
and of destroying orchards and crops.532 The construction of dams also 
contributed to mass displacement forcing 200-350,000 people to leave 
their homes between the 1980s and the early 2000s.533 Presented as a 
developmental solution to the Kurdish issue, hydroelectric plants also 
served the same purpose as village evacuations and forest burning: 
depopulate the countryside and resettle allegedly (actual or potential) pro-
PKK peasants to a more easily controllable urban environment.  
The result of Turkey’s counter-insurgency strategy was a rapid and 
disorderly process of urbanisation. Between 1990 and 1997, the rural 
population in the region under the OHAL regime decreased from 54.2 per 
cent to 41.9.534 This 12 per cent drop is particularly striking when compared 
to the data from the rest of Turkey (non-OHAL provinces) where the rural 
population decreased only by 5.4 per cent. Moreover, the latter figure does 
not only show Turkey’s structural urbanisation process but also includes the 
many displaced Kurds who moved to cities outside the OHAL region, in 
central and western Anatolia and thus increased the urban population of 
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these provinces. The population of the major towns and cities of the Kurdish 
region increased exponentially in the 1990s. According to independent 
estimates, between 1991 and 1996, Diyarbakır’s population increased 
almost four times: from 380,000 to 1.3 million people.535 Displaced Kurds 
swelled Turkey’s shantytowns joining the already existing underclass of 
urban poor. They also provided cheap labour to export-oriented and hyper-
exploitative industries in central Turkish cities – the so-called Anatolian 
Tigers (Anadolu Kaplanları) – that had been booming since the 1980s. This 
process of forced urbanisation had dramatic political consequences that 
were contrary to the intention of the Turkish government and military. As 
observed by Martin van Bruinessen, these “large urban Kurdish population 
concentrations with a strengthened sense of ethnic identity […] proved 
more easy to politically mobilize […] than villagers”536 and the PKK took 
advantage of the new situation to expand its geographical and social reach. 
 
The Kurdish Insurgency in the 1990s 
The shift in Turkey’s counterinsurgency strategy was the result of the PKK’s 
increasing ability to move freely across vast areas of the Kurdish region. 
Even if the guerrilla presence was still largely limited to the rural and 
mountainous areas, the PKK started to make inroads into the Kurdish towns 
and cities and the Kurdish communities in non-Kurdish areas. Information 
about the insurgency would easily spread from the villages where the PKK 
operated to the towns. Most small Kurdish towns existed in symbiosis with 
the surrounding rural environment as markets for agricultural products that 
villagers would visit frequently and in which they often had family ties. In the 
larger urban centres of the south-east and among the Kurdish diaspora in 
western Turkey, Kurdish leftist nationalism had been a powerful force since 
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the 1970s and especially among the working and lower-middle classes.537 
While underdevelopment, cultural oppression, police brutality – the 
grievances that motivated the radical Kurdish politics of the 1970s – were 
even more accentuated after the 1980 coup, the military had eliminated all 
the alternatives to the PKK making it the only possible outlet for Kurdish 
discontent. Moreover, the brutal post-coup repression of the movement, 
that evenly hit all Kurdish groups regardless of their militancy, validated 
Öcalan’s especially uncompromising stance in the eyes of many Kurds. From 
1989 onwards, the PKK received a wave of recruits from urban areas, 
including many university students.538 
Due to the limited information that filtered through the region, the Turkish 
public became aware of the extent of the PKK’s popularity only in 1990. In 
March, in the small town of Nusaybin, the funeral procession for a PKK 
activist turned into a mass protests where thousands of locals opposed the 
security forces and one protestor was killed. As the news of the revolt 
spread, protests broke out in Cizre, another small Kurdish town, leaving five 
dead. Signs of solidarity with the protests were visible throughout the 
south-east where shops were shut down for days. These mass 
demonstrations that turned into riots took the name of serhildan – literally 
‘raising one’s head’ – and made explicit references to the First Palestinian 
Intifada (1987-1993). The serhildans became more frequent in 1991 and 
1992 and tended to coincide with Newroz, the Kurdish new year on March 
21st, or the anniversary of the establishment of the PKK on November 10th.539  
These often spontaneous revolts convinced the PKK leadership that the 
time was ripe to move beyond guerrilla tactics and towards forms of 
conventional warfare that would show the PKK’s capability to hold 
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conquered ground and encourage a widespread popular uprising. In August 
1991, when Turkey attacked the guerrilla camps in northern Iraq, the PKK 
fighters maintained their positions and – despite heavy losses – repelled the 
Turkish army.540 In August 1992, the town of Şirnak became the theatre of 
an urban battle that displaced virtually its entire population – 20,000 out of 
25,000 – and left 40 gendarmes, 85 PKK fighters, and 22 civilians dead.541 
These displays of strength by the PKK were meant to signal the shift to a 
phase of mass popular uprising allowing the PKK to deploy its forces into 
the open and to challenge a demoralised Turkish army. With the liberation 
wars of Algeria and Vietnam in mind, Öcalan hoped that the Turkish military 
would eventually lose public support and be forced to withdraw from the 
region.542 However, this shift never materialised. Rather than withdrawing, 
by 1993, the Turkish army had deployed roughly half of its land forces to 
the region – 185,000 soldiers – that combined with the gendarmerie and the 
village guards amounted to more than 300,000 men. This was a force that 
could not be challenged in terms of conventional warfare.543 
If Öcalan had underestimated the determination of the Turkish military, his 
intuition about the growing gap between the military and the civilian 
authorities proved to be partially correct. As mentioned before, the military 
allowed little civilian supervision over the Kurdish war and maintained firm 
control over the public narrative. Yet, some Turkish politicians made timid 
attempts to challenge the military’s monopoly over the Kurdish issue and 
signs of this new attitude became more frequent in the early 1990s. In 
February 1991, the government lifted the ban on using the Kurdish language, 
and in December, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel announced that Turkey 
“acknowledged the Kurdish reality.” Turgut Özal – who had become 
President in 1989 – spoke favourably about the need to find a political 
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solution.544 In the meantime, Öcalan appeared on a series of public 
interviews to improve the PKK’s image among the Turkish public.545 
Interviewed by Turkish journalist Doğu Perinçek, in 1990, Öcalan announced 
that the PKK was no longer demanding independence and was willing to 
negotiate on a platform of regional autonomy.546  
The conditions for negotiations briefly materialised in spring 1993. Between 
February and early March, the Iraqi-Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani acted as a 
mediator meeting both Öcalan in Damascus and Turgut Özal in Ankara. 
Encouraged by this climate, on March 17th, Öcalan proclaimed a unilateral 
ceasefire ordering his followers to keep Newroz quiet and his commanders 
to suspend their military operations. However, no official response arrived 
from the Turkish government. While Özal was lobbying the state apparatus 
to create the conditions for a political response, the military took Öcalan’s 
move as a sign of weakness. In early April 1993, the Army launched a 
massive operation in the countryside of Diyarbakır with indiscriminate 
bombings. While many PKK cadres were increasingly critical, the remaining 
hope for a political solution was shattered by Özal’s sudden death on April 
17th. According to Cengiz Çandar, at the time special advisor to Özal, the 
conditions for peace were simply not there, regardless of the president’s 
“goodwill” or his sudden death: 
He was a lonely President encircled by many opponents, including 
the Prime Minister. […] Secondly, the military […] was totally against 
a political and peaceful resolution to the Kurdish issue. They wanted 
to go on in the conventional way and suppress them as bandits and 
terrorists. […] Ideologically, the PKK was also not enough mature to 
reach a settlement. It was Öcalan’s fantasy. We are talking about the 
year 1993, they were still more or less a pro-independence Marxist 
movement. When we look back, conditions were not mature to bring 
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about a resolution. I can attest how much Özal was committed […]. 
But in politics, that's not sufficient.547 
Turkey’s official response to the PKK ceasefire arrived on May 25th, when 
the National Security Council refused negotiations and offered a partial 
amnesty in exchange for unconditional surrender. On the same day, a PKK 
unit captured a military bus and executed 33 unarmed recruits, an action 
that horrified and angered the Turkish public.548 Two weeks later Öcalan 
abandoned the ceasefire. 
 
The ‘Urbanisation’ and Ideological Transformation of the PKK 
Even if the intensity of the war continued to grow in the mid-1990s, the PKK 
remained committed to a political solution and, both in 1995 and 1998, 
Öcalan proclaimed new unilateral ceasefires that received no answer from 
the Turkish side. On the part of the PKK, there was a degree of war fatigue 
and a growing awareness that the disproportion of means made a 
continuous escalation of the conflict unviable. However, the ceasefires were 
also the result of a gradual ideological transformation of the organisation. 
The crisis and collapse of Soviet communism made the PKK’s project of 
establishing a socialist Kurdistan look anachronistic and less appealing while 
liberal democracy was increasingly perceived as the only legitimate form of 
politics. Moreover, the fall of the South African Apartheid regime (1991), the 
Oslo Accords between Israelis and Palestinians (1993 and 1995) and the 
peace process in Northern Ireland (1994-1998) created a widespread 
optimism that the end of the Cold War provided the conditions for the 
resolution of decades-old conflicts. In the mid-1990s, Öcalan was explicitly 
taking distance from communism and re-defined the PKK’s programme as 
“humanistic in essence”: 
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We are dedicated to a philosophy that is based on democracy and 
pluralism, not on the power of the state. We favour the synthesis of 
capitalism and socialism, an economic structure in which individuals 
will freely develop to their fullest potential. We are against all 
ideologies that defend absolute authority for the state at the 
expense of individual freedom.549 
These positions were officially adopted by the PKK in its Fifth Congress in 
1995, where the hammer and sickle were removed from the party flag. This 
transition was not particularly dramatic. Despite its allegiance to Marxism-
Leninism, class politics was never a particularly central element of the PKK’s 
discourse that was instead largely based on the issue of ‘Turkish 
colonialism’. In these terms, the PKK was really an heir of the Turkish New 
Left and the student movement of the 1970s. In the cultural context where 
the PKK was originally established, the working class – partly incorporated 
by the state within the import-substitution industrialisation compromise – 
was absent and mostly evoked out of theoretical necessity.550 Even in its 
most ‘rural’ phase, in the mid-1980s, when the main constituency of the PKK 
was – by far – the Kurdish peasantry, the socialisation of land was not a 
central aspect of its programme.551 More than promising land, the PKK won 
a large part of the peasantry by targeting oppressive landowners and tribal 
chiefs, ‘collaborationist aghas’, that the PKK considered agents of Turkish 
colonialism. As Remzi Kartal explains 
the PKK did not carry out actions against those aghas who were 
national aghas, who were patriotic, who stood by the cause of the 
Kurdish people. They acted against those aghas who were regime 
collaborators.552    
This distinction between patriotic and collaborationist aghas reflects the 
classical distinction of Marxist anti-colonial thought between the ‘national 
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bourgeoisie’ – with which the working class and peasantry should be allied 
– and the native ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ working for the colonisers.553  
Moreover, in the 1990s the PKK expanded its presence in the urban 
contexts, thanks to its military successes and its effective propaganda that 
exponentially increased its appeal on urbanised Kurds of diverse class 
background. The ideological transformation of the PKK was parallel to and 
mutually reinforced by its growing strength among social groups other than 
the Kurdish peasantry. Precisely when the PKK was winning sections of the 
Kurdish working and middle classes, millions of Kurdish peasants – many of 
whom from PKK-supporting communities – were moving into the cities as a 
result of the evacuation of villages and other war-related reasons but also 
the damming of valleys and the country’s structural urbanisation. These 
parallel processes gave the PKK unprecedented presence and popularity in 
both the urban centres of the Kurdish region and among the Kurdish 
communities in central and western Turkey and the European diaspora. An 
indication of the expansion of the PKK’s class base can be found in the rapid 
growth of pro-Kurdish legal parties and their links to the Kurdish insurgency. 
 
The Kurdish pro-Democracy Movement and its Social Basis 
The 1980 military coup was particularly ruthless in the repression of Kurdish 
leftist forces including the ones that, in the 1970s, had tried the path of 
electoral politics rather than armed struggle. The socialist and Kurdish 
nationalist mayor of Diyarbakır Mehdi Zana, elected in 1977, was arrested 
and tortured by the putschist generals and jailed until 1991.554 Turkey’s 
legislation forbade the establishment of parties with an explicit ethnic or 
regional identity, and, during the 1980s, the south-east again became a 
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terrain of competition for nation-wide mainstream parties. In the 1987 
elections, the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) became the main 
opposition party with 24 per cent and performed particularly well in the 
Kurdish areas thanks to its commitment to undoing the political legacy of 
the 1980 coup. In 1989, however, the party leadership came under 
increasing pressure and eventually expelled several Kurdish MPs that had 
publicly spoken about the oppression of the Kurds in international venues.555 
The expulsion pushed six more Kurdish MPs and the chairs of twelve south-
eastern SHP branches to resign.  
The Kurdish MPs were joined by a number of non-Kurdish socialists to 
establish the People’s Labour Party (HEP) in June 1990. This new party 
proposed a civilian constitution for Turkey as well as a resolution of the 
Kurdish issue through the democratisation of the country. The HEP located 
itself on the left aspiring to be the party of 
the workers, the unemployed, the rural people, the civil servants, the 
teachers, democrats, the intellectuals of social democratic and 
socialist persuasion, the small businesses and artisans, the masses 
who have been subjected to oppression and exploitation and above 
all everyone who supports democracy.556  
The HEP was unable to run for the snap elections of October 1991 due to 
technicalities but managed to strike a deal with SHP that was fearing an 
electoral collapse in the south-east. Thanks to this arrangement, 22 HEP 
members were elected in the SHP list. The HEP was becoming a political 
space in which Kurdish activists felt free to express their identity 
unapologetically. At the same time, the Turkish centrist and right-wing 
forces, as well as the media, led an incessant campaign to depict the HEP 
as the political wing of the PKK. Under these conditions, the non-Kurdish 
 
555 In early 1989, Ibrahim Aksoy, parliamentarian for Malatya, was expelled by the 
SHP for a speech he delivered at the European Parliament. In October, seven SHP 
parliamentarians were expelled by the party for attending an international 
conference organized by the Kurdish Institute in Paris. At the conference, Aksoy 
harshly criticised the SHP calling it “racist and chauvinistic”. For Aksoy’s full 
speech, see International Paris Conference 14-15 October 1989. The Kurds: Human 
Rights and Cultural Identity (Paris: Institut Kurde de Paris, 1992), 53-60. 
556 Cited in Güneş, The Kurdish National Movement, 157. 
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HEP members were increasingly uneasy with the composition of the party 
and many of them resigned, in turn accelerating the ‘Kurdification’ of the 
party.557  
The alleged links to the PKK and the accusation of separatism haunted the 
HEP until the Constitutional Court shut down the party in 1993. This act 
inaugurated a pattern whereby every time a pro-Kurdish party was banned, 
it was immediately re-opened under a different name. The HEP was 
replaced by the Democracy Party (DEP) (1993-1994), in turn, closed down 
and replaced by the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) (1994-2003). 
These parties became increasingly ‘more Kurdish’, as Nicole Watts observes 
in her book on pro-Kurdish legal activism, “police harassment and state 
coercion radicalised the party and its leadership, which isolated it from 
mainstream parties and promoted the politics of polarization and 
difference.”558 On its part, the PKK was certainly interested in influencing 
electoral politics especially since the HEP was established roughly at the 
time in which Abdullah Öcalan started calling for negotiations with the state. 
This can be noticed in the shift from the 1987 to the 1991 elections: In 1987, 
the SHP performed well in the south-east but was nowhere close to being 
the strongest party. In the 1991 elections, when the Kurdish candidates on 
the SHP lists were largely HEP members and the PKK was openly supportive, 
the SHP boomed in the Kurdish region. Despite its nation-wide 6 per cent 
decline – a loss of almost one million voters – the SHP/HEP experienced a 
spectacular increase in areas of strong PKK presence: From 16 to 71.7 per 
cent in the Diyarbakır 2 constituency, from 27.8 to 54 per cent in Mardin, 
from 17.4 to 39.7 in Siirt.559 These results show the overwhelming popularity 
reached by the PKK in significant parts of the Kurdish region but also 
 
557 Ibid., 162-163. 
558 Nicole F. Watts, Activists in Office: Kurdish Politics and Protest in Turkey (Seattle 
and London: University of Washington Press, 2010), 65. 
559 ‘Seçim Arşivi’, T.C. Yüksek Seçim Kurulu <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/secim-
arsivi/2612>. 
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contributed to the Turkish public’s perception of the HEP as a mere political 
extension of the PKK. 
Watts explains that, despite not being a creation of the PKK, “the parties’ 
most active rank-and-file membership and much of its voter base supported 
pro-Kurdish parties because they viewed them as sympathetic to or as a 
surrogate of the PKK.” Within the HEP, DEP, and HADEP, there was always 
a degree of tension between “those who maintained close communication 
with the PKK leadership and indeed viewed the party as an unofficial front 
for the PKK” and “those who sought to maintain some distance and 
autonomy from the guerrilla organization.”560 The creation of these parties 
at a time in which the PKK had reached a level of popularity and strength 
that was unprecedented in Turkey’s Kurdish movement meant that the room 
for an alternative Kurdish politics was very limited. The gradual breakaway 
of Turkish leftists was, according to Hamit Bozarslan, virtually inevitable, as 
the success of the PKK insurgency triggered “a total reconfiguration of the 
Kurdish political space, as a distinct space from the Turkish political 
space.”561 In earlier stages of the insurgency, Kurdish nationalists and leftists 
could still maintain critical positions on the PKK’s ideology and strategy. By 
the early 1990s, the PKK had become so powerful that it was increasingly 
able to determine the boundaries of ‘legitimate’ Kurdish politics. Within this 
context, the HEP and its successors had little room to escape the PKK’s 
narrative that each Kurd could only be either with the PKK or with the 
Turkish state.  
 
560 Watts, Activists in Office, 14. 
561 Cited in Casier and Grojean, Between Integration, Autonomization and 
Radicalization, 11. 
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The PKK’s involvement provided these parties with wide support among the 
landless peasantry and the urban poor, especially in the mid-1990s, when a 
large part of the former was becoming the latter. Since this was the social 
base that allowed the pro-Kurdish parties to obtain such spectacular results 
in the Kurdish south-east, the party programme remained quite radical: 
“land reform and redistribution, programs to eradicate regional economic 
disparities, continued public ownership of state-owned economic 
enterprises, and greatly expanded services to aid the poor and 
unemployed.”562 The party leadership, however, was largely filled by the 
urban middle classes and in particular professionals – lawyers, teachers, 
engineers – and people who had gained prominence through civil society 
activism.563 Relying on this wide class base, by the mid-1990s, the pro-
Kurdish parties had largely displaced the Turkish mainstream parties and 
were the dominant electoral force in the south-east. The main challenge to 
their electoral hegemony came from the rising Turkish Islamist movement. 
The Islamist Welfare Party (RP) provided conservative Kurds with an 
alternative to the ‘opposed nationalisms’ and emphasised Turkish-Kurdish 
brotherhood under the banners of (Sunni) Islam. During the 1990s, the 
Kurdish south-east became the arena for the competition between the 
Islamists and the pro-Kurdish forces while the other Turkish parties became 
marginal in the region. The RP, however, shadowed its rivals among both 
 
562 Watts Activists in Office, 70. 
563 Ibid., 71. 
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Turkish and Kurdish slum dwellers in cities such as Istanbul, where the 
Islamists’ network of charity organisations won them vast support.564  
The pro-Kurdish parties faced a hostile judicial and political system. The 
1982 military constitution imposed a nation-wide 10 per cent – the world’s 
highest – electoral threshold, designed to ensure strong parliamentary 
majorities but also to make it difficult for ‘regional’ – read ‘Kurdish’ – parties 
to enter parliament. For these reasons, the pro-Kurdish parties had to opt 
for an electoral alliance – like in 1991 – or to run their candidates as 
independents. The success of the pro-Kurdish parties made them a target 
of the wave of extra-judicial violence that, in the 1990s, hit Kurds as well as 
Alevi, leftists, liberals, and secular intellectuals. The hundreds of murders 
that took place in this decade revealed the links between far-right 
organisations – like the Grey Wolves565 and Turkish Hizbullah566 – the Turkish 
mafia, and the Turkish ‘deep state’.567 Between 1991 and 1994, more than 
fifty DEP/HEP activists were murdered including two parliamentarians.568 
These crimes largely remained unpunished and took place in a context in 
which the political mainstream publicly painted elected Kurdish officials as 
terrorists and traitors. After the DEP was banned in 1994, five MPs were 
given sentences up to 15 years for their alleged ties with the PKK while six 
more went into exile before their trials began.   
 
Kurdish Diaspora and Exile in Europe 
One of the reasons behind the PKK’s growing strength between the 1980s 
and the 1990s was its ability to mobilise the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. 
 
564 Henri Barkey, ‘The People’s Democracy Party (HADEP): The Travails of a Legal 
Kurdish Party in Turkey’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 18.1 (1998), 129–38.  
565 The Gray Wolves (Bozkurtlar) is a violent neofascist group affiliated to the MHP. 
566 Known also as ‘Kurdish’ Hizbullah, due to its strength in the south-east, this 
Sunni organisation is unrelated to the more famous Lebanese Hizbollah. 
567 Zürcher, Turkey, 321-323. 
568 Güneş, The Kurdish National Movement, 163-164; Marcus, Blood and Belief, 
208. 
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Germany hosted the biggest Kurdish community in Europe, roughly 20 per 
cent of the 650.000 Turkish nationals who emigrated there as guest workers 
since the 1960s.569 With the waves of Kurdish refugees escaping Turkey, 
Iran, and Iraq in the 1980s, by the mid-1990s, the Kurdish population in 
Europe amounted, to approximately 850.000 individuals, half a million of 
whom in Germany.570 Up to the 1970s, the Kurdish population in Germany 
was overwhelmingly made up of migrant workers with a low degree of 
politicisation.571 It was the great influx of Kurdish political refugees after the 
1980 coup – roughly 30.000 – that helped rapidly politicise the Kurdish 
community.572 Activist Devris Çimen left Turkey with his family in 1978, 
escaping anti-Alevi persecution in southern Turkey and developed his 
Kurdish identity in Europe: 
I was a child basically when they sent us to Switzerland… I was 
asking 'why am I here?'. I didn't like it, my roots were in Maraş. […] 
The Kurdish movement was active in Switzerland. As a child, I 
thought 'why would I fight for Kurdistan? I'm from Elbistan573!'. We 
were suppressed to such a degree that we didn't even know that we 
were Kurds. And when we arrived in Switzerland we realised that the 
issue was much broader than we ever thought.574 
In the early 1980s, the PKK sent cadres to Europe with the specific purpose 
of organising the Kurdish communities and, by the end of the decade, the 
diaspora had become a major source of funding and recruitment. The PKK 
set up the Weşanên Serxwebûn publishing house in Cologne and organised 
community life through sectoral organisations – for women, workers, youth, 
but also religious groups (Sunnis, Alevis, Yazidis).575 These groups organised 
 
569 Birgit Ammann, ‘Kurds in Germany’, in Encyclopedia of Diasporas, ed. by Melvin 
Ember, Ian A. Skoggard (Boston, MA: Springer, 2005), 1011. 
570 Osten Wahlbeck, Kurdish Diasporas: A Comparative Study of Kurdish Refugee 
Communities (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). 
571 Ammann, Kurds in Germany, 1011 .  
572 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Shifting National and Ethnic Identities: The Kurds in 
Turkey and the European Diaspora’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 18.1 (1998), 
45. 
573 A district in Kahramanmaraş Province. 
574 Interview with Devris Çimen (Brussels, 2019). 
575 Güneş, The Kurdish National Movement, 109-111. 
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rallies and protests in solidarity with the insurgency in Turkey but also music 
festivals, dance contests, the Newroz celebrations with the aim of 
politicising Kurdish culture. According to police reports, in the mid-1990s, 
the PKK-affiliated organisations in Germany could count on approximately 
7,500 activists and were able to mobilise up to 50,000 German Kurds for 
protests and cultural events.576 In 1995, The pro-PKK MED-TV started 
broadcasting from Europe and, in just a few months, was being viewed by 
millions of people around the world.577 The successful organisation and 
mobilisation of Europe’s Kurds were aimed at creating a new pool of recruits 
for the insurgency but, even more importantly, a reliable flow of revenues. 
This topic is highly contested because of Turkey’s incessant campaign to 
present the PKK’s financing as based on extortion and the control of major 
drug trafficking routes.578 Even if the idea that the PKK exercises direct 
control on the flow of drugs to Europe has no actual foundation, the PKK 
certainly ‘taxes’579 legal and illegal commercial activities in areas under its 
influence.580 The PKK’s social control over Kurdish diaspora communities is 
manifested in both the large extent of voluntary donations but also in the 
 
576 Van Bruinessen, Shifting National and Ethnic Identities, 51. 
577 Amir Hassanpour, ‘Satellite Footprints as National Borders: Med‐tv and the 
Extraterritoriality of State Sovereignty’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 18.1 
(1998), 53–72; Bilgin Ayata, ‘Kurdish Transnational Politics and Turkey’s Changing 
Kurdish Policy: The Journey of Kurdish Broadcasting from Europe to Turkey’, 
Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 19.4 (2011), 523–33. 
578 Despite the poverty and dubious origin of the available sources, this narrative 
often makes it into academic and pseudo-academic literature, especially in the 
field of Terrorism Studies. See for example Roth and Sever, The Kurdish Workers 
Party (PKK); Ahmet Pek and Behsat Ekici, ‘Narcoterrorism in Turkey: The Financing 
of PKK-KONGRA GEL from Illicit Drug Business’, in Understanding and Responding 
to the Terrorism Phenomenon: A Multi-Dimensional Perspective, ed. by Ozgur 
Nikbay and Suleyman Hancerli (Washington: IOS Press, 2007), 140–52. 
579 Voluntary donations resembling taxes – regular and somehow proportionate to 
the donor’s income – are an almost universal characteristic of diaspora support to 
liberation struggles in the home country: from the Irish to the Tamils or the 
Basques. 
580 For a critical discussion on the alleged criminal activities of the PKK, see Paul 
White, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers?: The Kurdish National 
Movement in Turkey (London and New York: Zed Books, 2000), 191-200. 
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use coercion to persuade more reluctant members of the Kurdish 
communities to contribute to the cause. 
The PKK’s presence in Europe also served the purpose of internationalising 
Turkey’s Kurdish question. Since the failure of the 1993 ceasefire attempt, 
Öcalan started planning to establish a wider Kurdish national assembly in 
exile to gain a degree of international legitimacy that the PKK alone was 
unable to achieve. The Kurdistan Parliament in Exile held its first session in 
The Hague in April 1995, soon after the DEP was banned in Turkey. Öcalan 
was unable to convince any major party or organisation from the other 
Kurdish regions to join and the Kurdish parliament was largely composed by 
current and former DEP deputies, civil society activists, and some 
independent personalities. As Remzi Kartal, one of the exiled DEP 
parliamentarian and founder of the Parliament in Exile, explains 
we came to Europe in 1994 because we had escaped [Turkey]. Then, 
as a delegation of the [DEP] MPs in exile, we went to Damascus and 
met Öcalan. Öcalan said that the most important thing for us now 
was to establish a national congress to bring all these political 
parties together. And then we worked for that, we spoke with 
everybody, but the [Iraqi-Kurdish] KDP and PUK said that they had 
interests with Turkey and, for that reason, they did not come. So we 
established the Kurdish parliament in exile that was limited to 
northern [Turkish] Kurdistan. It wasn't a national parliament. But we 
worked in that direction.581 
The inability to convince other major groups weakened the parliament and 
in 1999 it transformed into the slightly more representative Kurdistan 
National Congress.582   
However, that severe limits to Kurdish political activism existed also in 
Europe became clear already in the early 1990s. In June 1993, after Kurdish 
activists had attacked the Turkish consulate in Munich, German authorities 
complied with Turkey’s request to outlaw the PKK, and France followed suit 
 
581 Interview with Remzi Kartal (Brussels, 2019). 
582 Tahiri, The Structure of Kurdish Society, 219-221. 
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by the end of the same year.583 Even if these bans have not been 
consistently enforced, they create a sense of precariousness as pro-Kurdish 
organisations and events are occasionally shut down and convey the 
message that the US and European government are ultimately always going 
to side with Turkey.  
 
The Capture of Abdullah Öcalan 
The Kurdish insurgency in Turkey was suddenly interrupted by the capture 
of the PKK’s leader Abdullah Öcalan in February 1999. Since 1979, Öcalan 
had been based in Damascus as a guest of the Ba’athist regime of Hafez al-
Asad. In the 1970s and 1980s, Asad offered safe heaven to leftist 
revolutionary and separatist groups active in neighbouring and hostile 
countries such as leftist Palestinians, the insurgency-aspiring Turkish New 
Left, Kurdish nationalists from Iraq, or Armenian militants. This policy was 
aimed at destabilising neighbouring Turkey, Israel, and Iraq – each of them 
stronger than and hostile to Syria.584 The reason why Damascus was able to 
provoke these countries without facing retaliation was that, from the 1970s, 
Syria enjoyed the protection of the Soviet Union as its most stable Middle 
Eastern ally. Syria’s support to the PKK was also specifically aimed at 
destabilising Turkey’s south-east and delaying the construction of large 
infrastructural projects in the upper Euphrates valley that could seriously 
affect the volume of water reaching eastern Syria.585 Rather than direct 
military and logistical assistance, Syria mostly offered the PKK the freedom 
to move and organise inside its territory.  
 
583 Alynna J. Lyon and Emek M. Uçarer, ‘Mobilizing Ethnic Conflict: Kurdish 
Separatism in Germany and the PKK’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 24.6 (2001), 938-
939. 
584 This policy certainly had also an ideological dimension and the organizations 
supported by Syria were largely socialist in orientation. However, in the 1980s, with 
the decline of leftist forces throughout the Middle East, Asad pragmatically started 
to support rising Islamist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine or 
Hezbollah in Lebanon. 
585 See Mark Dohrmann and Robert Hatem, ‘The Impact of Hydro-Politics on the 
Relations of Turkey, Iraq and Syria’, The Middle East Journal, 68.4 (2014), 567–83. 
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With the end of the Cold War, the balance of power shifted in favour of 
Turkey. In just a few years, the end of Soviet military aid to Syria as well as 
the increasing military cooperation between Turkey and Israel made 
Ankara’s threat of military invasion much more credible.586 In October 1998, 
Syria expelled Öcalan and shut down the PKK’s offices and training facilities. 
Öcalan fled first to Athens and then Moscow but both countries refused him 
asylum. In November, Öcalan made it to Italy. Under Turkish and American 
pressure, the Italian government did not grant Öcalan refugee status, and 
yet it refused extradition on the grounds that Turkey could apply the death 
penalty.587 There would have probably been safer choices for Öcalan – such 
as Libya or North Korea – than Italy, a NATO member with strong economic 
ties to Turkey. The PKK leader explained the move as a political choice: 
To explain the reality of [the Kurds], and if possible to find a political 
solution, I found it inevitable that I should go to Rome […] to explain 
the merciless truth to European public opinion and to seek the 
chance to create a political opening.588 
As observed by Paul White, Öcalan’s choice was aimed at breaking the 
political isolation of “a guerrilla chief hiding away in a so-called ‘pariah state’” 
and at bringing the Kurdish issue directly to the core of Europe.589 His hope 
was not well placed. In February, Öcalan was pressured to leave Italy for 
Greece where he was eventually flown to Nairobi in the hope that he could 
apply for asylum in South Africa thanks to the long-standing ties between 
the PKK and the ruling African National Congress. Once in Nairobi, Öcalan 
was captured by Turkish special forces aided by American and Israeli 
intelligence.  
 
586 For an analysis of the 1998 Turkish-Syrian crisis in terms of geopolitical and 
military development, see Meliha B. Altunışık and Özlem Tür, ‘From Distant 
Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations’, Security Dialogue, 37.2 
(2006), 229–48. 
587 Alessandra Stanley, ‘Italy Rejects Turkey’s Bid For the Extradition of Kurd’, The 
New York Times, 21 November 1998 
<https://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/21/world/italy-rejects-turkey-s-bid-for-the-
extradition-of-kurd.html>. 
588 Cited in Tahiri, The Structure of Kurdish Society, 235. 
589 White, Primitive Rebels, 183.  
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Öcalan’s capture led to an explosion of public rage in Turkey’s south-east 
but also in Iraqi Kurdistan and among the Kurdish diaspora. In Europe, PKK 
sympathizers attacked Greek and Israeli embassies and, in Germany, 
clashes between Turks and Kurds took place. Held two months after 
Öcalan’s capture, the local and legislative elections of April 1999 turned out 
to be a show of strength by the pro-Kurdish HADEP that won Diyarbakır and 
six other provincial capitals. With nearly 5 per cent, the HADEP was far from 
passing the 10 per cent threshold and yet it came first in eleven of Turkey’s 
81 provinces. In June 1999, Öcalan was sentenced to death by a military 
tribunal although the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment after 
Turkey abolished the capital punishment in 2002.590   
 
Conclusion 
From the early 1990s, the PKK became the only significant Kurdish national 
force in Turkey and the unavoidable point for reference of the Kurdish left, 
including the legal pro-Kurdish parties. Chapter 7 showed the immediate 
consequences of the 1980 coup and particularly how the elimination of the 
PKK’s political rivals by the putschist military contributed to the 
unforeseeable success of the early PKK insurgency (1984-1990). This 
chapter described the long-term consequences of the 1980 military coup. 
Through political repression and neoliberal reforms, the military regime 
profoundly altered the class structure and political landscape of the country. 
Banning the unions and forbidding strikes, the military laid the conditions for 
Turkey’s transformation into an export-oriented industrial country whose 
competitiveness was based on the contraction of salaries and workplace 
discipline. By creating a docile and fragmented working class, this strategy 
disarmed the political left eliminating the historical Turkish interlocutor for 
 
590 In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) declared that Öcalan’s 
trial had not been fair and that he had not been granted his right to appeal. ‘CASE 
OF ÖCALAN v. TURKEY (Application No. 46221/99)’, ECHR, 12 May 2005 
<https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22:[%22001-69022%22]%7D>. 
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Kurdish activists and created an unbridgeable gap between Turkish and 
Kurdish politics in Turkey.  
In the Kurdish region, this transformation went parallel, in the mid-1990s, to 
the coercive depopulation of the countryside through the forced 
displacement of millions of Kurdish villagers – the social base of the PKK – 
that were turned into urban poor. In this context of social fragmentation, the 
PKK had to rearticulate its political project abandoning the idea of a socialist 
and independent Kurdistan. As class mobilisation was made impossible by 
the authoritarian and neoliberal reforms and socialist politics had been 
discredited worldwide by the fall of the Soviet Union, the PKK and the pro-
Kurdish parties re-oriented their political project towards the resolution of 
the Kurdish issue through the democratisation of Turkey. Without 
abandoning social demands and a clear leftist stance, the re-framing of the 
Kurdish issue in terms of democratic representation allowed for the building 
of a wide social coalition in support of the PKK and the pro-Kurdish parties. 
Chapter 9 will show how this re-orientation of the PKK continued after the 
capture of Öcalan in 1999, developing into an alternative political project for 
the Kurds. 
 

Chapter 9 
The Political Economy of the New 
Kurdish Movement (2000-2019) 
 
 
 
Introduction  
This chapter discusses the expansion of the social basis of Turkey’s Kurdish 
movement in relation to the process of ideological and organisational 
transformation that followed the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 
1999. The transition of the PKK from Leninism and nationalism to radical 
democracy, the growth of the Kurdish women’s movement, and the 
experience of Kurdish self-government in Rojava have attracted an 
unprecedented degree of scholarly and media interest in the Kurds. Also 
due to the nearly complete abandonment of Marxist language by the 
movement itself, discussions of Kurdish politics are centred on issues of 
democratic representation, minority rights, and women’s liberation. The 
political-economic context in which the new Kurdish movement operates as 
well as the conflictual class dynamics existing within the movement itself 
are most often not part of the discussion.  
After discussing the new ideological paradigm developed by Öcalan and 
centred around the critique of nationalism, this chapter explores the three 
most significant aspects of the new movement in the 2000s and 2010s: the 
Kurdish women’s movement; the growth of legal pro-Kurdish parties in 
Turkey; and the establishment of Kurdish-controlled political entity in Syria. 
Each section touches upon relevant issues of political economy that 
affected these developments as well as the class dynamics at play, while 
the final section draws broader considerations on the political economy of 
the movement. While the movement’s strategy seems to be oriented 
towards building a wide social coalition with the inclusion of the middle and 
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even upper classes, its electoral and military strength remains rooted in the 
mass support the movement enjoys among the subaltern classes.  
 
From the PKK to the New Kurdish Movement 
In August 1999, from the island prison of İmralı and with a pending death 
sentence, Öcalan ordered his guerrillas to withdraw from Turkey and 
proclaimed another unilateral ceasefire. The PKK fighters retreated under 
Turkish fire to their bases in the northern Iraqi Qandil Mountains. The 
decision to suspend the war and the highly conciliatory statements by 
Öcalan to the Turkish government and public in these years drove many 
militants to abandon the organization.591 However, the PKK largely complied 
with the instructions, passed on by Öcalan through his lawyers, proving that 
the leader was still in control.  
The years following Öcalan’s capture were a period of transition for the PKK. 
The organisation changed its name twice: into Kurdistan Freedom and 
Democracy Congress (KADEK) in April 2002 and again into Kurdistan 
People’s Congress (Kongra-Gel) in late 2003. These were attempts to 
renovate the public image of the PKK and to avert the consequences of 
being designated terrorist.592 However, the name changes were not purely 
cosmetic operations. On the contrary, in the early 2000s, the PKK was going 
through intense ideological debates that had been triggered by the defeat 
of 1999. The congress documents of these years are increasingly focused 
on the critique of nationalism as the main source of the Kurdish Question: 
 
591 Around 1,500 militants according to White. Paul White, The PKK: Coming Down 
from the Mountains (London: Zed Books, 2015), 31. 
592 The PKK had been banned as a terrorist organisation by Germany and France in 
1993 and by the US State Department in 1997. That adding the PKK to terrorist lists 
was a political decision which had little to do with the PKK’s actions became clear 
to all Kurds in the early 2000s, when both the United Kingdom (2000) and the EU 
(2002) banned the PKK despite the latter had withdrawn from Turkey and was 
calling for a political solution to the conflict. On the PKK’s response to the listing, 
see Marlies Casier, ‘Designated Terrorists: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party and Its 
Struggle to (Re)Gain Political Legitimacy’, Mediterranean Politics, 15.3 (2010), 393–
413. 
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“the system of the 20th Century which is based on nationalism, division, 
denial and destruction is not the right solution but in fact the reason behind 
the problem.”593 These discussions were triggered and encouraged by the 
intellectual inputs coming from Öcalan’s prison cell. At his numerous trials,594 
the Kurdish leader opted for a political rather than a legalistic defence and 
used his court appearances as a platform to propose a new political project. 
His defence texts, presented before Turkish and international courts, were 
later published and officially adopted by the PKK and constituted the basis 
for a paradigm shift. At its 9th Congress, in spring 2005, the organisation 
reformed its structure and officially adopted Öcalan’s new paradigm.  
Öcalan turned his own imprisonment into the opportunity to accelerate the 
process of transformation that the PKK had started in the 1990s.595 By the 
late 2000s, the PKK had developed a new radical democratic project and 
rejected the nation-state as the political trajectory for the Kurdish 
movement. At the same time, the Kurdish movement that openly refers to 
Öcalan’s thought grew much wider than the PKK itself, both in terms of 
geographical reach and diversification of activities. From this transformation 
onwards, describing the complex of organisations following Öcalan’s 
thought as ‘the PKK’ is not only empirically incorrect as it is politically 
problematic. Even if the PKK leadership’s influence over the wider 
movement is stronger than they admit, it would be impossible for a guerrilla 
group to directly control the galaxy of Öcalan-inspired organisations in 
every field of society and spread around Turkey, the Middle East, and 
Europe. Moreover, describing the wider movement as PKK-affiliated 
legitimises the narrative of the Turkish government aimed at criminalising 
every expression of Kurdish politics by labelling it as terrorism.  
 
593 ‘Final Resolution on the 8th Congress of the PKK’, Management Committee of 
KADEK, 15 April 2002. Se also, Final Declaration of the Foundation Conference of 
the People's Congress of Kurdistan, 17 November 2003, (Cologne: International 
Initiative Freedom for Ocalan). 
594 The Imrali court that sentenced him to death and the Court of Appeals in Ankara 
in 1999, a local court in Şanlıurfa and the ECHR in 2001, a court in Athens in 2003, 
and the Grand Chamber of the ECHR in 2004. 
595 See Chapter 8. 
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With Marxism, the movement also abandoned the language of class politics, 
and the ideological transformation was accompanied – and arguably 
mutually reinforced – by the expansion and diversification of the 
movement’s class base. The next section describes the PKK’s ideological 
and organisational transformation in more detail to introduce the discussion 
of the political-economic programme and class basis of the new Kurdish 
movement.  
 
Öcalan’s New Ideological Paradigm 
This section summarises the main features of Democratic Confederalism, 
the PKK’s new paradigm, as a coherent political project as it appears in the 
2010s. However, it must be noted that Öcalan’s capture did not constitute a 
clear cut-off point between the PKK’s Leninist and nationalist past and its 
democratic and autonomist present. Even if the leader’s arrest in 1999 
became the occasion to accelerate the shift, the PKK’s transformation is 
doubtlessly in continuity with its evolution in the 1990s and particularly with 
Öcalan’s developing critique of the nation-state and the patriarchal society. 
As supporters proudly claim, the PKK’s resilience throughout the decades is 
the result of its capacity to continuously evolve. In the words of Remzi 
Kartal: 
The desire for change never dies in the PKK. We change 
continuously and according to the needs, not only of the Kurds but 
of the people of the Middle East and of humanity. We have to change 
to meet the demands and needs of the people. […] the dogmas that 
have damaged the international left and that block the development 
of the Middle East […] have to be broken to make change possible596 
Öcalan’s analysis, drawing heavily on the writings of American anarchist 
Murray Bookchin, starts from a critique of the nation-state as a source of 
oppression.597 The early democratic thinking of the European enlightenment 
 
596 Interview with Remzi Kartal (Brussels, 2019). 
597 Within academia, Joost Jongerden and Ahmet Akkaya are the authors of the 
most comprehensive and thorough work of interpretation of Öcalan’s writings and 
of the PKK’s new paradigm and this section largely relies on their publications on 
the topic. See Joost Jongerden and Ahmet Akkaya, ‘The PKK in the 2000s: 
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was defeated by the rise of nationalism that translated into the pursuit of 
culturally homogenous states – like the Turkish Republic – where all minority 
groups had to be suppressed and forcefully assimilated. The democratic 
solution for the Kurdish question cannot, therefore, be found in the 
establishment of a Kurdish nation-state, which would be as oppressive as 
the existing nation-states of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria where the Kurds 
were denied their freedom. A Kurdish nation-state would need to create a 
homogenous Kurdish people and to erase the regional, cultural, and 
linguistic diversity of the land of Kurdistan. As an alternative, Öcalan 
proposed the establishment of a ‘truly’ Democratic Republic in Turkey:  
I offer the Turkish society a simple solution. We demand a 
democratic nation. We are not opposed to the unitary state and 
republic. We accept the republic, its unitary structure and laicism. 
However, we believe that it must be redefined as a democratic state 
respecting peoples, cultures and rights. On this basis, the Kurds 
must be free to organize in a way that they can live their culture and 
language and can develop economically and ecologically. This would 
allow Kurds, Turks and other cultures to come together under the 
roof of a democratic nation in Turkey.598 
With continuous reference to Atatürk’s early speeches, Öcalan claimed that 
granting Kurdish rights in Turkey would not undermine the founding 
principles of the republic but strengthen its democracy.599 The PKK would, 
therefore, support political parties that not only defend the Kurds but also 
 
Continuity through breaks?’ in Nationalisms and Politics, ed. by Casier and 
Jongerden, 143-162; Ahmet Akkaya and Joost Jongerden, ‘Reassembling the 
Political: The PKK and the Project of Radical Democracy’, European Journal of 
Turkish Studies, 14 (2012); Ahmet Akkaya and Joost Jongerden, ‘Democratic 
Confederalism as a Kurdish Spring: The PKK and the Quest for Radical Democracy’, 
in The Kurdish Spring: Geopolitical Changes and the Kurds, ed. by Michael Gunter 
and Mohammed Ahmed (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2013), 163–86; Ahmet 
Akkaya and Joost Jongerden, ‘Confederalism and Autonomy in Turkey: The 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the Reinvention of Democracy’, in The Kurdish 
Question in Turkey, ed. by Güneş and Zeydanlıoğlu, 186-204; Joost Jongerden, 
‘The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK): Radical Democracy and the Right to Self-
Determination Beyond the Nation-State’ in The Kurdish Question Revisited, ed. by 
Stansfield and Shareef, 245-257. 
598 Abdullah Öcalan, War and Peace in Kurdistan (Cologne: International Initiative 
“Freedom for Abdullah Öcalan – Peace in Kurdistan”, 2008), 39. 
599 Güneş, The Kurdish National Movement, 137. 
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promote the recognition of the cultural rights of all ethnic and religious 
groups in Turkey as well as the secularists and other discriminated groups 
such as the LGBT+ community. 
The project of Democratic Confederalism goes even beyond that. Aware 
that changing the current Middle East borders – in order to create a Kurdish 
state – could only lead to bloodshed and displacement, the Öcalan proposes 
to build democracy by ignoring, rather than dismantling, state borders. 
Communities would autonomously organise on the basis of democratic 
councils in a confederal relation to each other. In such a system, the need 
to establish a Kurdish state would simply disappear. When framed in these 
terms, the status of the Kurds as the world’s ‘largest stateless nation’ is 
turned into the opportunity for an alternative political project and a true 
democratisation of the region. In Öcalan’s project, a “Middle Eastern 
democratic Confederalism […] will reunite those whose free lives were 
destroyed by the nation-state wars imposed on the former mosaic of the 
Middle Eastern peoples”.600  
Following these ideological premises, the 9th Congress of the PKK in 2005 
restructured the whole organisational framework of the group rejecting its 
previous “state-like hierarchical structure” now deemed in “dialectic 
contradiction to the principles of democracy, freedom and equality”.601 The 
PKK itself became – at least formally – just a component of a wider 
confederal body called the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK). The KCK, a 
confederation of local councils and organisations, was constructed as a 
direct alternative to the nation-state to collect all political forces that 
support the project of Democratic Confederalism under the same 
coordinating body. Within this framework, democracy takes the form of 
people’s power, rather than that of representative politics. The PKK became 
then the KCK-affiliated party representing the Kurds of Turkey and was 
 
600 Abdullah Öcalan, Manifesto for a Democratic Civilization, Volume 1, Civilization: 
The Age of Masked Gods and Disguised Kings (Porsgrunn, Norway: New Compass 
Press, 2015), 39. 
601 Öcalan, War and Peace, 28. 
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joined by a sister party for each of the Kurdish regions: the Kurdistan 
Democratic Solution Party (PÇDK) in Iraq, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) 
in Syria, and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) in Iran.602 Moreover, the 
KCK included the military wings, the women’s branches, as well as Kurdish 
diaspora associations. After 2005, what used to be known as the PKK 
became, rather than a party, a party-complex,603 organised in a less 
centralised structure.  
This transformation did not necessarily imply a significant change of the 
leadership and most of the powerful positions in the KCK, the PKK, and the 
military wings were taken by PKK veterans and members of Öcalan’s inner 
circle.604 However, the new structure created a plenitude of organisations, 
committees, and councils, empowering a generation of cadres who had 
joined the Kurdish struggle during the mass growth of the PKK in the 1990s. 
As described later in this chapter, the growth in strength and political 
significance of other formally and informally affiliated organisations, such as 
the women’s movement, the legal pro-Kurdish political parties in Turkey or 
the Syria-based PYD, inevitably created alternative centres of power which 
can only partly be subject to the acting leadership in Qandil. It is probably 
not coincidental that this more polycentric structure of the PKK/KCK party-
complex suits the interest of a jailed leader unable to run the day-to-day life 
 
602 While the PÇDK only had very marginal role in the crowded Iraqi-Kurdish political 
environment, the PJAK has become an important competitors to the declining 
Iranian Kurdish parties. The PYD is discussed more in details later in this chapter. 
603 Jongerden and Akkaya, The PKK in the 2000s, 147; 
604 In particular, Murat Karayılan and Cemil Bayık, two founding members of the 
PKK, have maintained leading positions throughout this period. In 2013, Karayılan 
left the leadership of the KCK to Bayık and became the head of the PKK’s military 
unit. ‘Interview with Hozat, Karayılan and Bayık’, Peace in Kurdistan, 18 July 2013 
<https://peaceinkurdistancampaign.com/2013/07/18/interview-with-hozat-
karayilan-and-bayik/>. The fact that senior commanders freely switch freely 
switch positions between formally-independent organisation applies also to the 
PYD and PJAK whose leaders were chosen among Syrian and Iranian PKK officials. 
Mazloum Kobani, that in the late 2010s became an internationally-renown symbol 
of the PYD-led Kurdish struggle in Syria was previously PKK representative to 
Europe and guerrilla commander in Turkey. Interview with Cengiz Çandar (personal 
communication, 2020). 
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of the organisation and worried to be sidelined by his own acting 
commanders.  
In his writings, Öcalan dedicated very little time to issues of class and 
political economy. Whereas capitalism is at the centre of Öcalan’s critique 
of Western modernity, this critique is historically oriented and driven by 
moral considerations on individualism and oppression. The analysis of the 
political economy of the Kurdish regions, of Turkey’s neoliberal 
transformation, of the role of oil in Iraqi Kurdistan do not feature in Öcalan’s 
writings, nor does the analysis of the evolving class structure of these 
societies.605 Political economy was never the main focus of Öcalan’s 
intellectual attention and certainly, after his capture, he could no longer 
access the sources required for its study. The following sections of this 
chapter cover the most important aspects of the PKK’s new paradigm as 
well as the attempts at its practical implementation in Turkey and Syria 
centring the analysis on the way they are shaped by the class structure and 
political economy of the region. 
 
Gender, Class and the Kurdish Women’s Movement 
One of the most important aspects of the PKK/KCK’s new paradigm – and 
certainly the one that has resonated most among non-Kurds – is its critique 
of patriarchy and its emphasis on women’s liberation. Rather than attributing 
this transformation solely to Öcalan’s prison writings, feminist scholars 
showed that the centrality of women within the Kurdish movement is largely 
the result of women activists and militants organising to offset the 
patriarchal tendencies of the movement itself. 
The PKK was founded in the 1970s as a Leninist organisation that supported 
gender equality but subordinated women’s emancipation to national 
liberation and socialism. In the late 1980s, Öcalan started to gradually revise 
 
605 Michiel Leezenberg, ‘The Ambiguities of Democratic Autonomy: The Kurdish 
Movement in Turkey and Rojava’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 16.4 
(2016), 676. 
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the PKK’s stance on women that was previously informed by classical 
Marxist writings.606 Hamdan Çağlayan explains that Öcalan was particularly 
successful at shifting the meaning of the concept of namus, honour, from 
the male’s guarantee over the female body and its chastity to the defence 
of the motherland violated by Turkish colonialism. The shift had the double 
purpose of calling on men to defend their honour by joining the revolution 
but also of removing “the namus barrier preventing women’s participation in 
the same fight.”607 This revised attitude also led Öcalan to make a strong call 
for the establishment of women-only military units and organisations. The 
left-wing ideological framework of the PKK and Öcalan’s attention to the so-
called ‘woman question’ allowed for the inclusion of Kurdish women within 
a masculinist project of nation-building “keeping in mind that they were 
primarily invited by the leader.”608 However, it was only after his capture that 
Öcalan placed the oppression of women at the origin of the history of 
civilisation, as the first act of enslavement, and their liberation at the centre 
of his revolutionary strategy:  
State and power centres gave the father-man within the family a 
copy of their own authority and had them play that role. Thus, the 
family became […] the fountainhead of slaves, serfs, labourers, 
soldiers and providers of all other services needed by the ruling and 
capitalist rings. That is why they set such importance to family, why 
they sanctified it.609 
Within these premises, “[l]iberating life is impossible without a radical 
women’s revolution which would change man’s mentality and life”.610  
Çağlayan makes a point to explain that these theoretical discussions served 
as “the preliminary steps for enabling gender egalitarian environments” but 
 
606 Öcalan’s 1980s writings on the topic were collected in Abdullah Öcalan, Kadın 
ve Aile Sorunu (Istanbul: Melsa Yayınları, 1992). 
607 Handan Çağlayan, ‘From Kawa the Blacksmith to Ishtar the Goddess: Gender 
Constructions in Ideological-Political Discourses of the Kurdish Movement in Post-
1980 Turkey’, European Journal of Turkish Studies, 14 (2012), 10-11. 
608 Çağlayan, From Kawa the Blacksmith, 18. 
609 Abdullah Öcalan, Liberating Life: Woman’s Revolution (Cologne: International 
Initiative 'Freedom for Abdullah Öcalan – Peace in Kurdistan', 2013), 37. 
610 Öcalan, Liberating Life, 51. 
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that the women’s experience was decisive in turning theory to practice.611 A 
similar argument is central to the work of Nadje al-Ali and Latif Tas who 
claim that Öcalan’s intellectual input “was as much inspired by the actual 
experiences and struggles of Kurdish women’s rights activists as by outside 
political philosophers” and only translated into gender-based equality 
thanks to the continued struggle of Kurdish women within the wider 
movement.612 It is important to properly historicised these theoretical 
discussions. It is not by chance that Öcalan’s call for women participation in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s coincides with the PKK’s entering the phase 
of the people’s war that necessitated mass mobilisation. The growing 
involvement of the civilian population in the Kurdish insurgency and Ankara’s 
counterinsurgency campaigns, combined with a surge in women recruits for 
the PKK, made women much more visible and present at every level of the 
Kurdish movement.613  
The need for separate women’s organisations was recognised by the PKK 
in 1995, first at a women-only conference in March and then at the 
organisation’s fifth congress in May which sanctioned the establishment of 
women-only guerrilla units and the Kurdistan Women’s Freedom 
Movement.614 In these years, women-only organisations combined with 
gender quotas in the non-women organisations started playing a central role 
in the strategy of the Kurdish women movement. As women members of 
decision-making bodies were elected exclusively by women-only 
organisations, they were accountable to their women-only constituency and 
thus maintained their autonomy from the male-dominated leadership. The 
principle of transitivity – as Çağlayan refers to it – “between women working 
in the political parties’ women’s units and those with positions in decision-
making bodies” informed the strategy of both the women in the PKK and of 
 
611 Handan Çağlayan, Women in the Kurdish Movement: Mothers, Comrades, 
Goddesses (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 77. 
612 Nadje Al-Ali and Latif Tas, ‘Reconsidering Nationalism and Feminism: The 
Kurdish Political Movement in Turkey’, Nations and Nationalism, 24.2 (2018), 462. 
613 For these events, see Chapter 8. 
614 White, Coming Down, 121-123. 
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those in the pro-Kurdish political parties in Turkey.615 That the principle of 
transitivity was strengthening women’s power within the PKK is made 
evident by the reactions it triggered. In the immediate aftermath of Öcalan’s 
capture, the male-dominated leadership of the PKK tried to curtail the 
autonomy of the women’s divisions but was forced to backtrack by the 
strong reactions of PKK women who also cut their hair in protest.616 
The creation of a space for autonomous feminist politics in the pro-Kurdish 
political parties in Turkey took more time. In the 1992 programme of the HEP, 
gender issues took up a single paragraph in the 64-page document. In 1994, 
the only woman elected to the 30-member party assembly of the HADEP 
was the sister of one of the founders of the PKK.617 The great visibility 
earned by Kurdish MP Layla Zana was not itself the sign of a deeper shift, 
as explained by former Diyarbakır co-mayor Gültan Kışanak: 
we had Leyla Zana as an example of an MP in 1991, but her role and 
power did not come from women's organisations or representation. 
She was the wife of a famous Kurdish politician, Mehdi Zana […] 
When Leyla Zana was first elected, her social status and her being 
the wife of somebody famous was the main reason for her to be 
elected.618 
Kurdish women activists challenged these practices by claiming spaces 
through the creation of women-only branches and by demanding change in 
the party’s structure. The HADEP adopted a women’s quotas of 25 per cent 
in 2000 and its successor raised the quotas to 35 per cent in 2003 and 40 
per cent in 2005.  
From 2004, the Kurdish movement in Turkey adopted the so-called ‘co-
chair system’ that became a worldwide known symbol of the achievements 
 
615 Çağlayan, Women in the Kurdish Movement, 126. 
616 Cited in Joost Jongerden, ‘Learning from Defeat: Development and Contestation 
of the “New Paradigm” Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’, Kurdish Studies, 7.1 (2019), 
85. 
617 Çağlayan, Women in the Kurdish Movement, 101-102. 
618 Latif Tas, Nadje Al-Ali, and Gültan Kişanak, ‘Kurdish Women’s Battle Continues 
against State and Patriarchy, Says First Female Co-Mayor of Diyarbakir. Interview 
’, OpenDemocracy, 12 August 2016 <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/kurdish-
women-s-battle-continues-against-state-and-patriarchy-/>. 
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of the Kurdish women’s movement. All the single-person positions in the 
Kurdish movement were ‘doubled’, to include both a man and a woman. The 
system was then extended to the local administration and the pro-Kurdish 
parties appointed co-mayors in the cities they won. Moreover, the growing 
strength of women within the parties gradually changed the profile of the 
Kurdish female politicians. As long as elected women were used as tokens, 
female politicians tended to be either famous women or wives of famous 
men. As the women’s movement grew stronger, women from more diverse 
“economic, social, ethnic and religious backgrounds” were elected to party 
positions or public offices.619 As Kışanak – a co-mayor herself – explains, 
female co-mayors were initially perceived “as assistants” to their male 
colleagues. Yet, with time and political labour, their role was gradually 
acknowledged by the movement’s base.620 
The achievements of the Kurdish women since the early 2000s is often 
attributed to Öcalan’s prison writings and especially to his 
reconceptualization of Kurdish feminism into a ‘science of women’.  The term 
Jineology, coined by Öcalan, defines a “new science” that “criticizes the 
connection of hegemony, oppression and science” and “the hegemony of 
men on history.”621 As Al-Ali and Tas observe, Öcalan – normally an avid 
reader of critical theory – fails to acknowledge that, long before him, critical 
feminist scholars of different theoretical strands have denounced the 
patriarchal nature of the social sciences as well as the links between liberal 
and white feminisms and imperialism.622 This remark on the dubious 
originality of Öcalan’s feminist writings is particularly relevant because the 
imprisoned leader is often the only theoretical reference explicitly 
mentioned by Kurdish women’s activists, at times, in a rather dogmatic 
 
619 Tas and others, Kurdish Women's Battle. 
620 Tas and others, Kurdish Women's Battle. 
621 ‘Jineolojî’, International Vrije Vrouwen Stichting, 2019 
<https://www.ifwf.nl/2019/03/15/jineoloji/>. 
622 Al-Ali and Tas, Reconsidering Nationalism and Feminism, 467. 
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way.623 This is problematic because it erases the role of the Kurdish women’s 
movement and attributes its success to the intellect of the male leader. 
Moreover, Jineology ethnicises Kurdish feminism, reinforcing an idea of 
Kurdish exceptionalism that negatively affects its capacity to create 
alliances with non-Kurdish feminists across the region. If Öcalan’s 
overarching presence as a symbol and theoretical presence seems to deny 
women’s authorship over their own achievements, it can also be the result 
of a patriarchal bargain made by the Kurdish women.624 The appeal to the 
(male) supreme leader’s intellectual authority would be, in these terms, an 
indispensable device employed by the women activists to give legitimacy to 
feminist ideas and practices across a male-dominated Kurdish movement. 
As observed above, the autonomisation of women’s politics within the 
Kurdish movement through the establishment of separate women’s 
organisation expanded the social basis of Kurdish female politicians. 
Especially since the mid-2000s, elected Kurdish women reflected the more 
diverse class base of the movement that set them apart from the profile of 
the female politician in Turkey, most often middle or upper class and highly 
educated.625 If before, women were handpicked by the male leadership to 
serve as tokens, the creation of the women-only organisations 
‘democratised’ the women’s movement giving a more powerful voice to the 
largely working-class base of the Kurdish movement. This change can be 
observed in the social policies implemented by Kurdish-controlled 
municipalities in south-eastern Turkey hiring women in public administration 
– including male-dominated jobs like bus drivers – setting up free laundry 
services and supporting the establishment of women’s co-operatives.626 
 
623 Al-Ali and Tas, Reconsidering Nationalism and Feminism, 470. 
624 As women’s strategizing “within a set of concrete constraints” imposed by 
patriarchy. Deniz Kandiyoti, ‘Bargaining with Patriarchy’, Gender & Society, 2.3 
(1988), 274–90. 
625 Çağlayan, Women in the Kurdish Movement, 121-122. 
626 See the report written by the German solidarity organisation TATORT Kurdistan 
Kampagne after the observation tour in the region in 2011. TATORT Kurdistan, 
Democratic Autonomy in North Kurdistan (Porsgrunn, Norway: New Compass 
Press, 2013). 
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These initiatives, aimed at tackling women’s unemployment and poverty, are 
clearly aimed at the movement’s working-class constituency and shows the 
capability of women-only bodies to reflect the social need of inner-city 
women. However, this attention is not necessarily reflected in the political 
discourse which more often associates womanhood with Kurdishness – as 
in Öcalan’s writings – as two interlocked sources of oppression leaving little 
theoretical room for the structural role of class hierarchies. In the 
movement’s theoretical analysis, class is more often conflated with 
gender,627 and, by treating women as a class, class difference and inequality 
between women inevitably lose political significance. 
 
Hegemonic Struggle in Turkish Kurdistan 
Öcalan’s prison writings had a great impact on the pro-Kurdish legal parties 
in Turkey which were receptive to a less militant approach. In the 2000s, 
pro-Kurdish parties took advantage of a relatively less oppressive political 
environment that allowed for their sustained electoral growth. On the one 
hand, the PKK had withdrawn from Turkey in 1999 and, even when fighting 
resumed in 2004, the intensity of the insurgency did not reach the level of 
the 1990s and left more room for electoral politics.628 On the other hand, the 
2002 elections brought the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to power. In the 2000s, especially thanks to 
the country’s sustained economic growth, the AKP was able to absorb a 
large part of the centre-right vote with their moderate and liberal platform 
of reform. The AKP’s commitment to the accession of Turkey to the EU led 
to a partial liberalisation of the political system and a slightly more open 
debate on the Kurdish issue. Moreover, the AKP inherited the strength in the 
 
627 Çağlayan, Women in the Kurdish Movement, 4, 120; Al-Ali and Tas, 
Reconsidering Nationalism and Feminism, 468. 
628 While in the mid-1990s the conflict cost thousands of life each year, casualties 
throughout the 2000s were in order of hundreds. ‘Turkey: Kurdistan’, Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program, Conflict Encyclopedia, Uppsala University 
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Kurdish region of its Islamist predecessor, the Welfare Party,629 and became 
the main competitor of the pro-Kurdish parties. While these conditions 
allowed for a more relaxed political environment relative to the 1990s, the 
pro-Kurdish parties continued to face the heavy hand of the (largely) 
Kemalist Turkish bureaucracy as “provincial governors, prosecutors, 
security forces, and other central authorities retained considerable capacity 
to circumscribe their activities through bureaucratic and legal 
procedures.”630 Turkish courts continued to ban pro-Kurdish parties just a 
few years after their establishment. The HADEP, banned in 2003, was 
replaced by Democratic People's Party (DEHAP) itself banned in 2005 and 
succeeded by the Democratic Society Party (DTP). The DTP was shut down 
in 2009 and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) took its place.631 
In the local elections of 1999, held only a few months after Öcalan’s capture, 
the HADEP achieved quite a spectacular result winning seven provincial 
capitals (Diyarbakır, Van, Batman, Mardin, Hakkari, Siirt, Ağri) and thirty 
more municipalities across the south-east. However, in 2004, the DEHAP 
faced a much stronger advance of the AKP. Despite winning some additional 
seats across municipalities, the DEHAP lost Siirt, Van, Bingöl, and Ağrı to the 
AKP. Breaking the traditional taboo of denying the existence of the Kurds in 
Turkey, Erdoğan made continuous reference to Turkish-Kurdish 
brotherhood especially in terms of shared religion and history. Moreover, 
the AKP heavily invested in a narrative that depicted pious Turks and Kurds 
as fellow victims of secularist oppression imposed by both the Kemalist elite 
and the PKK terrorists.632 The fact itself that, in the 2000s, the AKP was 
often in conflict with the Turkish military and Kemalist establishment made 
 
629 As shown in Chapter 8, in the 1990s pro-Kuridish and Islamist forces largely 
displaced Turkish mainstream parties in the south-east becoming the main 
competitors for the electoral control of the region. 
630 Watts, Activists in Office, 143. 
631 See Table 3. 
632 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Esra Dilek, ‘Struggling for the Kurdish Vote: Religion, 
Ethnicity and Victimhood in AKP and BDP/HDP Rally Speeches’, Middle Eastern 
Studies, 54.2 (2018), 293-295. 
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it easier for Kurds to sympathise with the new government.633 At the time, 
the AKP could also count on the support of the Hizmet movement, led by 
the Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen, that built a massive network of charity 
and educational institutions in Turkey’s south-east.634   
However, the strength of the AKP in the Kurdish region cannot be 
exclusively attributed to its ideology and discourse. The AKP’s success in 
the south-east was also the result of its capacity to replace previous centrist 
Turkish parties as the point of reference for the Kurdish traditional elite. In 
the least urbanised provinces – as shown by Feryaz Ocaklı in his study on 
Muş and Bingöl – where tribal ties maintained a strong social value, the AKP 
inherited the network of support of the previous ruling parties among pro-
government tribal leaders.635 Regardless of the ideological positions 
expressed by the AKP, siding with the ruling party was, for much of the 
Kurdish ruling class, indispensable to maintain their social power over their 
constituencies. The ‘state-Agha alliance’ – that sustained power 
relationships in the south-east for a good half of the previous century –636 
remained in place in the AKP era as economic growth, and particularly the 
construction boom multiplied the opportunity for enrichment for local 
notables – of tribal and non-tribal extraction –637 supportive of the AKP. In 
the rural areas, the alliance continued to rest heavily on the existence of the 
 
633 For example, in occasion of the 2007 presidential elections. 
634 See Mustafa Gürbüz, Rival Kurdish Movements in Turkey: Transforming Ethnic 
Conflict (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016). 
635 Feryaz Ocaklı, ‘Politics in the Kurdish Periphery: Clan Networks and Local Party 
Strategies in a Comparative Perspective’, Middle Eastern Studies, 53.4 (2017), 571–
84. 
636 See Chapter 7. 
637 As already discussed in Chapter 7, the ruling class of the Kurdish region only 
partly coincides with the tribal elite. In many areas, especially where urbanisation 
weakened tribal ties, the local ruling class is more likely composed by non-tribal 
landowners, entreprenours owning factories and construction companies, and rich 
professionals, and resembles more closely that of the rest of Turkey. However, in 
rural areas, tribal leaders often continue to be powerholders allied to the state and 
the ruling party. For example, Chapter 7 mentioned Sadun Şeylan as the head of 
the Alan tribe and pro-state warlord in the 1990s. In 2019, his son and successor 
Abdurrahman Şeylan was elected mayor of Çatak, the ancestral homeland of the 
Alan tribe, for the AKP. 
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Village Guards that allowed pro-government tribal leaders to maintain their 
semi-private petty armies at the expense of the state.638 The DEHAP’s 
setback at the 2004 local elections was therefore not only the result of the 
Islamists’ appealing discourse but also of the migration of the local elite from 
the previous ruling parties to the now dominant AKP that restructured power 
relations in the region. 
Since 1999 and for most electoral challenges of the 2000s and early 2010s, 
the pro-Kurdish parties increased their share of municipalities and 
parliamentary seats. The parties’ control of municipalities across the 
country’s south-east was used to challenge the Turkish state over issues 
such as the language taboo, introducing the provision of municipal services 
in Kurdish and other minority languages.639 But the pro-Kurdish parties and 
municipalities embarked on a wider project, using their growing power and 
popular support to implement the concept of Democratic Autonomy as 
developed by Öcalan’s prison writings. In October 2007, the Kurdish 
movement organized its parties, municipalities, and civil society 
organizations into the Democratic Society Congress (DTK) with the purpose 
of building a stateless democracy without directly challenging the existence 
and borders of the Turkish state.640 The Kurdish movement promoted the 
establishment of citizen councils which worked alongside public institutions 
and took the form of neighbourhood assemblies based on direct democracy 
anywhere pro-Kurdish politics was strongest.641  
 
638 Despite the AKP government’s promise to abolish it as a part of the EU-
accession reforms, the Village Guards system remained in place. See ‘Turkey’s 
Village Guard System – Still in Place, Still an Obstacle’, Kurdish Human Rights 
Project, Briefing Paper, 22 March 2011 <http://www.khrp.org/latest-news/646-
turkeys-village-guard-system-still-in-place-still-an-obstacle.html> 
639 Watts, Activists in Office, 152-153. Particular emphasis on minority languages 
was given by the 2005 DTP charter. See Demokratik Toplum Partisi: Program ve 
Tüzüğü, 2005. 
640 ‘Democratic Society Congress’, Demokratik Toplum Kongresi 
<https://www.kcd-dtk.org/english-2/>. 
641 TATORT, Democratic Autonomy, 25-28. 
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As the pro-Kurdish parties became the dominant force in many Kurdish 
provinces – even though never across the entire region – they also tended 
to become more inclusive. At the 2011 elections, the BDP led a coalition of 
small Turkish left-wing groups but was also able to add to their list and elect 
to parliament veteran Kurdish politicians coming from a conservative and 
Islamic background such as Şerafettin Elçi and Altan Tan. The fact that such 
personalities ran as independent candidates for the BDP was the sign that 
the Kurdish movement was winning its hegemonic bid over the region as 
political rivals were persuaded to cooperate from a position of 
subordination. In cities like Diyarbakır where pro-Kurdish parties had been 
continuously in power since 1999, a wider section of the affluent middle and 
upper classes was increasingly orbiting around the movement. As pro-
Kurdish parties were now (locally) in power, expressing sympathy for the 
movement for businessmen and professionals was not only less ‘socially 
costly’, it could even open the doors to public contracts and high-level 
positions in the local administration. This process, however, was limited to 
certain areas and never threatened the alliance between the local ruling 
class and the AKP especially because state repression continued to hit the 
pro-Kurdish parties and the Kurdish-controlled administrations.  
The growing strength of the Kurdish movement was, in fact, bound to 
generate the reaction of the state both in terms of repression and political 
opening. In 2009, Turkish security forces launched an operation to arrest 
thousands and convict hundreds of Kurdish activists and elected officials 
on charges of terrorism. The so-called ‘KCK trials’, that took place between 
2010 and 2012, directly targeted the legal expression of the Kurdish 
movement but also became the opportunity to hit sympathetic Turkish left-
wingers and trade unionists.642 While the state apparatus deployed a 
repressive strategy, the AKP government made the first serious attempt to 
 
642 Systematic information on the trials was published on the bulletin of the Human 
Rights Foundation of Turkey collected and translated by their German support 
group, the Democratic Turkey Forum. See ‘Backgrounder on the Union of 
Communities in Kurdistan, KCK’, Democratic Turkey Forum, 
<http://www.tuerkeiforum.net/enw/index.php/Backgrounder_on_the_Union_of_Co
mmunities_in_Kurdistan,_KCK#cite_note-bia201110-9>.  
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offer a political solution to the Kurdish issue. Between 2009 and 2011, the 
government held secret negotiations with the PKK in Oslo. The failure of this 
first round of talks led to a new wave of violence in 2011 and 2012, the 
bloodiest years since fighting had resumed in 2004.643 However, in 
December 2012, Erdoğan officially announced that Ankara was negotiating 
with the PKK’s jailed leader and, in March 2013, Öcalan ordered the PKK to 
end the armed struggle and to withdraw from Turkey. Even if the peace 
process was short-lived and unsuccessful, it yet gave a boost of democratic 
legitimacy to the Kurdish movement. As advised by Öcalan, in late 2013, 
Kurdish activists launched the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) as a 
coalition of the Kurdish BDP and minor socialist, environmentalist, feminist, 
LGBT+, and ethnic and religious minorities groups.644 The growth of the HDP 
was partly led by a section of the Turkish millennial generation who had their 
first political experience in the anti-AKP 2013 Gezi Park protests in Istanbul. 
The charismatic HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş was particularly 
successful in presenting the HDP as the only real alternative to the AKP and 
its project of a radical pluralist democracy as the political antithesis of 
Erdoğan’s AKP.645 The HDP’s narrative was strengthened by the fact that the 
years of the peace process coincided with Erdoğan’s gradual authoritarian 
and conservative turn. 
In 2015, as the peace negotiations in Turkey reached a standstill, the 
advance of the PKK-linked PYD in the Syrian Kurdish region and along the 
Turkish border increased tensions in Turkey and Erdoğan’s increasingly 
anti-Kurdish rhetoric was matched by a surge in extrajudicial violence 
against Kurdish and leftist activists, as well as HDP offices.646 At the June 
 
643 ‘Turkey: Kurdistan’, Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 
644 After the 2014 local elections, the BDP was replaced by the by Democratic 
Regions Party (DBP) which is now complementary to the HDP. The HDP runs for 
parliamentary and presidential elections and is concerned with national politics 
while the DBP exclusively works on the local administrations in the Kurdish south-
east.  
645 Zeynep Kaya and Matthew Whiting, ‘The HDP, the AKP and the Battle for Turkish 
Democracy’, Ethnopolitics, 18.1 (2019), 92–106. 
646 See Francis O’Connor and Bahar Başer, ‘Communal Violence and Ethnic 
Polarization before and after the 2015 Elections in Turkey: Attacks against the HDP 
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2015 elections, the HDP reached a surprising result – 13 per cent – that cost 
the AKP its parliamentary majority. In July 2015, the peace process 
collapsed and the fighting between the PKK and the army resumed. As the 
AKP recovered its majority with the November 2015 snap elections, 
Erdoğan’s move to the right was sealed by the alliance with the fascistoid 
and violently anti-Kurdish MHP. From summer 2015, the HDP faced an 
unprecedented level of repression. In November 2016, HDP co-chairs 
Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ were imprisoned. Dozens of HDP/BDP 
mayors elected in 2014 were removed by the government, replaced by 
trustees, and removed again after being re-elected in 2019. Despite this 
degree of repression, the HDP has maintained quite significant support. 
Thanks to the alliance with progressive Turkish groups “in the main cities in 
Turkey’s west, […] the HDP is also quite popular among the university 
students and urban intelligentsia from the more affluent districts and 
neighbourhoods.”647 However, the HDP’s project of building a wider 
progressive coalition including larger sections of the non-Kurdish electorate 
has been heavily undermined by the government’s criminalisation of the 
whole of the Kurdish movement as well as by the reluctance of the 
mainstream Turkish opposition to co-operate with them.  
The war threatened the HDP/BDP also in its Kurdish heartland. The state 
violence deployed in the Kurdish region has been directed at systematically 
dismantling the social power built up by the Kurdish movement in the 
previous decades. The vast social coalition set up to support the Kurdish 
municipalities has been under strain and the party had to find a difficult 
balance between the “conservative and increasingly affluent strata that 
would otherwise vote AKP as they had done before and the impoverished 
youths […] who showed a permanent potential for more radical political 
 
and the Kurdish Population’, Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea, 18.1 
(2018), 53–72.  
647 Cengiz Güneş, ‘The rise of the pro-Kurdish democratic movement in Turkey’, in 
Routledge Handbook on the Kurds, ed. by Michael Gunter, 263. 
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action.”648 The new phase of the conflict from autumn 2015 was marked by 
semi-spontaneous uprisings in the small towns of the PKK heartland on the 
Turkish border with Syria and Iraq. These armed revolts, largely led by poor 
and unemployed youth, revealed a degree of dissatisfaction with the 
movement’s moderate and legalistic stance.649   
 
The Rojava Experiment 
The democratic revolution that began in Syria in 2011 in the wider context 
of the Arab uprisings became an unexpected opportunity to establish a 
Kurdish autonomous entity in the country and to experiment with Öcalan’s 
project on a larger scale. The roughly two million Kurds, who live in the north 
of Syria and the major cities, have a deep historical relation to the Kurds of 
Turkey with whom they share the Kurmanji dialect. The establishment of the 
Syrian-Turkish border in 1923 separated tribes, clans, and families affecting 
especially the nomadic Kurds that moved across the area. Thousands of 
Kurds from Turkey migrated to Syria in the 1920s and 1930s after the failure 
of the early Kurdish revolts.650 These movements provided a recurrent 
excuse for Syrian Arab nationalists to present the Kurds as alien and, in 
1962, 120.000 Syrian Kurds were stripped of their citizenship.651  
While many Kurds, in the 1930s and 1940s, were involved in anti-landlord 
struggles and in the workers’ movement up to the point of dominating the 
Syrian Communist Party (SCP), the first Kurdish nationalist party was the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria (KDPS) established in 1957 under the 
 
648 Michiel Leezenberg, ‘The Rise of the White Kurds – An Essay in Regional Political 
Economy’, in The Kurds in a Changing Middle East, ed. by Jabar and Mansour, 107. 
649 Metin Gürcan, ‘PKK Looks to the Future with Creation of Youth Militias’, Al-
Monitor, 31 August 2015 <https://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/turkey-kurds-pkk-armed-young-
militias.html>. 
650 The feudal revolts of the interwar period (see Chapter 3). 
651 Jordi Tejel, Syria’s Kurds: History, Politics and Society (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 1-7, 50-51. According to Alan Semo, by the 2000s, “the number 
of stateless Kurds in Syria reached half a million.” Interview with Alan Semo 
(personal communication, 2020). 
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influence of the Iraqi KDP.652 Like its Iraqi-Kurdish model, the KDPS was 
ravaged by the very same “tensions between its left-wing (ex-SCP 
members, young students, teachers and manual laborers) and its right-wing 
(notables, religious leaders and landowners).” Since the 1960s, the KDPS 
faced numerous splits that over time were characterised less by ideological 
differences than by personal rivalries and, on the eve of the 2011 uprisings, 
a dozen parties were claiming its legacy.653 
The PKK was allowed to establish itself in Syria after the 1980 Turkish 
military coup and to use the country for training, logistics, and 
recruitment.654 Attracted by the militancy of the PKK and with the tacit 
consent of Damascus, the number of Syrian Kurds in the PKK ranks grew to 
the point that, in the late 1990s, nearly twenty per cent of PKK ‘martyrs’ were 
Syrian.655 As Alam Semo a Syrian Kurdish student at the time explains  
[The PKK] came with a new idea and a new project, a vision and a 
clearer position for an independent and united Kurdistan. Syrian 
Kurdistan was open to these ideas […]. The elite was linked to the 
KDP in Iraq and at that time they had lost their bases and their 
argument. […] Most of them were landowners and tribal leaders. The 
PKK took advantage of the weakness of the classical nationalist 
parties.656 
After the expulsion of the PKK from Syria in 1998, its followers and 
sympathisers reorganised and in 2003 established the PYD which grew a 
strong clandestine network. Its organisational strength and links to the PKK 
placed the PYD in the best position to take advantage of the outbreak of the 
Syrian civil war in 2011. When, in summer 2012, the Syrian regime withdrew 
from the Kurdish region in order to defend more vital areas, the PYD took 
control. The PYD could also rely on a pre-existing political infrastructure 
 
652 Tejel, Syria’s Kurds, 39-42. 
653 Ibid., 87-88.  
654 See Chapter 7. 
655 Accoriding to Güneş Murat Tezcür’s martyrs data, 529 out of the 2,919 PKK 
military casualties between 1995 and 1999 were Syrian. Güneş Murat Tezcür, 
‘Ordinary People, Extraordinary Risks: Participation in an Ethnic Rebellion’, 
American Political Science Review, 110.2 (2016), 247–64. 
656 Interview with Alan Semo (personal communication, 2020). 
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constituted by a clandestine network of local councils dating back to 2007 
and organised along the lines of Öcalan’s democratic confederalist 
project.657 With the beginning of the uprisings, these councils emerged and 
took “responsibility of organizing social life” including the provision of basic 
services and security.658 
The PYD established an autonomous administration in north-eastern Syria 
widely known as Rojava.659 In late 2014, the Rojava administration repelled 
the offensive of the ISIL in the city of Kobanî and, with American support, 
gained control of virtually all of Syria east of the Euphrates by 2017. The role 
of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the fight against ISIL 
in north-eastern Syria triggered a great deal of international sympathy and 
grassroots solidarity though little material support from state actors. The 
important presence of female combatants’ units contrasted sharply with 
ISIL’s misogynist brutality. 
The system of government established in Rojava is based on a Social 
Contract that was adopted by the councils in 2014 and amended in 2016 
and that works as a constitution for the regional administration.660 The 
diffusion of the council system and of forms of direct democracy greatly 
expanded popular participation in the governance of the region in strong 
contrast to the authoritarian nature of the Syrian regime. Despite this 
emphasis on council democracy, many observers denounced the lack of 
pluralism of the PYD rule and the repression of rival Kurdish parties.661 The 
greatest and most widely recognised achievement of the Rojava 
 
657 Interview with Khawla Mustafa (Sulaymaniyah, 2019). 
658 Cited in Akkaya and Jongerden, Democratic Confederalism, 173. 
659 The name Rojava, the Kurdish for ‘West’, is a common way for Kurds to refer to 
the Syrian Kurdish region as the western part of Kurdistan. 
660 Reader #5: Stateless Democracy, realized with Kurdish Women’s Movement, 
New World Academy, 19 May 2015, < https://www.e-
flux.com/announcements/29509/new-world-academy-reader-5-stateless-
democracy-realized-with-kurdish-women-s-movement/>, 130-157. 
661 See, for example, Fred Abrahams and Lama Fakih, Under Kurdish Rule: Abuses 
in PYD-Run Enclaves of Syria (Human Rights Watch, 2014) 
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/06/19/under-kurdish-rule/abuses-pyd-run-
enclaves-syria>. 
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administration has been in the direction of women’s liberation. The 
introduction of the co-chair system and of separate women’s bodies is 
having a deep impact on established gender relations in the region.662 
The PYD has placed particular emphasis on the Mesopotamian or Kurdistani 
– rather than Kurdish – identity of Rojava with an inclusive attitude towards 
the ethnic and religious minorities living in Kurdish-majority areas such as 
Arabs, Turkmens, Yazidis, and various Christian groups. Minorities have 
been given highly visible positions in the region’s decision-making bodies 
and were encouraged to establish their own political organisations and 
military units. It remains, however, to be seen the extent to which council 
democracy was extended to the Arab-majority areas of the governorates of 
Raqqah and Deir Ez-Zor. In the Syrian desert local power was partly 
delegated to tribal leaders who had opposed ISIL allowing for the 
reproduction of authoritarian and patriarchal modes of politics in direct 
contradiction with Rojava’s proclaimed democratic aspirations. The success 
– or lack thereof – of the Rojava model in Arab-majority areas will be critical 
to understanding whether Öcalan’s political project can be completely 
dissociated from Kurdish ethnonationalism and implemented in a non-
Kurdish context. As of mid-2020, the Rojava administration has guaranteed 
relatively peaceful coexistence in a very diverse region especially when 
considering the extreme levels of sectarian violence reached within the 
context of the Syrian Civil War. 
 
The Political Economy of the Kurdish Movement 
The Kurdish movement inspired by Öcalan’s thought moved away from its 
initial socialist positions and adopted a new political project. The critique of 
capitalism has remained part of the PKK/KCK’s ideology but is by no means 
a central aspect and its intellectual foundations can be found, rather than in 
Marxian analysis, in Murray Bookchin’s anarchism and anti-materialism. The 
 
662 See Michael Knapp, Anja Flach, and Ercan Ayboğa, Revolution in Rojava: 
Democratic Autonomy and Women’s Liberation in Syrian Kurdistan (London: Pluto 
Press, 2016).  
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social and economic programme of the movement is indeed heavily 
influenced by Öcalan’s reading of Bookchin and by the latter’s idea of the 
organic society as the primordial form of human organisation.663 The 
construction of a confederation of municipalities based on direct democracy 
from the local level is, for Bookchin, an indispensable way to return to an 
organic society which is interdependent, cooperative, and ecologically 
sustainable. Very much like democracy, the economy needs to be localised 
and decentralised.664 These ideas translated into an economic project that 
is alternative to capitalism but also to both Soviet-style and Keynesian 
centralised planning and that aims at building a decentralised and 
sustainable ‘social economy’. 
Even if economic transformation as a path for popular emancipation is 
marginal in Öcalan’s writings, the idea of the organic society inspired the 
anti-capitalist practices and policies enacted by the Kurdish movement. 
Naturally, the very limited space for governance available to the Kurdish 
movement in Turkey and the state of war in which the Rojava experiment 
has taken place relegated discussions of social and economic policies to a 
marginal place. In the case of Rojava, it is particularly difficult to distinguish 
socialist policies from war-economy policies – as in the case of food 
distribution and price control. However, the Kurdish movement in both 
Turkey and Syria has maintained strong popular bases – among the 
peasantry, the working class, and the urban poor – that shaped its 
programme in the direction of redistribution and even collective ownership 
in the form of cooperative enterprises. An academic study funded by the 
Turkish police in 2014 shows that, despite its ideological transformation, the 
PKK is still overwhelmingly composed of Kurds with a lower-class 
background. According to their findings, 72 per cent of the militants only 
 
663 Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of 
Hierarchy (Palo Alto: Cheshire Books, 1982). 
664 Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom, 344. 
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have an elementary school diploma and 78 per cent were unemployed 
before joining the guerrilla.665  
The establishment of cooperatives has become the most popular economic 
policy promoted by the Kurdish movement in Turkey and Syria. In south-
eastern Turkey, cooperatives were set up in a very diverse set of fields, from 
agriculture to housing to carpet production.666 In Rojava, cooperatives 
dominate agriculture – the region’s dominant sector – but have also 
mushroomed in urban contexts “for bread-baking, textile production, 
sewing and alterations, cheese-making and other dairy production, growing 
peanuts and lentils, and selling cleaning materials”.667 These cooperatives 
are not allowed to be independent enterprises and, even if their leadership 
is elected, they remain dependent on the democratic control of the local 
councils which ensure that production meets the needs of society.668 The 
local authority receives 20 per cent of the cooperative profit, while 50 per 
cent is divided among the workers and the remaining 30 per cent is re-
invested in production.669 The creation of this model of a cooperative 
economy, in combination with the state of war, brought the economy of 
Rojava largely under council control leaving only a marginal and 
subordinated role to profit-led enterprises. 
The Kurdish cooperative movement has been particularly successful in the 
field of agriculture which holds a central ideological role in the idea of the 
organic society and in the movement’s critique of the city. With the ambition 
to reach food self-sufficiency, the Rojava autonomous administration 
 
665 This study does not use PKK ‘martyr’ data like others cited earlier but is largely 
based on police records. Süleyman Özeren, Murat Sever, Kamil Yılmaz, and Alper 
Sözer, ‘Whom Do They Recruit? Profiling and Recruitment in the PKK/KCK’, Studies 
in Conflict & Terrorism, 37.4 (2014), 322–47. 
666 The TATORT report dedicate ample spaces for examples supported by 
interviews with cooperative workers. See TATORT, Democratic Autonomy, 34-35, 
44, 82-86, 101, 109.  
667 Knapp and others, Revolution in Rojava, 200. 
668 Ibid., 204-205. 
669 ‘The Experience of Co-operative Societies in Rojava’, TEV DEM Economic 
Committee, 19 January 2016, 4. 
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moved towards crop diversification as opposed to the Ba’athist policy of 
centrally-planned monocrop production.670 Given that the Syrian state 
owned more than 80 per cent of the land, the Rojava authority did not have 
to collectivise privately-owned land – which often remains in the hands of 
large landowners –671 and instead built rural cooperatives on state land.672 
By early 2016, 330.000 acres of land was farmed by cooperatives.673 In 
Turkish Kurdistan, land distribution remained extremely uneven. In 2001, the 
2.7 per cent largest landowners owning more than 33.2 per cent of the land 
while 56 per cent Kurdish peasants own less than 50 hectares accounting 
for only 9.7 per cent of the land.674 The economic unviability of the smallest 
farms pushed some Kurdish peasants to support the establishment of rural 
cooperatives whereby they self-collectivised their own small plots of land.675  
The critique towards the city as the centre and propagator of capitalist 
modernity that underpins the Kurdish movement’s push for a return to the 
‘organic’ life of the village, is directly inspired by Bookchin’s thought. 
However, it is also extremely relevant to the life experience of a large part 
of the movement’s base in Turkey which is effectively composed of 
peasants violently uprooted from their villages and deported into city slums 
in the 1990s.676 As a Kurdish activist in Turkey recalled in 2015: 
Our villages were razed, forcing us to move into the cities. We don’t 
know what city life is like or how you’re supposed to live here. […] Due 
to the forced relocation into the cities and modern capitalism, an 
extreme individualism prevails here. And we have to deal with it.677 
 
670 Knapp and others, Revolution in Rojava, 192-194. 
671 Interview with Alan Semo (personal communication, 2020). 
672 Knapp and others, Revolution in Rojava, 199. 
673 The Experience of Co-operative Societies, 1. 
674 Yadirgi, The Political Economy, 258. 
675 For example, in the Van province. Eliza Egret and Tom Anderson, Struggles for 
Autonomy in Kurdistan & Corporate Complicity in the Repression of Social 
Movements in Rojava and Bakur (London: Corporate Watch Cooperative, 2016) 
<https://corporatewatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Struggles-for-
autonomy-in-Kurdistan.pdf>. 
676 See Chapter 8. 
677 TATORT, Democratic Autonomy, 40. 
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The relevance of the environmental turn of the movement to the life 
experience of millions of its supporters is quite a significant example of the 
way the new paradigm of the PKK/KCK speaks directly to much of the 
Kurdish masses. In these terms, the emphasis on the organic society and 
the critique of the city are truly ideological expressions of the forcibly-
urbanised peasantry that represents the core of the class basis of the 
movement – in terms of electoral support for the pro-Kurdish parties and 
manpower for the insurgency.  
As largely confined to the moral level, this critique of capitalism tends to 
neglect the analysis of the material conditions of the Kurdish regions and 
thus ends up concealing class conflicts and social hierarchies. In reference 
to the Kurdish women’s movement, feminist scholar and activist Handan 
Çağlayan observes that 
The neoliberal transformation worsened the situation of poor Kurds, 
both in rural areas and in the cities. […] in Istanbul, we saw that in 
poor [Kurdish] families almost all the young women were working at 
textile workshops with no social rights and social security. Their 
wages were under minimum wage level. Among seasonal agriculture 
workers who have been working under the worst working 
conditions, there have been hundreds thousand of Kurdish women. 
Still, it is difficult to state that social issues go beyond the rhetorical 
level in the political discourse, political agenda and practices of 
Kurdish women. […] One of [the reasons], I think, is the assumed 
strict connection between class-based exploitation and deprivation 
of Kurds from rights.678 
By conflating exploitation with cultural oppression, social conflicts within 
Kurdish society fade away. The virtual absence of class analysis in the 
elaboration of the new Kurdish movement can be explained by the 
worldwide advance of identity politics in the 1990s and 2000s that coincide 
with the period of deepest transformation of the PKK. Those decades were 
also characterised by a great expansion of the class basis of the PKK, 
particularly towards the urban middle classes. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, activists with a middle-class background – and particularly 
 
678 Interview with Handan Çağlayan (personal communication, 2020). 
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professionals – are more likely to gain prominent positions in the Kurdish 
women’s movement and the legal parties. Middle-class cadres, due to their 
individual class position, are more likely to be politicised by forms of 
oppressions that they personally experienced, such as patriarchy and anti-
Kurdish racism, rather than economic exploitation. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the political economy of the wide Kurdish movement 
that follows Abdullah Öcalan’s new ideological paradigm. After Öcalan’s 
capture in 1999, the PKK evolved into a complex confederation that goes 
way beyond its military dimension and completed a long process of 
ideological transformation that saw the organisation abandoning both 
Kurdish nationalism and Marxism and replace them with a post-nationalist 
and radical democratic project. This transformation can only be properly 
explained if located in its historical context. The 1990s and 2000s were 
decades of deep crisis for the political left when socialism and class politics 
were erased by the political debate. Crushed by the fall of the Soviet Union 
and the defeat of labour movements worldwide, the left developed along 
fragmented lines and around environmentalist struggles, the anarchist-led 
anti-globalisation movement, and identity politics. All these influences can 
be spotted in Öcalan’s prison writings and the PKK/KCK’s new paradigm. 
The ideological shift was accompanied and mutually reinforced by the great 
expansion of the movement’s class basis especially towards the urban 
middle classes.  
In the new paradigm of the Kurdish movement in Turkey and Syria, the 
critique of capitalism is based on the idealistic assumptions of Murray 
Bookchin and his critique of the city and the industrial civilisation. Despite 
the lack of discussion about the political economy of the Kurdish regions, 
this line of critique resonates among the popular basis of the Kurdish 
movement. The call for an ecologically sustainable society and the critique 
of the city and the industrial society are extremely relevant to a great 
number of supporters in Turkey who were deported from their villages to 
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city slums in the 1990s and who often had to accept exploitative conditions 
in Turkey’s most labour-intensive industries. In this context, the most 
significant expression of the popular basis of the new Kurdish movement is 
the burgeoning cooperative movement for its particular attention towards 
agriculture and, more generally, for its push towards collective ownership. 
Even though this dimension directly reflects the interests and demands of 
the forcibly-urbanised peasantry that supports the PKK/KCK, the 
movement’s programme places little or no emphasis on social conflicts and 
class hierarchies within Kurdish society. This aspect is particularly 
significant because the most powerful element of the PKK’s rise in the 1980s 
was its capacity to combine the struggle for the national liberation of the 
Kurds with a frontal attack against the Kurdish landowning class that was 
presented as both exploitative and supportive of Turkish colonialism. The 
erasure of a critique of the class structure of the Kurdish region from the 
new Kurdish movement’s discourse inevitably conceals any other social 
conflict. Paradoxically, the ‘old’ nationalist PKK (up to the 1990s) – by 
acknowledging and intellectually elaborating upon conflictual dynamics 
within Kurdish society – was more capable to problematise Kurdish national 
identity than the current post-nationalist PKK.  
The contradictions of the new Kurdish movement are the inevitable 
manifestations of its great expansion from the self-proclaimed revolutionary 
vanguard that started the PKK insurgency in 1984 into a wide and plural 
movement involving several million people. The transformation of this 
movement was, as this and the previous two chapters showed, also the 
result of its evolution from a peasant-based and led insurgency into a pro-
democracy multi-class coalition.   
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion  
 
 
 
Introduction 
The concluding chapters of each of the two case studies (Chapters 6 and 
9) present a picture of Kurdish nationalism in the 2010s. As Map 5 illustrates, 
the fragmentation and weakening of Iraq and Syria as well as Turkey’s 
authoritarian turn and regional ambitions significantly accelerated the pace 
of Kurdish politics and assigned Kurdish forces an unprecedented centrality 
in Middle East regional dynamics. For the first time in modern history, two 
Kurdish-controlled political entities exist in Iraq and Syria, and pro-Kurdish 
forces have been in power in almost one hundred municipalities in south-
eastern Turkey. Yet, the widespread revival of Kurdish national feelings in 
all of the Kurdish regions did not translate into a unity of intent or action. On 
the contrary, Kurdish actors are pursuing radically different social and 
political projects and their relationship is conflictual to the point that they 
often side with ‘foreign’ powers against each other. The ideological 
differences between the Kurdish movements in Iraq – conservative and 
ethnonationalist – and in Turkey and Syria – radical and post-nationalist – 
seem to be far greater than the feelings of solidarity among Kurdish groups. 
These considerations were the starting point for the formulation of a number 
of empirical and theoretical research questions: What determines the 
political divides within a national movement? What is the origin of conflicts 
among Kurdish nationalists and why are they so resilient? What is the origin 
of the alternative and competing nation-building project they pursue? What 
is nationalism if it can be associated with the most diverse set of ideological 
propositions? What determines the political content of nationalist 
movements? The thesis covers over a century of Kurdish history and 
identifies the origins of the present divide in class politics. The politically 
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significant and successful Kurdish nationalist organisations that emerged in 
this long period were those that were capable of giving voice and 
incorporating the interests, demands, and values of broad sections of 
Kurdish society. Descending from abstract theorising to empirical 
investigation reveals the historical manifestations of nationalism as 
expressions of the struggle for state power between conflicting social 
actors. Far from being an autonomous force, Kurdish nationalism developed 
in different forms all embedded in social conflicts and each expressing the 
bid for power of Kurdish historical classes and class coalitions. These 
findings confirm the critique of nationalism theory formulated in Chapter 2, 
showing that the ideological content – such as social values, or ideas 
regarding the form of state and economic organisation – of a nationalist 
movement cannot be autonomous from its class basis. 
While the thesis reconstructs these developments in Iraq and Turkey in two 
parts of three chapters each, this concluding chapter highlights the 
elements of comparison across the two countries. First, this chapter runs 
through the comparison chronologically, outlining how the integration into 
the nation-states of Turkey and Iraq, characterised by different political and 
class structures and geopolitical location, contributed to the diversification 
of the Kurdish national movement allowing different class actors to emerge. 
Second, these developments are analysed class-by-class, reconnecting 
Kurdish nationalism to the theoretical discussion introduced in Chapter 2 
and comparing the political posture and form of nationalism developed by 
the same classes in each context. Finally, the chapter ends with concluding 
remarks assessing the contribution to the field and the generalisability of 
the findings, as well as identifying potential new avenues for research. 
 
Comparing Kurdish Nationalism in Iraq and Turkey 
This section summarises the findings of this thesis highlighting the elements 
of comparison that emerged by the discussion of the two cases of Iraq 
(Chapters 4-6) and Turkey (Chapters 7-9). It shows how a focus on class 
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politics significantly improves our understanding of certain crucial moments 
of the history of Kurdish nationalism. 
In both Turkey and Iraq, the first significant expression of Kurdish 
nationalism occurred in the interwar period, when Ottoman Kurdistan was 
divided into the newly-established states of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. The 
Kurdish revolts of the interwar period had a number of shared 
characteristics that allowed us to treat them as part of a single phenomenon 
defined as feudal nationalism. They largely involved the Kurdish tribal 
aristocracy, the aghas, and were led by shaykhs whose religious role gave 
them a degree of inter-tribal authority. The Kurdish tribal elite revolted 
against the intrusiveness – enforcement of taxes and territorial control – of 
the newly-established states of Turkey and Iraq and to preserve their 
traditional power. The programme and discourse of these revolts mixed 
Kurdish nationalist themes – borrowed by the early Kurdist organisations – 
with religious and traditionalist demands. As Chapter 3 discussed in detail, 
these revolts followed a traditional pattern of state-tribe relationship: tribal 
agitations were typical of periods of transition when the tribal periphery 
could seek to take advantage of instability at the centre to re-negotiate its 
local power vis-à-vis the state. This was a pattern that the old decentralised 
empires were more willing to accommodate than the newly-established 
nation-states. Despite these shared characteristics, the size and 
significance of these revolts in Turkey and Iraq were not even. The 
modernising and secular zeal of the Kemalist government in Turkey 
triggered both larger tribal revolts and a much more violent state-led 
repression. On the contrary, the conservative Iraqi monarchy and its British 
colonial patron were more accommodating towards tribal power and the 
Kurdish revolts in Iraq were militarily less significant and more easily 
forgiven. The different approach of the respective central states was 
decisive in shaping the diversification of the trajectories of Kurdish 
nationalism in the two countries.  
These different approaches to the early feudal revolts were not simply the 
result of the ideological positions of the two central governments but also 
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of the different location of Turkey and Iraq in the international system and 
world economy. After resisting colonial encroachment in the early 1920s, 
Turkey became a fully independent state and was welcomed into the US-
led Western block of the Cold War as a full member of NATO in 1952 and a 
bulwark against communism. This geopolitical positioning allowed Ankara to 
initiate a state-led programme of development, even though in a rather 
uneven way, that industrialised western Turkey and left the predominantly 
Kurdish east underdeveloped as a subordinate source of raw material and 
cheap labour. After the harsh repression of the Kurdish revolts of the 
interwar period, the Kurdish traditional elite had to abjure Kurdish identity 
and, in the 1950s, was allowed to re-take its economic and social position, 
entrusted with the task of maintaining order in the Kurdish countryside and 
of providing large packages of votes to the successive conservative 
coalitions in power in Ankara. This ‘state-agha’ alliance contributed to the 
increasing impoverishment of the peasantry. Unlike Turkey, Iraq was 
created as a British colony and remained substantially so until 1958. The 
Kurdish tribal elite and their Arab counterpart highly benefitted from the 
openly pro-tribal British policy that turned tribal leaders into a class of large 
landowners who controlled the domestic politics of Iraq and provided an 
indispensable social basis for the British-imposed Hashemite monarchy. 
The land-grabbing and exploitative practices of the landowning elite 
generated, in the 1940s and 1950s, a wave of rural struggles that affected 
the entire country but that were particularly intense in the Kurdish north. 
The power of the organised peasantry was decisive for the success of the 
republican and anti-colonial Iraqi revolution of 1958. This differentiation in 
the class structures that developed in the two Kurdish regions is key to 
understanding the different trajectories taken by Kurdish nationalism in Iraq 
and Turkey when it re-emerged in the early 1960s.  
In Iraq, Kurdish nationalism survived in the KDP that, established in 1946, 
was led by leftist professionals and intellectuals but was a marginal force in 
a context dominated by landlord-peasant conflicts. The Kurdish revolt of 
1961 started as the spontaneous uprising of tribal landowners against the 
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plan by the post-revolutionary government to redistribute and tax land as 
well as a reaction against the general empowerment of the peasantry. The 
revolting landowners legitimised their actions in nationalist terms, and the 
progressive KDP, after its initial reluctance, was forced to join the revolt in 
a position of subordination due to the far superior military means of the tribal 
elite and to accept the leadership of the tribal Barzani family. While providing 
ideological cover to the revolt, the KDP remained militarily marginal until the 
contradiction between its socialist ideology and the class interests that led 
the revolt exploded and the leftist leadership of the party was expelled in 
1966. The relations of power between the tribal and the urban components 
of Iraqi-Kurdish nationalism only changed in the following decade due to the 
rapid process of urbanisation and to the establishment of the PUK. The KDP 
and PUK fought a parallel war against Baghdad in the 1980s until they joined 
forces and took control of the Kurdish region in 1991 after the withdrawal of 
the Iraqi army. In a conflict led by different social classes, the demands of 
the Iraqi Kurdish peasantry disappeared from the political landscape.  
In Turkey, the absence of a revolutionary break allowed for the consolidation 
of the state-agha alliance. Kurdish nationalism re-emerged in the 1960s in a 
middle-class and radical form – the Eastern Meetings movement – that can 
be compared to the urban strand of Iraqi-Kurdish nationalism but that was 
virtually swept away by the 1971 military coup. It was only in the 1970s that 
a new form of Kurdish nationalism branched out of the Turkish New Left. By 
the mid-1970s, a generation of Kurdish intellectuals of peasant and working-
class extraction broke with the Turkish left – perceived as too compromised 
with the Kemalist tradition – and sought to replicate the experience of Third-
World liberation struggles against what they identified as Turkish 
colonialism. The PKK emerged as the most successful of these new groups 
by pursuing a strategy that targeted exploitative Kurdish landowners even 
before turning against Turkish security forces.  By playing on the existing 
rural conflicts, the PKK won, by the mid-1980s, large sectors of the Kurdish 
peasantry and working classes to the point of constituting an 
unprecedented military challenge to the Turkish state.  
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To counter the respective Kurdish uprisings, the governments of Iraq and 
Turkey deployed similar and highly consequential counter-insurgency 
policies. Both governments made wide use of loyalist tribal chiefs in setting 
up Kurdish anti-guerrilla battalions. These irregulars were semi-private 
armies that, besides their immediate military function, greatly enriched and 
strengthened the social power of loyalist tribal leaders. Even more 
significantly, the Iraqi and Turkish armies – respectively in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s – engaged in the systematic cleansing of the Kurdish 
countryside with the purpose of destroying the sources of supply and 
recruitment of the insurgencies. Several million Kurdish peasants were 
forced to leave their villages while their return was prevented by the 
systematic destruction of their sources of subsistence – houses, cattle, 
crops, woods, and wells. The virtual destruction of the peasantry 
permanently changed the class structure of both Kurdish regions but also 
their demographic and ecological outlook, depopulating the countryside and 
creating a vast class of urban poor. Kurdish towns doubled or tripled their 
population, mixed cities became predominantly Kurdish, and large Kurdish 
communities appeared in non-Kurdish cities. In Turkey, displaced Kurdish 
peasants constituted an immense ‘reserve army of labour’ that fed the 
industrialisation of the 2000s largely based on labour-intensive production. 
In Iraq, they constituted the dependent class of the burgeoning rentier 
system.  
These deep structural transformations had different political consequences 
in the Kurdish regions of Iraq and Turkey. In Iraq, the US-led interventions 
of 1991 and 2003 allowed first for the establishment of a Kurdish regional 
administration – the KRG – controlled by the KDP and PUK and then for its 
official recognition within post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. Due to the absence of 
industry and the destruction of agriculture, the region survived on several 
sources of rent, namely the control of smuggling routes and the 
management of international aid in the 1990s, and the export of oil since the 
mid-2000s. Locked in a competition that even led to a period of civil war 
(1994-1998), the KDP and PUK strove to co-opt former regime collaborators 
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to expand their own constituencies. This process led to the creation of a 
new ruling class made up of two components. First, the PUK and KDP 
commanders of the liberation war turned politicians whose power came 
from their control of the party militias regardless of their class background. 
Second, the part of the Kurdish ruling class that had remained loyal to 
Baghdad and fought against the Kurdish insurgency and that, with the 
transformation of the Iraqi economy in the 1970s and 1980s, had turned 
from landowners into regime-sponsored entrepreneurs. This new ruling 
class used its military control of the region to appropriate the streams of 
rent and to impose, since 1998, a KDP-PUK political duopoly. The vast 
majority of the Kurdish population was forced into a position of dependence 
on the patronage network of the two parties which dispensed public 
employment, most often the only source of income available. In Turkey, 
where Kurdish forces never gained control of the region, the destruction of 
the PKK’s rural basis of support contributed to the gradual ‘urbanisation’ of 
the Kurdish movement. In the 1990s, displaced peasants turned urban poor 
became a political force that could be easily mobilised in support of the PKK 
struggle. On the one hand, Kurdish poor and unemployed youth took over 
towns and neighbourhoods in many occasions and for days. On the other 
hand, displaced peasants socialised in the nationalist and socialist discourse 
of the PKK became the electoral backbone of the rising pro-Kurdish parties 
that – even if only partly associated with the PKK – took control of many 
Kurdish municipalities.    
In the late 2000s and early 2010s, the trajectories of Kurdish politics in Iraq 
and Turkey diversified even further but also increased their degree of 
interaction in terms of regional rivalry over a more and more interconnected 
transnational Kurdish space. In the KRG, the stabilisation of an authoritarian 
form of politics and oligarchic control over the economy led to the growth 
of popular and parliamentary opposition. In the mid-2010s, the collapse of 
the oil price brought the KRG rentier system to its knees and triggered 
sustained popular protests. The response of the Iraqi-Kurdish elite was, on 
the one hand, to violently crack down on dissent, and, on the other hand, to 
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invest in an increasingly aggressive nationalist rhetoric to regain political 
legitimacy with the result of exacerbating tensions with Baghdad but also 
with the neighbouring Turkey and Iran. In Turkey, the growing strength of 
the PKK in the urban contexts and control by pro-Kurdish parties of the local 
administrations contributed to a great expansion of the social basis of the 
Kurdish movement, especially among the urban middle classes. Parallel to 
this process – and mutually reinforcing – the PKK adopted a radical-
democratic and post-nationalist political project and increased its presence 
in the other Kurdish regions. In the context of the Syrian Civil War, local 
Kurdish forces linked to the PKK took over the Kurdish region of Syria and 
established the Rojava autonomous administration that attempted to 
implement the new PKK ideology on a regional scale. The war on ISIL (2014-
2017) was fought on both the Iraqi-Kurdish and Syrian-Kurdish fronts and 
saw the involvements of Kurdish groups from all four regions, strengthening 
popular feelings of pan-Kurdish solidarity. However, it also contributed to 
an increasingly virulent rivalry between the two competing national projects 
for the Kurds expressed by the Iraqi-Kurdish leadership and the PKK-Rojava 
movement. 
This thesis reconstructed the social origins of these projects highlighting 
the role of class conflict and alliance building in the history of Kurdish 
nationalism in Iraq and Turkey. The next section compares the nationalist 
projects developed by the same classes in the two different contexts 
showing common patterns but also the context-based differentiation.   
 
Social Classes and Kurdish Nationalism  
After building up the theoretical framework of this thesis, Chapter 2 ends by 
outlining historical patterns and tendencies for the approach to nationalism 
taken by different classes. Acknowledging the importance of the context-
specific genesis of each nationalist movement means ultimately leaving the 
study of its class basis to the realm of the empirical investigation. Yet, social 
classes do not develop infinitely variable forms of politics. Historical 
patterns exist and are rooted in objective material interests that 
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characterise social classes as such. The following sections present the 
findings of this thesis by comparing the historical posture taken towards 
nationalism by the main Kurdish social classes in Iraq and Turkey against 
the background of the theoretical considerations outlined in Chapter 2 in 
reference to the same social classes. The purpose of this section is to 
highlight common patterns and especially contextual differences in the 
posture of the same classes showing the value of comparative analysis, but 
also how the study of these two Kurdish cases can tell us something of 
theoretical relevance.  
The end of Chapter 2 sketched the forms of nationalism that have been 
historically developed by four social classes in terms. The following survey 
neither starts with nor includes the classical form of ‘bourgeois’ nationalism 
that played such a pivotal role in nineteenth century Europe. In Kurdistan, a 
class interested primarily in unifying the national market, rationalising 
societal institutions, and fully separating the political and economic spheres 
with the aim of promoting private capital, simply did not exist. On the 
contrary, this section covers the other three forms of nationalism sketched 
in Chapter 2 – feudal, middle-class, and subaltern nationalisms – as the 
historical expressions of the three ‘social protagonists’ of the past century 
of Kurdish history: the tribal and landowning elite, the urban middle classes, 
and the peasantry. 
 
Feudal Nationalism  
The subject of Chapter 3 was the first historical expression of Kurdish 
nationalism developed by the traditional ruling class of Kurdish tribal 
society. The power of aghas and shaykhs rested on traditional – religious, 
tribal, dynastic – sources of legitimacy that were no longer recognised by 
the states that succeeded the Ottoman Empire. In the 1920s and 1930s, the 
sudden adoption of Kurdish nationalist discourse by members of this class 
and the outbreak of the Kurdish revolts were a response to the threat posed 
by the centralising tendencies of the new states to the power traditionally 
held by this class. All of the revolts that took place in Kurdistan in those 
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decades were harshly crushed by the newly-established Turkey and Iraq. In 
different ways – depending on specific paths of state formation – the 
traditional Kurdish elite largely renounced Kurdish nationalism and found a 
comfortable place in the power structure of both countries. In Iraq, as an 
integral part of the country’s ruling class created by British colonialism. In 
Turkey, as a dependent elite entrusted by the central state with the 
maintenance of order and social hierarchies in the Kurdish periphery.  
In socio-economic terms, this class had been going through a long process 
of transformation and, by the mid-twentieth century, its power rested on 
large estates based on what Barrington Moore calls ‘labour-repressive 
agriculture’.679 Rather than increasing productivity by investing in 
improvements and technology, this class tended to secure higher surplus 
through the hyper-exploitation of the peasantry and to rely on extra-
economic coercive means to prevent peasant organisation. In both Iraqi and 
Turkish Kurdistan in the 1950s, the aghas, rather than employing villagers, 
owned villages. In Moore’s account on the social origins of democracy, 
labour-repressive landowners are the most strenuous opponents of political 
democracy as the emancipation of the peasantry would inevitably lead to 
the collapse of the form of appropriation of surplus they rely on. Their 
approach to Kurdish nationalism was driven by similar concerns. Since its 
incorporation into the new state, the Kurdish landowning class of Iraq 
‘rediscovered’ Kurdish nationalism only when the post-revolutionary 
government allied with the organised peasantry and directly threatened 
their interests. The dominance of this class determined the historically 
conservative character of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq, marginalising 
progressive middle-class nationalism until the late 1970s, and blocking the 
autonomous political organisation of the subaltern classes. In Turkey, in the 
absence of a revolutionary break, the ‘state-agha’ alliance was confirmed 
by all governments representing the conservative blocs that ruled Turkey 
since the 1950s, including the Islamist government that came to power in 
2002. This is why the ruling class of Turkish Kurdistan – unlike its Iraqi-
 
679 Moore, Social Origins. 
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Kurdish counterpart – largely opposed Kurdish nationalism and also why the 
only significant expressions of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey developed out 
of the political left. 
It is important to notice that in neither of the cases the Kurdish ruling class 
acted as a united class actor. The central states were always – except for 
Turkey in the Kemalist period – willing to provide strong incentives for the 
members of the traditional elite to remain loyal. In Iraq, many tribes remained 
loyal to Baghdad throughout the conflict providing the government with the 
counter-insurgency irregular forces, the jash, as Kurdish nationalists called 
them. This position was often driven by historical tribal rivalries but also by 
the fact that the anti-landlord zeal of the 1958 revolution was soon forgotten 
and Baghdad generously rewarded tribal loyalism. In Turkey, where most of 
the tribal elite sided with the government, there were always ‘patriotic 
aghas’ who let the Kurdish guerrillas operate in their territories or even 
supported them out of nationalist sympathy – though more likely with the 
intent of weakening a neighbouring loyalist tribe or reducing state control 
over their own land. Prestigious tribal families also hedged their bets by 
keeping members on both sides. In this regard, I explored the cases of the 
Barzanji in Iraq and the Bucak in Turkey. Mahmud Barzanji, a powerful 
shaykh in Sulaymaniyah province, led the feudal nationalist revolt that 
intermittently lasted from 1919 to 1932. His son Shaykh Latif became the 
vice-chairman of the KDP while being at the same time the target of a major 
peasant revolt in 1947. His brother Baba Ali was a loyalist politician and ‘a 
man for all seasons’, appointed minister first under the King, then under Abd 
al-Karim Qasim, and once again under the Ba’athists. In Turkey, the powerful 
Bucak family from Siverek represented a similar trend. Mustafa Tevfik Bucak 
was a conservative DP parliamentarian in the 1950s while his brother Faik 
was the founder of the ‘feudal nationalist’ PDKT. This could be the result of 
a strategic choice or conflicting individual choices, yet in both cases, it 
signalled that the tribal landowning elite was confident to keep their social 
position regardless of the forces in power and the historical record proves 
that they most often did. 
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Middle-Class Nationalism 
Kurdish nationalism was never exclusively the expression of the Kurdish 
feudal class. There was always a significant middle-class component and, 
in the course of the twentieth century, several forms of middle-class 
nationalism developed among the Kurds. The first politicised form of Kurdish 
national identity developed in the early twentieth century among Ottoman 
bureaucrats and army officers. As Chapter 3 explained, even if the Kurds 
working for the Ottoman Empire often hailed from the Kurdish feudal class, 
they had long rescinded their ties to the Kurdish provinces and were part of 
the Ottoman state class. The first Kurdist organisations emphasised the 
cultural specificity of the Kurds, demanded decentralisation and 
administrative autonomy for the Kurdish provinces and were characterised 
by a modernist and developmentalist ideology. When the Ottoman Empire 
collapsed, these demands were re-articulated in terms of national 
independence. In both cases, these demands reflected the ambition of 
becoming the ruling elite of a Kurdish autonomous entity within the empire 
or a Kurdish independent state. In the new nation-states of Iraq and Turkey, 
the principle of ethnic exclusivity made it hard for the Kurds to attain public 
offices and middle-class nationalism directly reflected the ambition to 
replace Arabs and Turks – or Arabised and Turkified Kurds – in the public 
offices. From the 1940s, Kurdish nationalist activism and organising were 
largely expressed by professionals from the major towns. By the same 
token, the re-birth of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey in the 1960s was a 
largely urban and middle-class phenomenon.  
Middle-class nationalism in the Kurdish case suffered from a structural 
weakness due to the predominantly rural character of Kurdish society. 
Kurdish towns were, up to the 1970s, small and largely dependent on their 
rural surroundings as agricultural marketplaces. Even if intellectually prolific 
and ideologically sophisticated, urban-based nationalists proved to be 
utterly unable to challenge the state by their own means or to lead wider 
social coalitions. Thus, they most often had to follow the lead of different 
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class actors. In the feudal revolts of the interwar period as well as the 
Barzani Revolution in Iraq (1961-1975), urban and progressive nationalists 
had to surrender the leadership of the national struggle to the traditional 
tribal elite due to the latter’s superior military means and, in both contexts, 
they provided nationalist legitimacy to the reactionary demands of the 
traditional landowning class. In other cases, middle-class nationalists allied 
from a subordinate position with mass-based movements. This was the 
case in Iraq in the 1940s and 1950s when landlord-peasant struggles 
dominated the political landscape of the Kurdish region and the progressive 
leadership of the KDP worked in coordination with the stronger Iraqi 
Communist Party. Even more significantly, this was the case in Turkey in the 
1980s where the decimated Kurdish leftist groups of middle-class 
extractions gradually lent their support to a PKK-led insurgency centred on 
the mobilised peasantry.  
In the 1970s, the rapid process of urbanisation changed the relative 
importance of the towns vis-à-vis the rural areas and allowed for a degree 
of autonomous action for middle-class nationalists. In Turkey, this process 
manifested in the proliferation of Kurdish leftist organisations and an 
intensification of the political struggle. However, the 1980 Turkish military 
coup dealt a mortal blow to these groups. In Iraq, middle-class and 
progressive nationalists gained their autonomy of action only in 1975 with 
the establishment of the PUK. If observed from a purely class-based 
perspective, the urban middle-class base of the PUK reached its objective 
and, since 1991, has constituted an integral part of the ruling class of the 
Kurdish region, or at least of the PUK-controlled part of the region. It must 
be noted, however, that the power of the PUK rested, since 1991, on a 
ruling-class pact with the KDP and the traditional elite that cost Talabani’s 
party its ideological peculiarity and made it barely distinguishable from its 
historical rival. In Turkey, the growth of pro-Kurdish parties, especially at 
the local level, created a space for the participation of the urban middle 
classes which gained a prominent position in the non-military wings – civil 
society and electoral politics – of the Kurdish movement.  
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Nationalism and the Subaltern Classes 
One of the objectives of this work was to paint a fuller picture of the history 
of Kurdish nationalism that goes beyond intra-ruling class politics – the 
struggle between competing elites – and account for the role and 
participation of the subaltern classes. One of the consequences of treating 
nationalism as an autonomous force disconnected from social struggle is 
that subaltern groups tend to fade away and be relegated to the background 
of history. In the Kurdish context, the rural character of the region combined 
with the late development (in Turkey) or virtual absence (in Iraq) of 
industrialisation meant that the peasantry constituted by far the largest 
subaltern group, the class producing the surplus that sustained the 
landowning elite but also the urban classes. Between the late nineteenth 
and the first half of the twentieth century, the Kurdish countryside went 
through a process of concentration of land ownership and proletarianization 
of tribesmen initiated by the Ottoman government and continued by the 
successor states, particularly colonial Iraq, a process that Lisa Anderson 
would call ‘the creation of a peasantry’.680 
Peasants were by no means passive victims of this process. On the contrary, 
Iraq’s 1940s and 1950s were characterised by intense rural struggles and 
peasants organising – in both Arab and Kurdish areas – that fuelled the 
growing political role of the ICP and the trade unions. The peasant 
movement, despite being even stronger in the Kurdish region, did not 
develop a Kurdish national project and is thus absent in scholarly accounts 
of Kurdish nationalism. However, the Kurdish peasantry, along with the Arab 
peasantry and the small but increasingly militant industrial working class, 
formulated a powerful national project for Iraq condensed in the ICP’s 
programme for a multi-national and socialist nation. Rather than 
sympathising with their fellow Kurdish landowners, the Kurdish peasantry 
 
680 Lisa Anderson, The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-
1980 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 28-29. 
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had a clear understanding of its commonality of interests with the Iraqi 
workers’ movement beyond the linguistic divide. Iraq’s subaltern classes did 
not only show their political agency through their autonomous action. They 
also highlighted the indissoluble link between British colonialism and the 
landowning class forcing reluctant Iraqi nationalists to acknowledge the 
importance of the struggles at the point of production. It was not a 
coincidence that, after more than a decade of struggles, the successful 
revolution of 1958 occurred only after the inclusion of the ICP in the National 
Front in 1956. The revolution led to a few years of unprecedented 
empowerment of the peasantry in which their autonomous organising was 
no longer violently obstructed by state authorities. It is in this pivotal period 
that Chapter 4 identified the origins of the Kurdish revolt of 1961 in the 
reaction of Kurdish landowners against the emancipating peasantry and a 
state that was no longer on their side. In the long conflict that followed 
(1961-1975), the Kurdish peasantry lost its political agency crushed 
between their ancient exploiters and the scorched-earth strategy deployed 
by an increasingly authoritarian and chauvinistic Iraqi government. 
Moreover, in the course of the 1970s and 1980s, the peasantry lost its 
centrality in the Iraqi economy as the increasing significance of oil exports 
made agriculture a rather marginal sector. In the 1980s, the Iraqi-Kurdish 
peasantry was virtually destroyed as a social class by the genocidal 
counter-insurgency strategy deployed by Baghdad and aimed at 
depopulating the Kurdish countryside. Dispossessed peasants became a 
class of urban poor dependent on public handouts distributed by the 
Kurdish forces that came to rule the region in 1991. As Chapter 5 and 6 
emphasised, this position of subordination into the burgeoning Kurdish 
rentier system was not passively accepted. Since the mid-2000s, several 
waves of protests hit the Kurdish region of Iraq combining demands for 
political freedom and more equitable distribution of the rent. 
Contrary to Iraq, Turkey never experienced a countrywide peasant 
movement due to a different rural structure dominated, especially in the 
non-Kurdish areas, by small independent farmers. As Chapter 7 showed, in 
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Turkey’s Kurdish region, a much less even distribution of land and the 
predatory practices of the landowning elite, led to an increase of rural 
conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s, especially since the mechanisation of 
agriculture significantly worsened the conditions of small farmers and 
landless peasants. In the course of the 1970s, leftist Kurdish groups had 
some degree of success at mobilising the popular classes in the Kurdish 
towns but were unable to link their action to that of the rural masses. Only 
the PKK, whose leadership largely hailed from the peasantry, deployed a 
rural strategy based on military actions against the Kurdish landowning elite 
and started building a support base among the peasantry. After the 1980 
military coup eliminated most of its competition, the PKK emerged as the 
dominant Kurdish group in Turkey. In the mid-1980s, the PKK was 
successful at incorporating anti-landlord struggles in a project of national 
liberation, creating the first Kurdish nationalist movement largely based on 
the mobilisation of the peasantry. The extent of this support is suggested 
by the overwhelming peasant background of the militants recruited by the 
PKK in these years but, even more significantly, by the counter-insurgency 
strategy deployed by Ankara. In the early 1990s, Turkey’s response to the 
increasing strength of the insurgency was to forcibly evacuate thousands 
of villages to destroy the base of supply and recruitment of the guerrillas. 
Displaced peasants formed a vast class of urban poor and many Kurdish 
towns doubled and tripled their population. The near-destruction of Kurdish 
rural society had deep consequences on the development of the uprising 
and Kurdish nationalism in Turkey. The urbanisation of hundreds of 
thousands of peasants often already politicised by the PKK transferred the 
centre of the Kurdish struggle to the urban areas and, in just a few years, 
allowed pro-Kurdish forces – directly or indirectly linked to the PKK – to win 
a large part of the local administrations of the Kurdish region. These 
transformations led to a gradual expansion of the PKK’s base of support 
among the urban working and middle classes, a process that had already 
started between the late 1980s and early 1990s in the wake of the PKK’s 
military successes. This class differentiation of the PKK led to a process of 
deep ideological transformation from Marxism-Leninism to radical 
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democracy with less and less emphasis on class struggle. The PKK-led 
Kurdish movement became much wider and, even though peasants and 
urban poor kept constituting the strongest base of guerrilla recruitment, the 
middle-class component gained a prominent role in the electoral and civil-
society organisations. As Chapter 9 showed, even if the movement 
maintained a high degree of internal cohesion, tensions emerged at pivotal 
moments between the part of the movement oriented towards electoral 
politics and coalition building and the unemployed or under-employed urban 
youth hailing from the displaced peasantry and more oriented towards 
radical action. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
For reasons explained earlier, the story of Rojava, the Kurdish-controlled 
region in north-eastern Syria established in 2012, is only briefly told in 
relations to the developments of the Kurdish movement in Turkey. This 
approach, imposed by the ‘economy’ of this thesis, runs the risk of 
reproducing the idea that the Kurds of Syria have only recently come “out 
of nowhere”681 and that their politics is a mere extension of that of the Kurds 
of Turkey. In the same way, the rich history of the Kurds of Iran did not have 
the space it deserves and only entered the story when it interweaved with 
that of the Iraqi Kurds. However, Kurdish politics in Syria and Iran always 
was and still is highly contested. A brief survey on the – much more limited 
– literature, as well as the interviews conducted for this thesis with Syrian 
and Iranian Kurdish activists, gave me the strong impression that Kurdish 
politics in Syria and Iran was traversed by tensions similar to those that 
shaped it in Iraq and Turkey and that conflicts and alliances between the 
peasantry, the traditional landowning elite, and the middle classes were 
decisive to the development of competing forms of Kurdish nationalism. 
Primary research can provide the data we need to study the evolution of the 
 
681 The title of Michael Gunter’s book on Syrian Kurdish history. Michael Gunter, Out 
of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War (London: Hurst & Company, 
2014). 
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class basis of the Kurdish movement in Iran and Syria and particularly on the 
extent of class conflicts that inevitably occur within trans-class movements. 
The relationship between class politics and Kurdish nationalism in Iran and 
Syria are thus fruitful avenues for future research.  
However, this thesis aimed at providing a framework to study nationalist 
movements beyond the Kurdish experience. Among the original motivations 
for choosing this topic, my initial ‘empirical curiosity’ for the diverse 
expressions of Kurdish nationalism and their historical roots were always 
accompanied by a deep dissatisfaction for the way nationalist politics is 
dismissed, especially in liberal academic environments, as the 
unsophisticated outburst of an anachronistic identity. Violent and racist 
nationalist projects have resurged in recent times in countries as far as the 
United States and Turkey, Brazil and Israel, Italy and India. As these 
movements threaten democratic institutions and collective values of 
solidarity and peace, they cannot be rejected only on the ground of the 
moral superiority of liberal multiculturalism or the post-political ideology of 
technocracy and expertise. To counter the resurgence of nationalism, we 
must investigate the social conflicts in which they are embedded, to discern 
the legitimate grievances they represent from the violence they voice. 
Distinguishing the anger generated by an unjust economic system from the 
mere defence of entrenched racial and social privilege is the only way to 
build an inclusive and just society and save the humanistic values of 
freedom and solidarity.  
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